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Abstract		
	
	
This	dissertation	provides	an	examination	of	the	recent	phenomenon	of	entrepreneurship	
and	innovation	promotion	in	the	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	(GCC)	countries.	Through	the	
use	 of	 the	 structured,	 focused	 comparison	 method,	 this	 research	 examines	 two	 cases,	
Oman	and	Qatar,	to	provide	a	deep	analysis	of	the	policy	and	practice	of	entrepreneurship	
promotion	in	the	region.	Despite	a	claim	of	responding	to	regional	challenges	of	economic	
diversification	 and	 the	 weak	 participation	 of	 nationals	 in	 the	 private	 sector,	
entrepreneurship	as	a	key	component	of	each	country’s	quest	for	a	knowledge	economy	
seems	paradoxical	 in	 its	ostensible	 inconsistency	with	 the	Gulf	 rentier	state	status	quo.	
Path	 dependencies	 from	 oil‐led	 development	 and	 the	 concomitant	 labour	 market	
bifurcation	 have	 perpetuated	 incentive	 structures	 which	 obstruct	 innovation	 and	
entrepreneurialism.	Responding	to	this	puzzle,	this	research	answers	two	questions.	The	
first	 is	concerned	with	the	character	and	motivation	of	 these	strategies	 in	 the	Gulf,	and	
what	that	reveals	about	the	evolution	of	policy	making	practices.	The	second	assesses	the	
role	of	the	millennial	generation	and	regional	transformation.	Through	interrogating	the	
entrepreneurship	policy	experience	in	the	case	studies,	this	research	extends	beyond	the	
often	perfunctory	assumptions	of	 rentier	 state	 literature	 to	 investigate	 the	unfolding	of	
development	 policies	 in	 the	 current	 milieu.	 This	 research	 finds	 that	 entrepreneurship	
promotion	risks	only	becoming	a	new	way	of	recasting	rentier	tools:	rentierism	2.0.	The	
study	argues	 that	 governance	 in	 the	Gulf	 is	best	understood	as	 a	 contestation	between	
reforms	 and	 rentier	 patterns.	 Being	 cognizant	 of	 this	 tension	 provides	 a	 venue	 for	
understanding	 how	 some	 policies	 contravene	 classic	 rentier	 expectations	while	 others	
appear	hypocritical	as	the	implementation	of	policy	announcements	become	obstructed	by	
structural	 contradictions.	 This	 dissertation	 makes	 an	 empirical	 contribution	 on	 a	
prominent	policy	shift	in	the	Gulf	that	has	been	largely	ignored	in	social	sciences.	As	well,	
it	 provides	 a	 theoretical	 contribution	 by	 integrating	 literature	 on	 development	 and	
innovation	which	is	generally	disconnected	from	scholarly	work	on	Gulf	political	economy	
to	deepen	understandings	of	development	and	transition	in	the	region.	Overall,	this	project	
provides	 a	 window	 into	 transition	 and	 transformation,	 demonstrating	 the	 way	 rentier	
patterns	 and	 a	 combination	 of	 novel	 pressures	 interact	 and	 affect	 the	 practices	 of	
development	policy	making	and	the	Gulf	ruling	bargain.	
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Chapter	1	
	
Introduction	
1. Introduction	
An	 interesting	 phenomenon	 has	 begun	 to	 unfold	 in	 the	 states	 of	 the	 Gulf	
Cooperation	 Council	 (GCC)	 over	 the	 past	 decade.	 That	 is,	 the	 promotion	 of	
entrepreneurship	by	the	state.	This	phenomenon	is	framed	in	the	context	of	developing	an	
innovation	system	toward	the	goal	of	shifting	to	a	knowledge‐based	economy.	Structurally	
typecast	 as	 hydrocarbon‐dependent	 economies,	 the	 Gulf	 Arab	 states	 have	 had	 their	
modern	development	trajectories	shaped	by	the	vicissitudes	of	the	petroleum	market.	Not	
only	 have	 hydrocarbons	 controlled	 state	 purses,	 they	 have	 impacted	 the	 nature	 of	
governance	and	institution	building.	Although	diversification	has	had	a	nominal	presence	
in	economic	planning	documents	of	earlier	decades,	it	has	only	recently	had	its	prominence	
heightened.	The	notion	of	a	knowledge	economy	has	become	the	distant	solution	to	the	
region’s	 sustainability	 in	 a	 post‐oil	 future.	 In	 this	 light,	 the	 championing	 of	
entrepreneurship	has	burgeoned.		
The	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 promotion	 trend	 is	 especially	 intriguing	
insofar	as	 it	 seems	structurally	 incongruent	with	 the	rentier	nature	of	 the	Gulf	political	
economy.	The	behavioural	expectations	of	rentier	states	that	scholars	have	gleaned	from	
two	decades	of	literature	on	the	topic	render	policy	moves	that	would	serve	to	strengthen	
the	private	sector	and	the	individual	at	the	expense	of	the	state	incredible.	Moreover,	many	
of	the	paradigmatic	assumptions	underlying	the	rentier	state	framework	fail	to	account	for	
the	motivation	for	this	policy	type	or,	conversely,	how	these	policy	changes	may	influence	
Chapter 1    C. A. Ennis 
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the	so‐called	rentier	social	contract.	This	dissertation	answers	the	following	two	questions	
that	evolve	out	of	this	puzzle:		
1. What	motivates	and	characterizes	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion	in	
the	Gulf	and	what	does	this	tell	us	about	development	planning	and	policy‐making	
practices?	
2. What	role,	if	any,	do	the	youth	demographic	bulge	and	the	regional	“Arab	Spring”	
actually	have	in	shaping	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	policy	measures	and	how	
does	this	inform	conceptualizations	and	/	or	the	evolution	of	the	social	contract?	
This	 dissertation	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 governance	 of	 development	 and	 policy	
making	in	the	GCC	countries,	Bahrain,	Kuwait,	Oman,	Qatar,	Saudi	Arabia,	and	the	United	
Arab	 Emirates	 (UAE).1	 It	 contributes	 to	 the	 scholarly	 reassessment	 of	 rentier	 state	
literature	by	providing	new	 insight	 into	 the	development	of	policy	 and	practice	 in	Gulf	
states.	 Through	 the	 novel	 examination	 of	 a	 new	 policy	 agenda,	 specifically	
entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion,	this	dissertation	delves	into	the	multilayered	
practices	of	development	choices	and	the	intersection	of	a	multiplicity	of	stakeholders.		By	
opening	the	black	box	on	rentier	state	literature,	it	moves	beyond	its	sometimes	cursory	
assumptions	 to	 examine	how	development	unfolds	 in	 the	 current	 environment.	To	 this	
end,	this	research	uses	two	paired	case	studies,	entrepreneurship	promotion	in	Oman	and	
in	Qatar,	to	shed	light	on	this	regional	trend.	It	provides	an	examination	of	the	character	
and	motivation	of	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	policies	in	the	cases,	by	delineating	the	
                                                            
1 In this dissertation, I use the term Gulf and Gulf Arab to refer to the six GCC countries listed above. I do not 
include Iran, Iraq, or Yemen. Although they are part of the Gulf region, they are beyond the scope of this study, 
which assesses the member states in the GCC regional organization.  
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entrepreneurship	ecosystem	in	each.	It	also	assesses	the	role	of	the	millennial	generation	
in	changing	the	dynamics	of	the	governing	game,	and	purviews	the	broader	implications	of	
such	 an	 evolution.	 Overall	 though,	 this	 dissertation	 assesses	 the	 paradox	 of	
entrepreneurship	promotion	in	the	Gulf	states,	and	attempts	to	provide	an	understanding	
to	an	apparent	policy	hypocrisy	that	is	striking	next	to	the	list	of	structural	contradictions	
these	policy	moves	confront.		
	
The	next	section	of	 this	 introduction	situates	 the	discussion	of	entrepreneurship	
promotion	within	the	context	of	regional	development,	national	innovation,	and	the	quest	
for	a	knowledge	economy.	This	is	followed	by	a	description	of	the	research	methodology,	
including	case	selection,	methods	used,	and	the	unfolding	of	the	research	agenda.	The	final	
two	 sections	 outline	 the	 dissertation	 structure	 and	 arguments	 and	 presents	 the	
contributions	this	work	makes	to	the	advancement	of	scholarly	knowledge.	
	
2. National	Innovation	and	the	Knowledge	Economy	
Across	the	Gulf,	entrepreneurship	is	being	advocated	as	the	tonic	for	the	challenges	
of	economic	diversification,	unemployment,	and	low	levels	of	private	sector	participation	
among	 nationals.	 In	 the	 pursuit	 of	 “knowledge	 economies”	 and	 as	 part	 of	 a	 desire	 to	
diversify	 economies	 away	 from	 oil,	 all	 six	 GCC	 states	 are	 engaging	 in	 some	 form	 of	
entrepreneurship	and	 innovation	promotion.	Development	plans	 and	policy	documents	
are	 rife	 with	 language	 pointing	 to	 these	 as	 the	 new	 way	 forward.	 Reading	 any	 Gulf	
newspaper,	you	cannot	avoid	articles	about	entrepreneurship	or	celebratory	reviews	of	
support	programmes	like	the	Muhammad	bin	Rashid	fund	in	Dubai,	Tamkeen	in	Bahrain,	
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Sharakah	in	Oman,	Enterprise	Qatar	in	Qatar,	to	name	a	few.	Despite	this,	thus	far	no	one	
is	assessing	these	within	social	science	academia.	Yet	with	such	a	widespread	policy	push,	
scholars	ought	to	assess	what	such	an	endeavour	means,	especially	when	it	seems	logically	
opposed	to	our	assumptions	of	how	Gulf	rentiers	govern.	How	then	can	we	understand	the	
rationale	behind	the	promotion	of	entrepreneurship	and	innovation?		
The	aspiration	of	becoming	a	knowledge	economy	is	a	fairly	recent	import	in	the	
Gulf	 countries.	 It	 is	 only	 in	 the	 last	 decade	 that	 the	 notion	 has	 been	 featured	 on	
development	agendas.	This	began	to	occur	after	the	2003	Arab	Human	Development	report	
infamously	chastised	the	Middle	East	North	Africa	(MENA)	region	for	its	developmental	
failures.2	 It	 was	 more	 emphatically	 highlighted	 after	 the	 2008	 World	 Bank	 report	
underlined	education	reform	as	vital	in	the	pursuit	of	a	knowledge	economy.3	Knowledge‐
based	economies	are	defined	as	those	which	are	“based	on	the	production,	distribution	and	
use	of	knowledge	and	information.”4	The	development	of	the	term	knowledge	economy	is	
attributed	to	Peter	Drucker	in	his	1969	text,	The	Age	of	Discontinuity.5	In	it,	and	before	it	
was	 popular	 to	 do	 so,	 he	 noted	 that	 “knowledge	 has	 become	 the	 central	 ‘factor	 of	
production’	 in	 an	advanced,	developed	economy.”6	 The	OECD	popularized	 the	 idea	of	 a	
knowledge	 economy	 in	 national	 development	 agendas.	 Its	 1996	 report	 on	 knowledge‐
based	 economies	 stressed	 how	 knowledge	 was	 a	 key	 driver	 of	 economic	 growth	 and	
                                                            
2 Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society (New York: United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2003). 
3 The Road Not Traveled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa, MENA Development Report 
(Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank, 2008). 
4 The Knowledge‐Based Economy (Paris: Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development, 1996), 7, 
http://www.oecd.org/science/sci‐tech/1913021.pdf. 
5 Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). 
In developing the concept, Drucker draws on the term “knowledge industries” coined by economist Fritz 
Machlup. 
6 Ibid., 264.   
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productivity	and	comprised	the	cornerstone	of	OECD	economies.	The	central	notion,	that	
is	the	hope	that	drives	the	encouragement	of	entrepreneurship	as	part	and	parcel	of	this	
quest,	 is	 that	 entrepreneurship	 can	 foster	 new	 ideas	 that	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 initiate	
change.7		
The	GCC	states	have	been	reliant	on	hydrocarbons	since	their	modern	development	
story	began	with	the	first	oil	boom	of	the	1970s.	Holding	33	percent	of	the	world’s	reserves,	
economic	 development	 has	 been	 rapid	 and	 vast.8	 GCC	 fiscal	 dependency	 has	 remained	
relatively	 constant	 over	 the	 years,	with	hydrocarbons	 accounting	 for	 approximately	80	
percent	of	revenue	and	exports	in	the	1990s	and	90	percent	of	revenue	and	80	percent	of	
exports	 during	 the	 2000s	 in	 most	 GCC	 countries.	 The	 exception	 has	 been	 Bahrain,	
remaining	 constant	 at	 around	60	 percent,	 and	 the	United	Arab	Emirates	 (UAE),	whose	
dependence	declined	to	roughly	60	percent	in	the	last	decade.9	This	dependency	has	also	
meant	that	development	pushes	tend	to	follow	the	vicissitudes	of	the	oil	market,	allowing	
for	faster	growth	during	oil	price	booms,	and	stagnation	or	fiscal	crisis	during	busts.	This	
was	evident	during	the	slowdown	in	the	1980s.10	Alleviating	such	risks	and	preparing	for	
a	 successful	 post‐oil	 future	 has	 prompted	 various	 measures	 to	 encourage	 the	
diversification	of	the	economy	away	from	hydrocarbons.		
	
	
                                                            
7 The Knowledge‐Based Economy, 30. 
8 GCC: A Statistical Glance (Riyadh: The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Secretariat General, 
December 2012), 18, http://sites.gcc‐sg.org/DLibrary/index‐eng.php?action=ShowOne&BID=569. 
9 Samya Beidas‐Strom, Tobias Rasmussen, and David O. Robinson, Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: Enhancing 
Economic Outcomes in an Uncertain Global Economy (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2011), 2–3, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2011/1101mcd.pdf. 
10 Hossein Askari, Vahid F. Nowshirvani, and Mohamed Jaber, Economic Development in the Gcc: The Blessing 
and the Curse of Oil, illustrated edition (Jai Pr, 1997), 2–8. 
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Figure	1.1:	Proven	Reserves	of	Crude	Oil	
	
	
EIA	data,	201311	
	
Figure	1.2:	Proven	Reserves	of	Natural	Gas		
	
	
EIA	data,	201312	
	
Investment	 in	 industrial	 projects	 and	 the	 development	 of	 steel,	 aluminium,	 and	
petrochemical	 factories	 was	 one	 such	 move.	 In	 later	 decades,	 this	 was	 followed	 by	
investment	 in	varied	 financial	products	and	markets	and	 real	 estate	growth.	Neither	of	
these	has	been	overwhelmingly	successful	in	mitigating	reliance	on	oil	and	gas.	In	fact,	to	a	
                                                            
11 “International Energy Statistics,” Independent Statistics & Analysis: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(eia), 2013, http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm. 
12 Ibid. 
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large	degree	in	the	early	decades	industrialization	was	tied	to	external	processes	rather	
than	 historical	 internal	 developments.	 Industrial	 plants	 were	 established	 through	
international	turnkey	contracts,	allowing	factories	to	develop	in	the	geographic	region	but	
remain	 externally	 dependent,	 tied	 to	 foreign	 construction,	 engineering,	 and	 expertise	
chains.13	 This	 meant	 limited	 genuine	 indigenous	 industrialization.	 It	 has	 also	 been	
suggested	that	emirates	like	Dubai	have	largely	bypassed	industrialization,	instead	shifting	
to	a	service	economy.14		
Reliance	on	foreign	labour	has	also	resulted	in	limited	local	productive	capacity	and	
stagnated	 the	 integration	of	nationals	 into	 the	private	 sector	workforce.	As	explored	 in	
further	detail	 in	chapters	three	and	four	(sections	2.1	and	6	respectively),	 it	 is	not	only	
hydrocarbons	 that	Gulf	 economies	 are	 addicted	 too,	 but	 expatriate	 labour	 as	well.	 This	
labour	 and	 expertise	 dependence	 began	 in	 the	 early	 oil	 boom	 days,	 where	 small	
populations	and	human	capital	development	constraints	meant	 local	 labour	pools	were	
both	insufficient	and	ill	equipped	to	manage	the	rapid,	large‐scale	development	projects	
let	alone	petroleum	operations.	Even	as	local	education	indicators	have	risen,	reliance	on	
foreign	labour	has	not	subsided.	The	by‐product	has	been	a	deeply‐entrenched	but	divided	
labour	 market,	 resulting	 in	 peculiar	 employment	 trends	 and	 distorted	 labour	 market	
outcomes.		
The	GCC	region	now	faces	a	dual	demographic	imbalance.	One	based	on	indigenous	
population	growth,	where	 the	Gulf’s	 own	baby	boom	generation	 is	now	moving	up	 the	
                                                            
13 Robert E. Looney, Industrial Development and Diversification of the Arabian Gulf Economies, vol. 70, 
Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis (Middlesex: Jai Pr, 1994), 25–26. 
14 Martin Hvidt, “The Dubai Model: An Outline of Key Development‐Process Elements in Dubai,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 41, no. 03 (2009): 404, doi:10.1017/S0020743809091120. 
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population	 pyramid	 and	 straddling	 the	 years	 which	 should	 be	marked	 by	 high	 labour	
market	 participation.	 Instead,	 youth	 unemployment,	 underemployment,	 and	 economic	
inactivity	is	high	in	most	countries.15	The	public	sector	is	bloated,	and	the	private	sector	is	
seldom	willing	to	hire	local	labour	without	incentive	and	local	labour	is	often	not	interested	
in	 the	 low‐paying,	 insecure	private	 sector.16	The	 second	demographic	 imbalance	 is	 that	
between	citizens	and	non‐nationals.	As	noted	in	table	1.1,	the	expatriate	composition	of	the	
population	 of	 GCC	 countries	 ranges	 from	 approximately	 32	 percent	 to	 89	 percent.	
Expatriates	comprise	an	even	greater	proportion	of	the	labour	force,	ranging	from	59	to	94	
percent.	 Not	 only	 does	 this	 widening	 demographic	 gap	 perpetuate	 labour	 market	
challenges,	but	gives	rise	to	popular	concerns	of	cultural	erosion	and	policy	questions	on	
labour	and	immigration	policies.17	
Table	1.1:	GDP	and	Population	Indicators,	GCC	
GCC GDP and Population Indicators 
Country Gross Domestic Product Population Labour Force 
  
GDP (million 
USD / Current 
Prices) 
GDP /  
capita Total 
% 
Expatriate Total 
% 
Expatriate
Bahrain 28,991 24,260 1,195,020 53.9* 618,036 77.3 
Kuwait 160,897 52,481 3,065,850 64.40 1,800,033 80.5 
Oman 72,680 22,056 3,295,298 39* 1,099,188 59.4 
Qatar 173,519 100,143 1,732,717 72 1,275,971 94 
Saudi Arabia 597,086 21,042 28,376,355 32* 8,611,001** 50.2** 
United Arab Emirates 338,690 40,983 8,264,070 88.52*  5,208,447 93 
2011	data,	based	on	author’s	calculations.	*2010	**200918	
                                                            
15 Tarik Yousef, Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward a New Social 
Contract, illustrated edition (Washington: World Bank Publications, 2004); Ingo Forstenlechner and Emilie 
Rutledge, “Unemployment in the Gulf: Time to Update the‘Social Contract’,” Middle East Policy 17, no. 2 (June 
2010): 38–51, doi:10.1111/j.1475‐4967.2010.00437.x. 
16 This phenomenon is explored in greater detail in chapters three and four. 
17 In the following EIU report, Jane Kinninmont raises a series of potential challenges resulting from the Gulf’s 
demographic imbalances. Jane Kinninmont, The GCC in 2020: The Gulf and Its People, The GCC to 2020: Outlook 
for a Rapidly Changing Region (Economist Intelligence Unit, September 2009); See also Gabriella Gonzalez, 
Facing Human Capital Challenges of the 21st Century: Education and Labor Market Initiatives in Lebanon, Oman, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008). 
18 GCC: A Statistical Glance, 63–64; Mshrooʿ al‐tʿdaad al‐ʿaam l‐lskaan w‐al‐mnsaaakn w‐almnshaat 2010, Ahm 
Ntaa’j Al‐tʿdaad ʿla Mstooa al‐Sultana 2010 (tʿdaad Census 2010) (Muscat: Census Administration, National 
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It	is	evident	that	the	modern	development	trajectory	of	the	Gulf	has	been	heavily	
impacted	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 hydrocarbons.	 Notwithstanding	 all	 the	 language	 in	
development	plans	confirming	a	desire	to	diversify,	the	practice	has	been	constrained.	The	
contribution	of	hydrocarbons	to	GDP	has	remained	around	the	50	percent	level.	(See	figure	
1.3)	 Some	 positive	 movement	 in	 industrial	 developments	 occurred	 in	 the	 last	 decade.	
Buttressed	 by	 the	 oil	 price	 rise	 in	 the	 2000s,	 the	 Gulf	 became	 a	 major	 producer	 for	
petrochemicals,	fertilizers,	aluminium,	cement,	and	other	construction	materials.	Not	only	
was	 investment	 in	 these	 industries	 fuelled	 by	 oil	 price	 windfalls,	 but	 their	 success	 is	
directly	tied	to	hydrocarbon	supplies.19	In	fact,	the	size	of	figures	for	the	oil	and	gas	share	
of	GDP	in	the	Gulf	masks	the	actual	levels	of	hydrocarbon	dependence	for	failing	to	account	
for	sectors	like	these	which	are	tied	to	oil	and	gas.	For	example,	manufacturing,	categorized	
as	a	non‐oil	sector	in	GCC	economic	reports,	was	approximately	8.9	percent	of	GDP	in	2011.	
This	figure	includes	2.1	percent	for	the	refining	sector	and	1.5	percent	for	petrochemicals	
                                                            
Centre for Statistics and Information, 2010), 87; Qatar Statistics Authority, The General Census of Population and 
Housing, and Establishment (Doha: Statistics Authority, State of Qatar, April 2010); Qatar’s Third National 
Human Development Report: Expanding the Capacities of Qatari Youth ‐ Mainstreaming Youth in Development 
(Doha: General Secretariate for Development Planning, January 2012), 56; 2010 Census Bahrain (Manama: 
Central Informatics Organization, Kingdom of Bahrain, 2010), http://www.census2010.gov.bh/; Bahrain Labour 
Market Indicators (Kingdom of Bahrain: Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), 2011), 
http://www.lmra.bh/blmi; Statistical Review 2013 (Kuwait: State of Kuwait Central Statistical Bureau, 2013), 
http://www.csb.gov.kw/Socan_Statistic_EN.aspx?ID=18; Annual Statistical Abstract 2011 (Kuwait: State of 
Kuwait Central Statistical Bureau, 2011), 97, http://www.csb.gov.kw/Socan_Statistic_EN.aspx?ID=18; Latest 
Statistical Releases 2012 (Riyadh: Central Department Of Statistics & Information, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), 
accessed May 6, 2013, http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/english/; Manpower Research Bulletin 2009 (Riyadh: Central 
Department Of Statistics & Information, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2009), 14, 
http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/english/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=86&Itemid=113; UAE 
Economic Insight 2012 (Doha: Qatar National Bank, 2012), 4, 
http://www.qnb.com.qa/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=
MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1355477182471&ssbinary=true. 
19 Jean‐Francois Seznec, “Financing industrialization in the Arab‐Persian Gulf,” in Jean‐Francois Seznec and Mimi 
Kirk, Industrialization in the Gulf: A Socioeconomic Revolution, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2010), 30–32. 
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and	chemicals.20	Thus,	despite	the	importance	designated	to	economic	diversification	by	
the	GCC	countries,	its	realization	has	been	limited.	Little	progress	has	been	made	outside	
enclaves	 such	 as	 Dubai.	 Even	 Dubai,	 once	 lauded	 a	 diversification	 success,	 required	 a	
financial	bailout	by	oil‐wealthy	Abu	Dhabi	when	it	succumbed	to	financial	crisis	in	its	own	
property	bust	in	2009.21		
Figure	1.3:	Oil	and	Gas	Share	of	GDP,	GCC	
	
	 	
Sources:	QNB	2012,	GPCA,	201222	
	
The	 exhaustibility	 of	 hydrocarbon	 reserves	 and	 oil	 price	 volatility	 has	 rendered	
diversification	 important,	 the	 latter	more	than	the	former.	Because	proven	reserves	are	
expected	to	last	for	around	a	century	in	several	GCC	countries	combined	with	the	potential	
for	new	discoveries	and	the	invention	of	new	extraction	technologies,	much	uncertainty	
actually	 abounds	 around	 the	 rate	 of	 depletion	 and	 levels	 of	 exploitability.	 Current	
                                                            
20 GCC Petrochemicals & Chemicals Industry: Facts & Figures 2011 (Dubai: Gulf Petrochemicals & Chemicals 
Association, 2012), 6, http://www.gpcaforum.net/facts2011.pdf. 
21 “Dubai’s Bail‐out: The Outstretched Palm,” The Economist, February 26, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/13186145; Haris Anwar, “Abu Dhabi Bails Out Dubai World with $10 Billion 
(Update 3),” Bloomberg News, December 14, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=apiaU8vfNR9A. 
22 GCC Economic Insight (Doha: Qatar National Bank, 2012), 12, 
http://www.qnb.com.qa/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=
MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1355478588574&ssbinary=true; GCC Petrochemicals & Chemicals Industry: Facts & 
Figures 2011. 
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estimates,	however,	 suggest	 that	 the	 remaining	years	of	production	at	prevailing	 levels	
renders	diversification	more	imperative	to	some	states	than	others.	(See	figures	1.5	and	
1.6)	Even	more	important	to	economic	planning	discussions	in	the	region	is	the	stability	of	
oil	prices.	A	sustained	oil	price	decline	would	have	a	heavy	impact	on	the	fiscal	balance	of	
GCC	countries.23	Breakeven	oil	prices	are	quite	high,	even	by	conservative	IMF	estimates	
(see	figure	1.4).24	Increases	in	domestic	spending	during	2011	and	2012	only	perpetuated	
this	trend.	Moreover,	energy	experts	expect	the	recent	stability	in	oil	prices	to	be	fleeting.25	
	
Figure	1.4:	Breakeven	Oil	Prices	
	
	
	IMF	figures,	201226	
	
                                                            
23 Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, World Economic and Financial Surveys (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund, November 2012), 19, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/mcd/eng/pdf/mreo1112.pdf. 
24 In the GCC, discussions on breakeven oil prices are in reference to the state budget breakeven point, rather 
than a commercial breakeven (i.e. the cost of oil extraction). This is a critical figure and well demonstrates the 
dangers of governments’ over‐reliance on oil in the region. 
25 Short‐Term Energy Outlook (STEO) (Independent Statistics & Analysis, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
May 2013), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf; Robin Mills, “Stable Oil Prices Will Not Be 
Staying That Way Much Longer,” The National, April 15, 2013, sec. Industry Insights, 
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry‐insights/energy/stable‐oil‐prices‐will‐not‐be‐
staying‐that‐way‐much‐longer. 
26 Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, 93. 
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It	is	clear	the	challenges	confronting	the	development	paths	of	Gulf	states	are	vast	
and	have	 the	potential	 to	be	more	critical.	 In	 response,	 the	contemporary	development	
agenda	across	the	region	is	wrapped	into	the	pursuit	of	a	knowledge	economy.	It	is	within	
this	framework	that	the	promotion	of	entrepreneurship	has	blossomed.	As	I	demonstrate	
in	the	third	chapter,	entrepreneurship	and	SME	support	is	viewed	as	the	antidote	to	the	ills	
of	Gulf	economies.	The	idea	is	that	in	order	for	emerging	economies	to	realize	the	potential	
of	establishing	a	knowledge	economy,	there	must	be	an	investment	in	both	human	capital	
and	 innovation.	As	 I	 show,	 a	 variety	of	 government	 agencies,	 financial	 institutions,	 and	
other	state	and	NGO	intiatives	are	stepping	into	various	components	of	nascent	domestic	
and	regional	entrepreneurship	support	ecosystems.	For	these	support	apparatuses	to	have	
the	 intended	 effect,	 genuine	 efforts	 need	 to	 be	 dedicated	 to	 secure	 an	 “economic,	
institutional	and	regulatory	environment	that	fosters	the	acquisition,	development	and	use	
of	knowledge,	an	education	system	that	supplies	citizens	with	the	ability	to	create	and	use	
knowledge,	a	dynamic	information	infrastructure,	innovation	systems	and	networks.”27		
Recent	indicators	suggest	there	is	a	long	way	to	go.	The	2012‐2013	World	Economic	
Forum	competitiveness	report	documented	intriguing	results	on	the	competitiveness	and	
innovation	of	the	Gulf.	In	this	report,	the	World	Economic	Forum	(WEF)	uses	three	stages	
of	development,	and	intermediary	transition	stages	to	categorize	economies.	These	stages	
include:	(1)	Factor‐driven,	(2)	Efficiency‐driven,	and	(3)	innovation	driven.	Countries	like	
Chad	and	Haiti	sit	in	the	first	stage,	and	countries	like	Canada	and	Denmark	are	positioned	
in	the	last.	Among	the	Gulf	countries,	the	UAE	is	the	only	one	declared	innovation	driven.	
                                                            
27 Ghirmai T. Kefela, “Knowledge‐based Economy and Society Has Become a Vital Commodity to Countries,” 
International NGO Journal 5, no. 7 (August 2010): 161. 
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Oman	 and	 Bahrain	 are	 classified	 as	 economies	 in	 a	 transition	 stage	 moving	 from	 an	
efficiency‐driven	to	an	innovation‐driven	economy.	Meanwhile,	Kuwait,	Saudi	Arabia	and	
Qatar	 are	 listed	 as	 in	 transition	 to	 efficiency‐driven	 economies.28	 This	 is	 particularly	
interesting	given	the	level	of	financial	investment	and	official	policy	discourse	dedicated	to	
the	push	to	development	and	the	knowledge	economy.	WEF	did,	however,	rank	Qatar	as	
the	most	competitive	Arab	economy,	placing	it	11th	globally.	Qatar	even	beat	the	UAE	which	
sits	at	24.		Elsewhere	in	the	GCC,	Saudi	Arabia	has	been	ranked	18,	Oman	32,	Bahrain	35,	
and	 Kuwait	 37.29	 Competitiveness,	 it	 would	 seem,	 does	 not	 necessarily	 equate	 with	
solutions	to	what	ails	the	region’s	economy.	
The	prevailing	wisdom	from	international	financial	institutions	suggests	not	only	
that	SMEs	are	the	backbone	of	the	economy,	but	also	that	they	comprise	the	main	engine	
for	growth	and	employment.30	The	employment	generation	potential	is	lauded	across	Gulf	
countries	in	public	justifications	for	entrepreneurship	and	SME	support.	Yet	this	rationale	
does	not	account	for	the	deep	structural	contradiction	presented	by	the	Gulf’s	dual	labour	
market,	where	economic	growth	and	employment	creation	will	not	necessarily	address	
indigenous	 innovation	and	citizen	employment	concerns.	Moreover,	without	addressing	
                                                            
28 There is an interesting collection of 21 countries listed in transition from efficiency to innovation‐driven 
economies, which includes Brazil and Russia of the BRICs. Of the remaining BRICS, India sits at stage one, a 
factor‐driven economy, while China and South Africa are listed as efficiency‐driven. Not one of them is 
categorized as innovation‐driven.   
 Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2012‐2013 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2012), 10, 
http://www.weforum.org/reports/global‐competitiveness‐report‐2012‐2013. 
29 Ibid., 14. 
30 SME Finance Policy Guide (Washington: International Finance Corporation, October 2011), 9, 
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/f3ef82804a02db409b88fbd1a5d13d27/G20_Policy_Report.pdf?MOD=A
JPERES; Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs, Policy Brief (Organization for Economic Co‐operation and 
Development (OECD), November 2006), 1, http://www.oecd.org/cfe/37704120.pdf; See also Susan M. Gates and 
Kristin J. Leuschner, In the Name of Entrepreneurship?: The Logic and Effects of Special Regulatory Treatment for 
Small Business (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2007). 
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the	real	labour	and	employment	issues,	in	the	absence	of	being	able	to	absorb	all	citizens	
into	the	public	sector,	entrepreneurship	support	potentially	creates	a	new	variety	of	a	rent‐
seeking	class.	Furthermore,	a	potentially	large	problem	with	SME	support	is	that	it	entails	
a	 high	 degree	 of	 risk.	 It	 is	 therefore	 not	 as	 socio‐politically	 stabilizing	 as	 a	 job	 in	 the	
government	because	the	entrepreneur	may	or	may	not	succeed	in	his	or	her	endeavour.	
Currently,	governments	are	walking	a	fine	balance	with	their	support	of	entrepreneurship	
among	the	national	population.	While	they	have	broad	development	and	innovation	aims,	
their	implementation	is	in	danger	of	only	serving	to	revise	existing	rentier	tendencies,	by	
creating	new	means	of	distributing	income	and	manipulating	new	forms	of	dependency	on	
the	state.	There	is	a	clear	need	to	decrease	dependency	on	the	state	rather	than	escalate	it,	
especially	 given	 the	 rising	 breakeven	oil	 prices.	 Some	of	 the	 SME	promotion	moves	do	
promise	to	do	just	that,	yet	if	appropriate	mechanisms	are	not	put	in	place	which	address	
broad	 reliance	 on	 expatriate	 labour,	 supporting	 local	 SMEs	will	 expand	 the	 number	 of	
citizens	 who	 can	 access	 a	 business	 owner’s	 income	 while	 perpetuating	 reliance	 on	
expatriates	 and	 generating	 employment	 opportunities	 for	 foreign	 labour.	 Certainly	 this	
will	increase	the	size	and	growth	of	the	economy,	but	will	do	little	to	resolve	the	current	
ailments	of	the	private	sector.		
The	body	of	this	research	project	identifies	and	addresses	several	overlapping,	and	
in	 some	 cases	 mutually‐reinforcing,	 contradictions	 that	 evolve	 out	 of	 these	 broader	
structural	contradictions.	The	first	 is	 the	significant	amount	of	 institutional	competition	
between	 various	 government	 agencies	 in	 attempting	 to	 target	 this	 broad	 policy	 shift.	
Second,	 the	 notable	 policy	 disconnect	 between	 the	 plans	 and	 actual	 experience	 of	
entrepreneurship	 on	 the	 ground,	 as	 represented	 by	 tedious	 bureaucracy,	 difficulty	 in	
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accessing	 finance,	 monopolized	 market	 conditions,	 competing	 pressures	 from	
stakeholders	 for	regulatory	change,	and	preferences	 for	 foreign	expertise	and	business.	
Third,	 a	 lack	 of	 definitional	 clarity	 for	 SMEs,	 entrepreneurship,	 self‐employment,	 and	
microbusiness	frustrates	policy	efforts,	confuses	application,	and	misplaces	the	innovation	
imperative.	Fourth,	the	two‐tiered	labour	market	with	its	dual‐wage	structure	is	arguably	
the	 staunchest	 challenge	 to	 these	 development	 aims.	 It	 is	 extraordinarily	 difficult	 to	
reverse	 incentive	structures	 in	the	organization	of	 labour	and	business	 in	the	economy,	
especially	when	the	political	will	is	confronted	with	competing	outcome	preferences.	Fifth,	
the	 ideational	 challenge	 posed	 by	 the	 millennial	 generation	 is	 quite	 high.	 Millennial	
expectations,	sitting	at	the	nexus	of	rentier	expectations	and	new	global	ones,	are	difficult	
for	the	state	to	meet	in	the	current	governance	context.	Finally,	the	pull	of	consumption	in	
the	drive	away	 from	 the	allocative	 structures	of	 rentierism	will	 challenge	 the	path	 to	a	
knowledge	economy	by	neither	increasing	productive	capacity	nor	stimulating	innovation.		
	
3. Methodology	
As	 part	 of	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 rentier	 political	 economy	 in	 the	
Arabian	 peninsula,	 I	 have	 conducted	 extensive	 field	 research	 on	 entrepreneurship	 and	
innovation	 promotion	 and	 policy	 development.	 As	 noted,	 the	 promotion	 of	
entrepreneurship	is	a	key	mechanism	utilized	by	governments	in	the	region	to	target	two	
of	their	prominent	development	challenges:	diversification	away	from	oil	and	gas	and	the	
facilitation	of	more	local	labour	into	the	private	sector.	Both	of	these	policy	goals	stem	from	
the	 acknowledgement	 of	 declining	 hydrocarbon	 reserves,	 rising	 unemployment	 and	
underemployment,	and	 the	challenges	associated	with	a	segmented	 labour	market.	The	
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increasing	 politicization	 of	 the	 region	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 Arab	 uprisings	 along	 with	
burgeoning	 young	 populations	 has	made	 these	 goals	 even	more	 crucial,	 particularly	 in	
those	Gulf	states	more	quickly	approaching	a	post‐oil	future.		
This	study	is	a	regional	analysis	of	the	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	(GCC)	countries.	
Toward	addressing	the	broader	questions	of	development	policy	making	in	the	region,	this	
research	 targets	 one	 particular	 policy	 subtype:	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	
promotion.	As	noted	above,	this	policy	push	is	occurring	in	all	six	GCC	countries.	In	order	
to	shed	light	on	this	phenomenon,	I	conducted	in‐depth	qualitative	cases	studies	of	two	
GCC	countries,	Oman	and	Qatar.	These	two	countries	are	representative	of	the	diversity	of	
the	 GCC	 states,	 and	 sit	 at	 opposite	 ends	 of	 the	 wealth	 spectrum	 and	 the	 ratios	 of	
hydrocarbon	 reserves	 to	 production.	 As	 shown	 in	 table	 1.1,	 Oman	 is	 among	 the	 lesser	
wealthy	of	the	GCC,	with	a	GDP	per	capita	of	$22,056	(USD).	Qatar,	on	the	other	hand,	is	the	
wealthiest	of	 the	 six.	 Its	GDP	per	 capita	 is	 among	 the	highest	 in	 the	world	at	$100,143	
(USD).		If	predictions	prove	accurate	and	production	levels	hold	constant,	Oman	is	expected	
to	have	17	remaining	years	of	oil	and	20	remaining	years	of	gas	production.	With	ample	
gas	 reserves,	 Qatar	 has	 a	 projected	 39	 years	 of	 oil	 and	 173	 years	 of	 gas	 production	
remaining	(see	figures	1.5	and	1.6).	
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Figure	1.5:	GCC	Oil	Reserves‐to‐Production	Ratio	
	
	
QNB	data,	201231	
	
Figure	1.6:	GCC	Gas	Reserves‐to‐Production	Ratio		
	
	
QNB,	201232	
	
Although	 there	are	significant	differences,	 like	 the	rest	of	 the	Gulf	subregion	Oman	and	
Qatar	have	similar	political	systems	insofar	as	they	boast	hereditary‐based	ruling	families,	
                                                            
31 GCC Economic Insight, 17. 
32 Ibid., 19. 
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fairly	recent	constitutions,	and	partially‐elected	councils.33	Within	this	broad	comparison	
though,	there	are	significant	differences.	Whereas	Tamim	bin	Hamad	Al‐Thani	,	the	second	
son	of	the	current	Emir	of	Qatar,	is	the	crown	prince,	Sultan	Qaboos	has	no	heirs	and	as	
such	his	successor	remains	unknown.34		As	well,	Oman	has	had	a	longer	history	of	suffrage	
and	 participation	 in	 its	 consultative	 council	 (majlis	 al‐shura),	 and	 levels	 of	 political	
engagement	 are	 expanding	 at	 a	 faster	 rate.	 In	 Qatar	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 aside	 from	
municipal	elections	citizens	have	yet	to	go	to	the	polls.	Although	the	first‐ever	consultative	
council	 elections	 are	 regularly	 promised,	 they	 keep	 getting	 delayed.	 Nevertheless,	 the	
combination	 of	 economic	 and	 political	 characteristics	 makes	 these	 two	 countries	
compelling	paired	comparisons.	
This	 research	utilizes	 the	case	study	method,	defined	as	 “an	 intensive	study	of	a	
single	unit	for	the	purpose	of	understanding	a	larger	class	of	(similar)	units.”35	To	this	end,	
I	engage	the	method	of	structured,	focused	comparison.36	The	overall	project	engages	four	
levels	 of	 analysis.	 The	 first,	 as	 is	 clear	 in	 chapter	 two,	 speaks	 to	 broader	 theoretical	
arguments	 concerning	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 and	 market	 in	 development.	 I	 situate	 the	
literature	on	the	rentier	state	within	this	broader	debate,	and	assess	the	role	of	Gulf	states	
in	governing	development.	The	second	level	of	analysis	provides	some	empirical	specificity	
to	 the	 prior	 debate.	 It	 assesses	 the	 impact	 of	 oil	 on	 the	 approach	 of	 states	 toward	 the	
                                                            
33 See “The Basic Law of the Sultanate of Oman” and “The Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar” on 
“Constitutions of the Arab Monarchies,” accessed August 4, 2011, 
http://www2.gsu.edu/%7Epolmfh/constitutions.htm; Michael Herb, “Emirs and Parliaments in the Gulf,” Journal 
of Democracy 13, no. 4 (2002): 41–47, doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0068. 
34 As of June 2013, Sheikh Hamad abdicated in favour of his son Tamim. Since this research was carried out 
during 2011 and 2012, I am retaining all references to Sheikh Hamad as the Emir throughout the dissertation. 
35 John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?,” The American Political Science Review 98, no. 2 
(May 1, 2004): 342. 
36 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (The 
MIT Press, 2005), 67–72. 
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governance	of	national	development.		The	third	level	is	concerned	with	the	regional	and	
domestic	contexts,	specifically	looking	at	demographic	challenges	in	the	region	including	
the	 growing	 youth	 bulge,	 rising	 unemployment,	 and	 abnormally	 high	 percentages	 of	
expatriates.	 The	 final	 level	 of	 analysis,	 and	 primary	 thrust	 of	 the	 focused	 case	 studies,	
examines	 the	policies	 and	practices	 of	 entrepreneurship	promotion	 in	 the	 two	 country	
cases.	Through	 this	multilayered	assessment,	 these	 research	 findings	will	 contribute	 to	
academic	debates	on	the	changing	nature	of	Gulf	economic	development	and	governance	
as	well	as	provide	academics	and	practitioners	a	view	for	understanding	this	new,	and	as	
of	yet	un‐researched,	development	initiative	that	is	growing	in	popularity	and	intensity.	
By	 drawing	 on	 the	 insights	 from	 the	 Omani	 and	 Qatari	 experience	 with	
entrepreneurship	promotion,	 I	am	able	to	speak	to	the	broader	entrepreneurship	trend	
and	 development	 policy‐making	 practice	 across	 the	 GCC.	 In‐person	 field	 research	 was	
carried	out	between	September	2011	and	August	2012	in	the	Sultanate	of	Oman	and	the	
State	 of	 Qatar.	 During	 this	 research	 period,	 I	 utilized	 three	 key	 qualitative	 research	
methods	 to	 arrive	 at	 the	 answers	 to	my	primary	 research	questions.	These	 include	 (1)	
content	analysis,	(2)	participant	observation,	and	(3)	semi‐structured	elite	interviews.	
	 Content	analysis	of	policy	announcements,	development	plans,	reports,	and	studies	
comprises	an	important	component	of	the	necessary	process	tracing	to	provide	answers	
to	 the	 research	 questions.	 To	 the	 extent	 possible	 given	 the	 constraints	 of	 limited	
transparency,	documents	were	collected	from	various	ministries	and	government	bodies	
engaged	 in	development,	 as	well	 as	policy	 announcements	 available	 through	 the	Oman	
News	Agency	(ONA)	and	Qatar	News	Agency	(QNA).	Several	of	 these	could	be	accessed	
through	libraries	at	ministries	and	chambers	of	commerce,	while	many	others	were	shared	
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with	me	by	various	departments	or	state	agencies.	In	the	case	of	Oman,	development	plans	
are	 the	 best	 source	 of	 tracing	 historical	 development	 plans	 and	 processes.	 These	 are	
developed	and	 released	by	 the	Supreme	Council	 for	Planning	 (formerly	 the	Ministry	of	
National	Economy)	in	five	year	intervals	beginning	with	the	first	one	in	1976.	Development	
visions	 and	 plans	 are	 a	 more	 recent	 development	 in	 Qatar,	 meaning	 policy	 plans	 and	
practice	are	more	difficult	to	trace	from	primary	document	sources	before	the	2000s.		
	 Participant	 observation	 played	 an	 enlightening	 role	 in	 the	 research	 collection.	 I	
attended	and	participated	in	conferences,	presentations,	existing	focus	groups,	initiative	
and	event	pitch	meetings	to	decision	makers,	competition	processes	(e.g.	Al‐Fikra	business	
plan	 competition	 in	 Doha),	 and	 other	 meetings	 and	 conferences	 organized	 by	 various	
government	and	private	groups.	This	involvement	allowed	me	to	gain	significant	insight	in	
the	 practice	 of	 policy	 development,	 promotion,	 and	 implementation.	 It	 also	 provided	 a	
first‐hand	 account	 of	 institutional	 competition	 between	 different	 SME	 support	
programmes.	My	involvement	was	primarily	in	an	observational	role,	but	I	was	often	asked	
to	 contribute	 to	discussions.	While	 serving	 as	 a	 visiting	 researcher	 at	 the	University	 of	
Nizwa	 in	 Oman’s	 ad‐Dakhiliyah	 province,	 I	 co‐directed	 workshops	 for	 students	 who	
aspired	 to	 be	 entrepreneurs.	 Being	 permitted	 to	 observe	 initiative	 directors	 making	
pitches	 to	 government	 bodies	 for	 support	 provided	 particular	 insight.	 As	 well,	 my	
understanding	of	the	experiences	of	local	entrepreneurs	was	augmented	by	my	frequent	
attendance	of	support	and	networking	events,	especially	the	entrepreneurship	workshops	
and	“jams”	 in	Muscat	and	the	Bedaya	Center	networking	events	 in	Doha.	These	various	
types	of	participant	observation	also	established	positive	contacts	and	helped	facilitate	the	
organization	 of	 small	 focus	 group	 sessions.	 I	 held	 small	 focus	 groups	 with	 university	
Chapter 1    C. A. Ennis 
 
21 
 
students	in	Oman	and	Qatar,	and	led	a	focus	group	organized	by	the	Social	Development	
Centre	 (SDC)	 in	 Qatar	 with	 some	 of	 their	 programme	 beneficiaries	 who	 are	 new	
entrepreneurs.		
	 Semi‐structured	 elite	 interviews	 comprised	 the	 primary,	 and	 arguably	 most	
significant,	 component	 of	 my	 research.	 Interviews	 targeted	 the	 relevant	 stakeholders.	
Hence,	there	were	four	main	categories	of	semi‐structured	interviews:		
(1)	policy	makers	and	bureaucrats,		
(2)	public	and	private	entrepreneurship	initiative	actors,		
(3)	entrepreneurs,	and	
(4)	other	stakeholders	(from	academic,	diplomatic,	media,	financial,	and	research	
sectors)		
Interviews	with	policy	makers	and	other	government	officials	were	aimed	at	assessing	the	
raison	d’être	behind	the	policies	Gulf	bureaucrats	have	formed,	understanding	the	nature	
of	the	policies,	and	examining	the	outcomes.	They	contributed	to	better	understanding	the	
state	 conception	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 private	 sector	 development,	 its	 rationale	 for	
entrepreneurship	initiatives	and	how	these	fit	within	government	development	plans,	as	
well	 as	 state	 conceptions	 of	 their	 nation	 and	 region’s	 global	 role	 and	 status.	 These	
interviews	also	shed	light	on	the	policy	makers’	broader	cognizance	and	response	to	the	
perceived	threat	or	opportunity	of	the	Gulf	millennials	and	the	entrepreneurial	members	
of	their	demographic.	
	 Interviews	 with	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 initiative	 actors	 revealed	
implementation	and	practice	details.	This	second	category	of	interviews	often	overlapped	
with	the	first,	as	many	of	these	initiatives	are	state‐led.	Many	others	are	state‐sponsored	
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or	somehow	affiliated.	(See	figure	3.2	and	3.3	in	chapter	three.)	In	addition	to	the	themes	
above,	 these	 interviews	 also	 focused	 on	 the	 perceived	 challenges	 of	 these	 initiatives,	
challenges	and	opportunities	of	the	clients	and	programme	beneficiaries	(entrepreneurs	
and	 aspiring	 entrepreneurs),	 expectations	 for	 the	 future	 of	 local	 entrepreneurship	 and	
innovation,	and	policy	advice.		
	 Another	 important	 side	 to	 this	 aspect	 of	 my	 research	 involved	 semi‐structured	
interviews	with	 entrepreneurs	 and	 other	 business	 people.	 In	 this	 category,	 there	were	
three	broad	 types:	aspiring	millennial	entrepreneurs,	existing	millennial	entrepreneurs,	
and	 business	 people	 from	 earlier	 generations.	 Aspiring	 entrepreneurs	 included	 young	
Omani	 and	Qatari	millennials	 enrolled	 at	 the	 local	 universities,	 colleges,	 or	 involved	 in	
entrepreneurship	 initiatives.	 Existing	 entrepreneurs	 were	 found	 through	 a	 variety	 of	
channels	 including	 local	 academics,	 initiatives,	 and	 even	 funders	willing	 to	 share	 their	
contact	 lists.	These	were	multiplied	through	the	snow	ball	effect	with	an	aim	of	gaining	
sectoral	 diversity.	 These	 interviews	 focused	 on	 the	 entrepreneurial	 ambitions	 of	 the	
interviewees.	Questions	were	asked	on	career	and	economic	aspirations,	with	follow	up	
queries	focused	on	uncovering	the	future	expectations	with	regard	to	economic	well	being,	
political	 direction	 and	 societal	 hopes.	 Millennial	 entrepreneur	 interviewees	 were	
specifically	asked	questions	concerning	where	they	see	themselves	in	10	to	15	years,	what	
their	 ideal‐case	scenarios	with	their	businesses	will	 look	 like,	and	whether	they	plan	to	
publicly	list.	They	were	also	asked	about	perceptions	of	accessibility,	barriers	to	entry,	ease	
of	 business	 start	 up,	 and	 programme	 and	 business	 application	 procedures.	 As	 well,	
interviewees	were	asked	about	their	views	on	the	best	ways	to	move	their	country	forward	
in	development.	 	Thus,	in	addition	to	understanding	the	entrepreneurial	motivation,	the	
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interviews	were	designed	to	gauge	socio‐political	apathy,	civic‐mindedness	and	sense	of	
citizenship	or	identity	with	their	local	area,	nation,	region	or	world.	
Part	of	the	aim	of	the	entrepreneurship	interview	process	was	to	discover	whether	
the	responses	from	different	generations	varied	with	regard	to	their	expectations,	views	
on	 development	 and	 their	 pro‐market	 versus	 government	 clientielist	 leanings.	 That	 is,	
were	 they	 seeking	 new	 ways	 of	 acquiring	 government	 income	 or	 favours,	 waiting	 for	
further	 government	 sponsorship	 in	 their	 business	 pursuits,	 or	were	 they	 interested	 in	
being	 subject	 to	 market	 forces?	 Economists,	 government	 advisors,	 and	 officials	 at	 the	
institutions	and	agencies	were	also	asked	whether	they	saw	a	difference	 in	the	cultural	
attitudes	 of	 different	 generations	 toward	 development	 policies,	 business,	 and	 private	
sector	growth	and	regulation.		
The	following	table	provides	a	quantitative	overview	of	the	interviews.		
Table	1.2:	Interview	Numbers	
 
Interviews	
CATEGORY	 OMAN QATAR	
Policy	makers	/	Bureaucrats	 25 15	
Initiatives	
ሺFounders/Directors/Managersሻ 12 12	
Entrepreneurs	 40 28	
Others	ሺAcademics,	Researchers,	Think	
tankers,	Banks,	Media,	Embassy	staffሻ 20 20	
Subtotal	 97 75	
TOTAL	 172	
 
Interviewees	 were	 granted	 their	 choice	 of	 confidentiality.	 In	 many	 cases,	
interviewees	wanted	either	full	or	partial	anonymity.	Interestingly,	participants	in	Oman	
were	 less	concerned	with	confidentiality	 than	those	 in	Qatar.	As	well,	Qataris	 tended	to	
prefer	hand‐written	notes	over	audio	recording	of	 interviews	than	Omanis.	 In	all	cases,	
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interviewees	were	assured	that	the	interview	transcripts	would	not	be	made	public.	For	
consistency’s	 sake,	 I	 opted	 to	 provide	 partial	 anonymity	 even	 to	 those	 who	 granted	
permission	to	use	their	names.		Another	motivation	for	this	confidentiality	is	to	protect	the	
identity	 of	 my	 interviewees	 given	 rapidly	 changing	 political	 situations	 on	 the	 ground.	
Where	 in	 late	 2011	 some	may	 have	 been	 comfortable	 to	 say	 political	 opinions	 on	 the	
record,	as	2012	progressed	the	political	environment	tightened.		Interviews	are	labelled	in	
the	 references	 in	 the	 following	way:	Those	 interview	 references	which	 credit	 a	 “senior	
official”	 refer	 to	 those	 officials	 at	 the	 undersecretary	 or	 director	 general	 level	 (or	
equivalent	 titles).	 The	 term,	 “official”	 refers	 to	 bureaucrats	 at	 other	 levels.	 Some	
interviewees	 had	 specific	 credit	 requests,	 such	 as	 “expert”	 at	 a	 specific	 broader	
government	 body,	 rather	 than	 detailing	 their	 position	 details.	 Others	 requested	 even	
vaguer	 crediting,	 for	 fear	 of	 identification.	 In	 these	 cases,	 the	 ministry,	 agency,	 or	
organization	 to	 which	 they	 are	 attached	 is	 also	 left	 unstated.	 In	 all	 cases,	 I	 left	 the	
entrepreneurs	and	aspiring	entrepreneurs	completely	anonymous.		
Data	from	document	content	analysis,	all	categories	of	interviews,	focus	groups,	and	
participant	observation	were	triangulated.		The	greatest	challenge	facing	this	research	was	
the	lack	of	available	data	and	the	lack	of	transparency	where	data	did	exist.	This	challenge	
is	well‐known	and	documented	by	scholars	of	the	region.37	Some	of	this	difficulty	can	be	
overcome	 through	 personal	 visits	 to	 ministries,	 official	 offices	 and	 through	 personal	
meetings	and	formal	and	informal	interviews.	Due	to	the	personal	nature	of	the	culture,	
officials	 are	 frequently	 more	 willing	 to	 discuss	 issues	 frankly	 on	 a	 one‐to‐one	 basis.		
                                                            
37 Janine A. Clark, “Field Research Methods in the Middle East,” PS: Political Science & Politics 39, no. 03 (2006): 
417–424, doi:10.1017/S1049096506060707. 
Chapter 1    C. A. Ennis 
 
25 
 
Although	 interview	 responses	 provide	 subjective	 data,	 this	 is	 overcome	 by	 both	 the	
quantity	of	the	interviews	across	a	variety	of	actors	as	well	as	by	triangulation	with	other	
data	and	reports	which	can	corroborate	or	refute	responses.	
Along	with	 exercising	 some	 caution	or	 skepticism	when	 looking	 at	 the	 available	
numeric	data	presented,	a	note	must	be	made	about	what	may	appear	 to	be	conflation	
between	 economic	 and	 political	 liberalization.	 In	 this	 research,	 it	 is	 often	 difficult	 to	
disaggregate	 economic	 from	 political	 reform	 because	 “an	 intrinsic	 link	 exists	 between	
politics	and	economics	in	rentier	states.”38	Indeed,	there	is	a	danger	of	conflating	economic	
and	 political	 liberalization	 and	 there	may	 seem	 to	 be	 conceptual	 slippage	 between	 the	
terms	economic	and	political	reform.	In	some	ways,	this	conflation	is	intentional.	Economic	
and	political	liberalization	have	many	shared,	overlapping	characteristics	in	the	GCC	cases.	
As	Jill	Crystal	notes,	both	economic	and	political	liberalization	are		
calculated,	 and	 limited,	 move[s]	 by	 rulers	 to	 maintain	 power…	 Economic	
liberalization	has	been	driven	largely	by	the	governments’	fear	that	growing	youth	
unemployment	will	metastasize	into	political	dissent	if	jobs	are	not	found,	and	by	
the	hope	that	the	private	sector	can	postpone	that	day.	Political	liberalization	has	
been	driven	by	a	similar	desire	to	maintain	power	and	delay	a	day	of	reckoning.39	
	
Because	the	processes	are	so	intertwined,	it	is	not	always	easy	to	separate	where	economic	
reform	ends	and	political	reform	begins.	
	
	
	
                                                            
38 Rolf Schwarz, “The Political Economy of State‐formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier States, Economic 
Reform, and Democratization,” Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 4 (2008): 600, 
doi:10.1080/09692290802260662. 
39 Jill Crystal, “Economic and Political Liberalization: Views from the Business Community,” in Joshua Teitelbaum, 
Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf (Columbia University Press, 2009), 43. 
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4. Dissertation	Structure,	Arguments,	and	Contributions:	
Rentier	states	are	not	a	coherent	black	box,	which	behave	as	unitary	actors.	To	many	
scholars,	 the	 characteristics	 of	 rentier	 states	 have	 become	 axiomatic.	 Hence,	 their	
governance	processes	remain	unexplored.	The	decision	and	policy	making	practices	of	Gulf	
rentiers,	 however,	 are	 important	 to	 understand	 to	 gain	 a	 more	 rounded	 view	 of	 their	
development.	 Through	 examining	 the	 policy	 practices	 related	 to	 the	 promotion	 of	
entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 as	 well	 as	 analyzing	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	
entrepreneurs,	my	dissertation	delves	into	the	nuanced	realm	of	development	in	the	Gulf	
Arab	states.	Where	scholars	have	historically	spoken	in	broad	generalities	of	rentier	state	
behaviour,	I	explore	specific	practices	and	the	intersection	of	state	and	society.	As	well,	I	
avoid	privileging	the	elite	to	the	extent	others	have	by	exploring	the	lived	experiences	of	
millennial	entrepreneurs	and	aspiring	entrepreneurs	–	the	key	focus	demographic	of	these	
government	 initiatives.	 This	 allows	 for	 both	 top‐down	 and	 bottom‐up	 analyses,	 and	
contributes	to	a	more	holistic	interpretation	of	the	cases.		
At	the	international	level,	studying	the	GCC	countries	matters	for	several	reasons	
including	the	region’s	centricity	to	commodity	markets	and	position	in	global	capital	and	
labour	 flows.	 	 Indeed,	 domestic	 and	 regional	 development	 practices	 are	 intrinsically	
connected	 to	 international	 forces	because	of	 their	 reliance	on	 them.	Although	receiving	
surprisingly	 scant	 attention	 in	 international	 political	 economy	 considerations,	 the	 GCC	
states	 play	 an	 increasingly	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 global	 economy.	 Despite	 the	 best	
Orientalist	arguments	to	the	contrary,	no	system	remains	stagnant	over	time.	Changes	in	
regional	 political	 economy	 are	 evident.	 From	 sovereign	 wealth	 funds	 and	 high‐profile	
foreign	 purchases,	 to	 their	 roles	 as	 international	 mediators	 or	 benefactors	 of	 certain	
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revolutions	in	the	wider	Middle	East	North	Africa	(MENA)	region,	different	Gulf	states	are	
etching	 out	 political	 and	 economic	 niches	 for	 themselves	 aside	 from	 their	 traditional	
centricity	to	commodity	markets.	Not	only	this,	but	also	the	eastward	shift	of	power	and	
finance	has	not	skirted	over	the	Gulf.	These	states	may	still	consult	Western	expertise,	yet	
having	 had	 their	 global	 business	 interests	 slighted	 by	 the	 West	 they	 are	 increasingly	
looking	East	for	economic	advice	as	well	as	business	and	trading	interests.	Especially	at	a	
time	 of	 such	 regional	 upheaval,	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 development	 and	 reform	
trajectories	 of	 states	 that	 have	 been	 thrust	 into	 capitalism	 and	 been	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
neoliberal	reconfiguration	of	the	region	for	several	decades	demands	attention.40	
In	this	dissertation,	I	examine	the	promotion	of	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	in	
the	 Gulf	 Arab	 states,	 which	 seems	 a	 peculiar	 policy	 push	 given	 conceptualizations	 of	
development	and	governance	in	the	region.	I	focus	more	heavily	on	the	entrepreneurship	
side	of	this	equation	which,	although	it	 is	part	and	parcel	of	 innovation,	 tends	to	be	the	
principal	focus	in	the	Gulf	given	its	increasingly	technocratic	style	of	governance.	In	many	
ways,	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	are	structurally	incongruent	with	the	way	scholars	
have	come	to	understand	the	nature	of	a	rentier	state.	The	research	then	explores	how	we	
understand	the	rationale	behind	their	promotion	across	all	six	GCC	countries.		
I	 argue	 that	 understanding	 the	 ways	 rentierism	 impacts	 the	 trajectory	 of	
development	 and	 shapes	 the	 structures	 of	 the	 political	 economy	 is	 important	 for	
                                                            
40 John W. Fox, Nada Mourtada‐Sabbah, and Mohammed al‐Mutawa, Globalization and the Gulf (Taylor & 
Francis, 2006); Bessma Momani and Crystal A Ennis, “Between Caution and Controversy: Lessons from the Gulf 
Arab States as (re‐)emerging Donors,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25, no. 4 (2012): 605–627, 
doi:10.1080/09557571.2012.734786; Andrew F Cooper and Bessma Momani, “The Challenge of Re‐branding 
Progressive Countries in the Gulf and Middle East: Opportunities through New Networked Engagements Versus 
Constraints of Embedded Negative Images,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 5, no. 2 (May 2009): 103–117, 
doi:10.1057/pb.2009.3; Matteo Legrenzi and Bessma Momani, Shifting Geo‐economic Power of the Gulf: Oil, 
Finance and Institutions (Ashgate Pub Co, 2011). 
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appreciating	the	Gulf	development	experience.	At	the	same	time,	one	must	move	beyond	
the	 limiting	 strictures	 of	 broad	 generalizations	 to	 understand	 ongoing	 political	 and	
economic	transformations.	The	deep	structural	contradictions	and	challenges	confronting	
the	 implementation	 of	 entrepreneurship	 policies	 noted	 in	 section	 two	 above	 and	
expounded	upon	later	in	this	dissertation	are	critical	to	understand.	The	difficulties	faced	
in	 interjecting	 entrepreneurship	 into	 the	 modern	 development	 narrative	 given	 the	
embedded	 rentier	 structures	 are	 only	 compounded	 by	 the	 realities	 of	 the	 segmented	
labour	 market.	 I	 argue	 that	 today	 governance	 in	 the	 Gulf	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 a	
contestation	between	reforms	and	rentier	patterns.	Being	cognizant	of	this	tension	allows	
us	to	understand	how	some	policy	outcomes	contravene	classic	rentier	expectations	while	
others	 appear	 hypocritical	 as	 the	 implementation	 of	 policy	 announcements	 become	
obstructed	 by	 structural	 contradictions.	 In	 many	 ways,	 entrepreneurship	 support	 has	
become	a	new	way	of	recasting	the	rentier	state.		
In	order	to	understand	the	policy	behaviour	in	each,	and	later	why	they	are	both	
undertaking	similar	trends,	we	have	to	understand	how	policy	making	occurs	in	the	Gulf	
monarchies.	 The	 next	 chapter	 of	 this	 dissertation	 then	 speaks	 about	 the	 conventional	
theoretical	explanations	of	policy	making	in	the	Arab	Gulf.	The	first	portion	of	chapter	two	
assesses	the	series	of	expectations	that	exist	on	how	a	state	behaves	when	it	is	categorized	
as	rentier.	In	this	body	of	literature,	a	number	of	assumptions	have	been	helpful	in	shaping	
the	scholarly	understanding	of	rentier	states.	These	include	an	expected	autonomy	of	the	
state	from	society	given	its	vast,	external	income	which	allows	the	state	to	implement	a	
social	contract	whereby	the	state	agrees	to	provide	for	the	citizens	in	exchange	for	political	
submission.	Another	set	of	assumptions	surround	the	projected	institutional	weakness	in	
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rentier	economies,	facilitated	in	part	by	an	absence	of	taxation	and	limited	administrative	
capacity.	The	 third	body	of	assumptions	are	 related	 to	a	pervasiveness	of	 rent	 seeking,	
whereby	the	pursuit	of	rent	rather	than	productivity	commands	attention	of	all	levels	of	
society.41	 The	 chapter	 then	 explores	 development	 literature	 as	 applied	 to	 late‐late	
industrializers.	This	is	followed	by	an	engagement	of	developmental	state	literature	with	
academic	conceptualizations	on	 the	Gulf	 region.	 	The	 final	section	assesses	 the	study	of	
innovation	 in	 reference	 to	 development	 and	 engages	 the	work	with	 the	 current	 policy	
environment	in	the	Gulf.	
The	subsequent	two	chapters	explore	the	insights	garnered	through	the	in‐depth	
cases	studies	on	Oman	and	Qatar.	The	third	chapter	is	rather	elite	focused,	speaking	about	
the	 plans	 and	 practices	 of	 state‐led	 entrepreneurship	 promotion,	 whereas	 the	 fourth	
chapter	 is	 more	 people	 focused,	 exploring	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	 entrepreneurs	 and	
aspiring	entrepreneurs.	Chapter	three	is	therefore	aimed	at	answering	the	first	research	
question	on	the	character	and	motivation	of	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion	
in	the	GCC.	To	this	end,	it	explores	the	motivations		behind	these	policies	and	illustrates	the	
plurality	of	pressures	which	converge,	creating	a	potent	motivational	force.	From	among	
the	motivations,	certain	ones	are	stronger	in	each	case,	corresponding	with	a	variance	in	
economic	 comfort	 and	 social	 stability.	 This	 chapter	 also	 maps	 the	 respective	
entrepreneurship	support	ecosystems	in	each	case,	tracing	the	process	of	each.	Through	
                                                            
41 See detailed description in chapter two of this dissertation. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier 
State (New York:: Routledge, 1987); Donald L. Losman, “The Rentier State And National Oil Companies: An 
Economic And Political Perspective,” The Middle East Journal 64 (Summer 2010): 427–445, doi:10.3751/64.3.15; 
Hossein Mahdavi, “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran,” in 
M. A. Cook, Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day 
(Routledge, 1970), 428–467. 
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an	examination	of	certain	structural	contradictions,	 it	discusses	 the	absence	of	an	 ideal	
policy	practice	experience	where	despite	both	 countries	highlighting	 the	 importance	of	
entrepreneurship	and	innovation	in	their	overarching	visions	and	development	plans,	the	
actual	implementation	has	been	less	well	crafted.			
The	 fourth	 chapter	 addresses	 the	 second	 research	 question.	 It	 looks	 at	 how	 the	
promotion	of	entrepreneurship	in	the	Gulf	predates	the	stressors	from	the	so‐called	Arab	
Spring	 but	 shows	 that	 the	 emphasis	 on	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 since	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 uprisings	 has	 grown.	 It	 proceeds	 with	 analyzing	 the	 real	 state	 of	
entrepreneurship	in	Qatar	and	Oman,	particularly	among	the	Gulf	millennial	generation.	It	
begins	 with	 a	 definitional	 exploration	 of	 the	 terms	millennials.	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 an	
examination	of	the	cultural	critique	thesis,	which	suggests	an	inherent	cultural	deficiency	
as	the	reason	for	limited	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	in	the	region.	After	shattering	
this	myth,	 it	 examines	 the	 generational	 divide	 that	 became	 rather	 apparent	 during	 the	
research.	 An	 exploration	 of	millennial	 expectations	 reveals	 dual	 levels	 of	 expectations,	
which	form	a	crucial	component	of	the	challenge	facing	the	Gulf	states’	social	contract.	The	
Gulf	millennials	no	longer	consider	state	handouts	as	mere	privilege	but	rather	an	expected	
norm.	At	the	same	time	as	retaining	high	economic	expectations,	they	harbour	stronger	
political	 and	 social	 expectations	 than	 previous	 generations.	 This	 consequently	 places	
pressure	on	the	existing	Gulf	rentier	social	contract.		
The	aim	of	the	fifth	and	final	chapter	is	to	tie	the	lessons	of	the	empirical	chapters	
together	 and	 more	 clearly	 delineate	 their	 theoretical	 lessons.	 It	 explores	 the	 broad	
implications	of	the	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	trend,	and	considers	the	overarching	
meaning	 we	 can	 extract	 from	 the	 lessons	 learned.	 In	 exploring	 the	 paradox	 of	
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entrepreneurship	promotion,	it	indicates	some	of	the	concomitant	questions	this	research	
poses	 while	 assessing	 the	 empirical	 state	 of	 these	 policies	 moving	 forward.	 The	
examination	 of	 transition,	 explored	 throughout	 the	 dissertation,	 illustrates	 a	 broader	
contradiction.	Hence,	 the	conclusion	weaves	a	 tale	of	 transition	against	 the	overarching	
incongruity	 between	 global	 neoliberal	 policy	 advice	 and	 the	 rationale	 and	 reality	 of	
economic	life	in	the	region.					
This	 dissertation	 makes	 three	 contributions	 to	 the	 advancement	 of	 scholarly	
knowledge	in	the	fields	of	Gulf	political	economy	and	development.	First,	scholars	of	the	
Gulf	 have	 largely	 overlooked	 the	 prominent	 shift	 toward	 entrepreneurship	 promotion	
across	the	region.	This	study	addresses	this	through	in‐depth	case	studies	of	two	of	the	six	
GCC	countries.	Second,	academics	in	Gulf	studies	and	scholars	of	development	have	been	
inclined	to	study	the	region	in	analytical	isolation.	The	result	of	this	tendency	has	been	an	
infrequent	 engagement	 by	 Gulf	 scholars	 with	 broader	 development	 literature	 and	
development	scholars	almost	never	incorporating	the	Gulf	region	in	development	debates.		
This	project	responds	to	this	deficit	by	engaging	both	literature	sets	within	the	analysis.	
Third,	scholars	of	the	rentier	state	have	learned	much	about	the	effect	of	resource	rents	on	
national	 and	 regional	 political	 economies.	 They	 have	 also	 developed	 hypotheses	
concerning	the	role	of	rentierism	in	shaping	state‐society	relations.	Much	 less	has	been	
learned	 about	 how	 these	 states	 actually	 develop	 and	 carry	 out	 policies,	 and	 how	 they	
behave	 under	 novel	 socio‐economic	 conditions	 which	 are	 the	 result	 of	 combined	
pressures.	Internally,	the	pressures	from	evolving	generational	norms	and	expectations,	
and	externally,	the	pressures	of	globalization	and	regional	change	have	impacted	the	rules	
of	the	game.	This	dissertation	provides	a	window	into	these	changes,	and	demonstrates	
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how	rentier	patterns	and	these	novel	pressures	impact	both	the	practices	of	policy	making	
as	 well	 as	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 Gulf	 ruling	 bargain.		
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Chapter	2	
	
Conceptualizing	Governance	and	Development	in	the	21st	Century	Gulf	
	
	
	
1. Introduction	
There	is	greater	complexity	to	the	politics	of	the	Gulf	than	oil	alone.	Despite	this,	
scholarly	frameworks	for	understanding	the	politics	and	economics	of	the	region	have	not	
moved	beyond	the	discourse	of	oil	and	the	impact	of	rents.	Indeed,	there	is	much	to	be	said	
for	 the	 heuristic	 value	 of	 rentier	 state	 literature	 for	 understanding	 the	 general	 nature,	
resilience,	and	practices	of	Gulf	states.	I	would	even	go	as	far	as	suggest	that	understanding	
the	assumptions	of	the	rentier	state	framework	are	important	for	introductory	conceptions	
of	the	region	and	an	appreciation	of	their	early	historical	development	post‐oil	discovery.	
Nevertheless,	 these	 same	 assumptions	 become	 increasingly	 dissatisfying	 in	 their	
generalisms	and	lack	the	sophistication	necessary	to	provide	compelling	interpretations	of	
governance	patterns	and	state‐society	relations	since	the	second	oil	boom	of	the	2000s.	
Not	only	does	 it	privilege	state	autonomy	and	remove	agency	from	anyone	but	elites,	 it	
marginalizes	domestic	pressures	while	its	focus	on	domestic	political	economy	obfuscates	
the	 impact	of	globalization	and	global	capitalist	 labour	movements	which	so	 impact	the	
regional	political	economy.	
This	chapter	examines	the	existing	literature	available	for	scholars	to	understand	
governance	patterns,	policy	making,	and	development	in	the	Gulf	Arab	states.	It	begins	with	
a	discussion	of	rentier	state	literature,	followed	by	an	overview	of	development	literature	
with	a	specific	focus	on	the	developmental	state.	It	then	assesses	the	means	of	examining	
and	 attempts	 at	 reframing	 the	 Gulf	 state	 in	 the	 current	 milieu.	 The	 final	 section	
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incorporates	 innovation	 literature	 into	 the	 development	 policy	 making	 context	 given	
current	policy	shifts.	This	chapter	offers	two	contributions	to	the	advancement	of	scholarly	
knowledge.	 First,	 it	 advocates	 increased	 dialogue	 across	 the	 fields	 of	 development,	
international	political	economy,	and	Gulf	studies.	Development	scholars	and	Gulf	scholars	
have	 tended	 to	 view	 the	 region	 in	 analytical	 isolation.	 This	 has	 resulted	 in	 scholars	 of	
development	rarely	including	the	Gulf	in	the	questions	and	debates	around	development	
and	 similarly	 Gulf	 scholars	 infrequently	 engaging	 broader	 development	 literature	 in	
relation	to	the	Gulf.			
Second,	 scholars	 of	 the	 Gulf	 rentier	 state	 have	 learned	 a	 great	 deal	 about	 how	
earnings	from	resource	exports	impact	the	political	economy	of	a	country	and	have	even	
hypothesized	about	how	rentierism	impacts	decision	making	and	state	society	relations.	
They	have,	however,	learned	much	less	about	how	these	same	states	behave	in	novel	socio‐
economic	realities	represented	by	the	external	pressures	of	globalization	and	the	internal	
pressures	of	changing	generational	norms	and	expectations.	In	many	ways,	rentier	state	
literature	has	not	moved	significantly	beyond	 the	assumptions	of	 its	primary	 literature	
base	 from	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s.	 These	 make	 broad	 generalizations	 about	 patterns	 of	
development	and	linkages	between	oil	and	authoritarianism,	but	fail	to	provide	nuance.	
Empirically	 rich	 accounts	 are	 sorely	 lacking	 and	 can	 lead	 readers	 to	 believe	 that	 rents	
explain	 everything	 about	 Gulf	 politics.	 These	 institutionalist	 political	 economy	
assumptions	attribute	a	great	deal	of	neutrality	to	the	state	and	ascribe	much	liberty	 in	
policy	development.		
I	argue	that	although	it	is	important	to	understand	the	patterns	of	rentierism	and	
its	impact	on	fashioning	the	structures	of	the	economy,	it	is	important	to	pay	heed	to	the	
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impact	 of	 globalization,	 generational	 change,	 demographic	 pressures,	 and	 local	 and	
regional	trends.	A	revised	form	of	rentierism	is,	in	fact,	being	engaged	by	the	state	today;	
one	which	stays	abreast	of	pressures	and	changes	in	the	global	and	regional	environment,	
maintains	an	eye	on	necessary	economic	reform,	and	seeks	to	address	the	desires	of	the	
millennial	generation.		Although	its	determination	to	utilize	the	global	language	of	reform	
makes	the	Gulf	state	appear	to	have	moved	beyond	the	old	structures	of	rentierism,	the	
realization	of	reform	is	constrained	by	some	path	dependent	structures.	These	constraints	
emerge	alongside	a	perceived	political	imperative	to	retool	practices	of	the	rentier	effect.	I	
argue	that	rentierism	is	in	effect	being	revised	through	attempts	to	deal	with	new	socio‐
economic	 and	 geopolitical	 realities.	 Gulf	 state	 behaviour	 today	 is	 best	 classified	 as	 a	
contestation	 between	 reforms	 and	 rentier	 patterns.	 In	 some	 cases	 this	 leads	 to	 policy	
outcomes	that	defy	classic	rentier	expectations	and	in	others	it	results	in	apparent	policy	
hypocrisy,	 where	 announcements	 and	 implementation	 are	 obstructed	 by	 structural	
contradictions.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 Gulf	 state	 can	 be	 cast	 as	 some	 genre	 of	 a	 neo‐
developmentalist	 state,	 absorbing	 capitalist	 tendencies	but	 still	harbouring	 some	of	 the	
deeply‐ensconced	 habits	 of	 patronage	 and	 rent	 seeking.	 In	 this	 usage,	 a	 neo‐
developmentalist	 state	 occurs	 in	 instances	 of	 late‐late	 development	 whereby	
conventionally	 statist	 countries	 attempt	 to	 mirror	 patterns	 of	 development	 in	
developmental	states	by	incorporating	or	approximating	their	capitalist	patterns	while	still	
securing	their	statist	footing.		
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2. Conventional	Views	on	Rentier	State	Behaviour	and	Policy	Making	
The	policy‐making	process	in	Arab	Gulf	states	is	nebulous	at	best,	complicated	by	
patronage	systems	and	informal	power	structures.	These	states	each	face	common	policy	
challenges	 and	 often	 respond	 to	 them	 in	 surprisingly	 similar	 ways	 even	 if	 at	 varying	
speeds.	Reform	processes	exist	in	most	Gulf	states	in	the	private	sector,	educational	sector	
and	labour	market.	The	policy‐making	process	which	leads	to	these	reform	programmes	
seems	to	be	evolving,	operating	at	different	levels	and	including	a	broader	array	of	non‐
state	actors.	The	evolution	of	policy	making	or	the	broadening	of	policy	making	space	does	
not	 fit	easily	within	existing	theoretical	 frameworks	for	explaining	policy	making	 in	the	
region.	The	conventional	paradigm	through	which	scholars	interpret	the	region	is	through	
rentier	state	literature.	In	the	last	decade,	this	was	often	used	in	parallel	with	work	on	the	
persistence	of	authoritarianism	in	the	Middle	East,	which	was	a	growing	body	of	literature	
until	the	Arab	uprisings	of	2011	instigated	a	temporary	pause.1	While	rentier	theories	may	
provide	 a	 valuable	 heuristic	 device	 for	 identifying	 broad	 problems	 of	 oil‐dependent	
economies,	 they	seem	less	useful	as	an	explanatory	mechanism.	Still,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	
adequately	 conceptualize	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 the	 Gulf	 without	 appreciating	 and	
utilizing	rentier	state	literature.	This	work	is	thus	the	best	starting	point.	In	addition	to	this,	
another	 body	 of	 literature	 exists	which	 can	 speak	 to	 economic	 policy	making,	 decision	
                                                            
1 See, for example: Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in 
Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (January 1, 2004): 139–157, doi:10.2307/4150140; 
Oliver Schlumberger, ed., Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes 
(Stanford University Press, 2007); Marsha Pripstein Posusney, “Enduring Authoritarianism: Middle East Lessons 
for Comparative Theory,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (January 1, 2004): 127–138, doi:10.2307/4150139; 
Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist, Authoritarianism In The Middle East: Regimes And 
Resistance (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005); Raymond Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization 
Theory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique,” Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006): 373–395, 
doi:10.1080/13510340600579243; Nicola Pratt, Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 2006). 
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making	 and	 development	 path	 choices	 in	 the	 region.	 That	 is,	 development	 literature,	
particularly	that	which	focuses	on	the	developmental	state	and	that	which	examines	the	
role	of	innovation	in	development	policy.		
Studies	 of	 economic	 development	 in	 the	Middle	 East,	 and	 the	 Gulf	 in	 particular,	
point	almost	exclusively	to	literature	pertaining	directly	to	the	region.	The	claim	of	Middle	
East	exceptionalism	pervades	much	academic	work	on	politics,	economics	and	decision	
making	in	the	region.	This,	unfortunately,	disconnects	analysis	of	 the	Gulf	 from	broader	
trends	 of	 globalization	 and	 the	 pressures	 of	 neoliberalism.	 It	 treats	 the	 Gulf	 as	 a	
geographically	distinct	area,	thereby	separating	it	 from	the	impact	of	capital	and	labour	
flows.	Moreover,	it	isolates	Middle	East	analysis	from	broader	political	science	and	makes	
it	 difficult	 for	 theorists	 to	 speak	 to	 other	 bodies	 of	 literature.2	 This	 trend	 is	 slowly	
devolving,	and	through	this	study,	I	hope	to	further	contribute	to	debates	that	span	more	
than	one	literature	set.	I	situate	this	dissertation	within	political	economy,	development	
and	Middle	East	studies,	 three	 fields	 that	are	well‐suited	 to	 the	nature	of	 the	questions	
under	examination.		
	
2.1	The	Rentier	state	
Petroleum	has	dominated	the	politics	and	economics	of	the	Gulf	since	the	middle	of	
the	 last	 century.	 Thrusting	 the	 region	 into	 the	 forces	 of	 globalization	 and	 establishing	
interdependencies	between	oil	producers	and	consumers	as	well	as	between	labour	rich	
                                                            
2 See Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” Comparative Politics 20, no. 1 (October 1, 
1987): 1–18, doi:10.2307/421917; Lisa Anderson, “Policy‐Making and Theory Building: American Political Science 
and the Islamic Middle East,” in Hisham Sharabi, ed., Theory, Politics, and the Arab World : Critical Responses 
(New York :: Routledge, 1990), 52–80; Pratt, Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World; and Bellin, “The 
Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East.” 
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and	 labour	 poor	 economies,	 oil	 has	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 geopolitics	 and	
economics	 of	 the	 region	 and	 has	 arguably	 shaped	 state	 building	 and	 development	
programmes.3	 In	 effect,	 oil	 “restructured	 political	 life”	 and	 “produced	 a	 new	 kind	 of	
economy.”4	This	economy	became	known	as	rentier.	The	concept	of	the	rentier	state	was	
first	developed	by	Hossein	Mahdavy	in	1970,	where	he	explored	the	concept	through	the	
case	 of	 pre‐revolutionary	 Iran.5	 It	 has	 since	 been	 developed	 and	 popularized	 by	 other	
scholars,	 chief	 among	 them	 Giacomo	 Luciani	 and	 Hazem	 Beblawi.6	 Derived	 from	 the	
economic	 term	 ‘rent,’	 referring	 to	 returns	 on	 scarce	 resources	 that	 require	 little	 to	 no	
productive	effort	as	in	the	case	of	rent	given	to	landlords,	an	economy	is	defined	as	rentier	
when	 it	 is	 dependent	 on	 externally‐accrued	 profit	 from	 the	 rent	 of	 a	 non‐reproducible	
resource.	In	the	case	of	the	Gulf	states,	this	resource	is	oil.7	A	rentier	state	is	characterized	
by	its	receipt	of	extraordinarily	high	revenue	from	the	rent	earned	on	its	resource	rather	
than	its	productive	capacity.	Wealth	is	generated	by	a	fraction	of	the	population,	with	the	
remainder	 involved	 in	 the	 distribution	 and	 utilization	 of	 this	 wealth.	 In	 contrast	 to	
standard	 productive	 states,	 Gulf	 rentiers	 are	 also	 known	 as	 “allocative”	 due	 to	 the	
distributional	role	of	the	state	in	rent	circulation.	Rents	are	circulated	through	a	variety	of	
distributional	mechanisms	including	land	allotment,	housing,	public	sector	employment,	
commercial	 licensing,	 agricultural	 subsidization,	 industrial	 development	 and	 other	
                                                            
3 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Globalization and Geopolitics in the Middle East: Old Games, New Rules, 1st ed. 
(Routledge, 2008), 110. 
4 Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, 1st ed. (Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 6. 
5 Hossein Mahdavi, “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran,” 
in Cook, Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, 428–467. 
6 Beblawi and Luciani, The Rentier State. 
7 Ibid.; Mahdavi in Cook, Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, 428–429; Losman, “The Rentier 
State And National Oil Companies,” Summer 2010, 427–429. 
Chapter 2    C. A. Ennis 
 
39 
 
subsidized	goods	and	services.	Rentier,	allocative	states	further	differentiate	themselves	
because	they	neither	rely	on	domestic	production	nor	taxes.8			
Much	of	the	literature	around	the	impact	of	natural	resources	on	a	country	focuses	
on	the	assumed	link	between	resource	abundance	and	violent	conflict,	part	of	the	so‐called	
“resource	 curse.”9	 Literature	 related	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 resources,	 and	 particularly	 oil,	 on	
development	is	more	applicable	for	the	purpose	of	this	discussion	of	oil	and	development	
policy	 making.	 Two	 general	 premises	 shape	 the	 discussion	 on	 oil	 and	 its	 impact	 on	
development.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 oil	 hinders	 democracy.10	 The	 second	 is	 that	 oil	 leads	 to	
economic	 problems	 like	 limited	 diversification,	 slow	 growth,	 and	 Dutch	 disease.11	 The	
expression	Dutch	disease	encapsulates	the	essence	of	growing	and	depreciating	sectors	of	
the	 economy	 that	 result	 from	 a	 rising	 level	 of	 export	 earnings	 in	 resource‐wealthy	
countries.	 The	 term	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 economic	 phenomenon	 witnessed	 in	 the	
Netherlands	 in	 the	1970s.		The	sudden	growth	of	 the	natural	resource	sector	can	cause	
                                                            
8 Giacomo Luciani, The Arab State (University of California Press, 1990), 70–93; Beblawi and Luciani, The Rentier 
State; Christopher M. Davidson, The United Arab Emirates: A Study In Survival (Lynne Rienner Pub, 2005), 34–39. 
9 Resource curse literature on conflict is wide and varied, much of it centred around correlations between 
resources and violent conflict. I am not including it in this discussion because I am examining here studies 
seeking to explain the impact of hydrocarbons on development. Paul Collier has been pivotal in the development 
of the literature and popularization of the thesis on resource abundance and conflict. See, for example:  Paul 
Collier, Natural Resources, Development and Conflict: Channels of Causation and Policy Interventions 
(Washington: World Bank, April 28, 2003), http://www‐
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/04/27/000265513_20040427110039/R
endered/PDF/28730.pdf; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (August 1, 2005): 625–633, doi:10.1177/0022002705277551; Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (October 1, 2004): 563–595, 
doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064; See also, Michael L. Ross, “What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil 
War?,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (May 1, 2004): 337–356, doi:10.1177/0022343304043773;  and 
Joshua D. Angrist and Adriana Kugler, Rural Windfall or a New Resource Curse? Coca, Income, and Civil Conflict in 
Colombia, Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2005), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11219. 
10 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (London; New York: Verso Books, 2011); 
Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?,” World Politics 53, no. 03 (2001): 325–361, 
doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011. 
11 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “The Curse of Natural Resources,” European Economic Review 45, no. 
4–6 (May 2001): 827–838, doi:10.1016/S0014‐2921(01)00125‐8. 
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exchange	 rate	 appreciation,	 thereby	 increasing	 the	 cost	 of	 exports	 and	 depressing	 the	
manufacturing	 sector.	 Although	 the	 service	 and	 transportation	 industries	 may	 grow	
rapidly,	other	industrial	sectors	are	marginalized.12	
Although	 much	 of	 the	 discourse	 on	 oil	 and	 democracy	 centres	 around	 Middle	
Eastern	states	which	are	almost	wholly	dependent	upon	oil,	some	scholars	suggest	that	oil	
in	fact	always	impedes	democracy.	This	is	said	to	be	true	whether	the	country	is	wealthy	
or	poor	and	even	when	export	earnings	are	moderate.13	Timothy	Mitchell	suggests	that	this	
condition	only	applies	to	particular	types	of	energy,	with	limited	organized	labour.	Oil	fits	
this	 well,	 and,	 in	 his	 view,	 hinders	 global	 democratic	 outcomes.	 Oil	 requires	 a	 limited	
labour	 force	 under	 steady	 supervision,	 and	 its	 transportation	 and	 distribution	 are	
mechanized.	Whereas	the	coal	industry,	with	its	large	workforce,	was	partially	responsible	
for	the	organized	labour	movements	and	democratic	pressure,	oil	has	no	such	parallel.14		
	Discussions	of	the	resource	curse	and	the	impact	of	oil	on	economic	development	
cannot	be	completely	disaggregated	from	the	political.	Luong	and	Weinthal	claim	that	it	is	
not	resource	wealth	itself	which	curses	states	but	rather	“the	persistence	of	entrenched	
patronage	networks	that	precede	the	formulation	of	development	strategies.”15	Looking	at	
former	Soviet	states,	they	suggest	that	state	leaders	prioritize	political	survival	over	short‐
term	economic	gains,	 thereby	choosing	 to	develop	energy	resources	 in	such	a	way	 that	
                                                            
12 Graham A Davis, “Learning to Love the Dutch Disease: Evidence from the Mineral Economies,” World 
Development 23, no. 10 (October 1995): 1768, doi:10.1016/0305‐750X(95)00071‐J; Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox 
of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro‐States (University of California Press, 1997), 5–6. 
13 Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”; Robert J. Barro, “Determinants of Democracy,” Journal of Political 
Economy 107, no. S6 (December 1999): 167, doi:10.1086/250107. 
14 Mitchell, Carbon Democracy. 
15 Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, “Prelude to the Resource Curse Explaining Oil and Gas Development 
Strategies in the Soviet Successor States and Beyond,” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 4 (May 1, 2001): 395, 
doi:10.1177/0010414001034004002. 
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allows	 them	 to	 structure	and	 fortify	 their	political	 support	and	position.	This	has	often	
resulted	in	strategies	that	are	better	for	long‐run	growth	and	political	stability.16	Similarly,	
Thad	 Dunning	 demonstrates	 that	 oil	 export	 earnings	 can	 produce	 incentives	 for	
authoritarian	leaders	to	hold	on	to	power	while	simultaneously	reduce	the	incentives	to	
invest	 in	 non‐resource	 economic	 sectors.	 His	 work	 examines	 the	 structural	 conditions	
which	allow	resource	rents	to	either	impede	or	promote	democracy.	He	claims	that	in	cases	
where	the	non‐resource	sectors	of	the	economy	are	small,	weak,	and	equal	in	size	to	one	
another,	then	resource‐derived	rents	result	in	an	“authoritarian	effect.”17			
Along	the	same	line	of	reasoning,	in	a	later	article,	Weinthal	and	Luong	suggest	that	
rather	than	focusing	on	macroeconomic	policies	and	economic	diversification,	managing	
the	“resource	curse”	or	limiting	the	effect	of	Dutch	disease	in	the	developing	world	is	better	
achieved	by	strengthening	institutions.18	Terry	Karl’s	work	makes	a	similar	argument	with	
the	 importance	of	 institutions,	although	she	 focuses	more	on	 the	 impact	of	oil	on	 these	
institutions.	 In	 her	 view,	 countries	 that	 depend	 on	 the	 same	 rent	 source	 have	 similar	
characteristics	in	their	development	capacity	and	policy	making	practices.	Much	depends	
on	the	source	of	the	rent.19	Significantly,	the	mechanisms	utilized	by	the	state	to	collect	and	
use	 revenue	define	 the	state’s	 character.	Using	a	 range	of	 cases	which	 includes	Algeria,	
Indonesia,	Iran,	Nigeria,	and	Venezuela,	Karl	emphasizes	the	importance	of	the	fiscal	base	
and	institutional	formation,	character,	and	capacity	of	the	state.	Her	research	suggests	that	
                                                            
16 Luong and Weinthal, “Prelude to the Resource Curse Explaining Oil and Gas Development Strategies in the 
Soviet Successor States and Beyond.” 
17 Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
18 Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong, “Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution to Managing 
Mineral Wealth,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 01 (2006): 35–53, doi:10.1017/S1537592706060051. 
19 Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 13. 
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oil	states	suffer	 from	a	narrow	array	of	decision	making	choices.	Development	policy	 is	
constrained	by	 the	 general	 “petrolization”	 of	 the	policy	 environment,	 international	 and	
domestic	private	vested	interests	linked	to	the	state	and	benefiting	from	the	rent	circuit,	
and	rentier	distributive	tendencies	which	importantly	involve	reliance	on	“the	progressive	
substitution	 of	 public	 spending	 for	 statecraft.”20	 Oil	 booms	 intensify	 each	 of	 these	
outcomes.21	The	source	and	use	of	revenue,	as	well	as	the	organization	of	pre‐oil	networks	
and	institutions	along	with	the	level	and	type	of	their	development	make	a	difference	to	
how	oil	influences	development.	
There	 are	 two	 general	 patterns	 to	 state	 building	 and	 development	 that	 can	 be	
identified	 in	 scholarly	work	 on	Middle	 East	 rentier	 states.	 The	 first	 is	 where	 the	 state	
indulges	in	excessive	spending	in	boom	years,	predominantly	investing	its	resource	wealth	
into	the	military.	With	high	security	expenditure	and	little	development	investment,	these	
states	descend	into	political	instability	in	times	of	fiscal	crisis.	(e.g.	Iraq	circa	1980s).	Both	
insufficient	regime	autonomy	in	economic	policy	making	and	the	presence	of	a	populist‐
mobilizational	history	have	also	been	considered	contributing	factors	to	the	development	
failures	of	this	category.22		
The	second	pattern	is	where	the	state	focuses	its	efforts	on	sweeping	economic	and	
social	development.	Along	with	heavy	infrastructure	investment,	it	subsequently	works	to	
diversify	the	resource	base	of	the	economy	and	establish	the	foundations	for	the	provision	
                                                            
20 Ibid., 16. 
21 Karl, The Paradox of Plenty. 
22 Schwarz, Rolf. Ch. 13, “Rentier States and War‐Making: The United Arab Emirates and Iraq in Comparative 
Perspective,.”Kenneth C. Omeje, Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the Global South: Multi‐regional 
Perspectives on Rentier Politics (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008), 223; Frauke Heard‐Bey, “The United Arab 
Emirates: Statehood and Nation‐Building in a Traditional Society,” Middle East Journal 59, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 
357–375; Steffen Hertog, “Defying the Resource Curse: Explaining Successful State‐Owned Enterprises in Rentier 
States,” World Politics 62, no. 02 (2010): 261–301, doi:10.1017/S0043887110000055. 
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of	social	welfare	and,	consequently,	political	stability.	The	states	of	the	Gulf	Cooperation	
Council	(GCC)	generally	like	to	be	characterized	by	the	latter	pattern	and	can	be	in	many	
ways.23	Diversification,	however,	remains	elusive	and	security	expenditure	is	high	by	all	
accounts.24	In	fact,	military	spending	as	a	share	of	GDP	in	the	GCC	countries	are	among	the	
highest	in	the	world.	In	2010,	these	ranged	from	3.4	percent	in	Bahrain	to	8.5	percent	in	
Oman	 and	 10.1	 percent	 in	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 well	 above	 the	 two	 percent	 global	 average.25	
Indeed,	the	use	of	money	in	rentier	states	makes	a	significant	difference	to	its	survival	and	
stability.26	
The	transformational	role	of	oil	on	state	building	is	evident	in	the	Gulf	rentiers.	With	
the	 economic	 activity	 of	 the	 pre‐oil	 era	 primarily	 centred	 around	 animal	 husbandry,	
pearling	and	trading,	merchants	formed	the	economic	basis	and	therefore	wielded	certain	
political	influence.	Traditional	social	structures	were	organized	around	family	and	tribal	
lines,	with	nomadic	Bedouin	lifestyles	dominating	living	patterns	on	the	interior	and	the	
pearling	 industry	 and	 trade	 dominating	 the	 coastal	 areas.	 Families	 heeded	 lineage	 and	
claimed	authority	and	status	based	on	ancestry.	The	 concept	of	modern	 statehood	was	
largely	alien	given	the	diffuse,	 tribal	way	of	 life.	Yet,	a	governance	system	was	 in	place,	
whereby	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 ruling	 family	 would	 be	 responsible	 for	 the	 institutions	 and	
grievances	of	his	population	with	a	network	of	advisors	and	consultative	meeting	places.	
                                                            
23 Schwarz, Rolf. Ch. 13, “Rentier States and War‐Making: The United Arab Emirates and Iraq in Comparative 
Perspective,.”Omeje, Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the Global South, 223; Heard‐Bey, “The United Arab 
Emirates”; See also Martin Hvidt, “Public – Private Ties and Their Contribution to Development: The Case of 
Dubai,” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 4 (2007): 557, doi:10.1080/00263200701348862. 
24 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2011 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), 
http://milexdata.sipri.org. 
25 Saudi Arabia, in fact, had the highest military expenditure in the world in 2010. Ibid. 
26 Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies 
(State University of New York Press, 1999), 10–11; Schwarz in Omeje, Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the 
Global South. 
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Patrimonialism	was	thus	part	of	the	existing	social	structure,	with	tribal	rulers	maintaining	
reciprocally‐beneficial	relationships	with	merchants	and	the	commercial	elite.27		
The	effects	of	 the	collapse	of	 the	pearling	 industry	 in	 the	 interwar	period	on	the	
merchant	class	were	compounded	by	the	consequences	of	oil	revenues.	Whilst	merchants	
once	 underpinned	 the	 economic	 base	 of	 governance	 arrangements,	 oil	 reoriented	 the	
economy	toward	oil	companies	and	eliminated	the	necessity	of	rulers	to	rely	on	merchant	
families	for	dues.	Once	the	economy	was	dominated	by	oil,	the	merchants	were	no	longer	
integral	 to	 the	 production	 process.	 The	 vast	 levels	 of	 oil	 revenue	 rendered	 taxes	
unnecessary	and	alliances	less	central.	Ruling	families	could	in	effect	‘purchase’	the	loyalty	
of	trading	families.28	This	pattern	ultimately	sets	the	stage	for	the	rentier	social	contract,	a	
trade	off	whereby	political	rights	are	substituted	for	socio‐economic	welfare.	
Although	 a	 coherent	 “rentier	 state	 theory”	 does	 not	 exist,	 the	 description	 above	
encapsulates	the	common	narrative	on	rentier	economies	and	state	building.	Along	with	
this,	 there	are	a	body	of	general	hypotheses	concerning	the	effect	of	oil	on	political	and	
economic	development	in	developing	countries.	Most	Gulf	rentier	state	studies	incorporate	
varying	combinations	of	the	following	three	assertions:	(1)	state	autonomy	and	societal	
apathy;	(2)	institutional	weakness;	and	(3)	ubiquitous	rent	seeking.		
	
	
	
                                                            
27 See Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 1990; Herb, All in the Family. 
28 Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 1990, 6–11 and 44–46; Davidson, The United Arab Emirates, 34–37; Oliver 
Schlumberger, “Structural Reform, Economic Order, and Development: Patrimonial Capitalism,” Review of 
International Political Economy 15, no. 4 (n.d.): 622–649, doi:10.1080/09692290802260670. 
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2.1.1 State	autonomy	and	societal	apathy:	
The	first	category	of	hypotheses	relates	to	the	autonomy	which	characterizes	states	
that	receive	vast	external	income.	The	bulk	of	literature	on	rentier	states	has	centred	on	
this	category.	It	is	important	to	reiterate	that	rentier	states,	in	their	pure	form,	are	defined	
as	 states	 that	 receive	 more	 than	 40	 percent	 of	 their	 revenue	 from	 external	 sources.	
Crucially,	this	income	accrues	directly	to	the	government.29	Since	they	do	not	have	to	tax	
the	citizenry,	these	regimes	are	not	required	to	bargain	with	them.	The	assumption	is	that	
these	states	draw	on	resources	they	are	not	accountable	for,	 freeing	them	from	societal	
demands	 and	 bestowing	 with	 them	 discretionary	 policy	 making	 power.	 Scholars	
frequently	invert	the	common	adage,	“no	representation	without	taxation”	to	illustrate	this	
negative	relationship	between	state	income	independence	and	pluralism.30	Michael	Ross	
extends	 this	 idea	 to	 explain	 the	 absence	 of	 democracy	 in	 oil‐exporting	 countries,	
purporting	that	oil	in	fact	impedes	democracy.31	
Thus,	fiscal	power	allows	the	state	to	reconstruct	entire	parts	of	society,	moulding	
dependency.	This	 comprises	part	of	 the	 “ruling	bargain,”	 alluding	 to	 the	 social	 contract	
between	 rulers	 and	 ruled	 wherein	 the	 state	 commits	 to	 provide	 for	 the	 welfare	 of	 its	
citizens	in	exchange	for	their	acquiescence.	These	hypotheses,	therefore,	typically	remove	
                                                            
29 Beblawi and Luciani, The Rentier State, 69–72; Luciani, The Arab State, 87–88. This is an important component 
because it suggests that arguments which point to high remittance receiving countries as rentier are inaccurate. 
In fact, because remittances travel to the population and not to the government, hypotheses about state 
behaviour are null. In fact, these arguments render assumptions about rentier state behaviour analytically 
nebulous. 
30 Beblawi and Luciani, The Rentier State; Luciani, The Arab State; Tom Najem and Martin Hetherington, eds., 
Good Governance in the Middle East Oil Monarchies (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Herb, All in the Family; Crystal, Oil 
and Politics in the Gulf, 1990; Michael Herb, “No Representation Without Taxation? Rents, Development, and 
Democracy,” Comparative Politics 37, no. 3 (April 1, 2005): 297–316, doi:10.2307/20072891. 
31 Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”. 
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agency	from	the	citizenry.	Ultimately,	oil	wealth	is	assumed	to	shield	rentier	states	from	
internal	and	external	pressures	and	allow	them	decision‐making	autonomy.32		
As	a	whole,	this	literature	assumes	political	apathy	among	the	populace.	Because	
their	loyalty	has,	in	effect,	been	‘bought	off,’	social	groups	tend	to	be	content	with	the	status	
quo.	 So	 long	 as	 the	 rentier	 social	 contract	 persists,	 society	 is	 expected	 to	 remain	
complacent	because	its	economic	needs	are	attended	to.	There	is	no	expectation	that	the	
population	might	desire	a	greater	 say	 in	 the	 trajectory	of	 the	 state’s	 socio‐economic	or	
political	affairs.		
	
2.1.2 Institutional	Weakness:		
The	 second	 set	 of	 hypotheses	 suggests	 that	 externally‐generated	 income	 also	
hinders	the	development	of	strong	institutions	and	weakens	state	capacity.	The	magnitude	
of	 rent	 income	 inflates	 the	 size	 and	 role	 of	 the	 state.	 Within	 the	 state,	 the	 executive	
dominates	and	tends	to	weaken	the	autonomous	organizational	capacity	of	societies	in	that	
social	groups	become	dependent	on	the	state’s	distribution.	This	argument	suggests	that	
since	rentier	states	are	distributive	rather	than	extractive,	their	administrative	capacity	for	
regulating	 markets	 is	 lacking.	 This	 line	 of	 reasoning	 thus	 intimates	 that	 the	 level	 of	
bureaucratic	 interaction	 and	 information	 gathering	 are	 absent	 or	 weak	 in	 most	 cases,	
enervating	information	and	decision	making	processes.33		
                                                            
32 Beblawi and Luciani, The Rentier State; Mehran Kamrava, The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the 
First World War, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 2005); Schlumberger, Debating Arab Authoritarianism. 
33 Schwarz, “The Political Economy of State‐formation in the Arab Middle East,” 615; See chapters by Beblawi 
and Chatelus in Luciani, The Arab State. 
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Some	add	to	this	by	claiming	that	while	rentier	states	appear	“superficially	strong	
and	autonomous,”	they	are	in	reality	unable	to	effectively	cope	with	the	various	interests	
within	 the	 society.34	 These	 scholars	doubt	 the	 real	 developmental	 potential	 of	 rentiers,	
suggesting	that	heavy	oil	dependence	“tends	to	produce	institutional	arrangements	which	
are	 conducive	 neither	 to	 real	 economic	 development	 nor	 to	more	 transparent,	 citizen‐
responsive	 systems	 of	 governance	 that	 better	 adjudicate	 state/civil	 society	 tensions.”35		
That	 is,	 consumption	and	stability	 tends	 to	be	prioritized	over	actual	development	and	
industrialization,	distorting	economic	and	political	development.	For	example,	in	the	early	
days	Gulf	 rulers	provided	a	pretence	of	 industrialization	which	often	amounted	to	 little	
more	than	spending	sprees	and	redundant	projects	from	competitions	aimed	at	boosting	
prestige	 or	 leadership	 claims.36	 The	 appearance	 of	 development	 rather	 than	 the	
improvement	of	real	institutional	structure	and	capacity	takes	precedence.	
	
2.1.3 Ubiquitous	rent	seeking.		
“Rentierism”	is	not	limited	to	states.	Rather,	this	behaviour	extends	to	lower	levels	
of	society	creating	a	hierarchy	of	rent‐seeking.	The	culture	of	rent	seeking	derives	from	the	
tools	of	patronage	engaged	by	the	state	as	 it	redistributes	wealth	throughout	society.	A	
significant	component	of	this	allocative	activity	is	the	provision	of	government	jobs,	which	
in	 the	 Gulf	 comprise	 a	majority	 of	 citizen	 employment.	 Rent	 seeking	 thus	 begins	with	
bureaucratic	jobs	being	used	as	a	mode	of	state	patronage.	Steffen	Hertog	has	elaborated	
                                                            
34 Nazih N. Ayubi, Over‐stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (I.B.Tauris, 1996), 400. 
35 Donald L. Losman, “The Rentier State And National Oil Companies: An Economic And Political Perspective,” 
The Middle East Journal 64 (Summer 2010): 427, doi:10.3751/64.3.15. 
36 Michel Chatelus, “Policies for Development: Attitudes Toward Industry and Services,” in Beblawi and Luciani, 
The Rentier State, 112. 
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on	 these	 practices	 in	 some	 detail	 in	 his	 work	 on	 Saudi	 Arabia.37	 He	 suggests	 that	 the	
government	 hires	 citizens	 into	 the	 state	 apparatus	 as	 a	 means	 of	 co‐opting	 them	 and	
warranting	their	political	compliance.	In	so	doing,	webs	of	state	clients	are	automatically	
incorporated	into	patronage	networks	which	create	layers	of	patron‐client	relations	and	
extend	a	complex	of	this	clientelism	throughout	society.	This	behaviour	also	causes	what	
has	been	called	rentier	mentality.	A	rentier	mentality	emerges	from	a	disconnect	between	
work	 effort	 and	 reward,	 where	 wealth	 is	 the	 result	 of	 happenstance	 rather	 than	
productivity.38		
The	ubiquity	of	rent	seeking	also	complements	the	weak	state	capacity	argument.	
Insofar	as	there	is	an	abundance	of	riches	to	be	distributed	and	a	weak	capacity	to	regulate	
this	wealth,	there	is	an	expectation	that	slack	and	waste	will	be	substantial,	inferring	that	
there	will	be	a	significant	portion	of	unused	productive	capacity.	Individuals	become	more	
preoccupied	with	devising	strategies	to	obtain	rent	than	developing	specialized	skill	sets	
or	 engaging	 in	productive	behaviour.	 Productive	 activity	becomes	 a	 second	 rate	 choice	
after	 inclusion	 in	 the	 rent	 circuit.39	 Essentially,	 attaining	 a	 piece	 of	 the	 economic	 “pie”	
becomes	more	rewarding	 than	actual	productive	behaviour.	All	 sectors	of	 the	economy	
then	become	entrenched	with	these	rent‐seeking	patterns,	making	economic	activity	both	
inefficient	and	incapable	of	autonomy	from	state‐centred	distribution.40	
	
                                                            
37 Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Cornell University Press, 
2010). 
38 Beblawi in Luciani, The Arab State, 88. 
39 Chatelus in Beblawi and Luciani, The Rentier State, 110–111. 
40 Luciani, The Arab State; Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, The Arab Economies in a Changing World (Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, 2007), 30. 
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These	represent	the	more	common	assumptions	in	relations	to	development	and	
policy‐making	processes	within	rentier	states.	Much	of	this	literature,	primarily	focused	on	
the	Gulf,	tends	to	represent	the	area	as	something	exceptional,	traditional,	and	culturally	
separate.	 Its	 socio‐cultural	 orientation	 disconnected	 from	 modernity	 and	 its	 rentier	
economic	foundations	separating	it	from	more	conventional	development	processes.	This	
has	meant	that	political	economy	studies	on	the	region	have	been	rather	insular,	mostly	
focusing	on	broad	generalizations	of	rentier	consequences:	 the	state	autonomy,	societal	
apathy,	 the	pervasiveness	of	 rent	seeking,	and	 institutional	weakness	delineated	above.	
While	these	descriptions	have	been	useful	tools	to	understand	the	economic	organization	
of	the	region,	it	sidelines	alternative	processes	and	diminishes	the	significance	of	ideational	
change.	 Thus,	 although	 these	 assertions	 offer	 interesting	 insights	 into	 some	 aspects	 of	
rentier	state	behaviour,	they	fail	to	explain	specific	outcomes.	More	crucially,	they	do	not	
elucidate	 the	 rationale	 behind	 recent	 economic	 policy	moves.	 In	 general,	 they	 lack	 the	
theoretically	 rich	 insights	 available	 through	 in‐depth	 case	 studies	 and	 instead	 rely	 on	
broad	generalizations.		
	
3. Rentierism	and	Late‐late	Industrialization	
With	the	above	in	mind,	I	am	suggesting	here	the	placement	of	Gulf	development	in	
the	 context	 of	 broader	 development	 and	 political	 economy	 literature.	 Rather	 than	 just	
relying	 on	 insular	 works	 of	 the	 Gulf	 rentier	 state,	 this	 adds	 a	 useful	 theoretical	 and	
interpretive	 lens.	 In	 this	way,	 I	view	rentierism	as	 influencing	the	trajectory	of	 late‐late	
development	in	the	region	without	unquestioningly	accepting	the	rather	deterministic	and	
perfunctory	outcomes	attributed	to	rentier	states.	All	states	are	dynamic	and,	influenced	
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by	 global,	 regional,	 and	 local	 factors,	 have	 fluid	 social	 and	 governance	 patterns.	
Categorizing	Gulf	states	as	“late‐late	industrializers”	à	la	Atul	Kohli	and	Alice	Amsden	is	a	
facilitative	entry	 tool	 to	broader	development	discussions,	 and	a	 solution	 to	 the	absent	
agency	in	rentier	state	literature.41	
Thus,	I	suggest	that	along	with	understanding	the	predominant	paradigm	through	
which	we	view	 the	Gulf,	 answering	questions	 related	 to	a	political	economy	analysis	of	
development	paths	requires	this	research	be	situated	within	development	literature.	This	
literature	 set	 is	 preoccupied	 with	 understanding	 the	 choices	 made	 along	 the	 road	 to	
‘development.’	It	is	entwined	within	broader	political	economy	debates	surrounding	the	
role	of	the	state	and	the	market	in	development.	This	section	begins	with	a	brief	overview	
of	development	theory,	and	progresses	into	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	developmental	
state	literature	which	I	suggest	is	important	to	understand	in	relation	to	Gulf	development	
choices.	Finally,	it	integrates	Gulf	development	into	the	analysis.		
	
3.1 Brief	development	theory	background	
While	there	is	limited	space	to	do	development	theory	as	a	whole	any	justice,	three	
prominent	 schools	 of	 thought	 deserve	 mention	 before	 exploring	 developmental	 state	
theory:	 modernization,	 dependency	 and	 neoliberalism.42	 These	 aid	 in	 tracing	 the	 state	
                                                            
41 See Atul Kohli, State‐Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004) for a survey of late‐late industrialization in three separate case studies. See 
also: Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989); and Alice H. Amsden, The Rise of “The Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late‐Industrializing Economies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) for a discussion of late industrialization. 
42 Political economists and sociologists who study the history of development and political economy thought will 
be unsatisfied with the depth of this introductory discussion. A more detailed history tracing the origins of the 
thought to Karl Marx, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, and Ferdinand Tonnies, among others, through to the 
development of modernization and dependency would allow for a more rounded historical discussion. For the 
purpose of this dissertation, these ought to be noted but the focus remains on literature centred on more recent 
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versus	market	debate	in	relation	to	development	thinking	in	late	industrializers.	The	first,	
modernization	theory,	grew	out	of	the	tradition	of	classical	economic	liberalism,	stressing	
the	benefits	of	market‐led	development	and	the	contention	that	economic	 liberalization	
would	 lead	 to	 growth.	 It	 viewed	 development	 as	 a	 primarily	 linear	 process,	 whereby	
nations	 would	 progressively	 achieve	 different	 benchmarks.	 The	 assumption	 was	 that	
developing	 countries	 would	 “modernize”	 according	 to	 the	 same	 pattern	 as	 European	
countries	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 century.43	 One	 of	 the	 more	 common	 modernization	
trajectories	included	Rostow’s	growth	model.44		
Reacting	to	the	predictive	failure	of	modernization	theory,	a	variety	of	contending	
responses	developed.	One	of	 the	most	 tractable	 of	 these	 turned	out	 to	be	Dependency,	
which	grew	out	of	the	nationalist	thinking	and	economic	analysis	of	Raul	Prebisch	in	the	
1950s.	Whereas	neoclassical	growth	 theories	 like	modernization	suggest	 that	economic	
growth	 would	 be	 pareto	 optimal	 for	 all	 countries,	 economic	 growth	 in	 industrialized	
countries	often	resulted	in	economic	problems	in	poorer	ones.	Dependency’s	basic	premise	
was	that	resources	flow	from	the	underdeveloped	and	developing	countries	to	the	“core”	
wealthy	ones,	creating	situations	of	dependency.	The	impoverishment	of	the	developing	
world	 was	 the	 result	 of	 Western	 subjugation.	 Poorer	 countries	 were	 forced	 into	
subordinate	positions	in	which	they	became	dependent	on	Western	powers.45	
                                                            
developmental paths for their comparative value with the case under examination. Sociologists and other 
scholars of development history will find these interesting to pursue however. 
43 Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (W. W. Norton, 2007); J.N. 
Pieterse, Ch. 13, “Trends in Development Theory,” in Ronen Palan, ed., Global Political Economy: Contemporary 
Theories, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2000). 
44 Rostow’s stages of growth include: stages of growth: 1. The traditional society; 2. the pre take‐off stage; 3. 
take‐off; 4. the road to maturity; 5. the society of mass consumption. See Pieterse in Palan, 2000. 
45 One noteworthy dependency theorist was Brazil’s Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who later served two terms as 
president. Pieterse in Palan, Global Political Economy; Frieden, Global Capitalism, chap. 18. 
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With	the	1980s	came	a	resurgence	of	classical	economic	liberalism	in	the	form	of	
“neoliberalism.”	 Championing	 a	 belief	 that	 a	 free‐market	 economy	 is	 best	 suited	 to	
promoting	 economic	 development	 regardless	 of	 national	 socio‐political	 and	 economic	
environments,	 neoliberalism	 conceptualizes	 development	 as	 economic	 growth,	
corroborated	by	aggregate	economic	indicators.	In	this	view,	the	role	of	the	government	in	
economic	management	should	be	limited.	Otherwise,	states	will	develop	economic	policies	
which	 are	 “manifestly	 unworkable.”46	 These	 views	 shaped	 development	 thinking	 and	
policy	prescriptions	over	several	decades,	becoming	entrenched	in	the	recommendations	
of	International	Financial	Institutions	and	forming	the	foundation	of	structural	adjustment	
programmes	until	recently.47	
During	the	late	1980s	and	early	1990s	when	rentier	state	literature	was	just	gaining	
popularity	in	work	on	the	Middle	East	thanks	to	the	texts	of	Luciani	and	Beblawi	in	1987	
and	 1990,	 theorists	 of	 all	 stripes	 posited	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 oil	 on	 the	 Gulf.	 Whereas	
modernization	writers	expected	that	oil	would	attract	the	necessary	capital	to	stimulate	
economic	growth	and	contingent	democratic	political	development,	dependency	thinkers	
projected	that	because	oil‐based	development	relied	on	“unpredictable	markets”	it	would	
usher	in	“dependency	and	decline.”48	Both	contentions	contained	some	truth.	These	voices,	
coupled	with	neoliberalism,	seem	to	have	all	affected	the	trajectory	of	development	choices	
                                                            
46 Anne O. Krueger, “Government Failures in Development,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, no. 3 (July 
1, 1990): p. 
47 Andrew Walter and Gautam Sen, Analyzing the Global Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 2009); 
Frieden, Global Capitalism; Palan, Global Political Economy. 
48Cardoso and Faletto considered oil‐producing states as part of a group of “enclave economies.” These 
economies were forced into situations of reliance on the world market and could not control production 
because their economic output was controlled externally.  Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, 
Dependency and Development in Latin America, trans. Marjory Mattingly Urquidi (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1979), 70; Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 1990, 6. 
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in	the	region.	In	fact,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	fame	and	perceived	strong	explanatory	
power	of	rentier	state	work	was	partially	responsible	for	the	subsequent	segregation	of	
the	Gulf	from	broader	development	work.	
	Even	given	 this	 separation,	 the	 contestation	between	 the	voices	 that	 argued	 for	
more	foreign	investment	and	those	that	argued	for	economic	independence	continues	to	
resound	in	local	policy	circles	in	the	region	today.49	Yusif	Sayigh’s	work	provides	a	good	
example	of	this	narrative	and	the	attempt	to	reconcile	them.	Taking	dependency	theory	to	
task,	Sayigh	builds	upon	it	and	provides	what	ultimately	comprises	a	nationalist	vision	to	
development	 and	 integration	 in	 the	 global	 capitalist	 system	 –	 on	 national	 terms.	 	 The	
perspective	 offered	 here	 suggests	 that	 in	 reality	 dependency	 “is	 less	 a	 determinant	
international	 structure	 and	 more	 a	 set	 of	 shifting	 constraints	 within	 which	 individual	
nation‐states	have	room	to	manoeuvre.”50	This	is	reflective	of	Sayigh’s	entreaty	for	a	move	
from	dependent	to	self‐reliant	development	in	the	Middle	East.51	The	sentiment	that	Sayigh	
reflects	 in	 his	 entreaty	 for	 shifting	 from	 dependent	 to	 self‐reliant	 development	 in	 the	
Middle	 East	 is	 ensconced	 within	 developmental	 state	 theory.	 Indeed,	 the	 example	 of	
developmental	 states	 elucidates	 the	 shortfalls	 of	 earlier	 theories.	 Literature	 on	 the	
developmental	 state	emerged	as	an	explanation	of	 the	developmental	 successes	of	East	
Asian	 economies,	 and	 was	 situated	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 dissatisfaction	 with	 both	
neoclassical	growth	theories	and	socialism.	
	
	
                                                            
49 Yusif A. Sayigh, Elusive Development: From Dependence to Self‐Reliance in the Arab Region (Routledge, 1991). 
50 Pempel in Meredith Woo‐Cumings, ed., The Developmental State (Cornell University Press, 1999), 143. 
51 Sayigh, Elusive Development. 
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3.2 Origins	and	Evolution	of	Developmental	State	theory	
The	 notion	 of	 a	 developmental	 state	 is	 most	 commonly	 associated	 with	 the	
“miracle”	of	East	Asian	development.	The	term	was	first	coined	by	Chalmers	Johnson	in	
1982	in	reference	to	Japan	and	its	Ministry	of	International	Trade	and	Industry	(MITI).52	It	
has	 since	 evolved	 into	 a	 quasi‐model	 of	 development,	 theorizing	 about	 the	 paths	 to	
industrialization	 predicated	 on	 a	 unique	 mixture	 of	 strong	 state‐led	 development	
strategies	 and	 manipulation	 of	 market	 mechanisms	 to	 exploit	 capitalist	 development.	
Developmental	states,	as	defined	by	Adrian	Leftwich,	are	
...		states	whose	politics	have	concentrated	sufficient	power,	autonomy	and	capacity	
at	 the	 centre	 to	 shape,	 pursue	 and	 encourage	 the	 achievement	 of	 explicitly	
developmental	objectives,	whether	by	establishing	and	promoting	the	conditions	
and	 direction	 of	 economic	 growth,	 or	 by	 organising	 it	 directly,	 or	 a	 varying	
combination	of	both.53		
	
Similarly,	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 her	 book,	 Meredith	 Woo‐Cumings	 engages	 the	 term	
developmental	states	as	“short	hand	for	the	seamless	web	of	political,	bureaucratic,	and	
moneyed	 influences	 that	 structures	 economic	 life	 in	 capitalist	 Northeast	 Asia.”54	 She	
considers	the	emergence	of	developmental	states	as	primarily	a	response	to	the	problems	
associated	with	Western	economic	dominance,	and	 their	persistence	as	evidence	of	 the	
necessity	for	a	nation	to	sharpen	its	competitiveness	and	maintain	a	“residual	nationalism”	
in	the	face	of	globalization.55	Despite	their	corruption	and	inefficiency,	their	growth	and	
resilience	lend	validity	to	arguments	for	state‐guided	development	processes.56	It	is	indeed	
                                                            
52 Chalmers A. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925‐1975 (Stanford 
University Press, 1982). 
53 Adrian Leftwich, “Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State,” Journal of 
Development Studies 31, no. 3 (n.d.): 401, doi:10.1080/00220389508422370. 
54 Woo‐Cumings, The Developmental State, 1. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Woo‐Cumings, The Developmental State. 
Chapter 2    C. A. Ennis 
 
55 
 
within	the	context	of	seeking	a	unique	solution	to	development	that	responds	to	ideological	
poles	 mandating	 both	 nationalism	 and	 international	 economic	 integration	 that	 the	
developmental	state	emerged.			
There	is	neither	a	consensus	on	what	ultimately	constitutes	a	developmental	state	
nor	 on	 what	 qualifies	 a	 state	 to	 be	 one.	 In	 all	 assessments,	 however,	 these	 states	 are	
characterized	 by	 regular	 state	 intervention	 in	 economic	 activities	 in	 order	 to	 promote	
domestic	competitiveness.	Oriented	toward	developing	their	national	economy,	long‐term	
economic	 development	 is	 prioritized	 over	 short‐term	 growth	 even	 though	 both	 are	
desired.	As	opposed	to	only	building	on	existing	comparative	advantage,	developmental	
states	 strive	 to	 construct	 “competitive	 advantages.”57	 	 The	most	 common	 assumptions	
underpinning	development	state	theory	include	the	requirement	that	the	state	have	strong	
capacity,	an	effective	ability	to	shield	itself	from	societal	interests	(relative	autonomy),	an	
insulated	economic	bureaucracy	that	is	both	potent	and	capable,	an	industrial	policy	aimed	
at	 shifting	 from	 import	 substitution	 to	 export‐oriented	 industrialization,	 the	 mutual	
embeddedness	 of	 the	 state	 and	 society,	 and	 the	 embrace	 of	 market	 manipulation	 as	
opposed	to	the	“deified	Western	concept	of	‘the	market.’”58		
The	embeddedness	of	the	state	in	society	combined	with	autonomy	from	the	society	
is	what	 Peter	 Evans	 calls	 “embedded	 autonomy.”59	 In	 a	 developmental	 state,	 economic	
development	 is	 achieved	 not	 through	 pure	market	 behaviour	 but	 the	 state’s	 ability	 to	
                                                            
57 T.J. Pempel, “The Developmental Regime in a Changing World Economy,” in ibid., 139; K.S. Jomo, “Rethinking 
the Role of Government Policy in Southeast Asia,” in Joseph E. Stiglitz and Shahid Yusuf, eds., Rethinking the East 
Asian Miracle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
58 Pempel in Woo‐Cumings, The Developmental State, 157; Wonik Kim, “Rethinking Colonialism and the Origins 
of the Developmental State in East Asia,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 39 (August 2009): 384, 
doi:10.1080/00472330902944446; Peter B. Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton University Press, 1995), 47–
60; Leftwich, “Bringing Politics Back In.” 
59 Evans, Embedded Autonomy. 
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guide,	regulate	and	stimulate	the	market.	The	ability	of	the	state	to	embed	itself	in	society	
allows	it	to	establish	industrial	policies	that	maximise	both	industrial	and	social	interests	
vis‐à‐vis	high	economic	development.60	Autonomy	grants	the	state	decision‐making	power	
whilst	embeddedness	allows	it	to	make	good	decisions.	Embeddedness,	in	Evan’s	view,	is	
on	equal	footing	with	autonomy	and	both	must	be	present	in	a	developmental	state.	He	
notes,	
...	 it	 is	 worth	 underlining	 that	 either	 autonomy	 or	 embeddedness	may	 produce	
perverse	 results	 without	 the	 other.	Without	 autonomy,	 the	 distinction	 between	
embeddedness	 and	 capture	disappears.	Autonomy	by	 itself	 does	not	necessarily	
predict	an	interest	in	development,	either	in	the	narrow	sense	of	economic	growth	
or	in	the	broader	sense	of	improved	welfare.	The	secret	of	the	developmental	state	
lies	in	the	amalgam.61	
	
There	 is	 broad	 consensus	 that	 embedded	 autonomy	 constitutes	 an	 important	
characteristic	 of	 the	 developmental	 state.	 Nevertheless,	 some	 scholars	 reject	 the	 term	
developmental	 state	altogether	because	 it	 is	misleading	and	obfuscates	 that	many	such	
states	are	not	always	developmental	and	are	often	quite	“brutal.”62	Earlier	descriptions	of	
the	developmental	state,	however,	identify	“repression”	as	a	defining	component.63	These	
scholars	 attach	 repression,	 legitimacy	 and	 performance	 to	 their	 lists	 of	 identifying	
characteristics.64	 In	 fact,	 authoritarian	 features	 often	 fit	 in	 well	 with	 the	 autonomous	
character	of	economic	bureaucracies.65	
                                                            
60 Kim, “Rethinking Colonialism and the Origins of the Developmental State in East Asia,” 384. 
61 Evans, Embedded Autonomy, 59. 
62 Kohli, State‐Directed Development, 31. 
63 Leftwich, “Bringing Politics Back In.” 
64 Ibid. 
65 See Jeong‐Hyun Kim and Chi Huang, “Dynamics of State Strength and Policy Choices: A Case Study of South 
Korea and Taiwan,” Pacific Focus 6, no. 2 (September 1, 1991): 83–108, doi:10.1111/j.1976‐
5118.1991.tb00090.x; Simon Springer, “Renewed Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia: Undermining Democracy 
through Neoliberal Reform,” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 50, no. 3 (December 1, 2009): 271–276, doi:10.1111/j.1467‐
8373.2009.01400.x; and Leftwich, “Bringing Politics Back In.” 
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Many	 theorists	 claim	 that	 developmental	 states	 are	 limited	 to	 the	 East	 Asian	
countries	of	 Japan,	 South	Korea	and	Taiwan.	Others	 expand	 this	 to	 include	Hong	Kong,	
Malaysia,	 Singapore	 and	 Thailand.66	 Pempel,	 for	 instance,	 believes	 that	 only	 East	 Asian	
states	qualify	as	developmental.	Reflecting	his	sense	that	the	developmental	state	model	
“is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 easily	 implanted	by	 other	 countries,”	 developmental	 state	 theory	has	
received	significant	attention	for	the	“particularity,	not	universality,	on	which	it	is	based.”67	
Some	scholars	do	broaden	 the	application	however.	Whereas	Evans	 situates	Brazil	 and	
India	 as	 “intermediate,”	 that	 is,	 those	 in	 between	 developmental	 and	 predatory	 states,	
others	such	as	Leftwich	claim	that	developmental	states	“have	not	been	confined”	to	East	
Asia.68	Some	have	even	expanded	the	applicability	 to	non‐Asian	states	 that	experienced	
high	 growth	 rates	 like	 Botswana	 and,	 with	 qualifications,	 industrialized	 states	 like	
France.69	The	strength	of	developmental	state	theory	therefore	lies	in	its	admission	to	the	
“possibility	of	more	than	one	historical	path	to	economic	development,”	lending	credence	
to	 the	view	 that	 it	 is	not	overly	 restrictive	 in	 its	 applicability.	70	As	 such,	 it	has	become	
increasingly	popular	to	expand	the	concept	to	include	new	emerging	economies	today.		
	
3.3 Rentier	Revised?	Situating	the	Gulf	
Recently,	 two	 scholars	 have	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 integrating	 developmental	 state	
literature	 into	 analyses	 on	 the	 Gulf,	 Martin	 Hvidt	 and	 Steffen	 Hertog.	 Indeed,	 Hertog	
                                                            
66 Evans, Embedded Autonomy; Woo‐Cumings, The Developmental State. 
67 Kim, “Rethinking Colonialism and the Origins of the Developmental State in East Asia,” 384; Pempel in Woo‐
Cumings, The Developmental State, 138. 
68 Evans, Embedded Autonomy; Pempel in Woo‐Cumings, The Developmental State; Adrian Leftwich, States of 
Development: On the Primacy of Politics in Development (Wiley‐Blackwell, 2000), 168. 
69 Leftwich, States of Development, chap. 7; Michael Loriaux, “The French Developmental State as Myth and 
Moral Ambition,” in Woo‐Cumings, The Developmental State, 235–275. 
70 Pempel in Woo‐Cumings, The Developmental State, 140. 
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suggests	 that	 the	 Gulf	 states	 may	 represent	 an	 “idiosyncratic	 variation	 of	 the	
developmental	 state,	 leading	 national	 development	 through	 small	 teams	 of	 elite	
technocrats	by	way	of	targeted	technology	acquisition,	export	promotion,	infrastructure	
policies,	and	protectionist	measures.”71	He	does	not,	however,	go	much	beyond	suggesting	
this	association	in	his	conclusion.	Hvidt,	on	the	other	hand,	engages	the	concept	in	more	
detail	in	his	series	of	articles	on	Dubai.72	He	does	this	as	part	of	an	effort	to	develop	what	
he	 calls	 the	 “Dubai	model”	of	development,	which	he	 frames	using	Luciani’s	 allocation‐
production	 state	 dichotomy	 that	 he	 situates	 on	 a	 sliding	 scale.	He	 suggests	 that	Dubai,	
inspired	 by	 Singapore,	 represents	 a	 new	 development	 model	 in	 the	 Gulf.	 Even	 more	
recently,	Hvidt	has	suggested	that	there	are	attempts	to	replicate	the	Dubai	model	in	other	
Gulf	 countries	 and	 even	 suggests	 it	 may	 be	 “displacing	 the	 rentier	 state	 model.”73	 His	
conceptualization	of	rentier	state	literature	as	a	“model”	that	is	displaceable	is	problematic.	
The	rentier	state	is	a	theoretical	construction	based	on	observations	of	the	behaviour	of	
resource‐wealthy	states.	Rentierism	is	more	of	a	condition	than	a	series	of	characteristics	
a	state	can	view	and	choose	to	emulate.	Thus,	a	state	does	not	voluntarily	opt	to	be	rentier	
or	elect	to	follow	a	rentier	model.	Dubai’s	path,	in	contrast,	does	offer	a	series	of	practices	
that	a	state	can	choose	 to	 implement.	Nevertheless,	although	Dubai’s	development	may	
indeed	comprise	a	model	that	some	Gulf	states	are	emulating	to	varying	degrees	in	their	
largest	cities,	the	reality	that	Dubai	required	bail	out	money	by	Abu	Dhabi	may	interrupt	
the	claim	of	the	model’s	efficacy	and	the	desirability	of	its	replicability.	
                                                            
71 Hertog, “Defying the Resource Curse,” 293. 
72 Hvidt, “Public – Private Ties and Their Contribution to Development”; Hvidt, “The Dubai Model.” 
73 Martin Hvidt, “Economic and Institutional Reforms in the Arab Gulf Countries,” The Middle East Journal 65, no. 
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	Aside	 from	 this,	 new	ways	 of	 conceptualizing	 the	 Gulf	 states	 have	 begun	 to	 be	
engaged	 within	 the	 last	 decade.	 The	 Gulf	 has	 clearly	 undergone	 political	 economy	
transformations	during	this	time,	causing	a	small	flurry	of	academic	re‐engagement	among	
the,	albeit	small,	Gulf	studies	community.	Academics	such	as	Anoush	Ehteshami	and	Steven	
Wright	 note	 a	 gradual	 shift	 toward	political	 enfranchisement	 in	 some	 cases.74	 Ahn	Nga	
Longva	calls	the	Gulf	states	civic	ethnocracies	rather	than	autocracies	or	democracies,	and	
Adam	Hanieh	frames	the	Gulf	in	terms	of	class	politics	and	its	position	and	participation	in	
global	capital	movement.	75		Clearly,	scholars	are	searching	for	novel	ways	of	framing	and	
explaining	governance	in	the	Gulf.	During	the	2000s,	the	UAE	in	particular	was	pointed	to	
as	part	of	this	gradual	change	potential.	Similar	to	Hvidt,	Schwarz	suggests	that	the	United	
Arab	Emirates	has	
combined	 the	 positive	 attributes	 of	 a	 rentier	 state	 (huge	 oil	 investment	 and	
revenues)	 with	 those	 of	 a	 production‐oriented	 welfare	 state.	 The	 UAE	 have	
attempted	to	diversify	their	economy	and	to	attract	foreign	investments	as	part	of	
a	plan	for	the	post‐rentier	phase.	Their	policy	trajectory	shows	that	the	country	is	
leaving	 the	 rentier	 tendencies	 of	 the	 past	 behind,	 and	 that	 the	 foundations	 for	
lasting	stability	and	prosperity	have	been	laid.76		
	
Even	 Luciani	 seems	 to	 note	 changes	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 Gulf	 governance.	 Pointing	 to	 an	
expanding	role	for	the	business	class,	he	suggests	that	while	they	originally	comprised	a	
rent‐seeking,	crony	capitalist	class,	there	seems	to	be	development	within	the	corporate	
                                                            
74 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Steven Wright, “Political Change in the Arab Oil Monarchies: From Liberalization 
to Enfranchisement,” International Affairs 83, no. 5 (September 2007): 913–932, doi:10.1111/j.1468‐
2346.2007.00662.x. 
75 Ahn Nga Longva, “Neither Autocracy nor Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and the Socio‐
Political System in Kuwait,” in Paul Dresch and James Piscatori, Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and 
Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (I. B. Tauris, 2005), 114–135; Adam Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf 
Arab States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
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Chapter 2    C. A. Ennis 
 
60 
 
world	causing	a	more	empowered	entrepreneurial	bourgeoisie	to	develop	as	a	result	of	
partnerships	between	FDI	and	locals.77		
Recent	 literature	 also	 adds	a	 twist	 to	 the	 rentier	 assumption	of	 state	 autonomy.	
Much	of	the	new	work	often	points	to	the	case	of	Saudi	Arabia.78	This	case	is	used	to	suggest	
that	the	state	is	never	actually	fully	autonomous	from	society	in	that	there	needs	to	be	a	
broad	popular	agreement	or	compliance	to	the	ruling	establishment.	This	is	because	Saudi	
Arabia	has	to	appeal	to	a	variety	of	societal	actors,	ranging	from	princes	to	the	religious	
establishment,	as	a	means	of	maintaining	its	governing	legitimacy	and	political	stability.79	
Along	with	these,	there	are	more	recent	works,	from	a	variety	of	disciplines,	which	look	
beyond	oil	in	their	analyses.	These	refreshing	studies	form	part	of	an	emerging	and	positive	
trend	 in	re‐examining	the	Gulf	 through	multiple	 lenses	and	avoiding	 the	reductionism	I	
criticize	 here.80	 Those	 who	 do	 employ	 the	 topic	 of	 oil	 see	 its	 use	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 regime	
legitimacy.	In	this	regard,	Toby	Craig	Jones	argues	that	oil	resources	(among	others)	are	
utilized	in	such	a	way	as	to	reinforce	the	legitimacy	of	the	al‐Sauds.	Marc	Valeri	engages	a	
similar	line	of	argument	with	regard	to	Oman	and	the	legitimization	of	Sultan	Qaboos	by	
                                                            
77 Giacomo Luciani. Chapter 10: “Linking Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East: The Role of the 
Bourgeoisie,” in Schlumberger, Debating Arab Authoritarianism, 161–176. 
78 In fact, if any empirically detailed case studies are engaged in rentier arguments the case of choice tends to be 
Saudi Arabia. See, for example: Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi 
Arabia (Harvard University Press, 2010); Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats; Tim Niblock and Monica 
Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (Routledge, 2007); Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking 
on the Saudi Oil Frontier (London: Verso, 2009). 
79 Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, Saudi Arabia in the Balance : Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs 
(Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 2005); Niblock and Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi 
Arabia; Madawi Al‐Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
80 Sean Foley, The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010); Hanieh, Capitalism 
and Class in the Gulf Arab States; Adam Hanieh, “Khaleeji‐Capital: Class‐Formation and Regional Integration in 
the Middle‐East Gulf,” Historical Materialism 18, no. 2 (2010): 35–76, doi:10.1163/156920610X512435; Jones, 
Desert Kingdom; Ahmed Kanna, “A Politics of Non‐Recognition? Biopolitics of Arab Gulf Worker Protests in the 
Year of Uprisings,” Interface 4, no. 1 (May 2012): 146–164; Ahmed Kanna, Dubai: The City As Corporation 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). 
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the	means	of	the	welfare	state.81	Still,	 this	conceptualization	of	state	autonomy	is	only	a	
slight	inversion	of	the	more	classical	use	of	the	rentier	ruling	bargain.	In	these	accounts	the	
rulers,	by	virtue	of	their	oil	resources,	are	able	to	function	with	significant	autonomy	from	
society	 even	 if	 the	 use	 of	 resources	 is	 operationalized	 in	 a	 way	 as	 to	 avoid	 popular	
discontent.	 Thus,	 rather	 than	 differing	 significantly	 from	 rentier	 arguments,	 these	
contribute	to	a	growing	body	of	literature	expanding	upon	them	and	deepening	the	level	
of	analysis.			
Despite	 the	 acknowledgements	 of	 change	 in	 recent	work	on	 the	Gulf	mentioned	
above,	attachments	to	rentier	state	generalizations	remain	predominant	within	political	
economy	studies	of	the	region.	As	well,	there	is	a	split	between	two	interpretations	of	Gulf	
state	behaviour	and	economic	policy	making,	one	which	suggests	that	reform	and	policy	
change	 are	motivated	 by	 regime	 security	 and	 the	 other	 which	 attributes	 reforms	 to	 a	
genuine	 development	 motivation.	 The	 first	 view	 contends	 that	 economic	 reforms	 are	
undertaken	 as	 regime	 survival	 strategies	 and	 serve	more	 as	 “a	 political	 project	 for	 the	
modernization	 of	 authoritarian	 rule”	 than	 a	 project	 for	 economic	 development.82	
Accordingly,	rentier	states	pursue	economic	reform	in	response	to	domestic	unrest	to	quell	
social	 discontent	 and	 maintain	 autonomy	 from	 the	 population.83	 This	 view	 attributes	
reform	in	the	1980s	to	internal	unrest	given	economic	troubles	resulting	from	the	oil	price	
decline,	the	establishment	of	trading	zones	in	the	1990s	to	a	desire	to	improve	relations	
                                                            
81 Jones, Desert Kingdom; Marc Valeri, Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State (London: Hurst Publishers, 
2009), 71–94. 
82 Schlumberger, “Structural Reform, Economic Order, and Development,” 630; Alan Richards and John 
Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, Third (Westview Press, 2007), 261. 
83 F H Lawson, “Economic Liberalization and the Reconfiguration of Authoritarianism in the Arab Gulf States,” 
Orient 46, no. 1 (2005): 19–43. 
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with	 the	 merchant	 community,	 and	 the	 establishment	 and/or	 reconfiguration	 of	
consultative	councils	to	an	attempt	at	improving	ties	between	the	ruling	families	and	the	
business	elite.84	As	such,	Fred	Lawson	suggests	that	the	commercial	elite	are	connected	to	
economic	decision	making	when	their	inclusion	is	deemed	facilitative	toward	stability	and	
regime	 durability.85	 Structural	 reform,	 in	 Oliver	 Schlumberger’s	 terms,	 resulted	 in	
capitalist	but	non‐market	economies.86	
The	 second	 view	 diverges	 slightly	 from	 the	 first,	 and	 seems	 to	 imply	 a	 genuine	
commitment	 to	 development	 and	 progress.	 These	 assessments	 point	 to	 the	 Gulf’s	 pro‐
capitalist	 orientation	 and	 political	 autonomy.	 The	 development	 of	 deep	 systems	 of	
patronage	across	Gulf	society	has	generated	a	strong	mutual	embeddedness	between	the	
corporate	elite	and	ruling	families	which	extends	beyond	rent	seeking.	Some	even	suggest	
a	process	in	which	the	business	class	“divorces	itself	from	rentier	politics.”87	This	has	also	
allowed	them	to	build	a	striking	number	of	“pockets	of	efficiency”	in	such	areas	as	state‐
owned	 enterprises	 (SOEs).88	 These	 evolutions	 coincide	 with	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	
developmental	 states	 outlined	 in	 section	 3.2.	 Like	 other	 developmental	 states,	 the	 Gulf	
rentiers	 have	 a	 strong	 capacity	 to	 shield	 themselves	 from	 society,	 and	 direct	 national	
development	 autonomously.	Moreover,	 they	have	 closely	 linked	 economic	 and	 security	
policies	with	 the	US.	GCC	countries	rely	heavily	on	 technocratic	economic	planning	and	
have	been	successful	at	preventing	the	working	classes	from	engaging	in	politics.89		Though	
                                                            
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., 29–32. 
86 Schlumberger, “Structural Reform, Economic Order, and Development.” 
87 Bessma Momani, “Shifting Gulf Arab Investments into the Mashreq: Underlying Political Economy Rationales?” 
in Legrenzi and Momani, Shifting Geo‐economic Power of the Gulf, 163. 
88 Hertog, “Defying the Resource Curse.” 
89 Ibid., 293–294; Pempel in Woo‐Cumings, The Developmental State; Leftwich, “Bringing Politics Back In.” 
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still	largely	accurate	given	the	two‐tier	labour	market,	this	resonates	less	strongly	today	
with	the	rising	frequency	of	worker	strikes	and	mobilization	in	several	Gulf	states	among	
both	expatriate	and	national	populations.90	
Whereas	 the	 one	 view	 grants	 society	 limited	 agency,	 the	 other	 removes	 it	
altogether,	 affording	 greater	 credence	 to	 the	 belief	 in	 the	 weakness	 of	 civil	 society	
throughout	the	region.	This	is	rooted	in	the	historical	story	of	severe	underdevelopment	in	
the	pre‐oil	era	which	bestowed	unprecedented	power	to	ruling	families	once	oil	conferred	
them	 fiscal	 autonomy.	 	 This	 view	 fits	 comfortably	within	 the	 Coxian	 definition	 of	 state	
corporatism,	suggesting	the	power	of	the	state		
in	 the	 hands	 of	 political	 leadership,	 predominates	 over	 both	 management	 and	
labour	 without	 there	 being	 any	 effective	 counterweight	 through	 parliamentary	
control	or	accountability.	This	mode	of	social	relations	of	production	accordingly	is	
to	be	found	in	countries	where	liberal	political	institutions	and	competitive	party	
politics	 have	 been	 suppressed	 or	 are	 only	 formal	 and	 where	 semiautonomous	
organizations	of	employers	and	workers	exist	or	are	created	under	state	tutelage	…	
State	corporatism	is	essentially	a	preemptive	political	form	of	social	control.91		
	
While	this	notion	seems	suitable,	the	claim	of	a	weakness	or	absence	of	civil	society	in	the	
region	fails	to	account	for	the	political	opposition	throughout	Bahrain,	Kuwait	and	Saudi	
Arabia	and	the	mobilization	of	grass	roots	demonstrations	of	discontent	in	four	of	six	GCC	
                                                            
90 See, for example Iman Al‐Quwaifili, “Saudi Labor Strikes: Rebirth of a Suppressed Tradition,” Al Akhbar English, 
January 16, 2012, http://english.al‐akhbar.com/content/saudi‐labor‐strikes‐rebirth‐suppressed‐tradition; 
Praveen Menon, “Labour Strikes Erupt in Dubai,” The National, August 31, 2009, 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae‐news/labour‐strikes‐erupt‐in‐dubai; “Arabtec’s Dubai‐based Workers End 
Wages Strike,” Arabian Business, January 27, 2011, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/arabtec‐s‐dubai‐based‐
workers‐end‐wages‐strike‐‐376656.html; “Expat Workers Lodge Complaint on Non‐payment of Salaries,” Muscat 
Daily, January 10, 2012, http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Expat‐workers‐lodge‐complaint‐on‐non‐
payment‐of‐salaries; “Over 2,200 Workers Strike Work over ‘unpaid Salaries’,” Muscat Daily, March 5, 2012, 
http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Over‐2‐200‐workers‐strike‐work‐over‐unpaid‐salaries; Sunil K. 
Vaidya, “Oman Petrol Company Workers Go on Strike,” Gulf News, May 27, 2012, 
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/oman‐petrol‐company‐workers‐go‐on‐strike‐1.1028296; Saleh Al‐
Shaibany, “Thousands of South Asian Workers Strike at Oman Airport,” Reuters, March 12, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/12/us‐oman‐strike‐idUSBRE92B0X320130312. 
91 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (Columbia 
University Press, 1987), 80–81. 
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states	during	the	Arab	Spring	of	2011.	It	also	marginalizes	the	emergence	of	transnational	
civil	society	networks	that	have	been	facilitated	by	regionalism	and	organized	on	a	Gulf‐
wide	basis,	in	some	cases	for	many	decades.92			
In	fact,	in	some	ways	both	views	complement	each	other;	suggesting	that	whatever	
the	 underlying	motivation,	 economic	 policy	 making	 is	 elite	 driven	 in	 the	 Gulf.	 Neither	
grants	much	credence	to	popular	agency.	The	first	school	of	thought	contends	that	decision	
making	is	comprised	primarily	of	ad	hoc	responses	to	internal	(domestic)	concerns.	The	
other	 suggests	 that	 the	 elite	 have	 real	 developmental	 interests	 and	 facilitate	 certain	
consultation	and	compromises	both	to	engender	development	progress	and	to	maintain	
national	stability	and	regime	longevity.	Rulers	are	thus	perceived	as	benevolent	dictators	
who	quash	dissent	when	necessary.	In	my	view,	this	is	reflective	of	the	conventional	theory	
of	 the	 developmental	 state	 prior	 to	 democratic	 reform.	 Speaking	 about	 contemporary	
developmental	states,	Leftwich	notes	that		
Combining	varying	degrees	of	repression	and	legitimacy,	where	civil	society	is	weak	
or	 weakened,	 these	 states	 have	 concentrated	 considerable	 power,	 authority,	
autonomy	 and	 competence	 in	 the	 central	 political	 and	 especially	 bureaucratic	
institutions	 of	 the	 state,	 notably	 their	 economic	 bureaucracies,	 and	 they	 have	
generated	 pervasive	 ‘infrastructural	 capacity’	 (Mann,	 1986)	 to	 achieve	 their	
developmental	objectives.	This	has	enhanced	 the	capacity	of	 these	states	 to	deal	
authoritatively	 and	 not	 dependently	 with	 both	 domestic	 and	 especially	 foreign	
economic	interests	in	pursuit	of	national	developmental	objectives.93		
	
Studies	indicate	the	importance	of	institutional	capability	in	ensuring	long‐run	economic	
growth	and	suggest	that	those	with	high	levels	of	institutional	capability	experience	more	
rapid	 growth	 than	 those	 without.	 Institutional	 capability	 can	 impact	 growth	 through	
                                                            
92 Matteo Legrenzi, “Did the GCC Make a Difference? Institutional Realities and (Un)Intended Consequences,” in 
Cilja Harders and Matteo Legrenzi, Beyond Regionalism?: Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization 
in the Middle East (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008), 107–124. 
93 Leftwich, States of Development, 168. 
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investment	and	through	the	allocation	of	resources.94	Although	this	is	a	factor	for	all	states,	
the	strength	of	a	state’s	institutional	infrastructure	necessarily	impacts	the	effectiveness	of	
its	 developmental	 aims.	 Given	 the	 perceived	 inherent	 institutional	weakness	 of	 rentier	
states,	this	contention	is	especially	significant	for	them.	Interestingly	Gulf	countries	ranked	
the	highest	in	institutional	quality	in	the	Middle	East	North	Africa	(MENA)	region.95	They	
have	even	been	successful	in	constructing	efficient	SOEs.96	Whether	these	developments	
are	 motivated	 by	 regime	 security	 or	 by	 a	 genuine	 development	 motivation	 remains	
contested	in	the	literature.	The	next	few	chapters	of	this	study	contribute	to	this	debate	by	
further	interrogating	policy	motivations	in	GCC	countries.	
	 Despite	the	lack	of	agreement	on	the	underlying	motivation(s)	 for	policy	change,	
contemporary	Gulf	 scholars	are	 indicating	 that	 rentier	systems	appear	 to	be	evolving.97	
Hertog	 notes	 that	 rent‐seeking	 is	 in	 decline	 and	 more	 sophisticated	 systems	 of	
redistribution	 and	 brokerage	 are	 developing.98	 Claiming	 that	 the	 ‘secular	 decline”	 of	
brokerage	 systems	 in	 the	 Gulf	 is	 “politically	 significant,”	 he	 suggests	 that	 “given	 the	
increasing	nationalization	of	private	labour	markets,	progressive	liberalization	of	business	
regulations,	and,	in	some	areas	at	least,	maturation	of	bureaucracy,	levels	of	brokerage	are	
bound	to	decline.”99	Onn	Winckler	and	Giacomo	Luciani	mirror	this	sentiment	and	point	to	
the	private	sector	business	community	as	eventual	provocateurs,	gradually	transforming	
                                                            
94 John Page and Linda Van Gelder, Chapter 2, “Missing Links: Institutional Capability, Policy Reform, and Growth 
in the Middle East and North Africa,” in Hassan Hakimian and Ziba Moshaver, The State and Global Change: The 
Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East and North Africa (Routledge, 2001). 
95 Page and Van Gelder in ibid., 30–31. 
96 Hertog, “Defying the Resource Curse.” 
97 See the essays included in Legrenzi and Momani, Shifting Geo‐economic Power of the Gulf. 
98 See Steffen Hertog, “The Sociology of the Gulf Rentier Systems: Societies of Intermediaries,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 52, no. 02 (2010): 282–318, doi:10.1017/S0010417510000058. 
99 Ibid., 314. 
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the	 nature	 of	 state‐business	 relations.100	 In	 fact,	 examining	 entrepreneurship	 within	
developing	 country	 contexts	 has	 been	 part	 of	 development	 research	 for	 the	 past	 few	
decades.	Development	theorists	and	rentier	state	theorists	have	posited	on	the	role	of	the	
business	classes	in	development	and	reform.101	There	is	much	debate	concerning	whether	
and	under	what	conditions	entrepreneurs	may	support	reform.	Several	scholars,	however,	
do	emphasize	that	in	the	Gulf	context	the	business	community	cannot	be	understood	as	an	
agent	for	change.	While	they	may	push	for	liberalization	when	beneficial,	many	note	their	
seemingly	duplicitous	desire	 for	 the	maintenance	of	 illiberal	 political	 orders	 as	 long	 as	
economic	reform	continues	in	their	favour.102	Thus	despite	any	agency	some	may	attribute	
to	them,	the	business	elite	may	not	actually	be	change	agents.	Later	chapters	speak	to	this	
contention,	between	entrenched	business	 interests	 and	 the	promotion	of	new	business	
hopefuls.		
The	promotion	of	 entrepreneurship,	 especially	 among	 the	millennial	 generation,	
arguably	contains	potential	for	shaking	the	assumption	of	a	stagnant	business	community	
in	favour	of	the	status	quo	as	we	move	into	the	future.	This	is	assessed	in	greater	detail	in	
chapter	 four.	 State	 intervention	 through	 policies	 which	 advocate	 and	 support	
entrepreneurship	and	 innovation	may	ultimately	 fashion	certain	social	norms.	To	some	
extent,	 this	 is	 the	 policy	 intention	 especially	with	 regard	 to	 attempts	 at	 inculcating	 an	
                                                            
100 Onn Winckler, “Labor and Liberalizaton: The Decline of the GCC Rentier System,” in Teitelbaum, Political 
Liberalization in the Persian Gulf; Luciani in Schlumberger, Debating Arab Authoritarianism. 
101 See for example,Peter B. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local 
Capital in Brazil (Princeton University Press, 1979); Eva Rana. Bellin, “Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, 
Labor, and Democratization in Late‐Developing Countries,” World Politics 52, no. 2 (2000): 175–205; S. 
Greenwood, “Bad for Business?: Entrepreneurs and Democracy in the Arab World,” Comparative Political Studies 
41, no. 6 (November 2007): 837–860, doi:10.1177/0010414007300123. 
102 See Greenwood, “Bad for Business?”; and Giacomo Luciani, Chapter 10: “Linking Economic and Political 
Reform in the Middle East: The Role of the Bourgeoisie,” in Schlumberger, Debating Arab Authoritarianism, 161–
176. 
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entrepreneurial	culture	through	education	and	training.	At	the	same	time	however,	just	as	
states	mould	their	own	societies,	they	are	also	“moulded	by	them.”103	When	social	change	
occurs,	it	can	impact	strata	from	the	bottom	to	the	top.	Social	change	impacts	a	state	no	
matter	how	autonomous	one	may	believe	it	to	be.	Indeed,	since	“industrialization	involves	
social	change,”104	one	cannot	disconnect	these	dual	processes	from	the	other.	It	stands	to	
reason	 that	 the	 Gulf	 state’s	 promotion	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 may	 have	
unintended	consequences	in	terms	of	social	change.105		
In	some	regards,	both	developmental	state	theory	and	rentier	state	literature	can	
be	accused	of	suffering	the	same	elite	centricism	and	statism,	which	risk	overlooking	social	
transformation.	A	 great	 deal	 of	 faith	 is	 placed	 in	 the	 autonomy	of	 the	 state.	One	 noted	
development	 scholar,	 Kohli,	 has	 suggested	 that	 the	 ability	 of	 researchers	 to	 build	
satisfactory	explanations	of	development	patterns	in	late‐late	industrializers	is	challenged	
by	a	limited	focus	on	social	conditions.	This	accusation	also	resonates	for	Gulf	cases.	Whilst	
noting	the	importance	of	analyzing	development	patterns	in	light	of	social	conditions,	such	
as	level	of	education,	Kohli	simultaneously	expresses	reservations	around	the	efficacy	to	
which	one	can	carry	out	such	analysis	since	social	factors	so	regularly	come	under	state	
intervention.	 	 Areas	 ranging	 from	 labour	 practices	 and	 ethics	 to	 education	 levels	 and	
quantity	 of	 entrepreneurs	 are	 often	 impacted	 by	 state	 intervention.	 He	 thus	 suggests	
placing	 the	 analytical	 focus	on	 “variations	 in	 the	patterns	of	 state	 intervention.”106	 This	
study	responds	 to	 this	 suggestion	by	examining	 the	practices	of	 the	state	promotion	of	
                                                            
103 Kohli, State‐Directed Development, 372. 
104 Ibid., 8. 
105 See Polyani’s classic text for a description of change in social and economic organization. Karl Polanyi, The 
Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press, 2001). 
106 Kohli, State‐Directed Development, 371. 
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entrepreneurship	and	 innovation	 in	Gulf	countries,	and	delineating	their	experiences	 in	
the	“promotion	and	policing”	of	these.107	
		
4. Reading	Innovation	in	Developmentalism	
Traditionally,	developmental	states	are	more	focused	on	production.	The	challenge	
in	the	Gulf,	as	we	delineate	here,	is	its	limited	productive	capacity.	It	seems	odd	that	states	
so	 oriented	 toward	 allocation	 or	 distribution	 could	 be	 cast	 in	 similar	 terms	 with	
developmental	states.	Yet,	it	is	the	inherent	developmentalism	in	their	language	and	the	
attempts	 at	 guiding	 and	 stimulating	 economic	 activity	 toward	 different	 aims	 that	 has	
prompted	scholars	such	as	Hvidt	to	engage	this	debate.	As	pointed	out	in	the	introduction	
to	 this	 dissertation,	Gulf	 states	 today	 are	 focusing	 their	 development	 visions	 and	plans	
toward	technological	innovation	and	the	knowledge	economy.	In	this	sense,	they	are	trying	
to	jump	onto	a	neo‐developmental	path,	admiring	the	successes	and	embracing	some	of	
the	patterns	 from	their	Eastern	neighbours.	Significantly	 though,	Gulf	states	seem	to	be	
looking	to	ideas	around	the	knowledge	economy,	and	more	specifically,	entrepreneurial	
growth,	as	a	cure	to	economic	concerns	in	the	absence	of	diversified	industrialization.	
It	is	true	that	the	nature	of	the	economy	today	has	changed	the	developmental	state	
from	its	earlier	days	with	its	focus	on	production	and	industrialization.	Trade	for	instance,	
has	been	surpassed	by	international	financial	flows	and	rises	in	FDI.108	The	Gulf	region	has	
been	no	stranger	to	this	trend,	despite	its	more	limited	industrial	base.	Joint	ventures	and	
FDI	in	the	Gulf’s	petrochemical,	aluminium,	and	other	similar	industries	are	a	case	in	point.	
                                                            
107 See chapter 5, Evans, Embedded Autonomy. 
108 V. Spike Peterson, A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive and 
Virtual Economies (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 56. 
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Likewise,	 the	growing	 financialization	of	 the	region	has	been	commented	on	by	several	
scholars.109	Along	with	this	change,	across	the	globe	FDI	has	been	shifting	to	services	while	
simultaneously	moving	away	from	raw	materials	and	manufacturing	since	the	late	1990s.	
This	investment	environment	has	only	intensified	since	then	and	can	be	linked	to	changes	
in	 technological	 developments,	 new	 production	 processes,	 and	 the	 size	 and	 flow	 of	
international	 financial	 capital.	 The	 investment	 environment	 now	 privileges	 short‐term	
commitments,	 trade	 in	services,	global	 financial	markets,	and	securities.110	Emphasis	on	
innovation	 and	 the	 knowledge	 economy	has	 replaced	 the	 stress	 on	manufacturing	 and	
industrialization	as	 the	perceived	means	 through	which	 to	engage	globalization	 toward	
developmental	aims.		
This	 final	 section	 reviews	 development	 literature	 around	 innovation	 and	
entrepreneurship,	and	follows	this	with	a	discussion	of	the	use	of	entrepreneurship	in	the	
Gulf	context.			
	
4.1 On	Innovation	and	Entrepreneurship	
The	discussion	of	innovation	utilized	throughout	this	dissertation	sits	at	the	nexus	
of	theory	and	policy	worlds.	Since	I	am	engaging	innovation	in	reference	to	policy,	I	begin	
with	the	technical	rather	than	theoretical	definition	as	used	by	the	World	Bank.	Holding	
that	innovation	does	not	necessarily	have	to	be	new	in	“absolute	terms,”	the	World	Bank	
                                                            
109 See articles in collected volume by Legrenzi and Momani, Shifting Geo‐economic Power of the Gulf; Seznec 
and Kirk, Industrialization in the Gulf;  and Jean‐François Seznec, “The Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds: Myths and 
Reality,” Middle East Policy 15, no. 2 (June 2008): 97–110, doi:10.1111/j.1475‐4967.2008.00352.x. 
110 Peterson, A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy, 56–57. 
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defines	 innovation	 as	 “technologies	 or	 practices	 that	 are	 new	 to	 a	 given	 society.”111	
Innovation,	in	this	view,	is	not	only	derived	from	high	technology,	but	also	“low–technology	
developments	 and	 the	 exploitation	 of	 indigenous	 knowledge.”	 Innovations	 thus	 “come	
from	 entrepreneurs	 who	 make	 them	 happen	 and	 ultimately	 depend	 upon	 a	 society’s	
receptiveness.	 Innovation,	 therefore,	 is	 fundamentally	 a	 social	 process.”112	 Innovation	
should	be	promoted,	in	this	view,	because	it	improves	economic	growth,	competitiveness,	
and	welfare.	
The	 study	 of	 innovation	 and	 innovation	 systems	 is	 intricately	 connected	 to	 the	
study	of	development	and	developmental	states.	During	the	1950s,	scholars	like	Solow	and	
Abrahamovitz	 identified	 a	 link	 between	 technological	 advances	 and	 economic	 growth,	
which	 has	 been	 attributed	with	 prompting	 questions	 around	 the	 role	 of	 innovation	 in	
development.113	One	can	even	trace	the	roots	of	the	discussion	further	back	to	Friedrich	
List’s	 idea	of	a	national	system	of	political	economy.114	The	study	of	national	systems	of	
innovation	began	 in	earnest	 in	 the	1980s	and	1990s	with	works	by	Freeman,	Lundvall,	
Metcalfe,	and	Leydesdorff	along	with	work	on	competitive	advantage	by	entrepreneurship	
guru	Michael	Porter.115	A	common	thread	which	extends	through	this	genre	of	works	is	the	
                                                            
111 Innovation Policy: A Guide for Developing Countries (Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development / World Bank, 2010), 4, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2460/548930PUB0EPI11C10Dislosed06131201
0.pdf?sequence=1. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Robert M. Solow, “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 70, 
no. 1 (February 1, 1956): 65–94, doi:10.2307/1884513; Moses Abrahamovitz, “Resource and Output Trends in 
the United States Since 1870,” American Economic Review 46, no. 2 (1956): 3–23; Jeffrey L. Furman and Richard 
Hayes, “Catching up or Standing Still?,” Research Policy 33, no. 9 (November 2004): 1332, 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2004.09.006. 
114 Friedrich List, National System of Political Economy: Three Volumes in One, Original 1841 (Cosimo Classics, 
2011). 
115 Chris Freeman, “The ‘National System of Innovation’ in Historical Perspective,” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 19, no. 1 (February 1, 1995): 5 –24; Bengt‐Ake Lundvall, National Systems of Innovation: Toward a 
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idea	of	“catching	up”	or	developing.	It	was	this	concern	which	prompted	List’s	analysis	of	
Germany’s	ability	to	catch	up	to	England	just	as	this	was	the	primary	concern	of	literature	
assessing	 how	 newly	 industrializing	 states	 could	 catch	 up	 with	 industrialized	 ones.		
Different	eras,	but	similar	development	enquires.		
The	focus	on	innovation	has	intensified	in	the	last	several	decades,	and	has	been	
coupled	 with	 theorizing	 around	 entrepreneurship	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 entrepreneur.116	
Scholars	like	Audretsch	and	Thurik	claim	that	new	firms	play	a	key	role	in	technological	
development.	 In	 their	view,	 this	role	has	been	enhanced	by	the	declining	 importance	of	
scale	 economies	 and	 rising	 levels	 of	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 global	 economic	 environment,	
allowing	space	for	innovation.117	The	central	idea	is	that	traditional	industrial	policies	have	
lost	their	effectiveness	as	policy	instruments	in	the	face	of	both	globalization	and	the	notion	
that	a	knowledge	economy	 is	 the	source	of	competitiveness	and	economic	growth.118	 In	
                                                            
Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning, (2010) ed. (London and New York: Anthem Press, 1992); Michael 
E. Porter, Competitive Advantage of Nations (Simon and Schuster, 1998); Carlsson, “Internationalization of 
Innovation Systems: A Survey of the Literature,” Research Policy 35, no. 1 (2006): 56–67; J. S. Metcalfe, 
“Technology Systems and Technology Policy in an Evolutionary Framework,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 19, 
no. 1 (February 1, 1995): 25–46; Loet Leydesdorff, “‘While a Storm Is Raging on the Open Sea’: Regional 
Development in a Knowledge‐based Economy,” The Journal of Technology Transfer 31, no. 1 (n.d.): 190. 
116 Enrico Santarelli, Entrepreneurship, Growth, and Innovation: The Dynamics of Firms and Industries (New York: 
Springer, 2006); Porter, Competitive Advantage of Nations; Freeman, “Continental, National and Sub‐national 
Innovation Systems—complementarity and Economic Growth,” Research Policy 31, no. 2 (2002): 191–211, 
doi:10.1016/S0048‐7333(01)00136‐6; Bo Carlsson and Ram Mudambi, “Globalization, Entrepreneurship, and 
Public Policy: A Systems View,” Industry & Innovation 10 (March 2003): 103–116, 
doi:10.1080/1366271032000068122. 
117 David B. Audretsch and Roy Thurik, Innovation, Industry Evolution and Employment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 2–6. 
118 For a more thorough discussion, see Asa Lindholm Dahlstrand and Lois Stevenson, Linking Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship Policy, Innovation Policy Research for Economic Growth (Swedish Foundation for Small 
Business Research, November 2007), http://ipreg.org/IPREG_AsaLois_web.pdf; Carlsson and Mudambi, 
“Globalization, Entrepreneurship, and Public Policy”; and Kefela, “Knowledge‐based Economy and Society Has 
Become a Vital Commodity to Countries.” 
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response,	 policy	 makers	 are	 looking	 to	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 policy,	
considering	them	crucial	ingredients	for	economic	growth	and	employment	creation.119		
Promoting	 innovation	 and	 developing	 a	 comprehensive	 innovation	 policy	 for	 a	
nation	 is	no	easy	task.	Although	 it	 is	often	conflated	with	science	and	technology	(S&T)	
policy,	 innovation	 policy	 extends	 beyond	 that	 and	 requires	 government	 action	 in	
education,	trade,	and	finance	among	others.120	Albeit	to	some	extent	theorizing	and	policy	
making	on	innovation	has	evolved	from	S&T	as	well	as	research	and	development	(R&D)	
policies,	innovation	policy	is	broader.	Similarly,	entrepreneurship	has	grown	out	of	SME	
policy,	but	also	moves	beyond	this	 to	 include	educational,	 training,	and	finance	aspects.	
Improving	 strategies	 and	 policy	 mechanisms	 around	 both	 innovation	 and	
entrepreneurship	policy	requires	a	view	of	all	of	these	elements.121	Research	suggests	that	
for	 innovation	 policy	 to	 thrive,	 both	 scientific	 and	 business	 environments	 need	 to	 be	
conducive	 to	 innovation.	 Regulatory	 frameworks	 need	 to	 be	 amended	 to	 facilitate	
innovators	 and	 innovative	 ideas.	 As	 such,	 technical,	 commercial,	 financial	 and	 other	
support	services	ought	 to	be	designed	with	 the	 innovator	or	entrepreneur	 in	mind	and	
designed	in	such	a	way	that	it	is	easily	accessible	by	them.122		
Like	most	development	questions,	 the	state	versus	market	debate	perforates	the	
discussion	of	entrepreneurship	support	as	well.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	discussion	 tends	 to	be	
centred	more	on	the	type	and	value	of	certain	forms	of	state	intervention	or	government	
                                                            
119 David B. Audretsch, Isabel Grilo and A. Roy Thurik, “Explaining entrepeneurship and the role of policy: a 
framework,” in David B. Audretsch, Isabel Grilo, and A. Roy Thurik, Handbook of Research on Entrepreneurship 
Policy (Cheltenham and Northamton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007). 
120 Innovation Policy: A Guide for Developing Countries, 9. 
121 Dahlstrand and Stevenson, Linking Innovation and Entrepreneurship Policy, 1–3, 17. 
122 Innovation Policy: A Guide for Developing Countries, 10–12. 
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support	of	innovation	or	entrepreneurship.	Frequent	examples	include	American	business	
support	practices	like	grants	from	the	Small	Business	Bureau	as	well	as	examples	of	state	
directed	support	in	evolving	developmental	states.123	Many	seem	to	take	a	fairly	nuanced	
view	and	suggest	 the	value	of	certain	support	policies	are	not	clear	cut.	With	regard	 to	
innovation,	Furman	and	Hayes	suggest:		
	
While	no	 country	 achieves	 a	 relatively	high	 level	 of	 innovative	 capacity	without	
such	innovation‐oriented	policy	commitments,	policy	commitments	appear	to	be	
insufficient	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 vastly	 increased	 investments	 in	 the	 drivers	 of	
innovative	capacity…	The	data	do	suggest	that	continuously	increasing	investments	
in	innovation	is,	ultimately,	essential	for	achieving	innovative	leadership.124	
	
As	 far	as	entrepreneurship	promotion	 is	 concerned,	 simple	policies	 that	 remove	excess	
regulations	 and	 call	 for	 strengthening	 education	 are	 generally	 viewed	 as	 positive.	
However,	the	benefits	stemming	from	policies	around	grants,	financing,	and	strategies	like	
building	innovation	cities	or	strategies	like	clustering	are	far	less	conclusive.125		
It	 was	 not	 until	 the	 2000s	 that	 international	 organizations	 began	 viewing	
entrepreneurship	and	the	support	of	SMEs	as	a	critical	component	of	innovation	policy.126	
According	to	an	UNCTAD	report,	“entrepreneurship	is	a	source	of	innovation	and	change,	
and	as	such	spurs	improvements	in	productivity	and	economic	competitiveness.”127	Central	
to	this	has	been	the	development	of	new	business	incubators,	the	clustering	of	innovative	
                                                            
123 Audretsch, Grilo, and Thurik, Handbook of Research on Entrepreneurship Policy; Carlsson and Mudambi, 
“Globalization, Entrepreneurship, and Public Policy.” 
124 Furman and Hayes, “Catching up or Standing Still?,” 1350. 
125 Aaron K. Chatterji, Edward Glaeser, and William Kerr, “Clusters of Entrepreneurship and Innovation,” NBER 
Working Paper Series, No. 19013 (Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13‐090, April 2013), 
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/10646423/13‐090.pdf?sequence=1. 
126 Innovation Policy: A Guide for Developing Countries, 83–94. 
127 Entrepreneurship and Economic Development: The Empretec Showcase (Geneva: United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, January 5, 2005), 3, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webiteteb20043_en.pdf. 
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sectors,	 and	 capacity	 building	 training.128	 In	 all	 cases,	 innovation	 and	 entrepreneurship	
require	“a	series	of	coordinated	policies	able	to	promote	innovative	entrepreneurship	and	
structural	change.	But	such	change	also	requires	major	effort	to	introduce	policies	targeted	
on	human	capital.”129	This	is	critically	important	in	the	case	studies	in	this	dissertation,	as	
will	be	interrogated	further	in	the	next	chapter.	Difficult	to	attain,	policy	coordination	is	
needed	 to	 effectively	 promote	 entrepreneurship.	 Overall,	 the	 promotion	 of	
entrepreneurship	 depends	 on	 the	 strengthening	 of	 entrepreneurial	 skills	 and	 the	
improvement	of	the	“entrepreneurial	framework	conditions.”130		
Like	the	state	of	industrial	diversification,	the	entrepreneurial	environment	in	the	
Gulf	has	been	impacted	by	the	nature	of	its	reliance	on	hydrocarbons.131	Indeed,	the	type	of	
diversification	 and	 style	 of	 developmentalism	 in	 the	 Gulf	 is	 both	 constrained	 and	
somewhat	distinct	from	other	regions.	For	example,	trade	policy	is	simple	and	guided	by	
commitments	associated	with	WTO	membership.	With	 limited	production	outside	of	oil	
and	gas,	export	strategies	are	limited.	Oman	and	Qatar	both	have	investment	promotion	
and	export	development	agencies	or	units	within	the	government.	Work	with	the	former	
is	more	successful	and	export	promotion	often	tends	to	be	concerned	with	promoting	local	
cultural	 products	 abroad	or	 local	 agricultural	 and	 fisheries	 products	within	 the	 region.	
Intellectual	property	 concerns	are	 theoretically	guided	by	WIPO	practices.	Local	offices	
responsible	for	intellectual	property	do	exist,	but	are	underdeveloped	and	understaffed.	
                                                            
128 Innovation Policy: A Guide for Developing Countries, 83–94; Chatterji, Glaeser, and Kerr, “Clusters of 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation”; Hector O. Rocha, “Entrepreneurship and Development: The Role of Clusters,” 
Small Business Economics 23, no. 5 (December 1, 2004): 363–400, doi:10.1007/s11187‐004‐3991‐8. 
129 Roberta Piergiovanni and Enrico Santarelli, “Chapter 13: What is the Best Policy for Innovative 
Entrepreneurship?” in Santarelli, Entrepreneurship, Growth, and Innovation, 272–273. 
130 UNCTAD: Entrepreneurship and Economic Development. 
131 Chapter four explores this at some length, after a detailed discussion of entrepreneurship and innovation 
promotion policy environment in chapter three. 
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The	 most	 rigorous	 domestic	 attention	 to	 intellectual	 property	 protections	 have	 been	
focused	 around	 cultural	 heritage	 and	 traditional	 knowledge.	Discussions	 around	 IP	 are	
increasing	however.132	This	 is	only	natural	given	 the	 recent	attention	 to	 innovation	and	
entrepreneurship	in	the	region.		
Discussions	of	innovation	within	national	and	regional	contexts	generally	include	a	
discussion	 of	 the	 level	 of	 innovation.	 Many	 researchers	 look	 to	 statistics	 such	 as	 the	
numbers	 of	 patents	 and	 scientific	 publications	 as	 indicators	 of	 innovation.133	 By	 these	
accounts,	the	Gulf	has	a	long	way	to	go.	Looking	at	the	two	cases	which	are	the	focus	of	this	
study,	 the	number	of	 scientific	 publications	per	million	of	 the	population	 in	Oman	was	
113.1	and	in	Qatar	was	152.2	according	to	a	2010	report.134	2012	data	based	on	the	Patents	
Co‐operations	Treaty	lists	Oman	with	0.4	and	Qatar	with	1.3	patent	applications	per	million	
of	 the	 population.135	 Compared	with	 Canada	 at	 77.6	 and	 Singapore	 at	 123.2,	 a	 shift	 to	
focusing	on	innovation	in	the	countries	is	arguably	quite	critical.136	If	the	GCC	patent	office	
figures	are	any	 indication,	 there	has	been	some	improvement.	They	suggest	 that	patent	
applications	 to	 the	 regional	body	have	doubled	since	2005,	 reaching	a	 total	of	3,001	 in	
2012.137	Oman,	in	fact,	is	to	be	the	first	GCC	country	to	undergo	a	Science,	Technology,	and	
                                                            
132 Personal interviews and meetings at Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Oman, and Ministry of Business and 
Trade, Qatar, September 2011 – July 2012; David Price, The Development of Intellectual Property Regimes in the 
Arabian Gulf States: Infidels at the Gates, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2009), 251–253. 
133 Hariolf Grupp and Mary Ellen Mogee, “Indicators for National Science and Technology Policy: How Robust Are 
Composite Indicators?,” Research Policy 33, no. 9 (November 2004): 1373–1384, 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2004.09.007. 
134 UNESCO Science Report 2010: The Current Status of Science Around the World (Paris: United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2010), 265, 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001899/189958e.pdf. 
135 Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2012‐2013, 283, 301. 
136 Ibid., 131; 319. 
137 “Annual Filing,” The Patent Office of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, accessed June 30, 
2013, http://www.gccpo.org/Statistics/en/Default.aspx. 
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Innovation	policy	(STIP)	review	by	UNCTAD.	The	review	will	provide	both	a	diagnosis	and	
a	 series	 of	 recommendations	 on	 improvements	 of	 the	 innovation	 system	 and	
environment.138	
		 Innovation	and	entrepreneurship	policy	has	captured	the	attention	of	development	
strategy	 throughout	 the	 Gulf	 region.	 A	 great	 deal	 of	 policy	 announcements	 and	 public	
discussions	revolve	around	this	policy	world	trend,	indicating	a	certain	impact	from	global	
actors	 and	 ideological	 trends	 on	 the	 region.	 The	 promise	 of	 economic	 growth	 and	
employment	creation	that	accompany	innovation	and	entrepreneurship	policy	makes	this	
shift	particularly	attractive	to	decision	makers.	
	
4.2 	Defining	Entrepreneurship	in	the	Gulf	
The	 framing	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 support	 in	 these	 cases	 is	 the	
provision	 of	 a	 new	path	 for	 a	 new	 generation.	 Certainly	 the	 language	 of	 sustainability,	
diversification,	and	private	sector	development	is	engaged,	but	it	is	really	the	focus	on	the	
younger	generations	that	makes	a	tired	dialogue	sound	fresh	and	invigorating.	Both	Oman	
and	Qatar	are	acutely	aware	of	 their	youth	bulge	moving	up	 the	demographic	pyramid,	
waiting	to	enter	adulthood	with	secure	employment	and	other	“growing	up”	markers	of	
success.	 One	 would	 be	 hard	 pressed	 to	 find	 someone	 not	 intimately	 conscious	 of	 the	
challenges	 these	 new	 generations	 face,	 however	 varied	 they	 may	 explain	 the	 causes.	
Indeed,	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 have	 dominated	 policy	 discussions	 on	 the	
                                                            
138 “UNCTAD to Conduct STIP Review for Oman,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 6, 
2012, unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=125. 
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domestic	agenda	and	have	become	the	ruling	buzzwords	for	a	new	generation,	offering	an	
alternate	path	and	the	hope	for	change.	
The	term	entrepreneur	itself	has	been	a	subject	of	some	debate	in	entrepreneurship	
promotion	circles.	Typically,	one	who	engages	in	business	endeavours,	whether	traditional	
or	 novel,	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 rajl	 aʿmal	 or	 businessman.	 Aside	 from	 the	 obvious	 gender	
implications,	this	terminology	is	problematic	in	reference	to	entrepreneurs,	the	definition	
of	which	connotes	an	element	of	risk	and	 innovation.139	 Indeed	an	entrepreneur,	as	 the	
acclaimed	 entrepreneurship	 scholar	 Peter	 Drucker	 notes,	 “always	 searches	 for	 change,	
responds	to	it,	and	exploits	it	as	an	opportunity.”140	In	the	Gulf,	and	broader	Middle	East	for	
that	matter,	those	who	work	in	entrepreneurial	support	capacities	have	been	utilizing	and	
encouraging	the	use	of	a	different	Arabic	term	for	entrepreneurs,	ruwad	aʿmal.	The	term	
ruwad	 literally	 translates	 as	 pioneers	 or	 leaders,	 thereby	 calling	 entrepreneurs	 the	
pioneers	of	business.	The	implication	of	leadership	and	pioneering	within	this	term	is	more	
consistent	with	the	innovative	aim	of	entrepreneurship	in	theory	and	practice.	
The	emphasis	across	 the	Gulf	on	entrepreneurship	often	overlooks	 this	element,	
equating	as	Americans	are	wont	to	do,	entrepreneurship	with	new	small	business	creation.	
Not	every	business	person	or	new	small	venture	is	entrepreneurial	though.141	The	need	for	
entrepreneurship	 in	the	Gulf	extends	beyond	the	creation	of	employment	opportunities	
outside	of	the	public	sector.	Of	course,	non‐state	employment	is	an	important	motivation	
                                                            
139 See, for example: Joseph Alois Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into Profits, 
Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1934); Santarelli, 
Entrepreneurship, Growth, and Innovation; Peter Drucker, Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Revised (Oxford: 
Elsevier Ltd., 2007). 
140 Drucker, Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 25. 
141 Ibid., 19. 
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behind	entrepreneurship	promotion.	Still,	 the	overall	 challenge	necessitating	 it	 is	much	
broader.	Enclosed	in	the	promise	of	entrepreneurship	is	also	the	hope	of	an	antidote	to	the	
much	 larger	 problems	 of	 diversification	 stagnation	 and	 the	 segmented	 labour	 market	
conundrum.	If	the	desire	is	for	the	entrepreneurship	effect	to	be	system	wide,	there	must	
be	 an	 inculcation	of	 innovation.	 Systemic	 innovation,	 as	Drucker	notes,	 “consists	 in	 the	
purposeful	 and	 organized	 search	 for	 changes,	 and	 in	 the	 systematic	 analysis	 of	 the	
opportunities	 such	 changes	 might	 offer	 for	 economic	 or	 social	 innovation.”142	 In	 this	
regard,	the	state	as	the	promoter	of	entrepreneurship	needs	to	delineate	with	some	clarity	
whether	 they	 are	 trying	 to	 stimulate	 the	 sort	 of	 systemic	 transformation	 that	 proffers	
innovation	and	change	or	merely	prompt	piecemeal	reforms	furthering	various	degrees	of	
self‐employment.		
Entrepreneurship	 in	 the	 Gulf	 is	 best	 characterized	 as	 an	 aspirational	 business	
endeavour	at	the	intersection	of	global	trends,	government	fanfare,	and	genuine	necessity.	
By	itself,	the	idea	of	promoting	entrepreneurship	thus	far	may	have	been	more	successful	
at	spawning	entities	with	a	vision	for	supporting	entrepreneurship	than	the	objective	of	
creating	 independent	 entrepreneurs	 and	 growing	 their	 establishments	 in	 the	 private	
sector.	This	phenomenon	is	well	illustrated	throughout	the	next	chapter.	Especially	in	the	
last	five	years,	the	language	of	entrepreneurial	promotion,	and	its	contingent	prestige	and	
financial	endowments,	instigated	the	creation	of	a	plethora	of	initiatives,	businesses,	and	
nonprofit	entities	aimed	at	training,	developing,	or	financing	entrepreneurship.		
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5. Conclusion		
Much	literature	on	the	Gulf	tends	to	represent	the	area	as	something	exceptional,	
traditional	 and	 culturally	 separate.	 Its	 socio‐cultural	 orientation	 disconnected	 from	
modernity	 and	 its	 rentier	 economic	 foundations	 separating	 it	 from	more	 conventional	
social	and	economic	processes.	Regional	political	economy	studies	have	mostly	focused	on	
the	consequences	of	rentierism	on	social,	political	and	economic	development.	The	concept	
of	the	rentier	state	has	been	one	of	the	more	frequent	and	functional	descriptions	of	the	
economic	environment	in	the	region.	The	alleged	consequences	of	this	structure	include	
state	 autonomy	 from	 the	 population,	 societal	 apathy,	 ubiquitous	 rent	 seeking	 and	
institutional	weakness	among	others.143	While	these	descriptions	have	been	useful	tools	to	
understand	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 the	 region,	 it	 sidelines	 alternative	 processes	 and	
diminishes	 the	 significance	 of	 ideational	 change.	 This	 literature	 reduces	 the	 state	
behaviour	 to	 a	 function	 of	 economic	 activity	 and	 removes	 any	 agency	 from	 the	 local	
population.		This	view	on	the	role	of	economy	in	Middle	Eastern	states,	in	Charles	Tripp’s	
words,		
privileging	the	economic	aspects	of	state	capacity,	has	been	heavily	influenced	by	
the	 structuralist‐functionalist	 assumptions	 underlying	 most	 writing	 on	 political	
economy,	whereby	states,	as	integral	parts	of	this	assumed	system,	are	represented	
as	 actors	 responding	 with	 varying	 degrees	 of	 effectiveness	 to	 pressures	 and	
attractions	of	the	system	itself.144		
	
Similarly,	international	relations	and	international	political	economy	scholarship	generally	
focus	on	oil	and	gas	supply,	with	some	attention	paid	to	the	neighbouring	threat	of	Iran	
                                                            
143 Beblawi and Luciani, The Rentier State; Losman, “The Rentier State And National Oil Companies,” Summer 
2010; Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). 
144 Charles Tripp, “States, Elites and the Management of Change,”Hakimian and Moshaver, The State and Global 
Change, 211. 
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and	 problems	with	 regional	 terrorism,	 particularly	within	 Saudi	 Arabia.	 On	 the	whole,	
though,	scholarship	on	the	Gulf,	tends	to	remain	within	particular	area	studies	and	engages	
little	with	broader	literature	and	its	ontological	and	conceptual	evolutions.			
While	there	is	a	small	but	growing	body	of	literature	addressing	development	and	
political	economy	within	the	Gulf	regional	framework,	there	are	notable	gaps.145	Although	
several	political	economy	pieces	 identify	the	challenge	posed	from	social	 issues	 like	the	
burgeoning	 youth	 ‘bubble,’	 few	 have	 explored	 the	 subject	 in	 detail	 or	 identified	 and	
assessed	 specific	 policy	 responses.	 This	 absence	 is	 significant	 because	 it	 limits	 our	
understanding	of	both	 the	domestic	 environment	with	 its	 contemporary	 social	 changes	
and	actual	patterns	of	policy	making.	Analyzing	specific	variations	in	policy	announcement,	
development,	and	implementation,	as	this	study	does,	will	undoubtedly	contribute	to	our	
understanding	of	Gulf	state	behaviour	and	policy	making	practices	today.		
To	date,	these	puzzles	have	been	neglected	in	academic	work	on	the	Gulf	region.	
This	 can	 be	 largely	 attributed	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 theoretical	 tools	 available	 to	 deal	 with	 the	
complexity	of	the	social	world	within	Middle	East	political	economy	studies.	Two	factors	
have	 caused	 this	 deficit	 in	 Gulf	 studies.	 First,	 the	 Gulf,	 and	 Middle	 East	 studies	 more	
broadly,	have	been	marginalized	in	most	political	science	disciplines	–	from	international	
relations	to	comparative	political	economy	debates	–	for	a	number	of	years.	Perceived	as	
holding	a	unique	place	within	governance	systems,	 their	development	 trajectories	have	
                                                            
145 Much of the political economy work on the Gulf has been situated within broader research on the Middle 
East although interest has been growing in the last number of years since Dubai’s mounting international 
presence. See  Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East; Beblawi and Luciani, The Rentier 
State; Askari, Nowshirvani, and Jaber, Economic Development in the Gcc; Michael C. Hudson, ed., The Middle 
East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Tim 
Niblock, ed., Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf (London: Croom Helm, 1980); Bradley Louis 
Glasser, Economic Development and Political Reform: The Impact of External Capital on the Middle East (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2001); Hvidt, “The Dubai Model.” 
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been	viewed	as	outliers.146	Only	a	small	number	of	scholars	engage	rentier	state	literature	
with	other	bodies	of	 academic	work	on	development.	Recently,	 scholars	 like	Hvidt	 and	
Hertog	have	pointed	to	developmental	state	literature	in	relation	to	the	Gulf	development	
context.	As	noted,	Hvidt	engages	the	topic	in	the	context	of	Dubai	and	develops	this	idea	of	
the	“Dubai	model.”	The	financial	bust	Dubai	experienced	in	2009	may	call	 into	question	
some	of	 these	 however.	At	 the	 very	 least	 it	 demonstrates	 that	Dubai	 is	 not	 a	 complete	
aberration	and	still	very	much	attached	to	the	underlying	structures	of	the	oil	economy	
despite	 trying	 to	 transcend	 them.	 Indeed,	 the	 trajectory	of	 late‐late	development	 in	 the	
Gulf,	even	in	its	intoxicating	Dubai	variation,	has	been	influenced	by	rentierism.	It	further	
demonstrates	 that	 bringing	 these	 different	 bodies	 of	 literature	 together	 and	 looking	 at	
wider	 development	 trends	 is	 essential	 for	 conceptualizing	 the	 Gulf’s	 new	 reality	 and	
understanding	of	these	patterns.	
On	 the	 ground,	 states	 are	 sending	 investigators	 to	 Asian	 countries,	 bringing	
speakers,	 experts,	 or	 advisors	 in	 who	 have	 looked	 at	 various	 Asian	 development	
experiences.	 However,	 researchers	 are	 still	 not	 speaking	 to	 these	 wider	 trends.	 They	
remain	consumed	by	one	body	of	literature.	Although	rentier	state	studies	may	have	first	
emerged	 out	 of	 discourses	 on	 wider	 international	 development,	 they	 evolved	 into	 an	
isolated	discussion	 and	 are	now	viewed	as	one	more	 example	of	 the	 exceptionalism	of	
Middle	Eastern	development	and/or	authoritarian	political	structures.	This	both	isolates	
and	 marginalizes	 the	 development	 experience	 of	 the	 Gulf	 and	 diminishes	 any	 cross	
learning	that	could	occur.	This	study	begins	addressing	this	widening	gap.		
                                                            
146 The perceived lack of contribution to political science theory by Middle East studies was suggested as far back 
as the late 1980s. See, for example, Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” 1. 
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Second,	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 role	 of	 ideas	 and	 norms	 on	 development	 and	
economic	 change	 is	 notably	missing	 in	 Gulf	 research.	 Scholars	 now	widely	 accept	 that	
prevailing	 ideas	 may	 certainly	 be	 “an	 important	 determinant	 of	 policy	 choice.”147	
Nevertheless,	 blending	material	 interests	with	 ideational	 factors	 is	 necessarily	 difficult	
because	doing	so	involves	a	more	nuanced	approach	than	scientific	modelling	allows.	Not	
only	do	 the	global	economy	and	prevailing	economic	discourses	necessarily	 shape	how	
actors	view	the	world	and	interact	within	the	system,	but	understandings	of	social	identity	
also	shape	actors’	interaction	and	how	they	undertake	systemic	change.			
		 In	this	study,	I	address	these	gaps	by	incorporating	insights	from	development	and	
innovation	literature	into	the	analysis	of	Gulf	development	policy	making.	I	argue	that	it	is	
the	 multivariate	 pressures	 from	 below	 and	 beyond	 the	 state	 which	 renders	 the	
contemporary	economic	policy	making	milieu	analytically	distinct	yet	still	not	detached	
from	 certain	 path	 dependencies	 of	 rentierism.	 Policy	 making	 processes	 are,	 in	 fact,	 a	
contestation	between	rentier	 structures	and	broader	struggles	with	development	paths	
whereby	these	states,	still	so	dependent	on	hydrocarbons,	are	entering,	competing,	and	
reaching	certain	development	stages	in	the	global	political	economy.		
Through	 an	 examination	 of	 two	 heretofore	 unanalyzed	 policy	 shifts,	 that	 of	
entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion,	I	assess	motivations	and	explanations	behind	
the	puzzle	of	their	promotion	given	our	expectations	from	rentier	state	literature.	I	further	
avoid	 the	 oversight	 of	much	 rentier	 state	work	 by	 examining	 generational	 change	 and	
demographic	 pressures	 alongside	 local	 and	 regional	 trends.	 Moreover,	 I	 incorporate	
                                                            
147 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International 
Organization 46, no. 01 (1992): 26, doi:10.1017/S0020818300001442. 
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learning	derived	from	innovation	policy	literature,	an	outgrowth	of	work	on	development,	
in	order	to	better	delineate	under	what	conditions	such	strategies	prosper.		
	
84 
 
Chapter	3	
	
Between	Trend	and	Necessity:	State‐led	Entrepreneurship	Promotion	
and	the	Reshaping	of	Rentierism	in	the	Gulf	Arab	States	
	
	
	
1. Introduction	 	
The	importance	designated	to	innovation	and	entrepreneurship	promotion	within	
the	 Gulf	 Cooperation	 Council	 countries	 have	made	 it	 one	 of	 the	most	 “vogue”	 regional	
policy	 trends	 of	 the	 past	 few	 years.	 Breakeven	 oil	 prices,	 that	 is	 the	 price	 per	 barrel	
required	 for	 a	 country’s	 fiscal	 accounts	 to	 remain	 in	balance	 for	a	 given	 level	of	public	
expenditure	and	oil	revenue,	have	reached	record	levels.1	These	prices,	driven	in	part	by	a	
sharp	 increase	 in	 government	 expenditure	 responding	 to	 associated	 Arab	 Awakening	
pressures,	have	made	the	GCC	countries	more	acutely	aware	of	the	need	to	diversify	their	
economies.2	While	all	Gulf	rentier	states	face	similar	challenges,	the	stakes	are	higher	for	
relatively	 less	 affluent	 ones	 approaching	 the	 new	 post‐oil	 reality.	 The	 centricity	 of	
entrepreneurship	policies	is	stimulated	not	only	by	diversification	but	also	the	necessity	
for	governance	mechanisms	to	contend	with	a	unique	regional	employment	conundrum:	
an	 economic	distortion	where	 expatriate	 labour	 levels	 and	national	 unemployment	 are	
                                                            
1 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook April 2012: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain, World 
Economic and Financial Surveys (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2012), 71, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/pdf/text.pdf. 
2 There is some variation in the figures offered by different bodies as comprising the average breakeven oil price 
for the GCC. This includes approximately $73USD by the IMF and $85 by TAIB Securities. In early 2013, the NBD 
surprised many with higher figures such as $107 for the UAE and $90 for Saudi Arabia. According to the same 
TAIB report, government spending across the GCC expanded by 6‐30% in 2011. International Monetary Fund, 
World Economic Outlook April 2012; Khatija Haque, GCC Outlook 2012, Quarterly (Dubai: Emirates National Bank 
Dubai, January 12, 2012), 
http://www.emiratesnbd.com/assets/cms/docs/quarterlyReports/2012/GCCQuarterlyQ12012.pdf; TAIB 
Securities W.L.L, GCC Economic Outlook 2012 (Manama: TAIB Securities, March 2012), 
http://www.menafn.com/updates/research_center/Regional/Economic/taib060312ev.pdf. 
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simultaneously	 rising	 with	 a	 growing	 youth	 population	 and	 private	 sector	 that	 either	
systematically	 excludes	 or	 fails	 to	 attract	 local	 labour.	 Policies	 aimed	 at	 promoting	
entrepreneurship	have	thus	been	looked	to	as	a	possible	policy	solution.	Their	diffusion	
across	 the	 region,	 however,	 has	 occurred	 irrespective	 of	 wealth	 levels	 or	 oil‐reserve	
longevity.		
This	chapter	assesses	the	peculiar	manifestation	of	similar	development	strategies	
across	the	Gulf,	despite	the	seeming	absence	of	incentive	to	implement	them	in	the	case	of	
the	wealthier	states	like	Qatar,	with	its	more	robust	hydrocarbon	reserves.	In	the	following	
detailed	examination	of	two	paired	cases,	Oman	and	Qatar,	the	motivation	and	character	
of	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion	is	determined	from	a	triangulation	of	data	
sources.	 This	 includes	 content	 analysis	 of	 development	 plans	 and	 policy	 papers	 across	
from	interviews	with	a	multiplicity	of	actors.	The	interviews	were	conducted	across	three	
categories	 of	 stakeholders:	 (1)	 policy	 makers	 and	 bureaucrats,	 (2)	 public	 and	 private	
entrepreneurship	 initiative	 actors,	 and	 (3)	 entrepreneurs	 and	 other	 business	 people.	
Overall,	I	examine	the	character,	motivation,	and	diffusion	of	state‐led	entrepreneurship	
promotion	in	Oman	and	Qatar	and	assess	what	this	says	about	the	evolution	of	rentierism	
and	policy‐making	practices.	
	
2. 	Motivations	for	the	Promotion	of	Entrepreneurship	and	Innovation	
In	recent	years,	a	considerable	aspect	of	development	policy	in	the	Gulf	is	wrapped	
up	in	the	promotion	of	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	as	part	and	parcel	of	a	broader	
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drive	 toward	 a	 knowledge	 economy.3	 It	 may	 have	 been	 the	 2003	 UNDP	 Arab	 Human	
Development	 Report	 which	 first	 placed	 the	 concept	 of	 “knowledge	 economies”	 on	 the	
regional	agenda	when	it	emphasized	the	imperative	to	establish	them	in	the	Middle	East	
North	 Africa	 (MENA).4	 The	 idea	 naturally	 reverberated	 in	 policy	 circles	 where	
diversification	 was	 already	 featured	 prominently	 but	 the	 end	 game	 had	 yet	 to	 be	
articulated.	This	was	followed	by	the	2008	World	Bank	report	on	education	reform	in	the	
MENA	 that	 stressed	 human	 capital	 development	 as	 a	 critical	 pathway	 on	 the	 road	 to	
knowledge	 economies	 while	 cautioning	 against	 the	 dangers	 of	 falling	 further	 behind	
comparably	developed	regions.5	Building	a	knowledge	economy	has	since	become	central	
to	diversification	strategies	in	the	imagination	of	a	post‐oil	future	in	the	GCC.		
	
2.1.	The	“Three‐D”	Challenge	
Motivations	for	the	promotion	of	entrepreneurship	abound	in	both	the	theoretical	
and	practical	spheres.	Many	of	the	policy	endeavours	stem	from	the	hope	that	there	is	truth	
to	 international	wisdom	on	entrepreneurship.	The	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	
and	 Development	 (UNCTAD)	 links	 entrepreneurship	 to	 growth,	 claiming	 that	
“entrepreneurship	is	a	source	of	innovation	and	change,	and	as	such	spurs	improvements	
                                                            
3 The idea of a knowledge economy was popularized by the OECD in their analysis of the role of knowledge and 
technology in economic growth. They used the term “knowledge‐based economies” in reference to economies 
that are “based on the production, distribution and use of knowledge and information.”The Knowledge‐Based 
Economy (Paris: Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development, 1996).  
The realization of the potential of knowledge economy in emerging countries demands an investment in both 
human capital and innovation. It requires an “economic, institutional and regulatory environment that fosters 
the acquisition, development and use of knowledge, an education system that supplies citizens with the ability 
to create and use knowledge, a dynamic information infrastructure, innovation systems and networks.” Ghirmai 
T. Kefela, “Knowledge‐based Economy and Society Has Become a Vital Commodity to Countries,” International 
NGO Journal 5, no. 7 (August 2010): 161. 
4 Arab Human Development Report 2003. 
5 The Road Not Traveled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa. 
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in	 productivity	 and	 economic	 competitiveness.”6	 This	 claim	 encompasses	 the	 vision	 of	
dynamism,	 sustainability,	 and	 growth	 that	 developing	 and	 emerging	 economies	 aspire	
toward.	 This	 is	 especially	 relevant	 to	 a	 region	 characterised	 by	 unitary	 resource‐led	
growth,	low	productivity,	low	capital	development,	and	rising	national	unemployment.		
It	is	within	the	ambition	of	becoming	a	knowledge	economy	that	three	challenges	
confronting	this	regional	trajectory	are	apparent:	(1)	development,	(2)	diversification,	and	
(3)	 demographics.	 These	 concerns	 are	more	 salient	 in	 the	 less	wealthy	 GCC	members,	
where	a	post‐oil	future	is	more	imminent.	Of	the	two	case	studies	delineated	in	this	study,	
Oman	is	representative	of	this	group	whereas	Qatar	rests	on	the	other	side	of	the	spectrum	
as	the	wealthiest	(per	capita)	Gulf	state	with	a	much	longer	expected	future	of	hydrocarbon	
revenue.	 Interestingly	 perhaps,	 both	 states	 point	 to	 these	 same	 challenges	 as	 concerns	
moving	into	the	future	and	entering	the	knowledge	economy.		
As	part	of	Gulf	development	goals,	human	capital	development	was	incrementally	
featured	 more	 prominently	 alongside	 industry	 and	 infrastructure	 from	 the	 mid‐1990s	
onwards.	The	mid‐2000s	marked	a	real	shift	in	development	moves	in	the	region.	By	2005,	
Saudi	 Arabia	 became	 the	 last	 GCC	 country	 to	 accede	 to	 the	World	 Trade	 Organization	
(WTO),	 and	 the	 visibility	 of	Dubai’s	 economic	boom	escalated.	 States	 and	 citizens	 alike	
could	point	 to	 the	allure	of	Dubai’s	 rapid	development,	 and	 their	 experimentation	with	
economic	liberalization	in	the	form	of	foreign	direct	investment,	economic	free	zones,	and	
an	open	property	market	with	the	concomitant	wide	growth	in	the	real	estate	sector.	This	
transformation	led	credence	to	the	neoliberal	dogma	of	opening	markets	and	encouraging	
                                                            
6 UNCTAD: Entrepreneurship and Economic Development, 3. 
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FDI.7	It	also	seems	to	support	common	pathways	to	developmental	state	status,	whereby	
the	 ability	 to	 attract	 FDI	 is	 considered	 advantageous	 to	 development	 promotion	when	
combined	with	the	nurturing	of	innovation	networks	and	linkages	between	local	and	global	
technology.8	
Buttressed	 by	 high	 oil	 prices,	 the	 mid‐2000s	 were	 characterized	 by	 high	 FDI,	
bilateral	free	trade	agreements,	and	rising	levels	of	expatriates	that	overwhelmed	even	the	
pretext	of	encouraging	labour	nationalization	quotas.	During	this	time,	a	focus	on	industrial	
development	 beyond	 hydrocarbons	 began	 which	 has	 continued	 into	 the	 present.	 The	
beginning	of	 this	 decade,	 however,	 has	been	 characterized	by	official	 discourse	 around	
stimulating	knowledge‐based	economies.	Stimulating	innovation	is	deemed	a	crucial	factor	
on	the	road	to	knowledge	economy.	To	this	end,	recent	years	have	been	imbued	with	high‐
profile	 research	 announcements,	 forums	 and	 conferences,	 and	 the	 announcement	 of	
innovation	and	entrepreneurship	promotion	initiatives.	Much	of	the	attention	is	dedicated	
to	 entrepreneurship.	 Indeed,	 its	 promotion	 serves	 as	 a	 means	 through	 which	 the	
government	is	targeting	labour	market	reform	and	encouraging	local	participation	in	the	
private	sector.	It	also	contributes	to	economic	diversification	strategies.		
The	imperative	to	diversify	the	economy	away	from	oil	and	engender	sustainable	
development	for	the	post‐oil	age	becomes	more	critical	as	oil	reserves	dwindle.	Thus	the	
                                                            
7 Foreign Direct Investment has long been viewed as key to economic growth in times of transition. Part of a 
neoliberal market agenda, it was especially championed in Easter European and former Soviet areas during their 
transition to capitalist economies. FDI here, however, met with mixed results.  See Chapter 5, “Economic Growth 
and Foreign Direct Investment in the Transition Economies,” in Secretariat of the Economic Commission for 
Europe, Economic Survey of Europe (Geneva: United Nations, 2001), 185–222, 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ead/pub/011/. 
8 Dan Breznitz, “Development, Flexibility and R & D Performance in the Taiwanese IT Industry: Capability 
Creation and the Effects of State–industry Coevolution,” Industrial and Corporate Change 14, no. 1 (February 1, 
2005): 158–160, doi:10.1093/icc/dth047. 
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second	challenge	in	the	regional	development	trajectory,	diversification,	remains	high	on	
the	agenda.	This	is	true	at	least	in	the	language	of	policy	aims.	The	share	of	GDP	attributed	
to	 petroleum‐related	 activities	 tells	 a	 different	 story.	 This	 figure	 has	 not	 declined	
significantly	in	the	last	decade.	The	annual	statistical	bulletin	published	by	Oman’s	Ministry	
of	National	Economy	in	2010	indicates	the	relative	share	of		GDP	that	petroleum‐related	
activities	comprise	was	40.4	percent	in	1999,	increased	to	49.4	percent	in	2005,	only	to	
come	back	to	40.6	percent	in	2009	(current	prices).	If,	however,	we	look	at	constant	prices	
(with	 2000	 as	 the	 base	 year),	 we	 see	 a	 19.6	 percent	 decline	 in	 the	 relative	 share	 of	
petroleum‐related	 activities	 to	GDP	 from	1999	 to	 2009.	 This	 also	 is	 not	markedly	 high	
given	 the	 attention	 paid	 to	 diversification.9	 The	 Qatari	 case	 is	 quite	 similar	 with	
hydrocarbons	comprising	a	53	percent	 share	of	GDP	 in	2006	and	51.1	percent	 in	2010	
(current	prices).10	One	should	keep	 two	 things	 in	mind	when	considering	 these	 figures.	
First,	the	hydrocarbon	sector	contribution	to	GDP	does	not	include	downstream	activities	
like	petrochemicals	and	metallurgy.	Second,	a	failure	to	diversify	considerably	in	Qatar	is	
not	as	significant	of	a	concern	in	the	short	run	as	in	Oman	given	the	size	of	its	oil	and	gas	
fields.				
Notwithstanding	the	above,	there	has	been	an	increase	in	downstream	and	services	
to	upstream	activities	in	Oman,	contributing	to	industrial	development	and	the	building	of	
internal	industrial	capacity.11	The	Public	Establishment	for	Industrial	Estates	(PEIE),	for	
example,	hosts	over	333	projects	across	 the	 industrial	 estates	of	Rusayl,	 Sohar,	Raysut,	
                                                            
9  See Annual Statistical Bulletin, Oman, 2010. 
10 Qatar Economic Statistics at a Glance (Doha: Economic Statistics and National Accounts Department, Qatar 
Statistics Authority, April 25, 2012), 24. 
11 See Oxford Business Group, The Report: Oman 2011 (Oxford Business Group, 2011). 
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Nizwa,	Sur,	and	Al‐Buraimi.	The	aluminium	sector,	 for	example,	 is	 in	a	good	position	 in	
Oman.	Sohar	Aluminium	Company	(SAC)	began	in	2008	as	a	joint	venture	between	Oman	
Oil	 Company	 and	 Rio‐Tinto‐Alcan,	 the	 result	 of	 an	 Australian‐Canadian	 merger.12	 Rio‐
Tinto‐Alcan	currently	has	a	20	percent	share	in	SAC	and	other	shareholders	include	Oman	
Oil	and	Abu	Dhabi	Water	and	Electricity	Authority,	each	with	a	40	percent	share.	In	2011,	
SAC	 reached	 its	 millionth	 tonne	 of	 aluminium	 production.13	 Along	with	 the	 petroleum	
refinery	and	power	plant	in	Sohar,	SAC	is	part	of	a	broader	narrative	of	industrialization	in	
the	Al‐Batina	region	which	includes	the	development	of	the	Port	of	Sohar	(a	joint	venture	
between	the	Omani	government	and	the	Port	of	Rotterdam)	where	SAC	has	a	dedicated	
facility,	 and	 the	expanding	Sohar	 Industrial	Estate,	under	 the	auspices	of	PEIE.	 It	 is	 the	
industrial	development	of	Duqm,	in	the	al‐Wusta	governorate,	and	the	establishment	of	its	
Special	 Economic	 Zone	 Authority	 (SEZAD)	 in	 2011	 however	 which	 has	 been	 gaining	
increasing	attention	over	 the	past	 two	years.14	Duqm	projects	 include	a	 large	 industrial	
port,	 a	 dry	 dock	 and	 ship	 repair	 yard,	 an	 airport,	 an	 industrial	 and	 logistics	 zone,	 a	
petrochemical	complex,	water	and	power	generation	and	distribution,	natural	gas	supply,	
and	a	fisheries	harbour.	Imports	into	the	zone	will	be	duty	free,	and	there	are	plans	to	make	
the	 area	 into	 a	 transportation	 hub	 for	 the	 region.	 SEZAD	 is	 also	 developing	 an	 area	
dedicated	to	tourism.15	 In	fact,	Oman	has	been	pursuing	diversification	through	tourism	
since	 its	 fifth	 five‐year	 development	 plan,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 increasing	 its	 miniscule	
                                                            
12 “Rio‐Tinto‐Alcan,” 2013, http://www.riotintoalcan.com/index.asp; Jean‐Francois Seznec, “Financing 
Industrialization in the Arab‐Persian Gulf,”Seznec and Kirk, Industrialization in the Gulf, 31. 
13 “Rio‐Tinto‐Alcan”; “Sohar Aluminium,” 2013, http://www.sohar‐aluminium.com/. 
14 “Royal Decree 119/2011 Establishing Al‐Duqm Special Economic Zone Authority and Issuing Its Regulations” 
(Special Economic Zone Authority ‐ Duqm, 2011), http://www.duqm.gov.om/resources/royal‐decree.pdf; “Duqm 
Special Economic Zone – Planning for the Future,” Muscat Daily News, February 9, 2013, 
http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Duqm‐Special‐Economic‐Zone‐Planning‐for‐the‐future‐2143. 
15 “Special Economic Zone Authority ‐ Duqm,” accessed June 1, 2013, http://www.duqm.gov.om/. 
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contribution	to	GDP.	Although	this	has	risen	from	one	percent	in	2005	to	three	percent	in	
2012,	tourism	as	a	generator	of	revenue	remains	well	short	of	goals.16		
Similarly,	 inexpensive	hydrocarbons	in	Qatar	have	helped	the	development	of	 its	
downstream	activities.	Along	with	this,	Qatar	has	been	expanding	in	media,	airlines,	and	
real	estate.	In	terms	of	 industrialization,	 it	seems	that	much	outside	of	the	hydrocarbon	
sector	remains	at	 the	planning	and	development	stage.	For	 instance,	an	Agro‐Industrial	
Park	for	the	food	processing	industry	is	being	planned	as	part	of	a	broader	food	security	
programme.17	Still	most	active	industrial	expansion	is	concentrated	around	the	national	oil	
company,	Qatar	Petroleum	(QP).	QP	oversees	all	of	the	stages	and	activities	of	the	oil	and	
gas	 industry	 as	 well	 as	 holds	 controlling	 stakes	 and	 joint	 ventures	 with	 several	 other	
companies	especially	concentrated	in	the	gas	and	petrochemical	industries.	It	also	retains	
investments	 in	 several	 others	 from	plastics	 and	metals	 to	 shipping.18	 Like	much	 of	 the	
region,	industrial	cities	exist	in	Qatar	as	well.	At	least	half	of	them	focus	on	oil	and	gas	with	
the	 others	 directed	 toward	 downstream	 and	 service	 activities	 to	 the	 energy	 and	
hydrocarbon	 sector.	 Steel	 and	 cement	 are	 growing	 segments	 given	 rapid	 construction	
development.19	 The	 benefit	 of	 state‐owned	 enterprises	 in	 Qatar	 is	 that,	 like	 in	
developmental	 states,	 it	 has	 allowed	 the	 government	 to	 embed	 their	 activities	 in	 the	
                                                            
16 International Financial Corporation, Doing Business 2011: Making a Difference for Entrepreneurs (Washington: 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank, 2010); “Economic Update ‐ Oman: 
New Blueprint for Tourism,” Oxford Business Group, February 12, 2013, 
http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_updates/oman‐new‐blueprint‐tourism. 
17 “Agro‐Industrial Park,” Qatar National Food Security Programme, 2011, 
http://www.qnfsp.gov.qa/programme/food/agro‐industrial‐park. 
18 “Qatar Petroleum Investment Porfolito,” Qatar Petroleum, 2011, 
http://www.qp.com.qa/Files/Flash/QP_Map_3.swf. 
19 “Industrial Development Hallmarks in Qatar,” Qatar News Agency, 2012, 
http://www.qnaol.net/QNAEn/Main_Sectors/Energy_Industry/Pages/IndustrialrenaissancehallmarksinQatar.asp
x. 
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sectoral	and	national	development	strategies.	For	example,	 Industries	Qatar,	a	group	of	
four	companies	[Qatar	Petrochemical	Company	(QAPCO),	Qatar	Fuel	Additives	Company	
(QAFAC),	 Qatar	 Fertiliser	 Company	 (QAFCO),	 and	 Qatar	 Steel],	 receives	 inexpensive	
petrochemical	 feedstock	 by	 QP,	 coincidently	 its	 largest	 shareholder.20	 Likewise,	 Qatar	
Airways,	 the	national	airline,	began	running	 its	 fleet	on	 locally‐produced	 fuel	 in	2007.21	
There	 are	 moves	 to	 increase	 activity	 in	 the	 industrial	 areas,	 but	 regional	 competition	
remains	high	and	the	procedures	for	entrepreneurs	to	acquire	a	plot	and	operate	in	the	
industrial	areas	remain	cumbersome	even	for	Qatari	nationals.22	More	remains	to	be	done.		
	 The	third	and	final	challenge	to	regional	development	is	posed	by	demographics.	
There	are	two	separate	but	symbiotic	demographic	challenges	endemic	across	the	region.	
The	first	is	the	youth	bulge	and	the	second	is	the	segmented	labour	market.	78.4	percent	
of	the	population	of	Oman	and	60.87	percent	of	Qatar	are	under	the	age	of	35	with	47.8	
percent	of	Oman’s	population	and	17.25	percent	of	Qatar’s	below	20.23	The	situation	can	
be	further	highlighted	when	you	look	at	the	age	pyramid	of	Qatari	nationals	alone,	where	
19.6	percent	of	Qataris	are	between	the	age	of	15	and	24.24	Alongside	this,	unemployment	
is	 an	 expanding	 challenge.	 Indeed,	 the	 Gulf	 sits	 within	 a	 region	 that	 the	 International	
                                                            
20 With the exception of Qatar Steel, which is fully owned by IQ, the remaining IQ companies are joint ventures 
with various international companies although IQ retains majority ownership. “Industries Qatar Website,” 
Industries Qatar, 2013, 
http://www.industriesqatar.com.qa/IQ/IQ.nsf/en_Pages/en_AboutUs_IQGroupCompanies; Steffen Hertog, 
“Lean and Mean: the new breed of state‐owned enterprises in the Gulf Monarchies,” in Seznec and Kirk, 
Industrialization in the Gulf, 21. 
21 Hertog in Seznec and Kirk, Industrialization in the Gulf, 21. 
22 Interviews with businessmen and SOE employees, February – May 2012. Interview with senior staff at the 
Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry, April 11, 2012, and interview with a senior manager at Barwa, real 
estate developer, May 1, 2012.  
23 Qatar Statistics Authority, Qatar Census 2010; Mshrooʿ al‐tʿdaad al‐ʿaam l‐lskaan w‐al‐mnsaaakn w‐almnshaat 
2010, Census 2010, 68 and 120.   
24 Qatar’s Third National Human Development Report, 17. 
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Labour	 Organization	 (ILO)	 ranks	 as	 second	 only	 to	 North	 Africa	 for	 the	 highest	
unemployment	 rates	 in	 the	world,	 exceeding	10	percent.25	 Youth	unemployment	 in	 the	
region	is	estimated	to	have	reached	28.1	percent	in	2012.26	Yet	gathering	reliable	statistical	
data	on	employment	trends	in	the	GCC	is	rather	difficult,	with	variance	between	figures	
from	 the	World	 Bank,	 IMF,	 Economist	 Intelligence	 Unit	 (EIU),	 and	 local	 ministries.	 All	
studies	 suggest,	 however,	 that	 unemployment	 and	 underemployment	 among	 youth	 is	
significantly	higher	than	overall	levels.	Some	reports	indicate	unemployment	in	Oman	at	
15	 percent,	 with	 unemployment	 among	 16‐24	 year	 olds	 much	 higher	 at	 35	 percent.27	
Official	government	statistics	indicate	unemployment	is	less	a	problem	in	gas‐rich	Qatar,	
with	 only	 2.06	percent	 overall	 unemployment	 and	3.1	 percent	 among	15‐34	 year	 olds.	
However,	with	only	46	percent	of	Qataris	in	the	latter	age	category	listed	as	employed,	the	
remaining	percentages	are	considered	“not	economically	active.”28		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                            
25 Global Employment Trends 2013: Recovering from a Second Jobs Dip (Geneva: International Labour 
Organization, 2013), 81, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/‐‐‐dgreports/‐‐‐dcomm/‐‐‐
publ/documents/publication/wcms_202326.pdf. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Kito de Boer and John M. Turner, Beyond Oil: Reappraising the Gulf States, Special edition, The McKinsey 
Quarterly (McKinsey & Company, 2007), 13, http://mkqpreview2.qdweb.net/PDFDownload.aspx?ar=1902. 
28 Qatar Statistics Authority, Qatar Census 2010. 
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Figure	3.1:	Dissecting	Labour	Market	Statistical	Categories	
	Despite	 these	 employment	 trends,	 the	 region	 remains	 excessively	 reliant	 on	
expatriate	 labour	 with	 migrant	 workers	 constituting	 approximately	 70	 percent	 of	 the	
labour	force	since	the	1980s.29	 In	fact,	Omanis	only	comprise	40.6	percent	of	the	labour	
force	while	Qataris	have	consistently	comprised	six	percent	of	the	labour	force	from	2008	
to	2011.30	Dependence	on	 foreign	 labour	has	persisted	and	remains	difficult	 to	contend	
with	given	a	variety	of	economic	structural	issues.	This	will	be	discussed	in	greater	detail	
in	section	4.4	below.			
	
	
	
                                                            
29 N. Shafik, “Labor Migration and Economic Integration in the Middle East,” in Hudson, Middle East Dilemma, 
285–291. 
30 Qatar’s Third National Human Development Report, 56; Mshrooʿ al‐tʿdaad al‐ʿaam l‐lskaan w‐al‐mnsaaakn w‐
almnshaat 2010, Census 2010, 87.  
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2.2.	Betwixt	Force	and	Fashion	
Protests	 that	 emerged	 during	 the	 Arab	 uprisings	 of	 2011	 have	 heightened	 the	
significance	of	 labour	market	 and	youth	 inclusion	 items	on	 the	development	 agenda	 in	
Oman.	Although	entrepreneurship	has	been	given	policy	attention	in	recent	years,	it	was	
only	 since	 2011	 that	 the	 government	 really	 magnified	 its	 support.	 At	 a	 government‐
sponsored	event	in	2012	on	developing	entrepreneurship	in	the	country,	a	conversation	
with	a	senior	government	ministry	official	illustrates	the	degree	of	urgency	sensed	across	
the	country.	The	event	had	a	significant	component	designed	for	college	student	inclusion	
and	entrepreneurial	development.	When	probed	about	whether	his	ministry	was	planning	
on	offering	similar	programmes	in	the	future,	the	official	replied,		
Of	course	we	do.	Actually,	we	must.	Were	you	not	here	during	February	of	last	year?	
Did	you	see	the	events?	There	are	significant	numbers	of	youth	who	lack	economic	
opportunities.	We	have	to	do	something	about	this.	Things	have	to	change.31		
	
The	concentrated	protests	during	February	of	2011	in	several	population	centres	across	
the	country	were	mentioned	without	prompting	 in	all	 interviews	with	bureaucrats	and	
policy	makers.	Stability,	in	fact,	was	brought	up	time	and	time	again	in	personal	interviews	
when	participants	were	asked	about	the	motivations	for	entrepreneurship	promotion.		
Members	of	government,	entrepreneurship	support	organizations,	and	the	private	
sector	 frequently	 pointed	 to	 the	 protests,	 rising	 levels	 of	 unemployment,	 and	 growing	
numbers	of	school	graduates	and	school	leavers	as	significant	concerns.	“The	motivation,”	
claimed	a	senior	official	from	the	Ministry	of	Commerce	and	Industry	(MOCI),		
...	 is	 to	 create	 jobs	 for	 Omanis.	 We	 have	 a	 problem.	 Every	 year	 a	 big	 number	
graduates	 –	 around	 50,000.	 The	 government	 cannot	 employ	 them.	 Big	 private	
companies	cannot	employ	them,	so	they	really	have	to	start	their	own	businesses.	
The	contribution	of	SMEs	to	the	GDP	is	only	23	percent.	We	want	to	increase	the	
                                                            
31 Informal conversation with senior government official, March 2012. 
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contribution.	We	 cannot	 just	 rely	 on	 the	 oil.	 ...	We	 have	 no	 choice!	We	 have	 to	
encourage	 [entrepreneurs],	 to	 support	 them.	Until	now,	we	don't	have	a	private	
sector	in	Oman	that	can	really	help	the	small	businesses.	So	the	government	has	to	
take	a	larger	hand.	If	we	don't	help,	I	don't	think	we	will	be	a	success.32	
	
Nongovernmental	initiatives	supporting	entrepreneurship	echo	this	sentiment.	A	member	
of	the	GroFin	/	Intilaaqah	team	stated	that,	“we	are	really	keen	on	developing	the	capacity	
of	small	businesses	in	Oman	to	be	sustainable	and	eventually	be	able	to	hire	more	Omanis.	
So	really,	job	creation	and	job	development	are	one	of	our	priorities.”33	The	hope	in	Oman,	
and	even	in	Qatar,	is	that	entrepreneurship	will	stimulate	not	just	a	new	segment	of	the	
economy,	but	also	generate	employment	opportunities	for	nationals.34		
Albeit	 the	 economic	 imperative	 in	 Qatar	 is	 less	 immediate,	 the	 drive	 toward	
entrepreneurship	has	also	risen	in	force	over	the	last	year.	Some	question	the	genuineness	
of	the	Qatari	moves,	suggesting	that	mere	fad	is	behind	the	initiatives.	“This	is	just	the	story	
now	until	2022,”	noted	a	ministry	employee	in	reference	to	the	FIFA	World	Cup	bid	that	
bestowed	 upon	 Qatar	 international	 renown.35	 To	 be	 sure,	 “elements	 of	 grandiose	 and	
prestige”	 underline	 many	 decisions	 in	 the	 Gulf	 where	 rulers	 desire	 to	 be	 considered	
regional	leaders	in	particular	policy	areas.36	Nonetheless,	an	argument	can	be	made	for	the	
sincerity	 of	 government	 support	 of	 entrepreneurship.	 Senior	 officials	 at	 the	 General	
Secretariat	of	Development	Planning	(GSDP),	IctQatar,	the	Ministry	of	Business	and	Trade	
(MBT),	and	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	suggested	that	the	rulers	are	truly	visionary.	Their	
support	of	entrepreneurship	and	investment	in	innovation	is	indicative	of	their	desire	to	
                                                            
32 Interview with senior official at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, October 25, 2011. 
33 Interview with senior management at GroFin, Intalaaqah, October 22, 2011. 
34 Interviews 2011‐2012. 
35 Confidential interview, February 19, 2012. 
36 Hiba Khodr, “The Dynamics of International Education in Qatar: Exploring the Policy Drivers Behind the 
Development of Education City,” Journal of Emerging Trends in Educational Research and Policy Studies 2, no. 6 
(December 2011): 578. 
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diversify	 the	economy,	pursue	 sustainability,	 and	 in	 so	doing	pre‐empt	 future	potential	
challenges.37	Along	these	lines,	a	senior	official	at	the	Qatar	Chamber	of	Commerce	stated,		
...	 the	economy	is	shifting	toward	a	knowledge‐based	economy.	It’s	shifting	to	be	
dependent	less	on	hydrocarbons	and	shifting	toward	supporting	SMEs	...	I	can	see	
on	a	daily	basis,	and	you	may	not	yet	see	the	results,	but	the	efforts	that	are	being	
put	to	[the	support	of	SMEs]	are	tremendous.38		
	
Mid‐level	to	senior	bureaucrats	seem	to	rally	behind	the	programmes	in	part	because	of	
their	 connection	 to	 Qatar	 National	 Vision	 2030.	 Some	 would	 point	 to	 conventional	
American	economic	advice	which	describes	SMEs	as	the	backbone	of	the	economy.	As	well,	
the	idea	of	entrepreneurship	and	fast‐paced	development	seems	a	good	way	to	move	into	
the	 global	 limelight.	 It	was,	 after	 all,	 part	 of	Dubai’s	 claim	 to	 fame.	Dubai	 is	 frequently	
pointed	to	as	a	regional	business	example	by	both	business	people	and	bureaucrats	alike.	
Its	 liberalization	of	the	economy	combined	with	speedy	business	registration	processes	
with	fewer	bureaucratic	hurdles	makes	the	Dubai	model	attractive.	Even	in	the	wake	of	the	
2009	financial	crash	in	Dubai,	Qatar	appears	to	be	cautiously	looking	to	its	business	model.	
Still,	 the	 prestige	 allocated	 to	 the	 entrepreneurial	 trend,	 especially	 in	 the	 Qatari	 case,	
cannot	be	disregarded	entirely.	
	 The	 challenges	 of	 real	 diversification,	 youth	 inclusion,	 and	 the	 stratified	 labour	
market	have	provided	the	grounds	on	which	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion	
are	framed	as	necessary	endeavours.	These	challenges,	when	combined	with	the	regional	
trend	and	global	economic	ideological	fashion,	produce	a	powerful	driver.		
	
	
                                                            
37 Interviews, Qatar, February – May 2012. 
38 Interview with senior official at the Chamber of Commerce, April 11, 2012.  
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3. 	The	Emergence	of	Nascent	Entrepreneurship	and	Innovation	Policy	Frameworks		
The	 impending	 challenges	 described	 above	 provide	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 motivation	
behind	 entrepreneurship	 promotion	 in	 the	 region.	 These	 problems	 have	 beleaguered	
development	 policies	 and	 practice	 over	 the	 last	 several	 decades.	 Initially,	 the	
contemporary	narrative	of	development	in	the	Gulf	emerged	from	the	awareness	that	the	
hydrocarbon‐driven	rapid	development	experienced	since	the	1970s	had	both	neglected	
some	important	aspects	of	development	and	created	significant	sustainability	challenges.	
Across	the	Gulf,	entrepreneurship	education,	training	and	sponsorship	have	emerged	as	
the	prominent	response	and	comprise	a	critical	means	through	which	policy	makers	are	
attempting	 to	 transition	 to	 a	 new	 developmental	 phase,	 the	 knowledge	 economy.	 The	
language	in	the	development	plans	of	each	GCC	state	recognizes	knowledge	economy	as	a	
goal	 and	 several	 states	have	benchmarked	 their	development	plans	on	Singapore,	New	
Zealand	 and	 other	 small	 states	 building	 knowledge	 capacity.39	 This	 shift	 is	 significant	
because	it	signals	not	just	the	awareness	of	finite	petroleum	reserves	but	also	the	necessity	
to	find	new	and	creative	ways	to	innovate	and	to	employ	nationals	in	the	private	workforce.	
However,	whether	there	has	been	a	tangible	shift	beyond	the	discourse	of	development	
remains	questionable.	
Development	policy	literature	recognizes	innovation	and	entrepreneurship	policy	
as	 coinciding	 with	 developmental	 aims	 and	 running	 parallel	 with	 national	 shifts	 to	 a	
knowledge	economy.	The	body	of	consultancy	companies,	which	both	coexist	and	compete	
                                                            
39 The UAE, for example, used Singapore, New Zealand, Norway and Ireland as models in their recent Abu Dhabi 
Economic Vision 2030. Neil Parmar, “A Vision of Abu Dhabi’s 2030 Future in Focus,” The National, August 1, 
2011, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry‐insights/economics/a‐vision‐of‐abu‐dhabis‐
2030‐future‐in‐focus. 
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for	 advising	 roles	 in	 the	 Gulf,	 have	 encouraged	 the	 fostering	 of	 entrepreneurship	 for	
developmental	progress	and	for	helping	address	labour	market	challenges.40	The	role	of	
consultancies	 in	 the	Gulf,	 in	 fact,	 cannot	 be	highlighted	 enough.	 Likewise,	 international	
organizations	have	developed	reports	encouraging	entrepreneurialism	as	part	of	a	broader	
programme	of	private‐led	growth.41	The	advice	of	consultancies	and	IOs	is	not	cultivated	
in	a	vacuum.	It	grows	out	of	very	real	policy	challenges	related	not	only	to	diversification	
needs	 but	 also	 to	 the	 embedded	 labour	market	 challenges	 described	 below.	 They	 also	
emerge	out	of	a	particularly	neoliberal	dogma	which,	while	claiming	to	hold	the	remedies	
to	the	problems	of	the	economy,	often	remain	disconnected	from	the	actual	challenges	and	
practices	that	underline	Gulf	economic	life.		
Entrepreneurship	 promotion	 sits	 within	 a	 broader	 mandate	 that	 involves	 the	
development	 of	 a	 national	 system	of	 innovation.	 Although	 these	 systems	 include	much	
more,	 there	 is	 hope	 that	 fostering	 entrepreneurship	will	 lead	 to	 the	 technological	 and	
managerial	 innovations	 characteristic	 of	 knowledge	 economies.	 A	 national	 system	 of	
innovation	can	be	defined	as		
that	 set	 of	 distinct	 institutions	 which	 jointly	 and	 individually	 contribute	 to	
development	and	diffusion	of	new	technologies	and	which	provides	the	framework	
within	which	governments	form	and	implement	policies	to	influence	the	innovation	
process.	As	such	it	 is	a	system	of	 interconnected	institutions	to	create,	store	and	
transfer	the	knowledge,	skills	and	artefacts,	which	define	new	technologies.42	
	
In	the	following	pages,	I	detail	the	entrepreneurial	ecosystems,	and	the	nascent	national	
systems	of	innovation	in	which	they	sit,	of	Oman	and	Qatar.	In	many	respects,	I	am	engaging	
                                                            
40 See for example Richard Shediac and Hatem Samman, Meeting the Employment Challenge in the GCC: The 
Need for a Holistic Strategy, Ideation Center Insight (Booze & Company, 2010). 
41 See Najy Benhassine, From Privilege to Competition: Unlocking Private‐led Growth in the Middle East and 
North Africa, MENA Development Report (Washington: World Bank Publications, 2009). 
42 Metcalfe, “Technology Systems and Technology Policy in an Evolutionary Framework,” 38. 
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the	‘narrow”	definition	of	national	innovation	systems	which	entails	the	organizations	and	
institutions	 that	 act	 within	 this	 ecosystem.43	 This	 account	 does,	 however,	 set	 up	 the	
discussion	in	such	as	way	so	that	I	can	later	speak	to	the	broader	definition.	The	“broad”	
definition	 of	 a	 national	 system	 of	 innovation	 includes	 all	 facets	 of	 the	 economic	 and	
institutional	structures	that	affect	learning	such	as	the	production,	marketing,	and	finance	
systems.44				
	
3.1 	The	Entrepreneurship	and	Innovation	Support	Ecosystem	in	the	Sultanate	of	Oman	
		 Oman	has	perhaps	a	stronger	 impetus	 than	 its	wealthier	neighbours	 to	 invest	 in	
diversification	and	innovation.	Within	the	last	decade,	and	particularly	within	the	last	year,	
there	 has	 been	 growing	 focus	 on	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation.	 This	 is	 illustrated	
clearly	 in	 Table	 3.1,	 which	 shows	 how	 many	 governmental	 and	 nongovernmental	
initiatives	either	re‐strategized	or	increased	their	funding	support	packages	since	the	2011	
unrest.	
 
Table	3.1:	Entrepreneurship	Support	
 
# Programme Type Level Date Shift Government 
Actors 
1. Sanad Funding / 
Training 
National 2001  2007 changes / 
2011 funding 
increase 
MoM 
2. Sharakah / Youth 
Fund 
Financing / 
Advisory 
services 
National 1998 / 
Redesi
gned 
2008 
2011 funding 
increased 
PPP – various 
Ministries & 
Government 
institutions 
3. Knowledge Oasis 
Muscat (KOM) 
Technology 
park / 
Incubator 
National 2006 2011 expansion MOCI 
                                                            
43 Lundvall, National Systems of Innovation, 13. 
44 Ibid., 13–14. 
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4. The Research 
Council – 
Innovation 
Programmes 
Policy making/ 
funding / 
innovation 
stimulation 
National  2005 2010 tasked with 
drafting national 
scientific research 
strategy / 2013 
innovation strategy 
Government 
research council 
5. National Career 
Guidance Centre 
Education National 2008 2011 MOE 
6. Intilaaqah / GroFin Training / 
funding 
Global - localized 1995 2010 shift to GroFin 
management 
Private / Shell 
7. Injaz Oman (Part 
of Injaz al-Arab, a 
member of Junior 
Achievement 
Worldwide) 
Training / 
education 
Global - localized 2006 2012 Initiated by MoM, 
Sanad and later 
delivered via MOE, 
MOHE, and ITA 
8. Cisco  
Entrepreneurship 
Institute  
Training Global, localized 
delivered via 
cooperation w/ 
AMIDEAST 
2009 2011 Delivered via local 
consultancy by the 
end of 2011 
 SME 
Development 
Fund   
Funding  National with 
global 
cooperation / fund 
management 
2012 N/A MOCI & National 
Company for 
Projects and 
Management 
(NCPM) 
9 The Cell 
(OMIFCO) 
Training / 
incubator 
National, with 
consultants 
2012 N/A OMIFCO CSR via 
consultancy 
10. Start-Up Weekend 
(annual) 
Training Global - localized 2010 N/A  
11. Global 
Entrepreneurship 
Week (GEW), 
(annual) 
Variety of 
events: 
training, 
education, 
competitions. 
Global project / 
local branch 
hosted by local 
entrepreneur, 
owner of Zajil 
Oasis, LLC. 
2011 N/A In cooperation w 
many public and 
private partners. 
 
As	 a	 result	 of	 Oman’s	 production	 of	 development	 plans	 throughout	 its	 modern	
history,	one	can	trace	the	evolution	of	language	and	usage	over	time.	This	provides	useful	
insights	into	the	trajectory	of	development	planning	over	the	years	and	one	can	trace	the	
influence	 of	 prevailing	 global	 development	 ideologies	 and	 norms	 on	 its	 direction.	 The	
Omani	government,	since	the	British‐orchestrated	coup	which	led	Sultan	Qaboos	bin	Said	
to	power	in	1970,	never	joined	the	ardent	Arab	nationalist	/	Nasserist	camp	given	its	own	
fight	with	leftist	revolutionaries.	Rather,	it	was	a	combination	of	British	direction	and	the	
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discourse	 of	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	which	 solidified	 its	 capitalist	 tendencies.	 The	 global	
neoliberal	push	of	the	1980s	coupled	with	the	oil	price	slump	prompted	economic	policy	
language	 that	 mirrored	 prevailing	 international	 discourse	 of	 the	 time.	 Privatization,	
economic	 liberalization,	 and	 free	 trade	 became	 buzzwords	 in	 press	 releases	 and	
development	plans.		
The	 existence	 of	 a	 clear	 entrepreneurship	 and/or	 innovation	 policy	 in	 Oman	 is	
dubious	at	best.	Still,	there	are	a	variety	of	programmes,	plans,	and	reforms	across	a	cross‐
section	of	Ministries	and	government	bodies	that	point	in	a	direction	leaning	toward	the	
creation	of	an	unambiguous	policy.	In	the	interim,	a	strategy	is	being	developed.	Like	most	
development‐related	activities,	each	of	these	can	be	traced	back	to	the	Vision	for	Oman’s	
Economy	 2020.	 It	 is	 also	 tied	 to	 the	most	 recent	 five‐year	 development	 plan.45	 Human	
development	began	 to	be	 featured	prominently	on	 the	development	 agenda	during	 the	
1990s,	as	is	evident	in	Vision	2020,	published	in	1995.	This	was	clearly	before	the	push	
toward	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	in	regional	development	agendas.	Vision	2020,	
in	fact,	only	mentions	“entrepreneurship	mentality”	and	“entrepreneurial	spirit”	on	the	last	
page	in	the	context	of	directing	Omanis	toward	free	enterprise	and	preparing	them	with	
the	skills	of	“businessmen.”46	However,	 its	current	 five‐year	plan,	 the	fourth	 installment	
toward	the	Vision	2020	objectives,	places	it	front	and	centre.		
                                                            
45 The completion of the most recent five‐year plan was announced at the beginning of 2011 during the then 
Minister of National Economy, Ahmed Abdul Nabi Macki’s speech. Although preliminary portions of the 2011‐
2016 plan were released around that time, the remainder was delayed. This delay was most likely tied to the 
disbanding and retooling of the Ministry of National Economy in March 2011 after protests took the nation by 
surprise. To date, only the second part, the Investment programme in civil ministries, has been published. The 
first part which comprises the primary planning document with goals, rationale, and targets has not yet been 
published. It seems likely this is tied to the uncertainty emanating from the unrest and the government response 
that likely does not closely follow pre‐unrest plans. 
46 Vision for Oman’ s Economy – 2020: Long‐Term Development Strategy (1996‐2020), 2nd Edition (Muscat: 
Ministry of National Economy, 2007), 140. 
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In	 fact,	 early	 initiatives	 toward	 this	 end	 started	 a	 few	 years	 after	 Vision	 2020’s	
release.	These	include	Sharakah,	the	Fund	for	the	Development	of	Youth	Projects	in	1998	
and	 Sanad	 through	 the	Ministry	 of	Manpower	 (MoM)	 in	 2001.	 Sharakah	 is	 a	 type	 of	 a	
venture	capital	fund	aimed	at	promoting,	developing,	and	financing	SMEs.	It	is	the	brain	
child	of	Mohammed	Zubair,	economic	advisor	to	the	Sultan,	and	his	office.	Although	it	is	
officially	 a	private	 fund,	 it	was	 established	by	Royal	 decree	 and	 a	 sizeable	donation	by	
Sultan	 Qaboos.	 Funding	 from	 private	 sector	 actors	 soon	 followed.	 The	 programme	
experienced	road	bumps	along	the	way.	Many	of	the	early	projects	that	were	funded	went	
out	of	operation	by	2005,	and	the	organization	went	quiet.	It	basically	stopped	functioning	
for	 at	 least	 a	 year	 and	 a	 half.	 In	 2008,	 there	 was	 an	 organizational	 revamping	 which	
included	a	fresh	managerial	team.	Since	that	time,	they	have	been	performing	better	and	
have	also	been	involved	in	useful	research	projects.47		
The	Ministry	 of	Manpower’s	 programme,	 Sanad,	meaning	 support	 in	Arabic	 and	
standing	for	Self‐Employment	and	National	Autonomous	Development,	was	 launched	in	
2001	to	stimulate	local	business	creation,	ownership,	and	employment.	While	it	is	included	
in	 most	 discussions	 of	 entrepreneurship	 support	 in	 the	 country,	 its	 activities	 have	
traditionally	been	more	closely	akin	to	microfinancing	and	training	 for	micro	and	small	
businesses.	The	 types	of	projects	 financed	are	more	often	 “foodstuff”	 sale	shops,	 textile	
sales,	flower	selling,	car	washes,	etc.	Until	this	past	year,	the	maximum	funding	was	5,000	
                                                            
47 Interviews with Sharakah management, Oman, October 23, 2011;  and interviews with other stakeholders 
between September 2011‐July 2012. See also “Fund for Development of Youth Projects Website,” accessed 
October 31, 2012, http://www.youthfund.com.om/sharakah/. 
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OMR	per	applicant.	48	This	was	insufficient	to	even	cover	working	capital	for	the	first	few	
months	of	operation.	Applicants	were,	however,	able	to	combine	the	5,000	OMR	loan	with	
up	 to	 four	others	 involved	 in	 the	same	project	 for	a	maximum	of	25,000.	During	2011,	
funding	was	 increased	 to	 50,000	OMR,	 and	 allocated	 on	 a	 per‐project	 rather	 than	 per‐
applicant	basis.	Despite	this,	programme	participants	seem	to	have	retained	unfavourable	
opinions	of	Sanad,	including	its	training	and	support	services.49	
It	was	 the	 last	 two	 development	 plans	 that	 really	 earmarked	 innovation	 on	 the	
development	 agenda.	The	 relatively	newly	 created	Research	Council	 of	Oman	has	been	
tasked	with	 developing	 and	 drafting	 an	 innovation	 strategy	 to	 be	 used	 by	 government	
institutions.	Established	in	2005	by	Royal	Decree	(No.	54/2005),	the	Research	Council	has	
already	drafted	a	National	Research	Strategy	and	is	expected	complete	the	innovation	one	
in	the	near	future.	It	may	be	publicly	available	by	the	middle	of	2013.	Without	this	however,	
there	 is	no	coherent	document	on	which	to	base	 innovation	or	entrepreneurship	policy	
direction	 save	 Oman	 Vision	 2020	 and	 subsequent	 five‐year	 development	 plans.	 These	
vaguely	suggest	developing	Oman	into	an	innovation	centre	and	building	excellent	national	
research	capacity	as	part	of	resource	diversification	efforts	and	private	sector	and	human	
resource	development.50		
The	innovation	programmes	operated	under	the	auspices	of	the	Research	Council	
seem	 to	 comprise	 the	 closest	 attempt	 to	 the	Metcalfe	 definition	 of	 national	 systems	 of	
                                                            
48 Equivalent to $13,000 USD. The Omani rial is pegged to the U.S. dollar at $2.60.  Sulayman Al‐Qudsi et al., 
“Trade Volatility. The Dollar Peg and Inflation in the GCC Countries: Some Preliminary Findings,” The Arab Bank 
Review 10, no. 1 (June 2008): 16. 
49 Interviews with multiple Sanad beneficiaries and program administrators, September to December 2011. 
50 Oman Vision 2020. 
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innovation	 mentioned	 above.51	 The	 innovation	 division	 functions	 as	 an	 umbrella	 over	
three‐pronged	 project	 branches:	 Education	 and	 Academic	 Innovation	 Assistance,	
Community	Innovation	Assistance,	and	Industrial	Innovation	Assistance.	Mindful	of	state	
goals	 to	 enhance	 the	 private	 sector,	 the	 objectives	 surrounding	 each	 of	 these	 seem	
primarily	tasked	with	the	commodification	of	innovativeness.	The	first	branch	is	aimed	at	
fostering	an	innovative	and	entrepreneurial	culture	and	climate	in	educational	institutions	
and	among	educators	with	the	aim	of	eventually	commercialising	the	output.	The	second	
targets	community	and	cultural	organizations	and	associations	with	the	objective	not	just	
of	raising	awareness	among	community	initiatives	but	also	of	transforming	individual	and	
community	 ideas	 to	 commercial	 products	 and	 services.	 The	 final	 branch,	 Industrial	
Innovation,	 strategically	 positions	 itself	 as	 the	 main	 initiative	 building	 research	 and	
innovative	 capacity	 to	 address	 the	 shortfalls	 of	 industry	 in	 SMEs.	 Both	 interesting	 and	
ambitious,	this	project	has	gained	significant	speed	over	the	past	year.		
As	a	joint	initiative	with	the	Public	Establishment	for	Industrial	Estates	(PEIE)	and	
the	MOCI,	the	Research	Council	(TRC)	has	set	up	the	Industrial	Innovation	Centre	(IIC)	in	
2010	based	at	the	Rusayl	Industrial	Estates	near	Muscat,	Oman.	A	large	part	of	their	work	
involves	connecting	industry	with	academia	and	providing	the	needed	funds	to	encourage	
research	and	development	(R&D)	within	the	industrial	sector	and	in	SMEs	in	particular.	In	
the	late	1990s,	when	a	survey	revealed	the	dearth	of	R&D	activity	in	the	Omani	landscape,	
the	 idea	 to	 develop	 an	 innovation	 centre	 was	 first	 given	 birth.	 Initial	 activities	 were	
modelled	 after	 the	 Canadian	 Innovation	 Centre	 (CIC).	 Some	 suggest,	 however,	 that	 the	
variance	 between	 the	 Canadian	 and	Omani	market	was	 so	 vast	 that	 it	 retarded	 earlier	
                                                            
51 Metcalfe, “Technology Systems and Technology Policy in an Evolutionary Framework,” 38. 
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endeavours.52	 	 New	 consultants	 and	 experts	were	 brought	 in	 to	 try	 to	 develop	 a	more	
indigenous	or	 localized	approach	 suitable	 to	 the	 regional	 industrial	 context.	These	new	
attempts	are	still	rather	embryonic,	in	their	first	few	years	of	operation,	so	it	is	difficult	to	
assess	their	effectiveness.		
The	targeting	of	 industry,	working	with	industrial	authorities	and	policy	makers,	
and	connecting	industry	actors	with	academic	ones	seems	to	hold	promise.	Development	
scholars	have	learned	from	the	experience	of	Japan	during	its	time	developing	its	national	
innovation	system	 in	 the	1970s	and	1980s	 that	 targeted	 industrial	policies,	 as	 fostered	
under	the	guidance	of	the	Ministry	of	International	Trade	and	Industry	(MITI),	to	facilitate	
development	and	industrialization.	MITI	strategically	allowed	corporations	and	research	
institutions	to	enter	the	market,	but	ensured	that	their	programmes	and	participation	in	
national	R&D	projects	coincided	with	national	objectives.53	Amsden	and	Chu	also	elucidate	
similar	 practices	 in	 their	 2003	 work	 on	 development	 policies	 in	 Taiwan.54	 While	 the	
national	contexts	are	certainly	differentiated,	the	practice	of	having	government	involved	
in	targeting	industrial	projects	and	developments	has	a	history	of	working	in	cases	of	late	
industrialization.	With	a	very	Listian	flare,	a	national	system	of	innovation	in	developing	
contexts	features	consistency	in	state	strategy	toward	coordinating	long‐term	policies	for	
the	economy	and	industry.55		
                                                            
52 Interviews with various consultants and directors at TRC, Oman, September 2011 – July 2012. 
53 Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle; Carlsson, “Internationalization of Innovation Systems,” 60. 
54 See Alice H. Amsden and Wan‐Wen Chu, Beyond Late Development: Taiwan’s Upgrading Policies (The MIT 
Press, 2003). 
55 Freeman, “The ‘National System of Innovation’ in Historical Perspective,” 6–7; List, National System of Political 
Economy. 
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In	 addition	 to	 their	 tangential	 role	 in	 the	 IIC,	 the	 MOCI	 has	 recently	 created	 a	
directorate	general	for	small	and	medium	enterprises	(DG	SME).	Initiated	in	2007	by	royal	
decree,	the	DG	SME	began	by	connecting	with	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	to	look	into	
other	 country	 experiences	 in	 supporting	 entrepreneurship	 and	 SME	 development.	 The	
organizing	 idea	 was	 to	 develop	 a	 unit	 that	 facilitates	 increased	 collaboration	 and	
coordination	 among	 the	 various	 projects	 and	 programmes	 throughout	 the	 country.56	
Toward	the	end	of	2012,	they	relocated	their	offices	and	launched	a	centre	that	is	to	act	as	
a	 “one‐stop‐shop”	 for	 SME	 start‐up	 and	 support.	 This	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 first	major	 step	
toward	targeting	the	lack	of	collaboration	across	government	institutions.	Still	within	the	
early	days	of	operation,	it	remains	unclear	if	this	will	transpire.	If	anything	seems	constant	
in	personal	 interviews	across	the	government	bodies,	 it	 is	that	they	each	acknowledged	
policy	 coordination	 and	 cooperation	 problems	 and	 speak	 of	 potential	 future	 moves,	
databases,	and	initiatives	to	target	these.	Yet	at	the	same	time,	many	seem	oblivious	to	the	
plans	and	programmes	of	other	government	institutions.	
Knowledge	 Oasis	 Muscat	 (KOM)	 is	 a	 fairly	 recent	 invention	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Commerce	and	Industry	(MOCI).	Managed	by	the	PEIE,	it	is	a	technology	park	which	serves	
as	a	location	for	international	IT	companies	to	set	up	with	100%	foreign	ownership.	It	also	
hosts	The	Knowledge	Mine	(TKM),	a	business	incubator	for	local	entrepreneurial	projects.	
Fostering	the	creation	of	in‐country	knowledge,	TKM	supports	technology‐dependent	start	
ups	by	providing	them	affordable	office	space	and	free	or	highly‐subsidized	services	like	
internet	and	phone	lines.	This	allows	new	start	ups	to	dedicate	their	capital	to	research	and	
development	and	the	enhancement	of	their	market.	It	also	provides	training,	advice	and	
                                                            
56 Interview with senior official, DG SME, MOCI, October 25, 2011. 
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support	 to	 new	 entrepreneurs.	 TKM	 is	 seen	 as	 quite	 helpful	 to	 young,	 aspiring	
entrepreneurs.	Winners	of	competitions	like	Start‐Up	Weekend	are	extremely	grateful	for	
their	awarded	office	space	and	connectivity	services.	Still	many	others	report	difficulty	in	
acquiring	meetings	or	submitting	applications	for	such	space,	with	others	located	at	TKM	
bemoaning	 the	 lack	 of	 actual	 incubating	 support.	 Several	 suggested,	 in	 fact,	 that	 TKM	
offered	little	more	than	an	attractive	office	space.	They	wanted	training,	mentoring,	and	
business	guidance.57	A	KOM	expansion	promises	to	attend	to	space	limitations	and	there	
does	seem	to	be	an	awareness	of	some	of	its	more	substantive	shortcomings.	However,	the	
recent	opening	of	the	Information	Technology	Authority’s	(ITA)	own	incubation	centre	on	
the	same	grounds	risks	further	institutional	competition	rather	than	healthy	cooperation.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                            
57 Interviews with multiple TKM beneficiaries and managers, Muscat, Oman, September 2011 – July 2012.  
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Figure	3.2:	Oman’s	Entrepreneurship	Support	Ecosystem		
	
		
Some	of	 the	other	active	 initiatives	across	 the	country	are	 those	connected	with	
international	bodies.	Intilaaqah,	for	example,	is	based	on	the	Shell	Live	Wire	programme.	
It	was	initially	created	in	1995	as	a	training	body,	but	filtered	out	that	role	and	in	the	last	
five	years	and	modified	its	mission	to	function	primarily	as	an	enterprise	financier.	GroFin,	
a	multinational	microfinance	and	SME	 financing	organization,	has	been	appointed	 fund	
manager	as	of	2010.	It	now	provides	loans	between	20,000	and	380,000	OMR	to	Omani	
SMEs.	 Injaz	 Oman	 is	 another	 interesting	 example	 that	 has	 historically	 been	 quite	
collaborative.	It	is	part	of	the	international	Junior	Achievement	World	Wide,	which	in	its	
regional	 manifestation	 is	 known	 as	 Injaz	 Al‐Arab.	 The	 MENA	 office	 of	 Injaz,	 meaning	
achievement,	was	founded	in	2003.	Since	its	inception	it	has	expanded	into	15	countries	in	
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the	MENA,	with	20,000	corporate	volunteers	reaching	1	million	Arab	students.	In	Oman,	it	
has	reached	more	than	87	schools	since	its	start	in	the	country	in	2006.	Initially	initiated	
under	Sanad,	it	later	delivered	its	programmes	through	the	Ministry	of	Education	and	the	
Ministry	of	Higher	Education.	In	2012,	Injaz	switched	gears	to	focus	more	on	exit	points,	
targeting	 high	 school	 graduates	 and	 colleges	 students.	 It	 also	 focused	 its	 student	
competitions	at	the	college	level,	and	participated	in	local	and	regional	competitions.	Out	
of	seven	student	companies	that	competed	in	one	of	these	competitions,	two	turned	into	
start	 ups	 and	 one	 is	 in	 transition	 with	 an	 investor	 waiting.58	 Injaz	 has	 also	 signed	 a	
memorandum	of	understanding	with	the	Internet	Technology	Authority	to	participate	in	
its	programmes	like	its	incubator	and	its	hosting	of	an	innovation	camp	for	students.59	
There	 are	 a	 variety	 of	 other	 international	 initiatives	 and	 training	 programmes	
offered	through	local	partners	or	branches.	Ernst	&	Young,	for	instance,	organizes	annual	
“entrepreneur	of	the	year”	awards.	As	well,	the	Cisco	Entrepreneurship	Institute’s	training	
programme	 is	 offered	 in	 Oman.	 Initially,	 it	was	 delivered	 through	 the	 local	 AMIDEAST	
branch,	 but	 more	 recently	 has	 been	 available	 through	 a	 local	 consultancy	 owned	 and	
operated	 by	 an	 Omani	 entrepreneur,	 Sharifa	 Al‐Barami.	 Sharifa	 has	 become	 quite	 the	
powerhouse	 in	 the	 local	 entrepreneurial	 ecosystem,	 inspiring	 many	 young	 Omanis	 to	
pursue	 their	 passions	 and	 embark	 upon	 entrepreneurial	 endeavours.	 In	 addition	 to	
delivering	 the	Cisco	 training	programme,	she	convenes	regular	support	meetings	called	
“Entrepreneur	Jams,”	at	local	cafés.	These	serve	the	dual	function	of	therapeutic	sessions	
                                                            
58 Injaz Oman reports and presentations from 2011 and 2012; Other information provided in accounts from Injaz 
management. 
59 “ITA Signs MoU with Injaz Oman on IT Entrepreneurship,” Oman Daily Observer, May 3, 2012, 
http://main.omanobserver.om/node/93499. 
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where	 local	 entrepreneurs	 can	 share	 their	 difficulties	 and	 challenges	 as	 well	 as	 idea	
workshops	where	business	opportunities,	techniques,	and	strategies	for	success	within	the	
Omani	business	environment	are	shared.	Sharifa	is,	in	fact,	an	example	of	how	civil	society	
and	social	entrepreneurs	can	take	(and	are	taking)	more	prominent	roles	in	transforming	
the	social	milieu	and	pushing	for	bureaucratic	changes	from	the	grass	roots	up.		
Among	the	many	programmes	Sharifa	is	also	involved	in	is	a	project	conducted	in	
the	 South	 Sharqiya	 region.	 She,	 in	 partnership	with	 an	 expatriate	 consultant,	 has	 been	
contracted	by	the	Oman	India	Fertiliser	Company	(OMIFCO)	to	run	its	business	accelerator	
/	 incubator	 project,	 the	 Cell.	 The	 Cell	 is	 one	 of	 OMIFCO’s	 major	 corporate	 social	
responsibility	 (CSR)	 initiatives,	 and	was	 only	 launched	 in	 2012.	 It	 targets	 employment	
challenges	across	 the	country	but	primarily	 in	South	Sharqiya	where	 its	manufacturing	
plant	 is	 based.	 Oman	Oil	 Company,	wholly	 owned	 and	 operated	 by	 the	 government	 of	
Oman,	has	a	50	percent	stake	in	OMIFCO,	and	thus	has	a	keen	interest	in	encouraging	its	
state‐owned	 enterprises	 to	 join	 the	 broader	 state‐led	 entrepreneurial	 push.	 Even	 the	
Muscat	Youth	Summit,	run	by	royal	family	member	Sheikh	Faisal	bin	Turki	Al‐Said,	is	for	
the	second	year	in	a	row	focusing	on	entrepreneurship.	
	 Along	 with	 the	 more	 economically‐rooted	 initiatives,	 the	 various	 government	
bodies	 responsible	 for	 education	 are	 also	 participating	 in	 the	 promotion	 of	
entrepreneurship.	 These	 include:	 the	 Education	 Council,60	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education	
(MOE),	the	Ministry	of	Higher	Education	(MOHE),	the	Ministry	of	Manpower	(MoM),	and	
Sultan	 Qaboos	 University	 (SQU).	 There	 is	 frequent	 identification	 in	 each	 of	 these	
                                                            
60 The Education Council was established in September of 2012 (Royal Decree No. 48/2012), and replaced the 
Higher Education Council (RD No. 65/1998) under the Diwan of the Royal Court. (ONA) 
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institutions	of	a	perceived	lack	of	entrepreneurial	culture	and	instinct	among	young	people	
in	the	country,	who	have	grown	up	with	the	hope	and	expectation	of	a	job	in	the	security	
apparatus	or	elsewhere	in	the	vast	government	bureaucracy.	Change	has	to	occur	from	an	
earlier	age.	 In	 recognition	of	 this,	 the	MOE’s	National	Career	Guidance	Centre	has	been	
working	on	an	 initiative	 to	 reform	primary	and	high	school	 curriculum	as	well	 as	 train	
teachers	 to	allow	 for	an	earlier	 inculcation	of	entrepreneurship	as	a	viable	and	desired	
career	 path.	 The	 NCGC	 was	 established	 in	 2008.	 A	 2003	 Canadian	 consulting	 project	
designed	 its	 structure	 and	 this	 was	 blended	 with	 ideas	 from	 both	 Vision	 2020	 and	 a	
regional	Arab	symposium	in	2005	to	create	the	NCGC.	Through	the	centre,	career	guidance	
counsellors	are	located	throughout	the	country.	Students	are	able	to	access	training	and	
learn	 of	 career	 possibilities	 through	 these	 counsellors.	 As	 well,	 booklets	 have	 been	
developed	as	curriculum	addendums	for	grades	six	through	11,	which	help	orient	students	
to	the	various	options	available	post‐graduation.	In	addition	to	finding	ways	to	integrate	
business	 competency	 training	 in	 secondary	 school	 curriculum,	 another	 major	 project	
under	construction	is	a	national	job	demand	database.	This	latter	initiative	may	be	more	of	
a	pipe	dream,	as	even	between	ministries,	organizations	seem	to	encounter	problems	with	
data	transparency	and	information	sharing.	More	positive	however,	was	the	NCGC	team’s	
high	 consciousness	 of	 female	 enfranchisement	 and	 the	 imperative	 of	 providing	 equal	
opportunities	to	female	students,	graduates,	teachers,	and	ministry	staff.61		
	 The	MOE	 is	 only	 responsible	 for	 primary	 and	 secondary	 education,	 leaving	 the	
Ministry	of	Higher	Education	(MOHE)	to	oversee	most	tertiary	education	across	Oman.	The	
MOHE	manages	 the	 country’s	 six	 Colleges	 of	 Applied	 Science,	 all	 of	 which	 are	 located	
                                                            
61 Meeting with NCGC team, September 20, 2011.  
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outside	 the	 national	 capital.	 Initially	 set	 up	 as	 teacher’s	 training	 colleges,	 they	 were	
converted	to	Colleges	of	Applied	Science	in	2007.	In	the	last	couple	of	years,	these	colleges	
have	been	offering	courses	on	entrepreneurship	through	their	business	programmes	but	
open	 to	 the	 wider	 student	 body.	 As	 well,	 students,	 mostly	 through	 the	 initiative	 of	
instructors,	have	participated	 in	workshops	and	competitions	on	business	creation	and	
entrepreneurship.	 A	 recent	 conference	 hosted	 by	 the	 MOHE	 in	 cooperation	 with	 the	
Research	Council,	called	Moving	Mountains:	Entrepreneurship	Through	Higher	Education,	
brought	together	many	experts,	academics	and	practitioners	alike.	It	simultaneously	ran	a	
business	 plan	 training	 programme	 /	 competition	with	 student	 teams	 from	 a	 variety	 of	
institutions	across	the	country.	The	conference	boasted	wide	participation	from	academia,	
government,	and	civil	society.62		
The	Ministry	of	Manpower	manages	the	Higher	College	of	Technology	in	Muscat,	
which	is	the	second	largest	academic	institution	in	the	country	by	enrolment,	as	well	as	six	
other	Colleges	of	Technology	located	in	other	regions.	Vocational	training	is	an	important	
objective	 for	 these	 colleges.	 As	 such,	 On‐the‐Job	 Training	 in	 collaboration	 with	 local	
industry	and	business	as	well	as	Enhancement	Practical	Training	within	the	colleges	are	
important	components	of	the	educational	programming.	Outside	of	Muscat	however,	the	
regional	colleges	have	historically	had	a	difficult	time	finding	placements	for	their	students.	
In	 Sohar,	 for	 example,	 a	 great	deal	 of	 effort	was	 spent	by	 the	 staff	 at	 Shinas	College	of	
Technology	to	secure	partners	in	the	industrial	area.	The	unwillingness	of	industry	to	host	
                                                            
62 This was one of the workshops where I engaged in participant observation. For the workshop schedule, see:  
Moving Mountains ‐ Entrepreneurship Through Higher Education Workshop Programme (Muscat: Ministry of 
Higher Education, The Research Council, and The Central University of Finance and Economics in China, March 
17, 2012), http://mohe.gov.om/userupload/Workshop%20Programme.pdf. 
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student	placements	is	perhaps	telling	of	the	job	climate	graduates	face.63	The	MoM’s	Sanad	
programme	also	operates	business	 incubators	at	 the	Muscat	and	Nizwa	colleges,	where	
graduates	who	are	awarded	a	placement	can	use	the	space	without	cost	for	a	period	of	one	
year	to	get	their	business	off	the	ground.	Programme	beneficiaries	however,	seem	to	find	
the	 locations	 inconvenient	 for	starting	a	business.	Some	complained	 the	customers	and	
business	meeting	guests	would	often	be	denied	entry	to	the	college	grounds	by	security,	
making	it	difficult	to	conduct	an	interactive	business.64	
	
3.2 	The	Entrepreneurship	and	Innovation	Support	Ecosystem	in	the	State	of	Qatar	
Qatar’s	national	development	strategy,	its	first	development	plan	or	vision	for	the	
economy,	 places	 entrepreneurship	 front	 and	 centre	 of	 the	 agenda.	 It	 uses	 the	 terms	
entrepreneurship	and	entrepreneurial	21	times	and	speaks	of	innovation	and	innovations	
some	48	 times.	 The	 term	 “knowledge	 economy”	 occurs	 in	 36	 instances	 throughout	 the	
strategy.65	Despite	the	inconsistencies	and	contradictions	that	will	be	mentioned	in	more	
detail	 later,	 the	 strategy	demonstrates	a	genuine	desire	 to	 transition	 to	 this	knowledge	
economy	 and	 a	 very	 real	 sense	 of	 the	 challenges	 confronting	 the	 Qatari	 economy.	 For	
instance,	the	strategy	pragmatically	notes	that	“the	success	of	Qatar’s	efforts	to	graduate	
from	an	economy	based	on	non‐renewable	resource	inputs	to	one	in	which	productivity	
growth	 and	 eventually	 innovation	underpin	prosperity	will	 require	 fundamental	 policy	
                                                            
63 This was witnessed by observation and engagement during my time working with Shinas College of 
Technology and the Ministry of Manpower in 2006 and 2007. 
64 Interviews with Sanad programme beneficiaries and Sanad staff, 2011‐ 2012. 
65 General Secretariat for Development Planning, Qatar National Development Strategy 2011‐2016: Towards 
Qatar National Vision 2030 (Doha: General Secretariate for Development Planning, June 2011). 
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shifts	 that	 alter	 the	 incentives	 facing	 its	 citizens.”66	 Despite	 its	 lack	 of	 previous	
development	 planning,	 earlier	 scholarship	 suggests	 that	 even	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s,	
Qatar	demonstrated	awareness	 in	 the	 finiteness	of	 oil	 and	 the	 importance	of	 industrial	
diversification.67		
The	policy	push	for	entrepreneurship,	however,	only	began	in	2008	following	the	
release	of	Qatar	National	Vision	(QNV)	2030	by	the	General	Secretariat	for	Development	
Planning	(GSDP).	It	did	not	comprise	a	significant	part	of	the	development	discussion	prior	
to	this.	The	push	for	research	and	innovation,	however,	predates	QNV	2030	and	can	be	tied	
to	Qatar’s	education	overhaul.	Revamping	the	education	landscape	began	in	2001	with	the	
inception	 of	 the	 reform	 programme	 Education	 for	 a	 New	 Era.68	 The	 programme	 was	
developed	 by	 RAND,	 a	 non‐profit	 American	 policy	 institute,	 and	 highlighted	 several	
significant	weaknesses	 in	the	education	structure	and	academic	outcomes.	 It	 included	a	
major	overhaul	of	the	education	system	starting	at	primary	school	levels.	It	also	initiated	
the	establishment	of	the	Supreme	Education	Council	(SEC)	in	2002,	major	reforms	at	Qatar	
University	(Qatar’s	public	university),	and	the	 inauguration	of	Education	City	 in	2003.69	
The	changes	the	RAND	initiative	brought	have	been	surrounded	by	controversy,	resulting	
in	 broad	 policy	 incongruity	 and	 several	 reversals.	 Policy	 recommendations	 were	
implemented	 abruptly,	 with	 little	 to	 no	 explanation	 or	 local	 consultation.	 In	 fact,	 the	
instantaneous	implementation	of	policy	change	has	been	a	thorn	in	the	side	of	educational	
                                                            
66 Ibid., 11–12. 
67 Ragaei El‐Mallakh, Qatar: Energy and Development (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 45; Looney, Industrial 
Development and Diversification of the Arabian Gulf Economies, 70:121–146. 
68 Dominic J. Brewer et al., Education for a New Era: Design and Implementation of K‐12 Education Reform in 
Qatar, Monographs (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007). 
69Emiri decree No. 37 (2002); Ibid., 27–29; Khodr, “The Dynamics of International Education in Qatar,” 577; See 
also,“Supreme Education Council: About the SEC,” accessed October 29, 2012, 
http://www.english.education.gov.qa/section/sec/. 
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reform,	resulting	in	cultural	backlash	due	to	its	hastiness,	absence	of	communication,	and	
a	conspicuous	lack	of	clarity.70		
	Rather	than	being	managed	by	the	SEC,	Education	City	was	built	under	the	auspices	
of	 the	 Qatar	 Foundation	 for	 Education,	 Science	 and	 Community	 Development	 (QF),	
founded	in	1995	by	the	Emir,	Sheikh	Hamad	bin	Khalifa	Al‐Thani.	QF’s	chairperson	and	
“driving	 force”	 is	Sheikha	Mozah,	 the	wife	of	 the	Emir	and	mother	of	 the	Crown	Prince,	
Sheikh	Tamim	bin	Hamad	Al‐Thani.71	The	goal	of	Education	City	 is	 to	 serve	as	a	bridge	
between	research	and	policy,	and	train	and	develop	young	generations	of	Qataris	for	the	
future.	 To	 this	 end,	 it	 houses	 campuses	 of	 several	 international	 universities	 like	
Georgetown,	 Carnegie	 Mellon	 (CMU),	 and	 Virginia	 Commonwealth	 (VCU)	 for	 example.	
Attracting	leading	international	universities	to	Education	City	is	part	of	a	broad	drive	to	
educate	and	train	the	necessary	talent	for	future	knowledge	workers.	More	directly	related	
to	entrepreneurship	promotion,	CMU,	VCU,	Qatar	University,	and	the	College	of	the	North	
Atlantic	 ‐	 Qatar	 all	 have	 devoted	 professors	 of	 entrepreneurship	 or	 specific	 centres	
designed	to	inspire,	support	and	educate	aspiring	Qatari	entrepreneurs.	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                            
70 An excellent example of this policy confusion rests in the kerfuffle around the medium of instruction. In early 
2012, the Supreme Education Council announced that Qatar University would switch to using Arabic as a 
medium of instruction for a majority of its programmes, effective the very next semester. Meanwhile, a switch 
several years earlier of a majority of public Ministry schools to Independent (Charter‐type) schools (as part of the 
RAND policy plan) brought with it a change in the medium of instruction at the primary and secondary levels to 
English for all maths and sciences. Dominic J. Brewer et al., Education for a New Era; Gail L. Zellman, Louay 
Constant, and Charles A. Goldman, “K‐12 Education Reform in Qatar,” Orient 1 (2011): 55–60; Jenifer Fenton, 
“Qatar Cuts down on Lessons in English,” Financial Times, July 9, 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c7a87610‐c9ac‐11e1‐bf00‐00144feabdc0.html#axzz2EkVaWZhp. 
71 “About Qatar Foundation | Qatar Foundation ‐ Unlocking Human Potential.,” accessed December 12, 2012, 
http://www.qf.com.qa/discover‐qf/about‐qf. 
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Figure	3.3:	Qatar’s	Entrepreneurship	Support	Ecosystem		
	
		
	
There	 are	 four	 key	 origins	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 support:	
government,	 quasi	 government,	 private,	 and	 global/local	 partnerships.	 The	 first,	
government,	is	actually	difficult	to	separate	from	the	others.	The	state	in	Qatar	is	deep,	and	
as	 both	 the	 arbitrator	 of	 the	 permissible	 and	 the	 centre	 of	 financial	 resources,	 most	
programmes	 and	 initiatives	 are	 at	 least	 tangentially	 connected	 if	 not	 outright	 affiliated	
with	a	government	institution	or	quasi‐government	body.	Government	support	comes	in	
several	forms.	Of	course,	there	are	the	educational	components	as	outlined	above.	These	
come	in	two	forms.	Those	affiliated	with	the	SEC,	which	include	primary	and	secondary	
school,	 public	 vocational	 and	 technical	 training	 centres	 and	 colleges,	 and	 other	 public	
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higher	educational	institutions.	As	well,	it	includes	those	under	the	umbrella	of	the	Qatar	
Foundation.	Although	QF	 is	 considered	a	non‐profit	non‐governmental	organization,	 its	
close	affiliation	with	the	royal	family	makes	it	difficult	to	distinguish.		
In	 addition	 to	 Education	 City,	 the	 Qatar	 Foundation	 founded	 the	Qatar	National	
Fund	(QNRF)	 in	2006.	As	well,	Qatar	Science	and	Technology	Park	(QSTP)	 is	 located	 in	
Education	City.	Both	of	these	were	instituted	as	part	of	a	broad	drive	to	improve	research	
and	innovation	capacity	in	the	country	and	fulfill	the	Emir’s	2006	announcement	that	the	
country	would	spend	2.6	percent	of	its	GDP	on	research.72	QSTP	is	geared	not	only	toward	
carrying	out	 research	but	also	 in	delivering	 commercialized	 technologies	and	products.	
Similar	 to	 KOM	 in	Oman,	 QSTP	 operates	 as	 a	 science	 park	 that	 acts	 as	 a	 hub	 for	 large	
international	 corporations	 like	 Microsoft,	 Exxon,	 and	 Tata.	 It	 also	 tries	 to	 promote	
collaboration	 between	 university	 researchers	 and	 smaller	 companies.73	 MNCs	 like	
European	Aeronautic	Defence	and	Space	Company,	General	Electric,	Microsoft,	and	Rolls‐
Royce	to	name	a	few	have	committed	investments	in	the	millions	of	dollars	toward	R	&	D	
and	its	commercialization	in	QSTP.74	
The	Social	Development	Centre	(SDC)	also	operates	under	the	umbrella	of	the	Qatar	
Foundation.	SDC	 is	 involved	 in	activities	 that	have	 to	do	with	community	development.	
Through	this	lens	then,	SDC’s	entrepreneurship	support	is	more	similar	in	scope	to	Sanad	
in	 Oman	with	 an	 actual	 focus	 on	 self‐employment	 and	microenterprises.	 Its	 funding	 is	
                                                            
72 Zamila Bunglawala, “Nurturing a Knowledge Economy in Qatar” (Brookings Doha Center, September 2011), 4, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2011/9/qatar%20bunglawala/09_qatar_bunglawala; 
“Qatar Science and Technology Park,” accessed February 12, 2012, www.qstp.org.qa. 
73 interview with senior staff, QSTP, February 20, 2012; Bunglawala, “Nurturing a Knowledge Economy in Qatar,” 
4. 
74 N Janardhan, Boom Amid Gloom: The Spirit of Possibility in the 21st Century Gulf (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2011), 
82–83, http://site.ebrary.com/id/10480937. 
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offered	through	a	project	called	Rasameel,	while	its	training	and	advice	is	given	through	
Tanmia.		SDC	is,	however,	quite	active	and	has	seen	some	success	with	their	beneficiaries.	
A	 focus	 group	with	 SDC	 beneficiaries	 revealed	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 appreciation	 toward	 the	
centre	and	its	team,	who	provided	them	with	a	fair	amount	of	support	in	the	form	of	hand	
holding	 and	 guidance.75	 Women,	 in	 particular,	 seemed	 to	 benefit	 from	 advice	 and	
microfinancing	for	small,	independent	businesses.	In	fact,	across	Qatar	women	seem	to	be	
popular	 beneficiaries	 of	 the	 promotion	 of	 entrepreneurship.	 Most	 organizations	 and	
initiatives	 indicate	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 interest	 from	 aspiring	 female	 entrepreneurs.	 Even	
university	programmes	mentioned	strong	interest	and	performance	by	female	students.	
Working	 for	 oneself	 or	 having	 the	 flexibility	 of	 making	 your	 own	 hours	 is	 especially	
appealing	to	women	who	recently	started	their	own	families	or	who	live	 in	particularly	
conservative	ones.76		
The	Roudha	Centre	was	actually	set	up	for	this	very	purpose.	It	responds	to	a	need	
for	an	exclusively	female	entrepreneurship	training	and	support	organization.	The	two	co‐
directors	 of	 the	 project	 are	 local	 women,	 Shareefa	 Al‐Fadhel	 and	 Ayesha	 Al‐Mudehki,	
entrepreneurs	themselves.	The	inspiration	for	Roudha	came	out	of	the	results	of	a	research	
project	in	cooperation	with	Carnegie	Mellon	University	and	was	introduced	as	a	proposal	
in	2009	to	QF,	QSTP,	and	Qatar	Financial	Centre	(QFC).	After	not	receiving	any	sponsors	at	
the	outset,	they	launched	on	their	own	and	have	become	a	go‐to	focal	point	for	local	women	
to	receive	support	in	the	form	of	advice	or	training	at	any	point	in	the	business	process.	
Although	they	struggled	to	get	it	off	the	ground,	the	project’s	success	can	be	attributed	to	
                                                            
75 Focus Group, Social Development Centre, Doha, Qatar, February 22, 2012.  
76 Interviews with entrepreneurs, aspiring entrepreneurs, initiative and organization directors and staff, and 
university professors, Qatar, February to May 2012.  
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both	the	motivation	and	hard	work	of	the	cofounders	as	well	as	the	very	real	need	within	
the	country	for	a	women’s	entrepreneur	support	centre.		
Although	not	verifiable,	organizations	and	initiatives	that	were	not	birthed	within	
the	Qatar	Foundation	or	do	not	ultimately	come	under	the	patronage	of	Shiekha	Mozah	
seem	to	 face	additional	difficulties	 in	 the	commencement	and	expansion	processes.	For	
instance,	the	Junior	Achievement	Worldwide,	Injaz	Al‐Arab	branch	in	Qatar,	Injaz	Qatar,	
was	slow	to	get	off	the	ground.	It	took	them	five	years	to	receive	a	commercial	license.	Injaz	
Qatar,	 directed	 by	 Roudha	 co‐founder	 Ayesha	 Al‐Mudehki,	 has	 also	 been	 active	 at	 the	
primary,	 secondary,	 and	 post‐secondary	 levels	 much	 like	 its	 sister	 in	 Oman.	 Since	 its	
inception	in	2007,	Injaz	Qatar	has	run	programmes	in	20	independent	schools	and	reached	
over	5,000	students	at	Qatar	University.	This	was	made	possible	through	a	wide	network	
of	25	corporations	and	250	corporate	volunteers.77	
Similar	in	some	ways	to	QSTP,	and	perhaps	fueling	some	organization	competition,	
the	Supreme	Council	of	Information	and	Communication	Technology	(ictQatar)	is	also	in	
the	business	 of	 supporting	 technology	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation.	Through	 their	
initiative,	 the	 Digital	 Innovation	 Centre,	 ictQatar	 has	 two	 key	 projects.	 The	 first	 is	 a	
technology	 incubation	 centre	which	 provides	 both	 logical	 and	 facility	 support	 for	 their	
hosts.	The	Centre	also	provides	training	and	workshops.	The	Innovation	Theatre	held	at	
QITCOM	each	year	is	their	signature	event.	It	serves	as	an	entrepreneurial	hub,	particularly	
focused	on	women	and	youth,	to	promote	their	media,	gaming,	internet,	mobile	or	Arabic	
content	 business	 activities.	 The	 second	 project	 of	 the	 Digital	 Innovation	 Centre	 is	 the	
development	 of	 a	 digital	 content	 industry	 in	 Qatar.	 To	 this	 end,	 ictQatar	 is	 supporting	
                                                            
77 Injaz Qatar report and brochure, 2011.  
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quality	 ideas	that	contribute	to	the	enrichment	of	Arabic	content	on	the	web.	Given	the	
small	 size	 of	 the	 country,	 ictQatar	 would	 do	 well	 to	 help	 projects	 under	 the	 Digital	
Innovation	centre	to	move	beyond	a	domestic	focus	and	seek	a	broader	MENA	end	user	
market.78	
Given	its	nature,	the	Ministry	of	Business	and	Trade	(MBT)	in	Qatar	is	central	to	the	
entrepreneurial	 ecosystem.	 Naturally,	 it	 is	 one	 necessary	 stop	 (and	 more	 frequently	
several)	 for	 registering	 a	 business.	 Although	not	 yet	well‐delineated,	 it	 is	 the	 centre	 of	
many	 required	business	 set	up	procedures.	A	 lack	of	 clarity,	 of	 course,	 results	 in	much	
bureaucratic	confusion	that	tends	to	confound	new	business	hopefuls	and	dissuade	some	
from	the	pursuit.	Tangentially	related,	though	administered	separately,	Enterprise	Qatar	
(EQ)	was	founded	to	respond	to	these	problems	and	serve	as	an	overarching	organization	
for	SME	development.	A	2008	announcement	by	 the	prime	minister,	Sheikh	Hamad	bin	
Jassim	bin	Jaber	bin	Muhammad	Al	Thani,	publicly	committed	the	government’s	support	
to	 the	 creation	 of	 institutions	 and	 initiatives	 to	 support	 SME	 development	 and	
entrepreneurship	among	the	young	in	Qatar.	The	announcement	notes,		
H.E.	 The	 Prime	 Minister	 has	 created	 a	 steering	 committee	 chaired	 by	 H.E.	 the	
Minister	of	Business	&	Trade	and	been	given	a	mandate	for	the	creation	of	a	new,	
independent	authority,	whose	goals	will	be	to	 foster	diversification	of	 the	Qatari	
economy	 through	 SME	 development	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 breed	 of	 young	
entrepreneurs.79	
	
                                                            
78 The experience of the Taiwanese software industry may provide an interesting example to the 
commercialization of this and other projects in Qatar and the region. Although Taiwan is broadly lauded as a 
developmental success, policies which led to remarkable outcomes in its hardware industry preformed less 
spectacularly in the software one. Breznitz partially attributes this failure to the fact that the industry is primarily 
domestic.  Breznitz, “Development, Flexibility and R & D Performance in the Taiwanese IT Industry,” 168–176. 
79 Mohammed Abdul‐Rahman J. Al‐Thani, “SME Support Policy, Qatar ‐ 3rd Meeting of the MENA‐OECD Working 
Group on SME Policy, Entrepreneurship and Human Capital Development” (OECD, October 26, 2009), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/6/43982279.pdf. 
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EQ	 was	 then	 announced	 in	 2008	 by	 the	 Emir	 with	 a	 two	 million	 Qatari	 riyal	 funding	
package.		Not	only	was	EQ	to	offer	a	full	range	of	training	and	business	support	services,	it	
was	to	aid	SMEs	in	finding	and	accessing	financial	products	like	venture	capital,	grants,	and	
loan	 guarantee	 programmes.	 Losing	 momentum	 after	 the	 death	 of	 a	 Sheikh	 who	 was	
especially	passionate	about	the	project,	it	was	not	until	2010	that	a	contract	was	awarded	
to	Capitas	Group	 International	 to	design	 the	 structure	and	 strategy	 for	EQ.80	 Its	 official	
establishment	did	not	materialize	until	March	2011	when	an	Emiri	decree	announced	EQ’s	
official	launch.	By	2012,	everyone	knew	of	EQ	but	no	one	could	point	to	concrete	projects	
or	 outcomes.	 Internally,	 the	 organization	 itself	 seemed	 caught	 in	 a	 web	 of	 constant	
reinvention.	 Insiders	 seem	pessimistic	 about	 the	whole	project.	They	attribute	EQ	with	
starting	what	 they	see	as	a	 trend,	but	not	 following	through.	Crippled	by	 infighting	and	
conflicting	interests	at	the	board	of	director’s	 level,	competition	between	different	state	
agencies	wanting	 the	 limelight	 in	 this	 new	niche	 rendered	 them	 ineffective.	The	whole	
landscape	has	become	“about	what	you	can	buy	rather	than	what	you	can	achieve,”	one	
individual	noted.81		
Institutional	 competition	 seems	 to	 come	 in	 the	 strongest	 form	 from	 the	 Qatar	
Development	 Bank	 (QDB).	 QDB	 has	 become	 an	 active	 actor	 in	 the	 entrepreneurship	
scramble	in	the	country	since	it	opened	its	SME	division	in	2011.82	In	cooperation	with	the	
International	Financial	Corporation	(IFC)	of	the	World	Bank,	QDB	launched	an	online	SME	
toolkit	in	April	2012	to	help	smaller	businesses	and	new	start	ups	navigate	bureaucratic	
                                                            
80 Interviews with EQ staff in Doha, February – May 2012; “Capitas Group Wins Deal to Establish Enterprise 
Qatar,” Arab News, November 5, 2010, http://www.arabnews.com/node/359650. 
81 Interviews with past and present employees and others involved in EQ projects or related initiatives. Doha, 
primarily on February 12 and 18, 2012 and April 16 and 29, 2012. 
82 Interviews with senior staff, QDB, Doha, Qatar: February 13, 2012. 
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processes	and	improve	their	overall	performance.83	It	also	instituted	Al‐Dhameen,	a	credit	
guarantee	scheme	that	cooperates	with	12	different	financial	institutions	throughout	the	
country	by	providing	an	80	to	85	percent	guarantee	for	SME	loans.		
A	 final	 project,	 but	 increasingly	 prominent	 and	 central	 to	 the	 entrepreneurship	
ecosystem,	is	the	Bedaya	Centre.	Launched	in	2011	as	a	joint	initiative	between	QDB	and	
Silatech,	 the	 Bedaya	 Centre	 focuses	 on	 entrepreneurship	 and	 career	 development.	 Its	
mission	is	to	provide	career	counselling	to	youth,	with	a	particular	 focus	on	developing	
entrepreneurial	 skills	 and	 knowhow.	Bedaya	hosts	monthly	 networking	 sessions,	 talks,	
workshops,	and	has	recently	launched	an	Angel	Investor	Network.	Its	parent	organization,	
Silatech,	is	particularly	active	in	the	Arab	world	on	issues	of	youth	empowerment.	While	
based	in	Doha,	Silatech	focuses	on	the	wider	MENA	region	with	its	training,	investment,	
and	research	activities.	It	aims	to	make	an	impact	on	the	mélange	of	issues	surrounding	job	
creation,	employability,	and	the	creation	of	opportunities	for	young	people.	Moreover,	it	
seeks	to	inculcate	the	policy	space	by	cultivating	an	enabling	mindset	and	programmatic	
environment	for	these	projects	to	flourish.84		
	
3.3. Rallying	for		Entrepreneurship	and	Innovation	for	Development	
At	this	early	stage	in	the	development	of	innovation	policies	and	strategies,	the	Gulf	
cases	could	learn	from	the	experiences	of	earlier	developmental	states.	One	such	lesson	
indicates	 that	 industrial	 and	 innovation	 policies	 oriented	 toward	 public	 research	
                                                            
83 Riham Mustafa, “IFC Helps Support Smaller Business in Qatar with New Web Platform,” International Finance 
Corporation, April 3, 2012, 
http://www.ifc.org/IFCExt/pressroom/IFCPressRoom.nsf/0/A0B0CF70C3F5FB6B852579D5004BCA32. 
84 Interviews with Silatech and the Bedaya Centre staff members and managers, Doha, February 12 and 19, and 
April 8 and 17, 2012. 
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institutions	 helps	 private	 development	 and	 growth	when	 these	 public	 research	 bodies	
expand	interaction	with	private	industry	and	when	the	research	body	itself	builds	rather	
than	competes	with	the	industry.85	In	this	light,	Qatar	and	Oman	would	do	well	to	intensify	
efforts	 around	 institutions	 and	 initiatives	 like	 QSTP,	 KOM,	 and	 IIC	 toward	 the	 goals	 of	
building	 research	 capacity	 and	 stimulating	 innovation.	 Of	 particular	 interest	 are	 those	
efforts	aimed	at	strengthening	ties	between	researchers	and	industry.		
As	 was	 noted	 earlier,	 one	 of	 the	 advantages	 Gulf	 governments	 have	 in	 their	
developmental	aims	is	the	ability	to	galvanize	actors	across	multiple	areas	to	focus	their	
activities	toward	national	development	agendas.	This	can	come	in	the	form	of	inexpensive	
products	 from	 some	 SOEs	 to	 others	 or	 the	 provision	 of	 logistical	 and	 infrastructural	
support	like	airports	and	sea	ports.86	This	ability	is	a	product	of	the	nature	of	governance	
in	the	countries.	Together	developmentalism	and	authoritarianism	provide	what	has	been	
suggested	 is	 a	 crucial	 leeway	 in	 directing	 or	 coordinating	 efforts	 toward	 development	
objectives.	 This	 type	 of	 manipulation	 and	 channelling	 of	 resources	 to	 achieve	 desired	
results	was	an	early	characteristic	of	developmental	states	like	Korea	and	Taiwan.87	Other	
than	 fairly	 obvious	 concerns	with	 authoritarianism,	 the	developmental	 outcome	of	 this	
governance	behaviour	in	the	Gulf	is	still	something	of	a	question	mark.	Outside	of	the	Dubai	
                                                            
85 William Lazonick, “The Innovative Enterprise and the Developmental State: Toward an Economics of 
‘Organizational Success’” (presented at the INET Annual 2011 Confeence: Crisis and Renewal: International 
Political Economy at the Crossroads, Bretton Woods, NH: Institute for New Economic Thinking, 2012), 1–51, 
http://fiid.org/wp‐content/uploads/2012/11/Lazonick‐Innovative‐Enterprise‐and‐Developmental‐State‐
20121117.pdf; Breznitz, “Development, Flexibility and R & D Performance in the Taiwanese IT Industry.” 
86 Hertog in Seznec and Kirk, Industrialization in the Gulf, 21–22. 
87 Eun Mee Kim, “Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With Illustrations from the South Korean 
Case,” Social Problems 40, no. 2 (May 1993): 228–249, doi:10.2307/3096924; Ann Sasa List‐Jensen, Economic 
Development and Authoritarianism ‐ A Case Study on the Korean Developmental State, DIIPER Research Series 
(Denmark: DIIPER and Department of History, International and Social Studies, Aalborg University, 2008), 
http://vbn.aau.dk/files/13994106/DIIPER_wp_5.pdf; Kim and Huang, “Dynamics of State Strength and Policy 
Choices.” 
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experiment	and	other	pockets	of	economic	activity,	early	efforts	have	only	been	marginally	
effective	at	diversification,	and	seem	to	be	short	on	cohesive	coordination,	and	long‐run	
consistency.		
Despite	this,	the	policy	push	toward	indigenous	SME	support	is	gaining	government	
attention.	Increasingly,	the	state	seems	to	be	channeling	institutional	efforts	toward	this	
current	major	policy	 shift.	As	was	demonstrated	 above,	 governments	 in	both	 cases	 are	
funnelling	resources	and	a	considerable	amount	of	policy	language	toward	the	support	of	
entrepreneurship.	Oman	 is	 taking	 this	 a	 step	 further.	 It	 is	 assembling	 the	business	and	
trade	 arms	 of	 the	 government	 for	 external	 knowledge	 transfer	 support	 and	 export	
development	as	well	as	prompting	business	leaders	from	the	Omani	business	dynasties	to	
support	the	state’s	SME	push.		
With	 regard	 to	 the	 former,	 for	 example,	 the	 Ministries	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 and	
Commerce	and	Industry	are	reportedly	exploring	and	encouraging	trade	by	new	SMEs	with	
emerging	economies,	especially	India.88	A	foreign	affairs	delegation	recently	visited	India	
with	 the	 purpose	 of	 establishing	 contacts	 for	 knowledge,	 know‐how,	 and	 technology	
transfer	 toward	 the	 development	 of	 Oman’s	 SME	 sector.	 The	 goal	 is	 to	 explore	 “new	
methods	that	can	be	implemented	by	Omani	youth	to	help	them	set	up	commercially	viable	
SME	projects	in	manufacturing	products,	which	can	be	marketed	across	the	world.”89	As	
well,	 MOCI	 in	 collaboration	 with	 Omantel,	 the	 national	 telecommunications	 company,	
began	sending	groups	of	Omani	entrepreneurs	to	Singapore	in	2012	as	part	of	a	training	
                                                            
88 “Cooperation Between GCC and Indian SMEs Vital for Bilateral Sustainability,” Al Bawaba Business, June 17, 
2013, http://www.albawaba.com/business/gcc‐smes‐sustainability‐499937. 
89 Dabasish Mitra, “Oman Seeks Indian Expertise in Developing SME Projects,” Times of Oman, June 24, 2013, 
http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article‐18547.aspx. 
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programme	organized	between	the	Omani	and	Singaporean	governments.90	 In	a	similar	
vein,	the	Public	Authority	for	Investment	Promotion	and	Export	Development	(PAIPED)	
launched	 a	 seminar	 series	 introducing	 Omani	 SMEs	 to	 ways	 of	 expanding	 into	 and	
competing	 in	 the	 global	market.91	 Along	with	 this,	MNCs	 like	Ericsson,	 a	 leading	 global	
technology	provider,	are	launching	training	programmes	in	the	ICT	field.92	
The	government	is	also	keen	on	galvanizing	support	from	the	merchant	dynasties	
in	the	country.	The	Zubair	Group,	for	example,	has	launched	a	centre	to	support	small	
enterprises.93	The	Zubair	family	has	been	very	close	to	decision	making	circles	since	the	
beginning	of	Qaboos’	reign,	and	even	before	with	the	earlier	Sultans	of	Muscat.	Given	its	
history,	one	could	expect	that	the	family’s	corporate	side	would	join	the	state‐led	push.94	
Zubair	Group	managing	director,	Khalid	Al‐Zubair,	noted,	“In	accordance	with	the	vision	
and	wise	leadership	of	His	Majesty	Sultan	Qaboos	bin	Said,	the	private	sector	has	been	
asked	to	step	up	and	play	a	pivotal	role	in	the	development	of	SMEs,	to	further	aid	the	
transformation	of	the	economy	in	the	Sultanate.”95	Likewise,	the	Bahwan	trading	family,	
close	to	the	Sultan	since	he	unseated	his	father,	provides	a	similar	example.	They	are	
exclusive	agents	for	companies	such	as	Ford,	Toyota,	IBM,	and	Pepsi‐Cola	with	activities	
across	a	wide	array	of	sectors	from	agriculture	and	motors	to	public	works,	travel,	and	
recruitment.	Despite	bearing	the	brunt	of	accusations	around	market	monopolization	
                                                            
90 “Commerce and Industry Ministry Inaugurates SME Program in Singapore,” Oman News Agency, June 5, 2012, 
www.omannews.gov.om/ona/english/newsDetails_inc.jsp?newsID=130411. 
91 Times News Service, “Trade Up Seminar Series for SMEs Kicks Off,” Times of Oman, June 23, 2013, 
http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article‐18542.aspx. 
92 “Ericsson Attracts Omani Talent by Launching an ICT Training Programme,” Al Bawaba Business, June 27, 2013, 
http://www.albawaba.com/business/pr/ericsson‐ict‐training‐502479. 
93 “Small Enterprise Centre to Help Omani Businesses Take‐Off,” Oman Daily Observer, January 27, 2013, 
http://main.omanobserver.om/node/142797. 
94 Valeri, Oman, 44, 115. 
95 “Small Enterprise Centre to Help Omani Businesses Take‐Off.” 
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from	entrepreneur	interviewees,	the	media	has	recently	lauded	the	Bahwan’s	support	of	
“national	priorities,”	namely	SME	development.96	The	Khimji	Ramdas	group,	a	primary	
wholesaler	in	Oman	and	agent	for	companies	ranging	from	Rolex	and	Compaq	to	
Marlboro,	is	another	such	example.	Khimji	Ramdas	is	presented	in	the	media	as	being	
supportive	of	the	Sanad	programme.97		
In	the	case	of	trading	families	like	these,	“oil	not	only	strengthened	inherited	
economic	and	social	positions,	through	the	conversion	of	trade	dynasties	to	rent	wealth;	
it	led	to	a	profound	disruption	of	the	boundary	between	politics	and	economy.”98	For	this	
reason,	real,	beneficial	support	toward	SME	development	is	difficult	to	elicit	from	these	
embedded	corporations.	As	will	be	discussed,	their	growth	priorities	combined	with	their	
privileged	position	in	the	economy	means	their	objectives	are	necessarily	at	odds	with	
the	needs	of	new	start	ups.	In	comparison	to	Qatar,	Oman	appears	to	be	more	successful	
at	rallying	the	business	elites.	At	least	in	the	last	year,	they	have	been	able	to	extract	
verbal	support	of	SME	efforts	with	some	more	active	engagement.	
The	 privileging	 of	 SME	 support	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 innovation	 and	 industrial	
development	 may	 be	 partially	 attributable	 to	 the	 role	 of	 IOs	 and	 international	
consultancies	 in	 emphasizing	 private	 enterprise	 and	 entrepreneurship.	 Along	 with	
appealing	 to	 human	 capital	 and	 employment	 concerns,	 it	 promises	 to	 pave	 the	way	 to	
knowledge	 economy	 and	 a	 sustainable	 future	which	may	 not	 be	 as	 attainable	without	
                                                            
96 It is worth noting that the Bahwan trading group split in the early 2000s between two brothers, Saud and 
Suhail, to form the Saud Bahwan Group and the Suhail Bahwan Group. It is the former which is featured in this 
article. Times News Service, “Saud Bahwan Group Felicitates 131 High Performing Omani Entrepreneurs,” Times 
of Oman, February 9, 2013, http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article‐8056.aspx. 
97 Times News Service, “Khimji Ramdas Honoured for Supporting Sanad,” Times of Oman, December 30, 2012, 
http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article‐4978.aspx. 
98 Valeri, Oman, 107. 
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sufficient	focus	on	other	areas.			This	pattern	also	stems	from	the	nature	of	governance	and	
policy	making	in	the	Gulf,	whereby	decision	making	rests	in	the	hands	of	the	elite	who	find	
the	promotion	of	entrepreneurship	politically	expedient.	Managed	in	a	certain	way,	it	can	
prove	 to	 have	 a	minimal	 political	 cost	 and	 still	maintain	 the	 appearance	 of	 addressing	
major	socio‐economic	problems.	Although	reframed,	rentier	practices	can	still	be	engaged.	
As	well,	this	policy	move	speaks	to	the	impact	of	both	global	and	domestic	pressures	on	the	
choices	Gulf	 rulers	make.	Should	 the	 focus	on	stimulating	 innovation	become	of	central	
importance,	it	could	crucially	change	this	assessment.	The	cooption	of	innovation,	and	the	
culture	 it	 creates,	 is	much	more	difficult	 than	widening	 the	 social	net	or	 reconstituting	
wealth	 distribution	 mechanisms	 to	 a	 certain	 mass	 of	 entrepreneurial	 nationals.	
Importantly,	 the	 practice	 of	 innovation	 and	 its	 concomitant	 technological	 and	 socio‐
economic	 changes	may	 bypass	 the	 usual	 rent‐seeking	 patterns,	making	 the	 revision	 of	
rentierism	more	difficult.99	
	
4 The	 Contradictions	 of	 Entrepreneurship	 Promotion	 in	 Rentier	 Political	
Economies	
Notwithstanding	the	considerable	amount	of	development	policy	making	wrapped	
in	entrepreneurship	promotion	in	recent	years,	policy	statements	and	initiatives	are	rife	
with	 contradictions	 and	 inconsistencies.	 These	 are	 present	 in	 both	 cases	 but	 vary	 in	
severity	 from	 case	 to	 case.	 This	 final	 section	 discusses	 four	 such	 problématiques:	 (1)	
institutional	competition	and	lack	of	cooperation,	(2)	policy	disconnect	from	realities	on	
                                                            
99 This discussion is explored further in the final chapter.  
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the	ground,	(3)	absence	of	differentiation	between	innovative	entrepreneurship	and	self‐
employment,	and	(4)	the	segmented	labour	market	
	
4.1 Institutional	competition	and	lack	of	cooperation	
Although	much	ado	is	made	of	the	importance	of	intergovernmental	cooperation,	
each	 government	 body	 seems	 more	 inclined	 to	 brandish	 their	 own	 name	 and	 claim	
contribution	toward	development	with	the	“new”	catch	phrase	than	actually	contributing	
to	sustainable	development	and	change.	There	is	a	dearth	of	cooperation	and	collaborative	
strategizing,	with	no	 coherent	unifying	 strategy	 in	existence.	 It	 still	 remains	 to	be	 seen	
whether	Oman’s	Research	Council	by	virtue	of	its	contribution	to	an	innovation	policy	or	
Qatar	Foundation	by	its	sheer	convening	power	will	remedy	this	deficiency.		
In	 the	 Omani	 case,	 the	Ministry	 of	 Commerce	 and	 Industry	 and	 the	Ministry	 of	
Manpower	 are	 not	 the	 only	ministries	 involved	 in	 entrepreneurship	 support.	 Virtually	
every	Ministry	and	major	government	institution	is	involved	somehow	–	yet	not	in	unison.	
Those	ministries	serving	the	educational	sector	are	a	case	in	point.	Officially	initiated	in	
2006,	the	National	Career	Guidance	Centre	(NCGC)	at	the	Ministry	of	Education	grew	out	
of	a	project	targeting	educational	challenges	in	the	country.	A	task	force	and	a	Canadian	
consultancy	helped	develop	the	project	which	was	propelled	into	full	operation	in	2008.100	
Its	 main	 aim	 is	 to	 stimulate	 an	 entrepreneurial	 culture	 at	 an	 early	 age	 and	 develop	
awareness	 of	 different	 career	 paths	 available	 to	 young	Omanis.	The	Ministry	 of	Higher	
Education	 has	 some	 of	 its	 own	 programmes,	 requests	 entrepreneurship	 education	
(courses)	in	its	educational	institutions,	and	participates	in	conferences	on	the	subject.	Its	
                                                            
100 Official presentation from Ministry of Education and team meeting 20 September 2011.  
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activities	seem	rather	devoid	of	creativity	and	lack	the	willpower	and	urgency	demanded	
by	the	necessity	of	 inter‐institutional	cooperation	and	strategy.	Without	the	energy	of	a	
few	 of	 their	 very	 motivated	 staff,	 even	 fewer	 meaningful	 activities	 would	 transpire.	
Moreover,	the	 lack	of	communication	between	ministries	dealing	with	education,	which	
also	 includes	 the	MoM	for	 their	 technical	colleges	and	training	 institutions,	has	 led	 to	a	
rather	 disjointed	 approach	 to	 revamping	 and	 improving	 quality.	 This	 can	 have	 serious	
ramifications	 for	 development	 as	 “variations	 in	 levels	 of	 education	 across	 societies	 are	
deeply	 consequential	 for	 late‐late	 industrialization	 because	 they	 influence	 not	 only	 the	
productivity	of	the	work	force	but	also	the	capacity	to	absorb	existing	technology	and	to	
innovate.”101	
	 In	addition	to	the	scramble	for	budget	funding	and	recognition,	a	sense	of	impotence	
and	 limited	 meaningful	 consultation	 with	 mid‐level	 /	 front‐line	 bureaucrats	 may	
contribute	to	this	difficult	cooperating	environment.	With	a	few	exceptions,	interviews	in	
both	cases	revealed	that	even	at	the	level	of	director	general	bureaucrats	do	not	seem	to	
feel	 like	 they	 are	making	 a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 informing	policy.	 They	belong	 to	
committees,	often	multiple,	and	they	discuss	the	challenges	and	issues	of	the	time.	Yet	still,	
it	 is	 their	 overseer,	 the	 undersecretaries	 and	 those	 with	 ministerial	 rank,	 who	 are	
perceived	as	holding	the	ability	to	make	decisions.	Some	suggest	they	are	consulted	from	
time	 to	 time,	 others	not.	Many	 in	Oman	 indicated	 that	at	 times	 they	had	proposals	put	
forward,	and	that	limited	intra	and	inter‐ministerial	collaboration	occurrs.	Still,	decision	
making	remains	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	a	few.	Interviews	in	Qatar	were	indicative	of	
even	 tighter	 top‐down	 control	 of	 policies,	 ideas,	 and	 processes.	 In	 the	 development	 of	
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knowledge	and	innovation	policies,	“one	finds	hierarchy	in	the	machinery	of	government	
but	that	is	often	not	for	the	good	of	developing	coordination.”102	
There	are	a	few	signs	that	this	situation	is	gradually	evolving	in	the	Omani	case.	In	
the	 shadows	 of	 the	 2011	 protests,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 growing	 awareness	 of	 the	
implications	of	this	lack	of	coordination.	Several	events	over	the	last	year	indicate	attempts	
at	enhancing	coordination.	There	is	a	new	impetus	for	enhanced	governance,	necessitated	
by	the	acknowledgement	that	if	things	do	not	improve	soon	the	next	round	of	civil	unrest	
could	be	more	severe.	The	SME	Symposium	at	the	beginning	of	2013	is	representative	of	a	
more	concerted	government	effort	to	harmonize	entrepreneurship	promotion.	The	Forum	
was	preceded	by	the	launch	of	Sultan	Qaboos’	“meet	the	people”	tour	in	the	ad‐Dakhiliyah	
region,	when	the	Sultan	announced	the	upcoming	symposium	and	several	new	policies	and	
SME	 funding	 opportunities	 that	 would	 follow.103	 Along	 with	 assembling	 a	 variety	 of	
government	bodies	in	support	of	the	agenda,	it	began	a	renewed	and	broader	policy	push	
which	responded	to	some	of	the	recent	criticisms	of	current	practice.104		
Given	the	presence	in	both	cases	of	hierarchal	governance	levels	like	an	absolute	
ruler	 or	 ruling	 family,	 cabinet,	 ministries	 and	 agencies,	 and	 a	 plethora	 of	 horizontal	
governance	levels,	political	coordination	needs	to	be	“designed	and	promoted”	rather	than	
left	to	“an	evolutionary	process.”105	Ad	hoc	committee	creation	or	policy	measures	will	not	
                                                            
102 Dietmar Braun, “Lessons on the Political Coordination of Knowledge and Innovation Policies,” Science and 
Public Policy 35, no. 4 (May 2008): 292. 
103 “His Majesty the Sultan Announces New Measures to Boost SMEs,” Muscat Daily, January 28, 2013, 
http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/His‐Majesty‐the‐Sultan‐announces‐new‐measures‐to‐boost‐SMEs‐
202a; “Oman’s Sultan Qaboos Begins Annual Meet‐the‐People Tour,” Middle East Online, January 20, 2013, 
http://www.middle‐east‐online.com/english/?id=56560. 
104 This micro‐level policies are discussed throughout the next several sections and the conclusion.  
105 Braun suggests that “political coordination cannot be the outcome of an evolutionary process.”Braun, 
“Lessons on the Political Coordination of Knowledge and Innovation Policies,” 291. 
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suffice	in	the	long	run	and	lead	to	institutional	competition.	This	was	well‐demonstrated	
by	the	case	of	EQ	and	QDB	in	Qatar	discussed	above.	Hints	at	a	more	concerted	effort	in	
Oman	may	appear	positive,	but	without	sustained	coordination	are	likely	to	face	similar	
outcomes.	Indeed,	“spontaneous	policy	coordination	is	very	unlikely	and	even	mechanisms	
specifically	 designed	 to	 improve	 external	 coordination	 will	 fail	 as	 long	 as	 there	 is	 no	
general	 strategy	 that	has	been	decided	at	 the	highest	 level	 of	 politics	and	 that	demand	
coordination	 efforts	 from	ministries.”106	 Although	overarching	 strategies	 are	 present	 in	
both	 cases,	 the	 means	 of	 implementation	 are	 left	 open	 to	 interpretation	 at	 various	
bureaucratic	 intervals.	At	present,	ad	hoc	policy	measures	or	 the	Qatari	 “rule	by	whim”	
style,	prevail.107	Added	to	this,	what	little	coordination	does	exist	is	often	negative.	Negative	
coordination	 describes	 coordination	 that	 occurs	 only	 to	 ensure	 that	 any	 new	 policy	
initiative	will	not	interfere	with	the	policies,	practices,	and	interests	of	other	government	
units.108	Negative	coordination	is	possibly	better	than	no	coordination	because	at	the	very	
least	it	ensures	some	level	of	information	exchange.	However,	this	base‐level	coordination	
is	only	complicated	by	the	prevalence	of	rent‐seeking	behaviour,	whereby	individual	and	
ministerial	unit	actors	are	pursuing	access	to	resources	as	well	as	recognition.		
	
	
	
                                                            
106 Ibid., 297. 
107 “Rule by whim” is a term coined by David Roberts in reference to Qatar. “‘Rule by Whim’: More Thought 
Needed in Qatar,” MidEastPosts.com, July 2, 2012, http://mideastposts.com/2012/02/rule‐by‐whim‐more‐
thought‐needed‐in‐qatar/. 
108 Fritz W. Scharpf, “Games Real Actors Could Play Positive and Negative Coordination in Embedded 
Negotiations,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6, no. 1 (January 1, 1994): 38–40, 
doi:10.1177/0951692894006001002. 
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4.2 	Policy	disconnect	from	realities	on	the	ground	
A	 common	 charge	 by	 entrepreneurs	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 sectors	 levied	 against	
government	 actors	 is	 the	 accusation	 that	 they	 are	 disconnected	 from	 the	 reality	 of	 the	
business	environment.	Without	actually	functioning	in	the	business	world,	there	is	a	broad	
lack	of	awareness	of	the	difficult	tedious	bureaucratic	steps	from	business	registration,	set	
up	procedures,	and	access	 to	 finance.109	A	2011	World	Bank	study	on	the	ease	of	doing	
business	suggested	the	same.	It	ranked	Oman	57	and	Qatar	50	out	of	183	countries.110	It	
further	reported	no	positive	reform	in	business	regulation	in	either	Oman	or	Qatar	in	the	
last	several	years.	In	contrast,	it	stated	Qatar	had	further	complicated	the	start	up	process	
by	requiring	an	additional	procedure	for	tax	registration	and	obtaining	a	company	seal.111	
In	 Oman,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Manpower	 seems	 to	 inspire	 the	most	 resentment,	 with	 livid	
accusations	 levied	 against	 it	 for	 burdensome	 labour	 regulations.	 A	 majority	 of	
interviewees,	 especially	 those	 entrepreneurs	 not	 connected	 to	 the	 long‐dominant	 large	
business	 families,	point	 to	 favouritism	and	personal	 connections	as	 complicating	 issues	
and	 discouraging	 potential	 new	 start	 ups.112	 This	 sentiment	 was	 also	 reflected	 in	
interviews	with	 Qatari	 entrepreneurs.	 Although	 they	 remained	 slightly	 less	 concerned	
with	regulations	from	Qatar’s	Ministry	of	Labour,	the	weight	of	nepotism,	favouritism,	and	
personal	connections	within	the	ministries	was	considerable.		
Access	to	finance	is	another	commonly	raised	concern	as	a	key	challenge	facing	new	
business	entrants.113	There	are	some	signs	 that	 this	 is	 improving	and	that	governments	
                                                            
109 Confidential interviews with Omani and Qatari entrepreneurs, September 2011 to July 2012. 
110 International Financial Corporation, Doing Business 2011, 42–43. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Confidential interviews with Omani entrepreneurs, September 2011 – July 2012. 
113 Ibid. 
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have	identified	it	as	a	stumbling	block.	Whereas	in	2010	the	World	Bank	ranked	Oman	127	
and	Qatar	135	out	of	183	for	ease	of	obtaining	credit,	this	figure	went	up	to	98	for	both	
countries	by	the	2012	reports.114	Meetings	with	banking	officials	indicate	as	much.115	There	
is	 a	 broad,	 though	 understandable,	 unwillingness	 for	 commercial	 banks	 (and	 even	 the	
Oman	Development	Bank	following	its	retooling	after	years	of	near	bankruptcy)	to	fund	
new	 start	 ups.	 78	 percent	 of	 GCC	 banks	 indicate	 that	 their	 collateral	 requirements	 are	
higher	for	SMEs	than	for	larger	corporations	and	claim	that	SME	lending	is	82	percent	more	
risky	 than	 large	 corporate	 lending.116	 Problems	 financiers	 point	 to	 include	 weak	
educational	preparation,	inadequate	business	planning,	a	lack	of	commitment,	“part‐time”	
entrepreneurship,	 and	a	 lack	of	 risk	 taking.117	 Possibly	even	more	problematic,	 funding	
programmes	claiming	to	target	youth	and	young	entrepreneurs	in	practice	do	not.	While	
lauded	 in	 the	 media	 as	 programmes	 designed	 to	 facilitate	 youth	 employment,	 an	
entrepreneurial	 youth	 culture	 and	 private	 sector	 development,	 programmes	 such	 as	
Intilaaqah	and	Sharakah	often	do	not	in	practice.	While	they	claim	to	not	specifically	try	to	
alienate	youth	applicants,	they	find	many	of	them	demonstrate	a	lack	of	preparation	and	
                                                            
114 International Financial Corporation, Doing Business 2010: Qatar (Washington: The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development / World Bank, 2009), 25–26; International Financial Corporation, Doing 
Business 2012 ‐ Economy Profile: Qatar (Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development / World Bank, 2012), 51–52; International Financial Corporation, Doing Business 2010: Oman 
(Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank, 2009), 25–26; 
International Financial Corporation, Doing Business 2012 ‐ Economy Profile: Oman (Washington: The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank, 2012), 50. 
115 Interviews with public and commercial banks in Oman and Qatar between October and July 2012. 
116 Roberto Rocha et al., The Status of Bank Lending to SMES in the Middle East and North Africa Region: The 
Results of a Joint Survey of the Union of Arab Banks and the World Bank, Financial Flagship (The World Bank and 
the Union of Arab Banks, June 2010), 35 and 41. 
117 Interviews with initiative managers, funders, and bankers, Oman and Qatar, September 2011‐July 2012. 
Chapter 3    C. A. Ennis 
 
135 
 
commitment.	 Thus,	 despite	 language	 targeting	 youth,	 young	 entrepreneurs	 and	 new	
business	entrants	are	deemed	financially	risky	by	all	financiers.118		
Compounding	this,	the	systemic	weakness	of	protection	for	borrowers	and	lenders	
reduces	 the	 willingness	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 equation	 to	 enter	 a	 loan	 agreement.	 The	
weakness	or	absence	of	collateral	and	bankruptcy	laws	has	Qatar	ranked	3	and	Oman	4	out	
of	10	on	the	strength	of	legal	rights	index	in	the	context	of	credit.119	Not	only	this,	but	the	
market	lacks	a	private	credit	bureau	leaving	credit	information	restricted	within	banking	
institutions.120		
Even	in	Qatar	with	its	seemingly	unlimited	resources,	young	start	ups	and	aspiring	
entrepreneurs	complain	about	the	difficulty	accessing	finance.	If	they	do	not	self	finance	or	
have	 generous	 family	members	 offer	 to	 grant	 or	 loan	 them	money,	 they	 are	 put	 in	 the	
difficult	 position	 of	 pitching	 their	 business	 plan	 at	 financial	 institution	 after	 financial	
institution,	and	often	end	up	discouraged	and	ultimately	quit	the	process.121	This	does	little	
to	 encourage	 full	 time,	 local	 entrepreneurship,	 particularly	 among	 the	 youth.	Rather,	 it	
facilitates	 the	 existing	 model	 whereby	 individuals	 who	 decide	 not	 to	 quit	 the	 process	
instead	 settle	 for	 the	 path	 of	 less	 resistance.	 They	 opt	 for	 part‐time	 or	 “hobby”	
entrepreneurship,	dabbling	in	small	business	endeavours	during	after‐work	hours.	If	they	
continue	 on	 this	 route,	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 resort	 to	 the	 conventional	 model	 of	 hiring	
expatriates	for	operational	management	and	outsourcing	most	of	the	work	and	creative	
                                                            
118 Ibid. 
119 International Financial Corporation, Doing Business 2011: Making a Difference for Entrepreneurs, 16–17. 
120 Sharifa Al‐Barami, “Defining Small and Medium Enterprises in Oman,” Wamda, April 25, 2012, 
www.wamda.com/2012/04/defining‐small‐business‐in‐oman. 
121 Interviews with entrepreneurs, members of large business families, and aspiring entrepreneurs, Doha, Qatar, 
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design	 to	others.	This	only	 serves	 to	 reproduce	 the	same	problems	underlying	 the	Gulf	
economy.		
Some	 incremental	 change	 is	 occurring	 on	 this	 front.	 In	 Oman,	 for	 instance,	 the	
eighth	five‐year	Development	Plan	(2011‐2016)	includes	a	retooling	of	the	Central	Bank	to	
develop	 its	 capacity	 for	 supporting	 and	 granting	 loans	 to	 SMEs	 and	 for	 the	 state	 to	
stimulate	the	private	sector’s	investment	and	development	of	SMEs.122	Moreover,	several	
commercial	banks	have	recently	set	up	divisions	specifically	for	SMEs.	Bank	Muscat,	one	of	
the	 leading	commercial	bank	 in	the	country,	began	a	pilot	study	 in	 late	2011	with	new,	
perhaps	 easier,	 lending	 options	 for	 SMEs.	 The	 idea	 is	 to	 be	 specifically	 helpful	 to	 new,	
young	 entrepreneurs	 by	 offering	 simpler	 requirements	 and	 a	 range	 of	 support	 and	
guidance.	Other	banks	are	also	starting	to	open	SME	divisions.123	The	same	is	true	in	Qatar.	
Bank	Doha,	for	example,	became	the	first	commercial	bank	to	open	an	SME	division	in	the	
country.	As	well,	it	introduced	a	corporate	credit	card	specifically	for	SME	clients.	This	is	
in	contrast	to	previous	practice	which	has	the	same	loan	requirements	for	SMEs	as	they	
have	 for	 larger	 commercial	 firms,	 necessarily	 complicating	 the	 lending	 process	 and	
potential	for	accessing	start‐up	financing.124	
Within	a	national	context,	Chambers	of	Commerce	are	often	considered	the	crux	of	
entrepreneurial	 support	 and	 SME	 development	 since	 they	 can	 draw	 on	 their	 long	
experience	in	supporting	the	domestic	business	community.	This	has	long	been	the	case	
throughout	the	EU,	where	SME	development	is	prioritized	because	of	the	high	contribution	
of	SMEs	to	GDP.	Whereas	in	Europe	SMEs	contribute	roughly	55	percent	to	GDP,	they	only	
                                                            
122 Oman Development Bank, Future Anticipation Annual Report 2010, 2010. 
123 Interview with senior manager, Bank Muscat, November 2, 2011. 
124 Interview with official, Bank Doha, April 24, 2012. 
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contribute	between	15	and	23	percent	in	Oman	and	Qatar	despite	comprising	roughly	90	
percent	 of	 the	 number	 of	 businesses	 in	 each	 case.125	 The	 Chambers	 of	 Commerce	 and	
Industry	 in	Oman	and	Qatar	claim	to	be	promoting	entrepreneurship	and	 indeed	sit	on	
boards	 or	 tangentially	 participate	 in	 various	 initiatives.126	 Nonetheless,	 their	 primary	
constituency	remains	the	large,	family	business	empires	whose	interests	more	often	than	
not	conflict	with	those	of	new,	smaller	start	ups.	An	expert	at	GSDP	suggested	much	the	
same.	 In	 the	 expert’s	 view,	 the	Chamber	has	 a	 fairly	 skewed	view	of	what	 government	
support	should	entail,	mostly	just	wanting	protection	for	their	large,	corporate	interests.127	
In	both	cases,	the	chambers	only	play	a	marginal	role	in	the	support	of	entrepreneurship,	
and	their	primary	function	as	the	champion	of	business	interests	in	the	country	remains	
focused	on	the	merchant	elite	and	government	ones.	
Indeed,	 the	monopoly	 that	 the	 large	business	dynasties	of	Oman	and	Qatar	have	
over	 the	market	 is	 a	 known	 impediment	 to	 new	 business	 entrants.	 Not	 only	 do	 these	
families	enjoy	the	protection	of	government,	but	rules	often	work	in	their	favour.	When	
this	fails,	their	personal	connections	and	strong	cash	flow	smooth	the	way.	Often,	rather	
than	searching	for	competent	small	businesses	within	the	market,	larger	companies	will	
open	their	own	subsidiaries	to	serve	the	needs	of	their	business.	It	doubles	as	a	good	way	
                                                            
125 Interviews with senior officials at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Oman, October 25, 2011 and July 
24, 2012; unpublished MOCI studies; and Santhosh V. Perumal, “SMEs’ Contribution to Qatar’s Non‐oil GDP Is 
Lower, Says QDB Official,” Gulf Times, June 3, 2012, http://www.gulf‐
times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=50; “16pc of GDP Is from SMEs,” Oman Observer, April 2, 
2012, http://main.omanobserver.om/node/89237; Steffen Hertog, Benchmarking SME Policies in the GCC: a 
Survey of Challenges and Opportunities, The EU‐GCC Chamber Forum (Brussels: Eurochambres, 2010), 
http://www.europolitique.info/pdf/gratuit_fr/270047‐fr.pdf. 
126 Interviews with officials at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Oman, October 25, 2011 and July 24, 
2012; officials at the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, October 16, 2011;  senior official at the Qatar 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, April 11, 2012. 
127 Interview with expert at the General Secretariat of Development Planning, April 26, 2012. 
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to	give	a	son	a	stake	in	the	family	inheritance.	So	rather	than	opening	a	market	for	logistics,	
transportation,	and	other	service	or	product,	they	create	their	own	supply	chain.	As	well,	
the	tender	boards	maintain	rules	about	the	category	of	the	company	and	financial	standing	
required	 in	 order	 to	 bid	 on	 government	 projects.	 Traditional	 big	 business	 leaders	 or	
international	corporations	fit	these	standards	and	have	a	longer	history	and	reputation	to	
draw	upon.	Even	when	smaller	companies	have	a	chance	at	a	larger	project,	they	must	give	
pause	because	without	early	or	timely	pay,	 they	may	not	have	the	 liquidity	to	purchase	
necessary	materials.		
What	is	particularly	intriguing	is	how	the	governments	in	each	case	are	responding	
to	these	challenges.	On	the	one	hand,	Qatar	has	little	necessity	to	do	anything	at	all.	Yet	the	
Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 has	 an	 annual	 face‐to‐face	 between	 sectoral	 directors	 at	 the	
chamber	with	the	prime	minister	and	the	cabinet.	This	is	viewed	as	an	opportunity	for	the	
business	 community	 to	 raise	pressing	 issues	 facing	 the	private	 sector.	Despite	 this,	 the	
kinds	of	regulatory	changes	or	the	support	that	larger	companies	would	require	are	quite	
different	 than	what	 smaller	 ones	 require.	 Often	 times	 they	 clash.	 As	mentioned,	 larger	
companies	are	commonly	perceived	by	SMEs	to	be	monopolizing	the	market	or	blocking	
their	entry	into	it.	Thus	the	balance	between	these	various	needs	is	tenuous,	and	debatably	
non‐existent.	Moreover,	there	is	broad	acknowledgement	of	a	preference	for	contracts	to	
be	awarded	to	foreign	corporations	because	of	a	perceived	lack	of	local	expertise.128	This	
is	arguably	even	more	troubling	when	one	realizes	the	affinity	for	foreign,	and	particularly	
Western,	expertise	pervades	all	layers	of	government	and	economy.		
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	 In	practice,	Oman	has	struggled	with	much	of	the	same	malaise:	a	fondness	for	
foreign	 expertise,	 a	 tender	 board	 equally	 geared	 toward	 big	 business,	 and	 competing	
pressures	 for	 regulatory	 changes.	 In	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 2011	 protests	 however,	 several	
noteworthy	changes	occurred.	A	large	cabinet	shake	up	in	February	saw	Mohammed	bin	
Nasser	al‐Khasibi		replace	Maqbool	bin	Ali	Sultan	as	Minister	of	Commerce	and	Industry.	
Not	even	a	month	later,	he	too	was	replaced	by	Sa’ad	bin	Mohammed	bin	Said	Al‐Mardouf	
Al‐Sa’adi	–	 just	one	among	12	other	ministerial	 changes	 through	 royal	decree	 that	also	
disbanded	the	Ministry	of	National	Economy	and	ousted	long‐standing	Minister,	Ahmed	
bin	 Abdulnabi	Macki.129	With	 another	 reshuffle	 a	 year	 later,	 Ali	 bin	Masoud	 bin	 Ali	 Al‐
Sunaidi,	former	Minister	of	Sports	Affairs,	was	appointed	the	new	Ministry	of	Commerce	
and	Industry.	Prior	to	his	role	at	Sports	Affairs,	Sunaidi	had	been	the	undersecretary	at	
MOCI.130	 In	 fact,	 American	 embassy	 staff	 seemed	 to	 hold	 a	 positive	 assessment	 of	 his	
acumen	 for	 business	 and	 economic	 affairs,	 even	 considering	 him	 as	 one	 of	 their	 “key	
economic	interlocutors.”131	Though	young,	he	was	brought	back	in	to	lead	the	Ministry.	His	
enthusiasm	for	entrepreneurship	and	the	support	of	SMEs	was	evident	from	the	beginning.	
Soon	after	his	appointment,	he	released	a	definition	for	SMEs,	inaugurated	a	loan	guarantee	
                                                            
129 “Oman Shuffles Cabinet Amid Protests ‐ Middle East,” Al‐Jazeera English, February 26, 2011, 
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McDowall, “Oman Removes Powerful Economy Minister,” The Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703386704576186422382605668.html; Ravindra Nath, “Sultan 
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ary782.xml&section=middleeast. 
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February 29, 2012, http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/qaboos‐names‐three‐new‐ministers‐in‐cabinet‐
reshuffle‐1.988362. 
131 New Sports Minister On The Ball, But Off Economic Team (Embassy Muscat (Oman): Wikileaks, November 23, 
2004), http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=04MUSCAT2030; Ambition, Vision, And Frustration: Omani 
Commerce Official Speaks Out (Embassy Muscat (Oman): Wikileaks, December 5, 2004), 
http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=04MUSCAT2112. 
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programme,	 launched	 a	 new	 SME	 development	 fund	 with	 the	 National	 Company	 for	
Projects	 and	 Management,	 and	 initiated	 a	 discussion	 on	 tender	 board	 policy	
amendments.132	Subsequent	policy	adjustments	were	announced	following	the	2013	SME	
Symposium.	which,	when	implemented,	will	have	the	tender	board	reserve	10	percent	of	
business	for	SMEs	and	banks	allocate	five	percent	of	their	credit	to	SMEs.133	
		 In	ways,	the	Qatari	and	Omani	approaches	to	entrepreneurship	policy	specifically,	
and	economic	policy	more	broadly,	are	similar	in	their	seemingly	improvised	nature.	The	
Qatari	habit	of	‘throwing’	money	at	problems	or	goals	and	the	recent	propensity	in	Oman	
to	hasten	efforts	to	do	something	to	address	what	the	government	may	mistakenly	imagine	
to	be	only	economic	concerns	could	be	cast	as	necessary,	but	fumbling	steps	to	vitalize	a	
crippled	private	sector.	Both	approaches	are	ad	hoc	with	unclear	outcomes.		
	
4.3 Definitional	Confusion	
Sunaidi’s	 institution	 of	 a	 standardized	 definition	 for	microenterprises	 and	 SMEs	
(MSMEs)	 is	a	 timely	step.	Here,	microenterprises	are	defined	as	 those	business	entities	
with	 fewer	 than	 five	 staff	 members	 and	 annual	 sales	 less	 than	 25,000	 OMR;	 small	
enterprises	 are	 defined	 as	 having	 between	 five	 and	 nine	 employees	 with	 annual	 sales	
between	 25,000	 and	 250,000	 OMR;	 and	 medium	 enterprises	 are	 those	 with	 10	 to	 99	
employees	and	annual	sales	between	250,000	and	1.5	million	OMR.134	Still,	all	it	serves	to	
                                                            
132 Gulam Ali Khan, “MOCI Revises Definition of SMEs ‐ Muscat Daily,” Muscat Daily, June 29, 2012, 
http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Business/MoCI‐revises‐definition‐of‐SMEs; Claire Valdini, “Oman 
Launches US$260m SME Development Fund ‐ Banking & Finance,” Arabian Business, April 24, 2012, 
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/oman‐launches‐us‐260m‐sme‐development‐fund‐455140.html. 
133 Hamoud Sangour Al‐Zadjali, Central Bank of Oman Circular: Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), Circular 
BM1108, 2013, http://www.cbo‐oman.org/circulars/2013/BM1108SME.pdf. 
134 Khan, “MOCI Revises Definition of SMEs ‐ Muscat Daily.” 
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do	 is	 standardize	 the	 points	 of	 reference	 within	 the	 Ministry	 and	 the	 Chamber	 of	
Commerce.	Other	actors,	including	banks	and	financial	lending	institutions,	continue	with	
their	 own	 definitions.135	 A	 lack	 of	 definitional	 clarity	 also	 pervades	 the	 Qatari	
entrepreneurial	ecosystem.	Although	EQ	uses	a	general	working	definition	of	250	or	fewer	
employees	with	annual	turnover	at	100	million	QR	or	less	to	apply	to	all	SMEs,	different	
institutions	and	initiatives	use	others.136	
Along	with	this	lack	of	definitional	clarity,	the	difference	between	the	terms	SME,	
entrepreneurship,	 self‐employment,	 and	microbusiness	 are	 often	 blurred.	 There	was	 a	
broad	sense	within	civil	society	and	even	state	entrepreneurship	initiatives	that	decision	
makers	do	not	understand	the	differences	between	an	entrepreneur	and	a	business	person,	
entrepreneurship	as	a	concept	and	SMEs,	or	innovation	and	entrepreneurship.	Terms	are	
used	 almost	 synonymously	 throughout	 the	 policy	 realm,	 conflating	 definitions	 and	
obscuring	 the	meaning	 behind	 the	 terms.	 Rather	 than	 creating	 entrepreneurs	who	 can	
contribute	to	the	innovative,	knowledge	economy,	government	programmes	were	accused	
of	merely	creating	business	owners	working	in	oversaturated,	“copy	cat”	business	types.137	
An	Omani	entrepreneurship	promoter	attributes	the	problem	to	the	fact	that	the	idea	does	
not	 begin	with	 the	 individual.	 Instead,	 it	 starts	with	 the	organization.	 Programmes	 like	
Sanad	give	aspiring	entrepreneurs	a	list	of	businesses	they	are	willing	to	fund	to	choose	
from.	 The	 same	 person	 accuses	 these	 programmes	 of	 being	 “the	 biggest	 killer	 of	
entrepreneurship,	because	at	the	end	of	the	day,	if	you	are	not	encouraging	innovation	and	
                                                            
135 The policy intention, though, would seem to be the introduction of a universal definition. 
136 Interviews with staff at EQ, Doha, April 29, 2012. 100 million QR is equivalent to approximately $274,668 
USD. The Qatari riyal is pegged to the U.S. dollar at 3.64 QR for $1:00 USD.   Al‐Qudsi et al., “Trade Volatility. The 
Dollar Peg and Inflation in the GCC Countries: Some Preliminary Findings,” 16. 
137 Interviews with initiative actors and entrepreneurs, Oman and Qatar: September 2011 – July 2012. 
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creativity,	 then	who’s	going	 to	 start	 thinking	out	of	 the	box?”138	Rather	 than	promoting	
innovative	entrepreneurship	then,	 they	are	making	a	 job.	Entrepreneurship	 is	generally	
more	about	employment	than	innovation.	A	Qatari	initiative	director	noted,	“some	other	
colleagues	 would	 look	 at	 self‐employability	 as	 entrepreneurship…	 I	 don’t	 see	 self‐
employability	 as	 a	 second‐class	 citizen.	 I	 just	 think	 it	 is	 different,	 and	 I	 think	we	 need	
both.”139	Reversing	this	trend	will	involve	a	re‐examination	of	language	usage.	Of	course,	if	
employment	is	the	actual	goal,	building	an	ecosystem	that	supports	both	self‐employment	
and	entrepreneurship	is	not	negative	by	itself.	It	will,	however,	limit	the	extent	to	which	
innovation	 is	 adequately	 integrated	 into	 broader	 ambitions	 of	 becoming	 knowledge	
economies.		
	
4.4 Segmented	labour	market	
One	 of	 the	 staunchest	 challenges	 besetting	 Gulf	 development	 remains	 the	
segmented	 labour	 market.	 The	 challenge	 began	 with	 the	 arrival	 of	 petroleum‐led	
development,	when,	with	the	sudden	onset	of	rapid	development	and	job	growth	in	a	new	
industry,	local	labour	was	deemed	unqualified	and	inexperienced.	Foreign	labour	had	to	
be	imported	both	at	the	expert	and	labourer	levels.	While	this	developed	out	of	an	early	
necessity,	 a	 certain	 path	 dependency	 ensued.	 As	 noted	 above,	 despite	 widening	
unemployment	 and	 widespread	 underemployment,	 the	 economy	 remains	 heavily	
dependent	on	foreign	labour	and	expertise.	
                                                            
138 Interview with an entrepreneurship initiative leader, Muscat, Oman, October 26, 2011. 
139 Interview with initiative directors, Doha, Qatar, February 19, 2012. 
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The	 nature	 of	 the	 rentier	 system	 has	 meant	 that	 expectations	 of	 meaningful	
employment	have	remained	rather	disjointed,	with	a	significant	proportion	of	nationals	
holding	onto	expectations	of	guaranteed	jobs	in	the	public	sector	despite	its	saturation.140	
Population	growth	during	the	boom	years	combined	with	the	expansion	of	education	has	
translated	 into	 youthful	 populations	 that,	while	 ready	 to	 enter	 the	 labour	market,	 find	
uncertain	 and	 inhospitable	 conditions.	 Misplaced	 incentive	 structures	 also	 perpetuate	
preferences	 that	 consider	 certain	 job	 categories	 undesirable.	 Remaining	 economically	
inactive,	 therefore,	remains	more	attractive	than	working	 in	these	generally	 low‐paying	
and	insecure	positions.			
Equally	 problematic,	 the	 private	 sector	 is	 generally	 an	 unwilling	 or	 reluctant	
employer	of	Gulf	nationals,	who,	along	with	higher	salary	expectations,	remain	stereotyped	
as	 ill	 prepared,	 unproductive	 and/or	 inefficient.	 This	 is	 combined	with	 abundant	 local	
sentiment	 that	 expatriates	 are	 sitting	 in	 positions	 that	 could	 be	 filled	 by	 locals.	 In	
recognition	 of	 this,	 the	 government	 has	 been	 undertaking	 various	 labour	 market	 and	
educational	reforms	as	a	means	of	encouraging	local	participation	in	the	private	sector.141	
Educational	reform	is	an	important	part	of	this	and	both	cases	have	made	huge	strides	in	
educational	attainment	throughout	the	last	several	decades.	Much	more	has	also	been	done	
following	 the	 UNDP	 Arab	 Development	 Report	 and	 World	 Bank	 report	 on	 education.	
Recent	 reforms,	 however,	 have	 tended	 to	 be	 ad	 hoc	 and	 inconsistent	 resulting	 in	
                                                            
140 Interviews with students, aspiring entrepreneurs, and academics. See also Richards and Waterbury, A Political 
Economy of the Middle East, 24; Askari, Nowshirvani, and Jaber, Economic Development in the Gcc, 65–66. 
141 The Road Not Traveled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa; Kamel Mellahi and Said 
Mohammad Al‐Hinai, “Local Workers in Gulf Co‐operation Countries: Assets or Liabilities?,” Middle Eastern 
Studies 36, no. 3 (July 1, 2000): 177–190. See also, Ennis, C.A. Labour Market Nationlization in the GCC: The Case 
of Oman,” Al Jisr, 2011 forthcoming. 
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immeasurable	outcomes	and	popular	confusion.	A	limited	amount	of	cooperation	between	
the	various	government	bodies	responsible	for	education	as	well	as	relying	on	competing	
consultancies	and	think	tanks	to	provide	solutions	has	only	compounded	this	effect.		
Added	to	this,	 labour	market	reforms,	especially	in	Oman,	have	focused	on	quota	
systems	and	complex	regulations	serving	to	micromanage	the	labour	market	while	at	the	
same	time	encouraging	back‐door	practices	to	circumvent	them.	Labour	market	reform	is	
a	prime	example	of	 the	 inconsistent,	short‐term	and	 inappropriate	policy	measures	rife	
with	 endemic	 contradictions.	 The	 repercussions	 of	 the	 (un)employment	 dilemma,	
especially	 in	 the	 Omani	 case,	 are	 only	 compounded	 by	 the	 expansion	 of	 female	
representation	 in	 the	 labour	market.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 recognize	 the	 important	 role	 of	
labour	market	problems	and	attempted	policy	solutions	in	understanding	the	challenges	
surrounding	entrepreneurship	and	 innovation	 throughout	 the	 region.	 Indeed,	 the	usual	
neglect	 in	IPE	of	“labour	issues	hinders	thorough	analysis	because	they	are	intrinsically	
connected	to	issues	of	transformation	and	stability.”142		
Private	 companies	 in	 most	 industrialized	 economies	 are	 vital	 components	 of	
national	innovation	systems.	Their	motivation	“is	to	improve	profitability	through	product	
and	process	 innovation,	by	 creating	 technology	of	 an	essentially	proprietary	nature.”143	
Herein	 lies	 a	 twofold	 problem	 confronting	 the	 push	 for	 innovation	 in	 our	 cases.	 First,	
historically	many	of	the	incentives	for	technological	breakthroughs	stem	from	liberating	
manual	labour.	There	is	little	incentive	to	do	so	in	the	Gulf	where	the	(primarily	South	and	
South	East	Asian)	 labour	supply	 is	seemingly	endless	and	 inexpensive.	The	opportunity	
                                                            
142 Robert O’Brien, “Labour and IPE: Rediscovering Human Agency,” in Palan, Global Political Economy, 89. 
143 Metcalfe, “Technology Systems and Technology Policy in an Evolutionary Framework,” 39. 
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cost	for	pursuing	innovative	change	is	high	when	presented	with	a	large	supply	of	cheap,	
replaceable	labour.	As	well,	since	the	labour	is	foreign,	both	corporations	and	governments	
accrue	 immediate	 savings	 by	 not	 incurring	 future	 pension,	 healthcare,	 and	 other	
retirement	costs.	Resource	wealth	seems	 to	 stymie	 innovation,	and	 the	development	of	
capital‐intensive	manufacturing	in	particular,	especially	when	coupled	with	a	large,	elastic	
labour	pool.			
Business	opinion	and	widespread	practice	notwithstanding,	public	opinion	across	
the	region	seems	to	support	mechanizations	to	replace	foreign	labour	with	local	 labour.	
This	 is	especially	 true	where	national	unemployment	 is	perceived	to	be	a	problem,	and	
where	citizens	form	minority	populations.	Dubai’s	chief	of	police,	for	example,	famously	
warned	of	the	impending	marginalization	of	Gulf	citizens	in	the	face	of	rising	expatriate	
populations.144	Along	with	this,	there	is	growing	concern	expressed	in	conversations	and	
in	 media	 around	 a	 perceived	 erosion	 of	 local	 culture	 due	 to	 overwhelming	 foreign	
populations.	As	Ahmed	Kanna	notes	 in	his	work	on	biopolitics,	 foreign	workers	are	not	
only	viewed	with	suspicion	across	the	Gulf	but	are	assumed	to	be	threatening	to	khaleeji	
culture.145	A	note	in	an	editorial	reflects	this	sentiment.	“This	Asian	tide	that	is	increasing	
day	after	day	despite	the	desire	of	some	to	reduce	it,	has	become	a	threat	to	Arab	/	Gulf	
identity,”	it	notes.146	Many	of	these	opinions	border	on	the	xenophobic,	and	one	can	expect	
                                                            
144 Habib Toumi, “Dubai Police Chief Warns of Expats’ Threat to Gulf Identity,” Gulf News, December 26, 2010, 
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/dubai‐police‐chief‐warns‐of‐expats‐threat‐to‐gulf‐identity‐1.736096. 
145 Ahmed Kanna, “The Arab World’s Forgotten Rebellions: Foreign Workers and Biopolitics in the Gulf,” South 
Asian Magazine for Action and Reflection (SAMAR), May 31, 2011, 
http://samarmagazine.org/archive/articles/357. 
146 Asim Al‐Shedi, “Influence of Expatriates on the Cultural Environment of Arab Countries,” Oman Daily 
Observer, October 21, 2012, http://main.omanobserver.om/node/117053. 
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these	to	 intensify.147	 Indeed,	 the	 importation	of	 labour	at	existing	rates	 is	unsustainable	
from	both	employment	and	cultural	perspectives.			
At	various	times,	efforts	in	both	Oman	and	Qatar	have	been	undertaken	with	the	
intention	of	targeting	the	directionality	of	the	demographic	imbalance.	One	such	attempt	
has	been	labour	nationalization	quotas.148	These,	logically,	face	similar	challenges	to	those	
confronting	the	innovation	drive	insofar	as	the	incentive	system	does	not	align	with	the	
intention	of	many	policy	changes.	One	particular	attempt	however	seems	to	hold	promise.	
The	Industrial	Innovation	Centre	in	Oman	is	attempting	to	inject	new	incentives	into	the	
mix,	by	partnering	with	both	industrial	actors	and	university	researchers	and	sponsoring	
innovative	projects.	Where	Qatar	may	not	be	actively	partnering	with	the	industrial	sector	
in	 the	 same	 way,	 they	 do	 have	 a	 variety	 institutes/organizations	 with	 programmes	
designed	 to	 support	 such	 innovation,	 particularly	 via	 ictQatar	 and	 QSTP.	 These	
government	and	quasi‐government	bodies	liaise	with	both	universities	and	industry,	but	
do	not	take	it	upon	themselves	to	coordinate	innovation	exercises.	It	tends	to	be	more	of	a	
competition‐driven	or	application‐reliant	process.		
Internationally	competitive	industries	in	the	petroleum	sector	have	been	provided	
with	a	strong	advantage	by	WTO	accession.	They	have	both	the	resources	and,	perhaps	
misconstrued,	 CSR	 motivation	 to	 employ	 (and	 educate	 to	 employ)	 graduates	 of	 elite	
educational	institutions.	The	oil	sector	is	known	to	be	the	most	well‐paying	in	Oman	and	
Qatar,	and	can	thus	attract	the	crème	de	la	crème	of	local	graduates	with	the	added	bonus	
of	 fulfilling	 labour	 nationalization	 quotas.	 Given	 the	 salary	 differentials	 inherent	 in	 a	
                                                            
147 See figures 4.1 and 4.2 in Section 4.6 of the next chapter for data on the rates of expatriate population 
increase. 
148 See section 6 of chapter 4 for a more thorough description. 
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segmented	 labour	market	as	manifest	 in	 the	Gulf,	 local	 companies	outside	 the	 scope	of	
petroleum	competitiveness	suffer	because	not	only	must	they	ensure	a	certain	percentage	
of	their	workforce	is	local,	they	are	not	able	to	attract	the	more	capable	graduates.	Even	
those	less	capable	prove	difficult	to	retain.	This	problem	is	particularly	acute	in	the	Omani	
case.	In	Qatar,	the	absence	of	a	strong	constraint	on	public	sector	employment	spending,	
coupled	with	the	presence	in	government	of	a	desire	to	encourage	local	SME	start	ups,	has	
resulted	in	a	tendency	among	officials	to	not	enforce	labour	nationalization	quotas.149		
	 Although	 this	 competitiveness	 problem	 remains	 a	 challenge	 outside	 of	 the	
hydrocarbon	industry,	it	has	been	helpful	in	terms	of	innovation	within	the	sector.	Where	
entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	may	 be	 off	 to	 a	 tepid	 start	 in	 other	 sectors,	 they	 are	
performing	much	better	in	the	familiar	oil	context.	An	observation	supported	by	Lundvall.	
Innovation,	 he	 claims,	 “must	 be	 rooted	 in	 the	 prevailing	 economic	 structure,”	 since	
technological	 advancements	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 occur	 where	 the	 national	 economy	 “is	
already	 engaged	 in	 routine	 activities.”150	 This	 notion	 seems	 particularly	 true	 in	 Oman,	
where	 several	 entrepreneur	 interviewees,	who	had	 their	 start	 in	 the	oil	 industry,	were	
developing	 industry‐specific	 innovative	 processes	 or	 products.	 Launching	 their	 own	
enterprises,	they	created	competitive	businesses	by	bringing	their	technical	knowhow	and	
managerial	experience	to	the	table.	Some	have	even	expanded	throughout	the	region	and	
hold	international	expansion	plans.151	
	
	
                                                            
149 Interviews. 
150 Lundvall, National Systems of Innovation, 10. 
151 Interviews with Omani entrepreneurs across Oman between September 2011 and July 2012. 
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4. Conclusion	
The	experiences	of	promoting	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	in	Oman	and	Qatar	
can	be	cast	within	the	bounds	of	the	genuine,	the	necessary,	and	at	times	even	the	trend.	
The	very	real	need	of	diversification	and	of	building	opportunities	for	young	adults	in	the	
countries	is	a	strong	galvanizing	force,	especially	given	the	regional	tumult	so	clearly	linked	
to	youth	frustrations.	Oman’s	own	experience	with	protests,	especially	those	which	were	
primarily	youth‐based	 in	 the	 industrial	 city	of	Sohar,	ultimately	 intensified	 the	urgency	
policy	makers	placed	on	entrepreneurship	promotion.	Policy	makers	in	Qatar	also	point	to	
a	 need	 to	 find	 fulfilling	 opportunities	 for	 youth.	 Indeed,	 the	 dual	 promotion	 of	
entrepreneurship	and	innovation	holds	the	promise	of	responding	to	the	lack	of	prospects	
for	 youth,	 employment	 challenges,	 and	 economic	 diversification	 needs.	 Yet	 the	 policy	
experience	 has	 been	 far	 from	 ideal.	 Although	 both	 countries	 have	 highlighted	 the	
importance	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 in	 their	 overarching	 visions	 and	
development	plans,	the	actual	implementation	has	been	less	well	crafted.	Ad	hoc	and	rife	
with	 inconsistencies,	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 promotion	 efforts	 confront	 a	
multitude	 of	 systemic	 challenges.	 Indeed	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 the	 rentier	 system,	 so	
hegemonic	within	the	socio‐economic	and	political	system	shaping	the	Gulf,	results	 in	a	
series	of	contradictions	that	are	difficult	to	correct.	Thus,	with	the	aim	of	determining	
…	what	governments	should	do	in	order	to	promote	innovation,	it	is	useful	to	know	
the	specific	systemic	context	in	which	a	national	government	intervenes.	Otherwise,	
government	policies	might	either	reproduce	weaknesses	of	the	national	system	or	
introduce	mechanisms	incompatible	with	the	basic	logic	of	the	system.152			
	
                                                            
152 Lundvall, National Systems of Innovation, 5. 
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Policy	efforts	to	date	have	often	done	one	or	the	other	or	both.	The	competition,	lack	of	
cooperation,	 political	 disconnect	 from	 the	 realities	 of	 the	 private	 sector,	 and	 the	
considerable	 obstacles	 which	 result	 from	 the	 segmented	 labour	 market	 all	 must	 be	
addressed.	Yet	identification	of	the	problems	has	done	little	to	initiate	meaningful	change,	
where	 competing	 interests	 are	 endemic	 and	 especially	 while	 hydrocarbon	 revenues	
continue	to	surpass	the	breakeven	point.	What	remains	intriguing	is	how	both	Oman	and	
Qatar,	 despite	 their	 differences,	 are	 announcing	 similar	 policy	 pushes.	 Given	 Oman’s	
already	rising	breakeven	oil	price	point,	how	the	country	fairs	as	it	approaches	a	post‐oil	
future	will	provide	lessons	to	its	GCC	neighbours.	Oman’s	mounting	spending	constraints,	
growing	political	uncertainty	given	the	lack	of	a	transparent	succession	plan,	and	changing	
socio‐political	mood	make	it	a	fascinating	and	underrated)	test	case	for	Gulf	reform	–	both	
economic	and	political.			
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Chapter	4:	
	
Millennials	and	the	State	of	Entrepreneurship	
	
	
	
1. Introduction	
As	noted	in	the	last	chapter,	the	promotion	of	entrepreneurship	in	the	Gulf	predates	
the	stressors	from	the	so‐called	Arab	Spring.	Many	of	the	causal	mechanisms	underlying	
the	eruption	of	the	uprisings	across	the	region	have	constituted	part	of	the	same	cluster	of	
pressures	underlying	the	development	of	entrepreneurial	and	innovation	initiatives.	It	is	
apparent,	 however,	 that	 the	 emphasis	 on	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 since	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 uprisings	 has	 intensified.	 This	 chapter	 analyzes	 the	 real	 state	 of	
entrepreneurship	in	Qatar	and	Oman,	particularly	among	Gulf	millennials.	It	examines	how	
the	demographic	bulge	influences	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	activities	and	policy	
measures	and	how	the	environment	in	turn	influences	young	people	in	the	Gulf.	Finally,	it	
discusses	what	these	symbiotic	activities	reveal	about	the	evolution	of	the	social	contract	
in	the	region.		This	chapter	demonstrates	that	the	rentier	nature	of	Gulf	political	economy	
has	created	structural	incongruencies	with	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion,	
lending	 to	 policy,	 practice,	 and	 behavioural	 contradictions	 that	 are	 difficult	 to	 resolve.	
Indeed,	 the	 state’s	 promotion	 of	 entrepreneurship	 will	 not	 prove	 the	 panacea	 to	 Gulf	
employment	challenges	as	 long	as	 inconsistent	expectations	endure	and	 the	segmented	
labour	market	with	its	dual‐wage	structure	persists.		
The	last	chapter	outlined	the	major	entrepreneurship	initiatives	in	each	case	study,	
drawing	an	image	of	the	complementary	and	competing	actors	and	interests	that	comprise	
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the	 respective	 ecosystems.	 The	 sections	 that	 follow	 further	 describe	 the	 business	
environment	and	demarcate	the	outcomes	and	roadblocks	facing	the	new	generation.		
	
2. Defining	Millennials		
The	demographic	makeup	of	the	Arab	Middle	East	is	skewed	in	favour	of	youth.	This	
demographic	reality	extends	to	the	Gulf	where	more	than	50	percent	of	the	population	is	
under	the	age	of	35.	With	a	view	of	Oman	and	Qatar,	the	percentage	of	the	population	under	
the	age	of	35	is	78.4	and	60.87	percent	respectively.1		In	this	work,	I	use	the	term	millennials	
to	refer	to	young	people	both	preparing	to	enter	the	work	force	and	in	the	early	stages	of	
their	 labour	market	 participation.	 The	 term	millennials	 is	 used	 globally	 to	 refer	 to	 the	
demographic	 born	 between	 1980	 and	 2000,	 and	 often	 includes	 those	 born	 in	 the	 late	
1970s.2	I	use	the	term	loosely	in	this	study	in	terms	of	year.		The	empirical	focus	remains	
on	those	who	are	new	labour	market	entrants	or	in	the	early	stages	of	their	participation	
in	the	workforce.	That	is,	those	over	18	years	of	age	and	usually	under	the	age	of	35	were	
the	primary	interview	respondents.		
While	the	term	millennials	is	more	commonly	used	in	reference	to	this	generation	
in	the	West,	its	use	in	this	study	is	a	fitting	beyond	the	basic	demographic	figures.	There	is	
a	general	sense	that	the	Western	millennial	generation	differentiates	itself	from	previous	
                                                            
1 Qatar Statistics Authority, Qatar Census 2010; Mshrooʿ al‐tʿdaad al‐ʿaam l‐lskaan w‐al‐mnsaaakn w‐almnshaat 
2010, Census 2010, 68 and 120.   
2 There is no clear consensus on the years of the millennial generation. For instance, Howe and Strauss suggest 
that millennials refer to anyone born after 1982, whereas Twenge includes those born in the 1970s.  Neil Howe 
and William Strauss, Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation (Random House LLC, 2000), 4; Jean M 
Twenge, Generation Me: Why Today’s Young Americans Are More Confident, Assertive, Entitled‐‐and More 
Miserable Than Ever Before (New York: Free Press, 2006), 1–15. 
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ones	 largely	 because	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 technological	 repercussions	 of	 the	 Internet.3	
Some	writers	suggest	a	greater	civic‐mindedness	and	strengthened	sense	of	community	at	
both	 local	 and	 global	 levels	 in	 comparison	 to	 previous	 generations.4	 These	 broad	
characteristics	are	applicable	 to	 the	Gulf	millennials	as	well.	More	specifically	however,	
comparisons	 can	 be	 drawn	 between	 how	 previous	 generations	 in	 the	West	 (e.g.	 “baby	
boomers”	and	“generation	X”)	depict	millennials.	Particularly	criticized	are	the	millennials’	
alleged	sense	of	entitlement,	high	expectations	held	for	the	job	market,	and	an	apparent	
need	for	praise	and	affirmation.5	Jean	Twenge’s	suggest	that	“childhoods	of	constant	praise,	
self‐esteem	 boosting,	 and	 unrealistic	 expectations	 did	 not	 prepare	 [millennials]	 for	 an	
increasingly	 competitive	 workplace	 and	 the	 economic	 squeeze,”6	 In	 the	 workplace,	
Western	millennials	are	criticized	for	“demanding	too	much	too	soon”	and	wanting	to	be	
“CEO	 tomorrow.”7	 Along	 with	 expecting	 higher	 pay,	 flexible	 work	 schedules,	 rapid	
promotions,	and	more	vacation	and	personal	 time,	 there	 is	a	prevailing	perception	 that	
millennials	“desire	to	shape	their	jobs	to	fit	their	lives	rather	than	adapt	their	lives	to	the	
workplace.”8	Many	of	these	latter	statements	could	easily	be	read	of	the	Gulf	millennials.	
Personal	interviews	in	both	cases	with	individuals	from	earlier	generations	often	shared	
similar	sentiments.	Business	managers	often	claimed	that	millennials	frequently	changed	
jobs	 “in	 pursuit	 of	 higher	 salaries,”	 wanted	 to	 “get	 a	 profit	 fast”	 without	 working	
                                                            
3 See, for example: William August Draves and Julie Coates, Nine Shift: Work, Life and Education in the 21st 
Century (River Falls: LERN Books, 2004). 
4 Howe and Strauss, Millennials Rising. 
5 Ron Aslop, “The ‘Trophy Kids’ Go to Work,” The Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455219391652725.html; Twenge, Generation Me. 
6 Twenge, Generation Me, 7. 
7 Aslop, “The ‘Trophy Kids’ Go to Work.” 
8 Ibid. 
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particularly	long	or	hard,	and	retained	excessively	high	expectations	for	pay,	job	title,	and	
flexible	working	hours.9		
Many	interviewees	suggested	that	higher	levels	of	education	came	with	a	sense	of	
entitlement	 to	 better	 jobs	 despite	 lacking	 practical	 experience.	 Everyone	 spoke	 of	 how	
technology	 had	 changed	 the	 mode	 of	 communication,	 connectedness,	 and	 social	
openness.10	 I	 do	 not	 want	 to	 stress	 the	 similarities	 too	 much.	 There	 are	 significant	
differences	and	definitely	diverse	historical	paths	which	led	to	the	types	of	expectations	as	
well	as	the	perceptions	of	the	older	generation	toward	the	millennials.	Despite	this,	I	find	
the	use	of	the	term	millennials	useful	in	the	Gulf	cases	because	it	coincides	well	with	the	
generational	divide	I	speak	to	in	section	3.2.	As	well,	its	use	seems	apt	in	the	Gulf	cases	as	
the	age	and	common	depictions	attributed	to	the	Western	millennial	generation	are	not	in	
reality	that	far	removed.	
It	 should	 also	 be	 reiterated	 that	 I	 am	 looking	 specifically	 at	 the	 Gulf	 national	
population	 throughout	 this	 dissertation.	 The	 impact	 of	 the	 bifurcated	 labour	market	 in	
Oman	and	Qatar,	where	59.3	and	94	percent	of	labour	force	is	comprised	of	expatriates,	
plays	a	significant	role	in	this	development	narrative.11	Yet,	 the	question	of	how	to	both	
encourage	 millennials	 into	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 make	 them	 competitive	 within	 it,	
although	intricately	and	intensely	influenced	by	the	two‐tier	labour	market	and	dual‐wage	
structure,	 remains	 distinct	 though	 complementary	 to	 the	 broader	 question	 of	 private	
sector	development.	In	fact,	the	two	are	often	at	odds	with	each	other.	The	default	mode	of	
                                                            
9 Interviews with business managers and policy makers: Muscat: October25 and 25, 2011, January 8, 2012; Doha: 
February 20, 2012, April 9, 22, and 30, 2012, May 7, 2012. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Mshrooʿ al‐tʿdaad al‐ʿaam l‐lskaan w‐al‐mnsaaakn w‐almnshaat 2010, Census 2010, 87; Qatar’s Third National 
Human Development Report, 56. 
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private	sector	enhancement	in	the	Gulf	includes	a	concoction	of	foreign	direct	investment,	
cheap	 foreign	 labour,	 and	 global	 expertise.	 In	 reality,	 this	 has	 only	 contributed	 to	 the	
difficulty	in	addressing	local	education,	labour,	and	sustainability	problems.		
Approximately	60	individuals	across	the	two	cases	participated	in	interviews	and	
focus	 groups	 as	 part	 of	 the	 interview	 category	 entitled	 entrepreneurs	 or	 aspiring	
entrepreneurs.	 Representatives	 of	 large	 business	 families	 and	 the	 older	 generation	 of	
businessmen	were	 also	 interviewed.	The	 lessons	 learned	 from	 the	 fresh	 labour	market	
entrants	have	implications	for	the	younger	generations	and	economic	and	labour	market	
policy	decisions.	Indeed,	although	the	label	millennials	is	employed	loosely	in	terms	of	year	
of	birth,	its	use	is	intentional.	It	draws	a	line	between	the	generation	who	remember	the	
social	 and	economic	 transformation	 resulting	 from	oil	 and	 those	who	were	born	 into	a	
world	with	certain	welfare	expectations.	It	is	the	ternary	evolution	and	intersection	of	oil	
wealth	 levels,	 demographic	 imbalance	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 age	 and	 expatriate	 levels,	 and	
millennial	expectations	rendering	this	discussion	of	pressing	concern	to	policy	makers	and	
theorists	of	rentier	state	behaviour.							
	
3. 	The	Cultural	Critique	and	Generational	Divide	
3.1		Culture,	business,	and	history	
A	 litany	 of	 articles	 indicates	 cultural	 deficiency	 behind	 the	 Gulf’s	 lack	 of	
entrepreneurial	 spirit	 and	 adroitness	 at	 innovative	 business.12	Many	decry	 the	 region’s	
failure	to	turn	out	someone	like	Steve	Jobs	while	others	blame	rampant	nepotism	and	rent	
                                                            
12 “Putting the Gulf to Work,” Arabian Business, October 26, 2010, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/putting‐
gulf‐work‐358224.html. 
Chapter 4    C. A. Ennis 
 
155 
 
seeking.	True	as	it	may	be,	it	would	be	inaccurate	to	blame	this	on	an	alleged	history	or	
culture	 inhospitable	 to	 business.	 A	 longer	 view	 of	 Gulf	 history	 reveals	 a	 record	 of	
international	trade	spanning	centuries.	Jill	Crystal	spent	a	great	deal	of	time	outlining	the	
merchant	activities	in	Kuwait	and	Qatar	whilst	others	like	Sugata	Bose	and	J.C.	Wilkinson	
look	at	the	long	history	of	trade	and	merchant	activities	in	Oman	as	part	of	a	wider	Indian	
ocean	economy.13	In	fact,	by	the	eighth	century	Omani	merchants	had	“commercial	colonies	
in	Basra,	Siraf,	Daybul	(Sind)	and	Aden”	and	were	involved	in	China,	India,	and	East	Africa	
trade.14	Sohar,	one	of	Oman’s	port	cities,	is	now	the	‘stuff’	of	legends	–	believed	to	be	the	
birthplace	of	Sinbad	the	sailor.	By	the	nineteenth	century,	Oman	was	a	maritime	empire	
under	the	leadership	of	Said	bin	Sultan	al‐Busaidi,	the	great	–	great	–	great	grandfather	of	
Sultan	Qaboos.15		
Although	 the	 merchant	 community	 in	 Qatar	 was	 small	 and	 weak	 before	 oil,	
especially	in	relation	to	Oman,	neither	country	is	a	stranger	to	business	and	trade.16	Their	
strategic	locations	at	the	edge	of	the	Arabian	Peninsula	have	long	etched	the	thoroughfares	
of	 trade	 coming	 across	 the	 Indian	Ocean.	 The	British	 had	protracted	 imperial	 strategic	
interests	in	the	region,	with	much	contestation	among	the	various	colonial	powers	vying	
to	 control	 the	 trading	 ports	 and	 passageways.17	 Following	 the	 decline	 of	 the	 pearling	
industry	in	the	1920s,	the	Great	Depression,	and	the	near	isolation	of	Oman	in	the	early	to	
                                                            
13 Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 1995; Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of 
Global Empire (Harvard University Press, 2006); J. C. Wilkinson, “Oman and East Africa: New Light on Early 
Kilwan History from the Omani Sources,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 14, no. 2 (1981): 
272–305, doi:10.2307/218046. 
14 Wilkinson, “Oman and East Africa,” 177. 
15 Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates and Oman, Revised edition (Ithaca Press, 1999), 12. 
16 Herb, All in the Family, 110–111; Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 1995, 113. 
17 For example, see Sultan Muhammad Al‐Qasimi, Omani‐French Relations 1715 ‐ 1900, trans. B.R. Pridham 
(London: Forest Row, 1996). 
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mid	1900s,	it	was	the	advent	of	the	oil	age	that	really	transformed	the	political	economy	of	
the	region.18	Oil	solidified	the	rule	of	particular	families	in	the	region	and	freed	them	from	
economic	reliance	on	the	merchant	class.	As	Jill	Crystal	noted,		
The	development	of	oil	in	the	postwar	years	has	led	to	the	withdrawal	from	formal	
political	life	of	the	merchants,	the	group	which	historically	pressed	its	claims	most	
effectively	on	the	state.	Merchant	claims	have	not	been	put	forward	because	of	a	
tacit	arrangement	between	the	rulers	and	the	trading	families:	a	trade	of	wealth	for	
formal	 power.	 In	 effect,	 the	 merchants	 renounced	 their	 historical	 claim	 to	
participate	 in	 decision‐making.	 Where	 economic	 elites	 once	 entered	 politics	 to	
protect	their	economic	interests,	after	oil,	merchants	left	the	realm	of	formal	politics	
to	preserve	those	interests.19	
	
So	while	this	arrangement	served	the	interest	of	the	rulers,	it	also	entrenched	particular	
merchant	families	into	the	business	landscape.		
In	both	Qatar	and	Oman,	there	are	a	handful	of	large	business	families	that	dominate	
various	segments	of	the	market.	Many	of	them	can	trace	their	business	heritage	back	for	
generations.	What	 is	 important	 for	 this	 discussion	 however	 is	 that	 despite	 a	merchant	
community’s	relative	strength	or	weakness,	oil	is	responsible	for	the	transformation	of	its	
relationship	with	rulers.	Outside	of	international	business,	very	little	evolution	of	the	local	
business	communities	has	since	occurred.	Oil	allowed	the	state	to	shift	labour	structures	
to	the	current	model	where	the	vast	majority	of	national	populations	are	dependent	on	
state	employment.	As	well,	 the	distributive	welfare	capacity	of	 these	new	rentier	states	
combined	with	their	swift	development	resulted	in	populations	whose	gratitude	combined	
with	a	sense	of	indebtedness	for	the	newfound	prosperity.	This,	in	fact,	is	a	major	reason	
the	GCC	states	are	used	as	modèle	exemplaire	of	rentier	state	behaviour.		
                                                            
18 Mohamed Bin Musa Al‐Yousef, Oil and the Transformation of Oman: The Socio‐economic Impact (London: 
Stacey International, 1996), 21; Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 1995, 39. 
19 Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 1995, 1. 
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3.2	Cultural	Divide	
There	is	a	sense	from	the	younger	and	older	generation	that	a	cultural	divide	exists	
between	 the	 generations.	 Some	 interviewees	divide	 into	 two	 groups,	 others	 three.	 The	
major	delineation	in	the	first	division	is	between	those	who	grew	up	in	the	pre‐oil	era	and	
witnessed	the	rapid	transformation	of	the	state	and	those	who	were	born	after	the	major	
infrastructural	 changes	 with	 all	 the	 trappings	 of	 wealth	 along	 with	 institutional	 and	
technological	modernity	blossoming	around	them.	
The	second,	tripartite,	demarcation	is	slightly	more	nuanced.	The	categories	are	as	
follows.	The	first	generation	are	those	who	represent	the	hard‐working	merchant,	trading,	
or	pearling	communities	as	the	case	may	be.	Entrepreneurs	would	point	back	to	this	as	the	
generation	 proving	 that	 business	 intelligence	 and	 an	 entrepreneurial	 spirit	 were	 not	
foreign	 to	 the	 region,	 but	 very	 much	 integral	 to	 it.	 The	 second	 category	 refers	 to	 the	
generation	that	worked	through	the	oil	transformation.	These	were	those	who	participated	
in	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 economy	 away	 from	 private	 and	 familial	 entrepreneurial	
interests	to	the	pursuit	of	wealth	that	centred	on	the	new	commodity,	oil.	Economic	activity	
shifted	toward	the	state,	and	earning	a	living	was	provided	by	direct	state	employment	or	
business	proximity	to	the	value	chains	attached	to	oil	activities.20		
The	final	generation,	then,	were	those	born	into	this	new	reality.	A	strong	welfare	
state	 was	 in	 place,	 families	 allotted	 prestige	 to	 employment	 in	 the	 government	 or	 oil	
industry,	and	other	business	activities	dwindled	or	eventually	fell	under	the	auspices	of	
expatriate	 labour	 and	 business	 classes.	 As	 well,	 this	 generation	 was	 more	 instantly	
connected	to	the	outside	world	than	ever	before	and	grew	up	along	with	rapid	changes	in	
                                                            
20 Interviews with officials, initiative actors, and entrepreneurs in Oman and Qatar: September 2011 – July 2012. 
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technology.	 	 The	 millennial	 generation,	 then,	 expected	 more.	 Many	 attributed	 the	
generational	difference	almost	exclusively	to	technology.	Others	suggested	that	millennials	
also	offered	more	dynamic	visions,	new	operating	methodologies,	and	 the	aspiration	 to	
innovate.	 It	 has	 not	 only	 been	 technology	which	 has	 changed,	 but	 also	 education.	 The	
newer	generation	has	received	a	more	dynamic	education	than	was	offered	before	and	this	
impacts	 business	 strategy	 and	management	behaviour.21	No	matter	which	division	 you	
choose	to	engage,	the	message	is	consistent.	The	millennial	generation	is	different	than	its	
predecessors	not	only	in	terms	of	it	technological	capabilities	and	the	“globalization	effect,”	
but	arguably	more	significantly	in	terms	of	its	divergent	expectations.		
	
4. The	Entrepreneurial	Landscape	and	Gulf	Millennials	
The	World	Bank	neither	has	data	on	entrepreneurship	nor	on	new	business	density	
in	Oman	and	Qatar.	A	Gallup	Poll	has	suggested	that	four	percent	of	young	men	and	two	
percent	of	young	women	across	the	Middle	East	are	opportunity‐driven	entrepreneurs.22	
Census	data	in	Qatar	estimates	that	2.5	percent	of	Qatar’s	economically	active	population	
are	entrepreneurs,	 but	 entrepreneurs	here	are	 cross‐defined	with	 employers.23	 Specific	
data	on	entrepreneurship	is	difficult	to	attain,	with	Chambers	of	Commerce	and	various	
government	 bodies	 often	 hesitant	 to	 release	 particular	 figures.	 The	 absence	 of	 a	
government	 culture	 of	 transparency	 partially	 explains	 this	 reluctance.	 Uncertainty	
explains	the	remainder.	This	uncertainty	has	two	root	causes.	First,	overlapping	spheres	of	
                                                            
21 Interviews with officials, initiative actors, and entrepreneurs in Oman and Qatar: September 2011 – July 2012. 
22 Dalia Mogahed and Lymari Morales, “The Rare (But Powerful) Opportunity‐Driven Young Female 
Entrepreneur,” The Edge, June 26, 2011. 
23 Qatar Information Exchange Database (Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority, 2012), http://www.qix.gov.qa. 
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responsibility	 across	 government	 bodies	 combined	 with	 swift	 changes	 in	 government	
appointments	 in	 effect	 institutionalizes	 ambiguity.	 Rapid	 changes	 in	 government	 and	
ministerial	 responsibilities	 results	 in	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 over	 responsibilities	 and	 often	
direction.	 This	 was	 especially	 evident	 in	 Oman	 with	 a	 series	 of	 changes	 implemented	
following	the	unrest	of	2011.	This	ambiguity	is	compounded	by	institutional	competition,	
with	many	outfits	scrambling	to	be	the	next	“big	thing”	in	entrepreneurship	support.		
Second,	the	preponderance	with	which	various	government	bodies	hold	different	
figures	on	the	same	topic	contributes	to	uncertainty.	Indeed,	the	lack	of	definitional	clarity	
and	consistency	lends	to	confusion.	Different	institutions	may	use	different	criteria	in	their	
assumptions	 and	 data	 collection,	 which	 contributes	 to	 the	 inconsistency.	 The	
establishment	 of	 the	 Qatar	 Statistics	 Authority	 (QSA)	 is	 an	 attempt	 at	 rectifying	 this	
tendency.	It	is	designed	to	function	as	the	exclusive	central	data	bureau	in	the	country.	All	
requests	 for	statistical	 information	must	be	processed	through	the	QSA.	The	creation	in	
2012	 of	 the	 National	 Centre	 for	 Statistics	 and	 Information	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	
Supreme	Council	for	Planning	in	Oman	may	also	improve	the	situation	there.	Yet	despite	
these	changes,	underlying	economic	realities	make	even	available	data	difficult	to	navigate.			
According	to	a	World	Bank	study,	a	key	indicator	of	entrepreneurship	is	the	entry	
rate	 of	 new	 firms	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 lagged	 total	 registered	 firms.	 Developing	 country	
averages	 are	 between	 seven	 and	 nine	 percent.24	 Even	 though	 data	 on	 new	 business	
registrants	is	available	from	the	Chambers	of	Commerce	and	the	Ministry	of	Commerce	and	
Industry	or	the	Ministry	of	Business	and	Trade,	it	fails	to	accurately	capture	the	business	
                                                            
24 Leora Klapper and Manuel Quesada Delgado, Entrepreneurship: New Data on Business Creation and How to 
Promote It, Viewpoint (Washington: The World Bank Group, Financial and Private Sector Development Vice 
Presidency, August 2007), http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/316Klapper_Delgado.pdf. 
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environment.	 First,	 the	 information	 does	 not	 disclose	 the	 rate	 of	 failure	 or	 number	 of	
businesses	which	never	became	operational.	This	is	a	clear	informational	deficit.	Second,	
and	 equally	 problematic,	 there	 is	 no	 mechanism	 within	 the	 available	 datasets	 to	
differentiate	between	the	businesses	which	are	genuinely	locally	owned	and	operated	or	
those	which	are	simply	using	the	name	of	a	citizen	for	official	records	but	in	reality	owned	
and	operated	by	an	expatriate.	Without	a	clear	differentiation,	it	is	impossible	to	know	with	
any	degree	of	confidence	the	number	of	local	business	people	who	are	merely	utilizing	one	
of	 the	 available	 ways	 to	 access	 rent	 from	 those	 who	 are	 legitimately	 engaging	 in	
entrepreneurial	business	endeavours.	
These	datasets	are	also	unable	to	reveal	whether	entrepreneurship	is	“opportunity	
driven”	or	“necessity	based”	–	an	 important	differentiation	according	to	some	studies.25	
Opportunity‐driven	entrepreneurs	are	believed	to	contain	certain	socio‐economic	change	
potential.	 Recent	 studies	 claim	 that	 Arab	 youth	 are	 increasingly	 entrepreneurially	
minded.26	The	results	of	the	2011	Arab	Youth	Study	suggest	that	Gulf	Arab	youth	are	even	
more	 likely	 to	 have	 entrepreneurial	 aspirations	 than	 young	 people	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
region.27	 What	 this	 survey	 does	 not	 disclose	 are	 the	 underlying	 motivations	 to	 these	
aspirations.	The	judgement	on	whether	entrepreneurs	are	opportunity	or	necessity	driven	
is	better	ascertained	through	interviews	and	focus	groups	with	entrepreneurs	and	aspiring	
entrepreneurs.	The	answer	proved	mixed,	with	aspiring	Omani	entrepreneurs	more	often	
driven	by	necessity	 than	Qatari	ones.	This	could	be	expected.	Young	people,	often	 from	
                                                            
25 Mogahed and Morales, “The Rare (But Powerful) Opportunity‐Driven Young Female Entrepreneur.” 
26 Imelda Dunlop, Business and Youth in the Arab World: Partnerships for Youth Employment and Enterprise 
Development (International Business Leader`s Forum, 2006), http://www‐dev.iblf.org/docs/BizYouthArab.pdf. 
27 3rd Annual ASDA’A Burson‐Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, White Paper (Dubai: ASDA’A Burson‐Marsteller, 
March 2011), 11. 
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families	 in	 a	 weak	 socio‐economic	 position,	 when	 confronting	 the	 prospect	 of	
unemployment	turn	to	alternatives	like	self‐employment	to	sustain	a	living.		
	
5. Structural	Challenges:	the	persistence	of	labour	market	woes	
The	 challenges	 millennials	 experience	 in	 the	 labour	 market	 are	 not	 necessarily	
unique	from	those	faced	by	other	labour	market	participants.	What	is	different,	however,	
is	the	effort	the	state	now	dedicates	to	promoting	alternatives	to	state	employment	to	this	
generation.	These	alternatives	include	private	sector	jobs	and	self‐employment,	but	have,	
for	the	last	several	years,	centred	on	entrepreneurship	in	particular.	The	overall	emphasis	
on	 the	 importance	of	 innovation	 along	 the	path	 to	 a	 knowledge	 economy	 is	 difficult	 to	
avoid.	Despite	this,	the	underlying	structures	of	the	economy	remain	the	same.	Along	with	
the	overarching	rentier	character	of	the	political	economy,	employment	options	and	labour	
market	trends	more	broadly	are	constituted	by	the	segmented	labour	market	and	dual‐
wage	 structure.	 This	 section	 highlights	 the	 particular	 difficulties	 this	 reality	 presents,	
especially	in	relation	to	its	significant	contradiction	with	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	
policy	aims.		
Where	the	state	has	been	the	main	source	of	employment	in	the	oil	age,	it	is	over	
saturated.	In	Oman,	the	state	no	longer	has	the	capacity	to	hire	as	many	new	graduates	as	
the	school	system	turns	out	each	year.	In	both	cases,	even	when	gainful	employment	can	
be	secured,	the	state	often	fails	to	provide	a	stimulating	or	challenging	environment	for	
those	who	 need	 it.	 Many	 young	 people	 are	 under‐employed	within	 these	 agencies,	 or,	
because	of	the	bloated	nature	of	the	public	sector,	find	they	have	little	to	nothing	to	do	in	
their	 roles.	 Other	 graduates	 find	 they	 do	 not	 have	 the	 skills	 or	 applicable	 education	
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required	 for	 available	 jobs.	 Indeed,	 the	 under‐utilization	 and,	 prior	 to	 that,	 the	 under‐
education	of	local	human	resources	remains	a	challenge.		
As	the	extraordinarily	high	percentage	of	expatriates	in	the	labour	market	indicates,	
there	is	demand	for	labour	in	the	economy.	Yet	even	when	local	labour	is	qualified	for	the	
position,	 the	dual‐wage	structure	has	a	two‐pronged	hindering	effect.	Citizens	are	more	
expensive	to	employ	and	difficult	to	fire.	At	the	same	time,	private	sector	jobs	are	perceived	
as	low	paying,	less	secure,	and	offering	fewer	benefits	than	the	public	or	oil	sectors.		
These	rather	long‐standing	labour	market	challenges	motivated	the	development	
of	 labour	 nationalization	 strategies.	 These	 policies,	 known	 as	 Omanization	 and	
Qatarization,	 preceded	 the	 push	 toward	 entrepreneurship	 and	 were	 its	 precursors.	
Omanization	 and	 Qatarization	 refer	 to	 government	 policies	 to	 promote	 their	 citizens’	
employment	 in	 the	workforce	 and	 encourage	 local	 instead	 of	 expatriate	 hiring.	 Labour	
market	nationalization,	or	localization	as	it	 is	sometimes	known,	was	the	initial	channel	
through	which	 local	participation	 in	the	 labour	market	was	encouraged.	Through	quota	
systems	and	enhanced	education	and	training	opportunities,	localization	seeks	to	reduce	
reliance	on	expatriate	 labour	and	 increase	 local	economic	opportunities.	These	positive	
discrimination	policies	can	be	understood	as	similar	in	intention	to	affirmative	action,	only	
rather	than	targeting	specific	minorities	they	target	the	wider	national	population.		
	 Omanization	was	first	introduced	as	policy	in	1988,	but	little	attention	was	paid	to	
it	 until	 the	mid‐1990s.	 Political	 emphasis	 on	Omanization	was	 intensified	 in	 the	Oman	
Vision	2020	which	dictates	an	increase	of	Omanization	percentages	from	their	1995	levels	
of	68	percent	in	the	public	sector	and	15	percent	in	the	private	sector	to	95	and	75	percent	
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respectively	by	2020.28	Labour	market	indicators	show	that	the	public	sector	had	achieved	
82.7	percent	by	2005.29	Banks	and	the	oil	and	gas	industry	have	also	been	rather	successful	
at	 reaching	 targets.30	 The	 percentage	 of	 Omanis	 in	 the	 private	 sector,	 however,	 only	
reached	a	22.5	percent	Omanization	ratio	by	2005	and	actually	decreased	to	15.6	percent	
by	 2010.	 31	 	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 though	 that	 this	 was	 primarily	 due	 to	 the	 increase	 in	
expatriates	 added	 to	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 exaggerated	 by	 the	 push	 of	 economic	
liberalization	that	deepened	after	2005.32			
	 Qatar	 introduced	 its	 own	 localization	 policy	 about	 a	 decade	 after	 Oman.	 The	
government	 officially	 adopted	 Qatarization	 in	 1997	 toward	 the	 goal	 of	 increasing	 the	
percentage	of	Qataris	in	the	total	workforce	to	20	percent.33	It	received	more	attention	in	
2000	with	the	introduction	of	the	Strategic	Qatarization	Plan	for	the	Energy	and	Industry	
Sector.	This	plan	aimed	at	a	50	percent	Qatarization	ratio	for	that	sector.34	Like	the	rest	of	
the	 region,	 Qatar	 combined	 quotas,	 incentives,	 and	 preferential	 hiring	 to	 encourage	
progress.35	Qatar	has	been	far	less	successful	at	reaching	its	localization	goals	than	Oman,	
as	suggested	by	earlier	figures.	To	date,	only	six	percent	of	the	total	labour	force	is	Qatari.36	
                                                            
28 Vision 2020, 94. 
29 Seventh Five‐Year Development Plan (2006‐2010) (Muscat: Ministry of National Economy, 2006), 185. 
30 “Omanisation Percentage Per Sector,” Ministry of Manpower, 2011, 
http://www.manpower.gov.om/en/omanisation_sector.asp. 
31 Facts & Figures 2010 (Muscat: Ministry of National Economy, June 2011), 21; Seventh Five‐Year Development 
Plan (2006‐2010), 185. 
32 See the first half of section 2.1 in chapter 3. 
33 Dell Felder and Mirka Vuollo, Qatari Women in the Workforce, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social 
Science Research Network, November 16, 2008), 5, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1291424. 
34 “Qatarization ‐ What Is Qatarization?,” Strategic Qatarization Plan for the Energy and Industry Sector, accessed 
March 3, 2013, 
http://www.qatarization.com.qa/Qatarization/Qatarization.nsf/40278ec4e9ade91c4325725d003bc463/f6d7350
0302675e7432574500040a8c5?OpenDocument. 
35 Justin Williams, Ramudu Bhanugopan, and Alan Fish, “Localization of Human Resources in the State of Qatar,” 
Education, Business and Society: Contemporary Middle Eastern Issues 4, no. 3 (2011): 200–201, 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/10.1108/17537981111159966. 
36 Qatar Statistics Authority, Qatar Census 2010. 
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Qatarization,	in	fact,	would	be	viewed	as	an	abject	policy	failure	had	deadlines	not	been	
dropped.	Reflecting	the	reality	of	the	Qatari	labour	market,	quotas	are	now	widely	viewed	
as	“unrealistic.”37	They	are	generally	considered	goals	worthy	of	aspiration,	but	are	neither	
enforced	nor	used	as	a	means	of	holding	up	foreign	labour	recruitment.		
Obstacles	 to	 labour	nationalization	efforts	 in	 the	private	sector	can	be	organized	
into	two	main	categories,	the	relative	preference	of	nationals	for	public	sector	positions	
and	the	hesitation	of	the	private	sector	to	hire	nationals.	The	private	labour	market	is	less	
appealing	because	 it	 is	perceived	to	offer	 less	secure,	 lower	paying	 jobs	than	the	public	
sector.	As	well,	 the	psychological	association	of	an	 imported,	marginalized	 labour	class,	
dominating	 certain	 labour‐intensive	 sectors	 further	 reduces	 the	 attractiveness	 of	
particular	 job	 categories.	 As	 a	 result,	 jobs	 in	 labour‐intensive	 or	 service	 industries	 are	
widely	viewed	as	undesirable	or	beneath	the	dignity	of	the	local	workforce.	While	this	is	
widely	true	in	Qatar,	the	situation	is	slightly	different	in	the	lesser‐wealthy	Oman.	Omanis,	
particularly	those	from	outside	the	capital	area,	are	in	fact	willing	to	work	in	lower‐level	
occupations	rejected	in	the	Khaleeji	norm.	Taxi	drivers,	for	instance,	while	remaining	the	
prerogative	of	foreign	labour	in	Qatar	is	a	completely	Omanized	occupation.	The	same	is	
true	for	clerical	positions,	drivers,	and	security	guards.38	Oman,	in	fact,	first	nationalized	
lower‐level	occupations	and	incrementally	expanded	quotas	up	the	job	scale	in	an	attempt	
to	better	 reflect	educational	and	experience	capabilities	at	 the	 time.	 In	addition	 to	 this,	
Oman	 has	 been	 particularly	 successful	 in	 the	 public	 and	 banking	 sectors	 reaching	
                                                            
37 Mehran Kamrava, “Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar,” The Middle East Journal 63, no. 3 
(2009): 407, doi:10.3751/63.3.13. 
38 “At a Crossroads,” Oman Economic Review, September 2003. 
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approximately	85	and	92	percent	Omanization	ratios	respectively.39	In	contrast,	like	many	
other	wealthy	Gulf	states,	Qatar’s	application	of	 job	nationalization	in	the	private	sector	
has	primarily	involved	appointing	Qataris	to	senior	managerial	positions	of	companies	or	
on	the	board	of	directors.		
Over	the	years,	some	attempt	has	been	made	at	countering	this	trend	and	enhancing	
the	overall	appeal	of	the	private	sector	to	Gulf	nationals.	Oman’s	institution	of	a	minimum	
wage	 is	 one	 such	 endeavour.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 tends	 to	 further	 reduce	 private	 sector	
interest	in	hiring	nationals	since	expatriates	are	not	subject	to	the	same	minimum	wage	
requirements.	 Moreover,	 given	 the	 majority‐expatriate	 status	 in	 many	 industries,	 the	
problem	is	reproduced	as	expatriate	managers	seem	to	have	a	predilection	for	hiring	fellow	
countrymen.	They	are	also	often	accused	of	failing	to	support	or	train	local	hires	who	are	
viewed	as	threats	to	their	job	security.		
Aside	 from	 this,	 minimum	 private	 sector	 wages	 remain	 below	 public	 sector	
averages.	While	this	is	not	a	problem	for	job	categories	with	high	educational	demands	that	
tend	to	pay	well,	it	is	particularly	challenging	for	low‐level	positions.	Other	attempts	have	
also	 largely	 failed	 to	 change	 these	 perceptions.	 For	 example,	 the	 Omani	 government	
implemented	 a	 social	 security	 law	 in	 1992	 to	 offer	 retirement	 security	 to	 permanent	
private	sector	employees.40	Despite	these	efforts,	graduates	continue	to	see	the	salaries,	
retirement	plans,	social	security,	compensation,	education	assistance,	vacations,	sick	leave	
and	working	 hours	 of	 private	 sector	 employment	 as	 inferior	 to	 the	 public	 sector.	 The	
                                                            
39 Seventh Five‐Year Development Plan (2006‐2010), 185; “Omanization in the Banking Sector,” Al‐Markazi, 
December 2004, 19. 
40 Salma Al‐Lamki, “Barriers to Omanization in the Private Sector: The Perceptions of Omani Graduates,” The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management 9, no. 2 (1998): 384. 
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necessity	 to	use	English	as	 the	medium	of	communication	also	serves	as	a	deterrent	 to	
many	graduates.	This	is	particularly	true	outside	the	capital	region	in	Oman	despite	having	
completed	 post‐secondary	 education	 by	 means	 of	 the	 English	 language	 as	 well	 as	 for	
graduates	of	Arabic‐language	programmes	in	Qatar.41	Language	is	an	even	greater	obstacle	
for	those	without	higher	education.	Likewise,	it	is	not	uncommon	to	hear	expressions	of	
discomfort	or	feeling	overwhelmed	in	foreign‐dominated	work	environments.		
A	 further	 problem	 is	 the	 continuation	 of	 a	 system	 which	 requires	 majority	
ownership	of	business	by	a	national.	Other	than	separate	arrangements	made	with	large	
multinationals,	the	standard	51%	ownership	share	guarantees	a	level	of	local	involvement	
or	 income	 from	 a	 business.	 In	 many	 cases,	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 shadow	 ownership	
arrangements	 further	 complicates	 the	 picture.	 The	 motivation	 to	 be	 independently	
productive	or	develop	an	innovative	enterprise	is	reduced	when	one	can	simply	receive	an	
income	by	being	a	name	on	a	business	deed	which	is	for	all	intents	and	purposes	owned	
and	 operated	 by	 a	 non‐national.	 This	 is	 just	 one	more	 example	 of	 the	many	ways	 rent	
seeking	has	pervaded	the	economic	foundation	of	the	state	and	represents	why	it	remains	
so	difficult	to	alter.		
	 Thus,	the	problem	with	labour	market	nationalization	endeavours	is	that	it	detracts	
from	the	reality	of	the	segmented	labour	market.	As	the	name	implies,	there	are	essentially	
two	labour	markets	resulting	in	labour	that	is	not	exchangeable	and	labour	market	actors	
that	do	not	in	reality	compete	with	each	other.	In	order	to	truly	address	these	challenges,	
the	 underlying	 structures	 and	 inequality	 that	 pervades	 them	 must	 be	 addressed.	 The	
variety	 of	 incentive	mechanisms	 that	 have	 been	 initiated	 over	 the	 years	 have	 failed	 to	
                                                            
41 Ibid., 388–391; interviews, meetings, and focus groups with students across both cases. 
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resolve	 the	 problem.	 As	 the	 Omani	 case	 demonstrates,	 raising	 the	minimum	wage	 for	
Omanis	 only	 serves	 to	 further	 reduce	 private	 sector	 interest	 in	 local	 hiring.	 As	 well,	
minimum	 wage	 increases	 consistently	 lag	 behind	 public	 sector	 averages.	 The	 private	
sector	continues	to	be	viewed	as	the	employment	of	last	resort.	Even	those	who	initially	
take	 up	 private	 sector	 jobs,	 do	 so	 to	 bide	 their	 time	 until	 a	 public	 opening	 becomes	
available.		
The	 jobs	and	salaries	provided	by	many	state	and	even	private	corporations	are	
simply	to	fulfill	nationalization	quotas	or	an	obligation	to	contribute	to	local	employment.	
This	obligation	may	be	the	result	of	government	inducement	or	form	part	of	a	corporate	
marketing	strategy.	In	fact,	many	multinational	companies	hold	distorted	views	of	national	
labour	quotas.	Some	perceive	it	as	an	expression	of	government	taxation,	holding	that	the	
necessity	of	hiring	local	labour	is	merely	part	of	the	cost	of	doing	business	in	the	country.	
Others	 view	 it	 as	 a	 form	 of	 corporate	 social	 responsibility,	 perversely	 suggesting	 that	
providing	employment	to	local	job	seekers	is	a	way	of	“giving	back.”42	This	presentation	of	
colonial	atavism	is	suggestive	of	a	condescending	view	of	local	needs	disconnected	from	a	
broader,	genuine	development	imperative.	The	lesson	though,	is	important	to	the	broader	
message.	 The	 structure	 of	 Gulf	 political	 economy	 is	 difficult	 to	 disentangle	 from	 the	
broader	global	structures	and	flows	of	capital	and	labour	that	underpin	it.		
Hence,	despite	the	policy	 language	over	the	years	aimed	at	 limiting	 immigration,	
building	 indigenous	human	resources,	and	nationalizing	private	sector	 jobs,	 the	ratio	of	
citizens	to	non‐national	population	continues	to	decrease.	(See	figures	4.1	and	4.2)		Efforts	
                                                            
42 Both these views were voiced repeatedly during this field research from September 2011 to July 2012, as well 
as during a research trip to Oman in 2009 examining labour market nationalization.  
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to	 attract	 investment	 and	 brand	 the	 country	 pro‐business	 reduce	 the	 state’s	 desire	 to	
directly	intervene	in	the	labour	market	and	enforce	quotas.43	Pledges	for	the	Omanization	
and	 Qatarization	 of	 private	 sector	 jobs	 and	 immigration	 control	 are	 negated	 by	 heavy	
investment	projects,	infrastructure	development,	and	the	courting	of	FDI.	These	increase	
demand	for	expatriate	labour.	As	shown	in	figures	4.1	and	4.2,	the	expatriate	population	
continues	to	expand	against	the	citizen	one.	This	 is	even	more	heavily	reflected	in	their	
disproportionate	representation	in	the	labour	market.		
Figure	4.1:	Population	Growth,	Oman	
	
Source:	Department	of	Health	Information	&	Statistics,	Ministry	of	Health,	Oman44	
	
As	evident	in	the	graphs,	the	situation	is	more	acute	in	Qatar.	On	a	political	economy	
level,	this	is	less	problematic	given	the	much	lower	national	demand	for	private	sector	jobs.	
On	 a	 politico‐cultural	 level,	 the	 general	 malaise	 spurred	 by	 a	 perceived	 onslaught	 of	
                                                            
43 Forstenlechner and Rutledge, “Unemployment in the Gulf,” 44. 
44 Annual Health Reports (Muscat: Department of Health Information and Statistics, Directorate General of 
Planning, Ministry of Health, 2012), http://www.moh.gov.om/en/nv_menu.php?o=stat/ahr.html. 
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foreigners	 is	of	particular	 local	 concern.	The	heavy	presence	of	 foreigners	 is	viewed	by	
some	 as	 a	 cultural	 threat,	 another	 unwelcome	 imposition	 by	 the	 new	 realities	 of	
globalization.	It	is	the	suddenness	of	the	increase	which	heightens	local	concern.	The	sharp	
increase	in	expatriate	numbers	was	prompted	by	developments	in	the	lead	up	to	the	2006	
Asian	Games.	It	was	accompanied	by	high	levels	of	inflation	as	well,	rising	from	3	percent	
prior	to	2004	to	11.8	percent	in	2006,	13.6	in	2007,	and	15.2	in	2008.45	There	is	a	great	
deal	of	concern	that	there	will	be	an	even	starker	increase	in	the	numbers	of	foreigners	and	
inflation	in	the	expected	construction	boom	in	the	lead	up	to	FIFA	2022.	Early	projections	
warn	that	inflation	could	average	18	percent	per	annum	over	the	coming	decade.46			
Figure	4.2:	Population	Growth	Rate,	Qatar	
	
Source:	Qatar	Statistics	Authority	
                                                            
45 Qatar Economic Statistics at a Glance, 17; “Record Inflation,” Qatar Financial Centre Authority, 2007, 
http://www.qfc.com.qa/en‐us/Media‐center/Media‐news‐detail.aspx?sNewsID=68524c59‐13f6‐4d6f‐8f73‐
3d0a8c64fb02. 
46 “Qatar ‘Must Be Wary’ of Construction Inflation,” The Peninsula, March 27, 2013, 
http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/business/230782‐qatar‐%E2%80%98must‐be‐wary%E2%80%99‐of‐construction‐
inflation.html. 
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Indeed,	the	contradictions	that	confront	the	current	push	for	entrepreneurship	are	
part	of	the	same	broader	constructs	which	have	encumbered	labour	market	remedies	and	
diversification	 strategies	 for	 the	 last	 several	 decades.	 Structural	 change	 is	 difficult	 and	
requires	 a	 great	 deal	 more	 political	 will	 than	 lip	 service	 commitment	 to	 the	 ideals	 of	
entrepreneurship.	Conflicting	social	pressures	also	run	deep.	On	the	one	hand,	this	desire	
exists	for	a	reduction	in	the	presence	of	foreign	workers	so	as	to	lessen	a	perceived	cultural	
threat.	On	the	other	hand,	and	this	is	especially	true	in	the	business	community,	there	is	a	
broad	unwillingness	to	relinquish	reliance	on	foreign	labour.		
The	 role	 of	 entrepreneurship	 initiatives	 at	 creating	 genuine	 employment	
opportunities	has	been	questioned	by	stakeholders.	This	was	especially	true	of	financial,	
training,	 and	 incubation	 support	 initiatives	 like	 Sharakah,	 Injaz,	 programmes	 through	
Enterprise	Qatar,	QSTP,	and	the	Bedaya	Centre.	Despite	the	state’s	apparent	drive	behind	
entrepreneurship	 promotion,	 initiative	 directors	 expressed	 skepticism	 that	 the	
government	and	larger	corporations	would	even	be	willing	to	change	their	procurement	
policies	 and	 establish	 contracts	 with	 small,	 local	 companies	 to	 accommodate	
entrepreneurship	support.	 If	 they	already	have	a	reliable	vendor,	“they	are	not	going	to	
prioritize	 the	 local	 entrepreneur.”47	 It	 is	 not	 simply	 a	matter	 of	 encouraging	 people	 to	
initiate	 start	ups,	 the	opportunities	need	 to	be	 available	and	 the	established	 structures	
require	both	the	incentive	and	opportunity	to	be	altered.		
                                                            
47 Interviews with Qatari initiative directors, February 19 and 22, 2012; and official at Qatar Science and 
Technology Park, February 20, 2012. Omani initiative directors expressed the same concern, which may be 
slightly assuaged after recent government policy announcements which should force 10 percent of contracts at 
the tender board to be allocated to SMEs.  
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If	 incentives	for	imported	labour,	reliance	on	foreign	expertise,	and	international	
corporations	 persist,	 a	 dynamic,	 independent,	 local	 private	 sector	 will	 be	 difficult	 to	
stimulate.	 Should	 the	 government’s	 desire	 to	promote	 entrepreneurship	 and	 a	broader	
national	 commitment	 to	 innovation	 be	 genuine,	 it	 must	 design	 suitable	 strategies	 to	
restructure	the	economy	and	transform	the	existing	incentive	structures.	Borrowing	from	
the	 playbook	 of	 the	 East	 Asian	 developmental	 state	 and	 its	 industrial	 development	
strategies	 including	 infant	 industry	protection	and	special	requirements	around	 foreign	
capital	 and	 investment	may	 be	 one	 approach.	Of	 course,	 the	Gulf	 states	 face	 particular	
resource‐centred	 challenges	which	 render	 its	 development	 status	 unique.	 Crafting	 any	
industrial	innovation	policy	will	require	specific	attention	be	paid	to	the	broad	mantel	of	
rentier	political	economy	and	the	underlying	structural	challenges	which	accompany	it	like	
the	segmented	labour	market.		
	
6. Cognitive	Dissonance	and	Millennial	Expectations	
By	and	large,	Gulf	millennials	have	grown	up	in	times	of	plenty.	They	are	the	first	
generation	to	have	never	known	dire	scarcity.	Although	poverty	and	inequality	does	exist	
among	the	national	population,	even	the	relatively	economically‐deprived	millennials	have	
grown	 up	 with	 certain	 expectations	 of	 what	 the	 government	 provides.	 Along	 with	
education	 and	 healthcare,	 this	 often	 includes	 real	 estate	 and	 employment.	 As	 new	
economic	realities	set	in,	it	is	becoming	increasingly	evident	that	the	status	quo	cannot	be	
maintained	 indefinitely.	 The	 idea	 that	 the	 governments’	 primary	 role	 is	 provider	 and	
caregiver	along	with	commander	and	rule	giver	is	difficult	to	supplant.	The	government’s	
failure	to	fulfill	expectations	can	have	dangerous	consequences.	The	first	of	which	were	
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arguably	evident	in	2011	Oman.	Indeed,	Oman	represents	a	test	case	for	Gulf	states	as	it	
tackles	 socio‐economic	 change.48	 This	 section	 assesses	 the	 convergence	 of	 millennial	
expectations	 in	 Oman	 and	 Qatar	 and	 suggests	 that	 the	 nexus	 of	 conventional	 rentier	
expectations	 with	 new	 global	 ones	 are	 difficult	 for	 the	 state	 to	 meet	 in	 the	 current	
governance	context.	
Not	only	do	young	people	expect	public	sector	jobs,	but	they	have	come	to	prefer	
them.	 Professors	 and	 other	 educators	 at	 higher	 education	 institutions	 in	 both	 cases	
frequently	mention	how	 their	 students	 cite	 government	 jobs	 as	 their	 first	 employment	
preference	post	graduation.	Others	indicate	oil	companies.	A	recent	Silatech	survey	found	
that	more	young	Qataris	 favour	 government	 employment	 to	 alternatives.49	 A	 variety	 of	
initiatives	like	those	delivered	through	Injaz	or	designed	by	local	educational	ministries	
are	attempting	to	change	this	predilection	at	 the	school	 level.	This	type	of	cultural	shift	
through	education,	if	successful,	will	take	time	to	materialize.	Until	the	younger	generation	
comes	through	the	system	and	broader	socio‐cultural	shifts	take	place,	school	leavers	will	
still	be	likely	to	favour	state	employment.		
In	focus	groups	and	interviews,	students	who	were	aspiring	entrepreneurs	either	
participating	 in	 entrepreneurship	 classes,	working	 groups,	 or	 volunteer	 societies	 often	
expressed	 the	 same	 preference.	 Even	 several	 of	 the	 interviewees	 in	 Oman	 who	 self	
identified	as	entrepreneurs	and	were	attempting	their	hand	at	a	new	start	up	suggested	
that	they	would	give	up	their	business	for	a	government	job	if	the	opportunity	arose	or	
                                                            
48 Although it could be argued that Bahrain provides a better test case, I dismiss it as an exemplar. Its economic 
and political development has been riddled by sectarianism and violence, particularly acute in the last several 
years. Its consumption by these issues makes it an impracticable model and a weak comparator.  
49 Qatar’s Rising Entrepreneurial Spirit (Doha: Silatech and Gallup, Inc., February 2012), 4, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/153011/qatar‐rising‐entrepreneurial‐spirit.aspx. 
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attempt	to	manage	both.50	Many	Qataris,	in	fact,	tend	to	treat	entrepreneurship	as	a	part‐
time	occupation	or	hobby	with	a	majority	of	the	new,	young	entrepreneurs	interviewed	
holding	on	to	positions	in	the	public	sector	or	state‐owned	enterprises	(SOE).51	To	some	
extent,	this	reflects	some	degree	of	pragmatism;	that	is,	test	running	a	business	idea	before	
full	commitment.	In	many	cases,	however,	this	is	how	independent	endeavours	will	remain.	
What	 it	 really	 suggests	 then,	 is	 an	 aversion	 to	 risk	 taking	 which	 is	 necessary	 for	 an	
entrepreneurial	sector	to	develop.	It	also	stymies	possible	innovation	as	those	engaged	in	
business	will	be	too	preoccupied	with	other	work	commitments	to	dedicate	the	creative	
capital	 necessary.	 This	 can	 also	 reinforce,	 or	 lead	 to	 a	 return	 to,	 the	 default	 hiring	 of	
expatriates	to	manage	operations.	Without	real	financial	investment,	these	managers	are	
unlikely	to	have	the	creative	drive	to	innovate.			
Nevertheless,	 as	 much	 as	 these	 preferences	 continue	 within	 the	 millennial	
generation,	 new	 desires	 and	 hopes	 are	 burgeoning.	 It	 could	 be	 that	 entrepreneurship	
promotion	is	already	paying	off	to	some	degree,	but	more	young	people	seem	to	consider	
entrepreneurship	worthy	of	exploration.	 In	 fact,	one	study	suggests	 that	 levels	of	youth	
entrepreneurship	in	Qatar	rose	from	24	percent	in	2009	to	33	percent	in	2011.52	Although	
both	Omanis	and	Qataris	may	prefer	to	keep	them	as	hobbies	or	as	part	time	endeavours,	
the	idea	has	been	implanted.	Many	who	have	tasted	the	beverage	find	it	difficult	to	turn	
away	 from.	 In	 response	 to	 whether	 they	 would	 consider	 government	 or	 corporate	
employment,	one	young	female	Qatari	entrepreneur	team	declared,	 “No,	we	can’t	work.	
                                                            
50 Focus groups in Oman, Qatar, interviews with professors, aspiring entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs, 
September 2011 – July 2012. 
51 Interviews with Qatari entrepreneurs and business men, February – May 2012. 
52 Qatar’s Rising Entrepreneurial Spirit, 5. 
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Are	you	kidding?	 It	 is	 impossible.	After	 running	 this	organization,	we	can’t	 give	up	our	
freedom	or	ideas.”53	
	 Freedom,	 in	 fact,	 was	 an	 oft‐cited	 reason	 for	 both	 pursuing	 and	 remaining	 in	
entrepreneurship.	It	seemed	to	particularly	strike	a	chord	with	millennial	entrepreneurs,	
both	 aspiring	 and	 practicing.	 One	 response	 to	 the	 motivation	 behind	 pursuing	
entrepreneurship	is	well‐captured	by	the	following	quote	by	a	young	Omani	entrepreneur:	
I	never	wanted	to	work	in	the	government.	The	economy	is	growing	and	I	want	to	
be	part	of	the	growing	economy.	Myself,	and	people	like	me,	want	to	participate	in	
the	development	of	our	country.	As	well,	and	 this	 is	very	 important,	we	want	 to	
make	our	own	private	income.	The	main	reason	however,	is	to	get	freedom	and	be	
free	in	thinking	and	free	in	movement.	This	freedom	is	what	you	will	hear	everyone	
tell	 you	 that	 is	 like	me	 and	wants	 to	work	 independently	 and	 operate	 our	 own	
business.	We	want	to	develop	our	skills	and	provide	new	things	for	society.54		
	
Young	 people	 in	 both	 cases	 seemed	 to	 sense	 something	 different	 about	 the	 current	
environment,	one	that	was	more	evocative	of	change.	Several	 interviewees	pointed	to	a	
difference	in	enterprise	and	individual	independence.	They	spoke	of	the	“closed	minds”	of	
earlier	generations	where	“everyone	worked	for	the	government	and	came	home	early”	in	
contrast	 to	 the	 more	 convoluted	 reality	 of	 today.55	 The	 present	 was	 representative	 of	
change.	Along	with	globalization	and	the	increasing	presence	of	international	companies,	
there	is	also	greater	“gender	mixing”	in	various	facets	of	social	and	economic	life.56		
	 Although	the	regional	“spring”	of	uprisings	only	touched	Oman	and	failed	to	reach	
Qatar	 at	 all,	 the	 Arab	 uprisings	 may	 function	 as	 a	 silent	 game	 changer	 in	 both.	
Entrepreneurial‐minded	millennials	 express	 a	 desire	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 regional	 change	
                                                            
53 Interview with Qatari entrepreneurs, April 22, 2012. 
54 Interview with Omani entrepreneur, October 31, 2011. 
55 Interviews with Qatari entrepreneurs,  February 20,  April 22, 29, 30, and May 7, 2012. 
56 Ibid. 
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narrative,	 even	 if	 only	 through	 economic	 development	 and	 social	 innovation.	 Despite	
frequent	admission	that	social	and	youth	engagement	are	nascent	concepts	in	the	region,	
many	 young	 people	 point	 to	 a	 growing	 presence.	 In	 fact,	 social	 entrepreneurship,	 and	
volunteer	 culture	more	generally,	 seemed	 to	be	on	 the	 rise.	This	was	especially	 true	 in	
Qatar	 where	 several	 young	 entrepreneurs	 had	 developed	 or	 were	 in	 the	 process	 of	
developing	 organizations	 or	 business	 concepts	 that	 had	 strong	 social	 contribution	
components.	Those	who	had	formed	organizations	found	plenty	of	young	people	willing	to	
volunteer	and	dedicate	time	to	worthwhile	causes.	57	The	IloveQatar	and	Sanad	society	are	
just	two	examples.	In	Oman,	where	there	seemed	to	be	somewhat	less	active	volunteerism	
among	 young	 people,	 millennial	 interviewees	 almost	 universally	 expressed	 an	
overwhelming	 desire	 to	 ultimately	 give	 back	 to	 society	 through	 various	 forms	 of	
contribution	ranging	from	donations,	to	training,	to	future	social	organization	plans.58	In	
both	cases,	increasing	numbers	of	social	initiatives	are	able	to	galvanize	local	interest	in	
participating.	Initiatives	like	distributing	drinking	water	to	construction	workers	on	hot	
days	have	grown	in	popularity.	
In	Qatar,	many	initiatives	are	inspired	and	directed	by	millennials	and	are	quickly	
becoming	part	of	a	new	and	growing	reality.	This	evidence	is	in	line	with	expectations	one	
might	have	of	countries	at	varying	wealth	levels.	Once	basic	needs	are	fulfilled,	a	certain	
degree	 of	 comfort	 allows	 more	 flexibility	 in	 pursuing	 formal	 social	 initiatives.	 Several	
studies	 have	 suggested	 a	 correlation	 between	 higher	 wealth	 levels	 and	 formal	
                                                            
57 Interviews with Qatari entrepreneurs, February 20, April 17 and 22, 2012. 
58 Relief efforts in the aftermath of Cyclone Gono (June 2007) mobilized a large number of volunteers, which 
arguably promoted a spirit of volunteerism.   
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volunteering.59	 In	 both	 cases	 however,	 bureaucracy	 often	 hinders	 the	 establishment	 of	
social	 organizations.	 Nonprofit	 registration	 proves	 extraordinarily	 tedious,	 and	
organizations	 in	 both	 countries	 often	 opt	 for	 commercial	 registration	 instead.	 These	
hassles	 only	 compounded	 the	 broader,	 general	 political	 disapproval	 of	 and	 constraints	
around	autonomous	associational	life.	If	more	flexibility	were	granted	to	civil	society,	the	
mood	suggests	that	initiatives	would	blossom.		
	 	The	 regional	 effect	 also	 seemed	 to	 influence	 who	 young	 entrepreneurs	 model	
themselves	 after.	 Young	 people	 have	 a	 regional	 outlook.	 They	 referred	 to	 events	 and	
activities	beyond	their	borders,	more	commonly	to	regional	ones	than	global.	There	was	
an	evident	affinity	with	an	Arab	narrative	as	millennials	repeatedly	spoke	of	“our	changing	
region.”	Millennial	entrepreneurs	involved	in	purely	business	activities	frequently	pointed	
to	the	United	Arab	Emirates,	and	Dubai	in	particular,	as	models	for	business	growth.	Others	
found	business	leaders	in	Dubai	and	other	parts	of	the	Middle	East	as	inspirational	role	
models.	Social	entrepreneurs	looked	to	Dubai	as	well,	but	while	praising	the	government’s	
support	for	initiatives	decried	its	necessary	hand	in	controlling	them.	Several	pointed	to	
Kuwait	and	Bahrain	as	having	started	social	initiatives	earlier	while	managing	to	maintain	
organizational	autonomy.	Young	women	especially	pointed	 to	 strong,	 influential	 female	
role	models	 in	Kuwait	and	Yemen	as	paving	a	particularly	stirring	path.	The	desire	and	
even	expectation	for	freedom	seems	to	be	lingering	in	the	air,	with	millennials	witnessing	
                                                            
59 See, for example K. Praveen Parboteeah, John B. Cullen, and Lrong Lim, “Formal Volunteering: a Cross‐national 
Test,” Journal of World Business 39, no. 4 (November 2004): 431–441, doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2004.08.007; and Evert 
Van de Vliert, Xu Huang, and Robert V. Levine, “National Wealth and Thermal Climate as Predictors of Motives 
for Volunteer Work,” Journal of Cross‐Cultural Psychology 35, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 62–73, 
doi:10.1177/0022022103260379. 
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it	from	a	distance	or	even	experiencing	elements	of	it	firsthand	through	their	engagement	
in	independent	projects.		
	 More	 tangibly	 in	Oman,	 the	 regional	wave	 saw	what	 has	 been	 called	 an	 “Omani	
Spring”	with	protests	calling	for	an	end	to	corruption,	labour	law	changes	which	include	a	
response	to	employment	challenges,	providing	more	job	opportunities,	and	raising	wages,	
as	well	as	increased	legislative	powers	to	the	Council	of	Oman.60	For	the	purposes	of	this	
discussion,	 the	 impact	here	 is	more	 clearly	 linked	 to	 triggering	a	protest	 culture	 in	 the	
country,	and	along	with	that	rising	populism	and	the	politicization	of	the	mundane.61	One	
might	 connect	 a	 more	 active,	 inquisitive	 youth	 base,	 such	 as	 those	 seeking	 out	
entrepreneurial	opportunities,	with	the	shift	in	civic	engagement.	Although	the	majority	of	
young	people	still	hope,	and	in	many	cases	bide	their	time	for,	state	employment,	university	
and	college	environments	seem	ripe	with	a	higher	degree	of	diversity	in	dreams	and	goals	
than	even	the	last	decade.62		It	seems	as	though	a	residual	‘Arab	Spring’	effect	has	inspired	
a	sense	of	empowerment	and	a	belief	that	change	can	occur.		
	 At	the	same	time	however,	the	regional	unrest	has	prompted	a	number	of	responses	
from	 the	 governments	 which	 directly	 contradicts	 their	 stated	 aims	 of	 increasing	 the	
                                                            
60 Said Sultan Al‐Hashimi, The Omani Spring: Towards the Break of a New Dawn?, Arab Reform Brief (Arab 
Reform Initiative, November 2011), http://www.arab‐reform.net/sites/default/files/Omanenglish.pdf. 
61 There exists a variety of administrative rules in Oman that, in earlier years, people seemed to accept. For 
example, there is an approved list of colours for the exterior of homes which is in many cases strictly enforced.  
These include whites and a small variety of off‐whites. There are reported cases where public utilities are not 
turned on until an approved colour is used. What was once a minor bureaucratic hassle in conversations, in late 
2011 was framed in politicized terms. One Sohar resident disparaged the nerve of the government for having the 
audacity to control the colour of their personal home. The government was now viewed as having too long an 
arm, demonstrating pervasive, controlling behaviour and impacting private choices. 
62 This is based on comparative observation, from working in Omani higher education in the mid‐2000s as 
compared to the environment witnessed during the field work for this project through focus groups with young 
people, classes, and interviews, meetings, and informal exchanges with academic and teaching staff across a 
wide range of institutions.  
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participation	of	nationals	 in	 the	private	 sector	which	 is,	 as	mentioned,	part	of	 the	 shift	
toward	promoting	entrepreneurship	and	innovation.	Not	only	was	Oman	granted	a	share	
of	 a	 $20	 billion	 aid	 package	 from	 the	 GCC	 to	 divide	 with	 Bahrain,	 but	 the	 Sultan	 also	
announced	a	series	of	royal	decrees	aimed	at	quelling	dissent.63	 	Aside	 from	ministerial	
changes,	 the	 economic	 reforms	 included	 the	 abrupt	 creation	 of	 50,000	 state	 jobs,	 an	
increase	 of	 the	minimum	wage	 from	 140	 to	 200	OMR,	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	monthly	
unemployment	benefit	of	150	OMR,	and	raising	the	living	allowance,	pensions,	and	social	
security	allowances	for	government	employees,	among	others.64	Just	under	two	years	later,	
the	minimum	wage	for	the	private	sector	was	again	increased	to	325	OMR	per	month.65	In	
response	to	a	question	about	the	creation	of	new	government	jobs,	a	senior	official	noted	
that	this	solution	was	not	entirely	problematic	during	times	of	high	oil	prices.	It	becomes	
more	concerning,	of	course,	when	the	price	of	oil	is	low.	“The	government	basically	did	this	
to	freeze	the	problem	so	as	to	avoid	a	‘Tunisia’	situation,”	he	noted.	“But	listen,	61,000	high	
school	students	will	 sit	 for	 their	 final	exams	 this	year.	Many	of	 those	won’t	move	on	 to	
college	 or	 university	 and	 will	 need	 jobs	 –	 but	 the	 government	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	
accommodate	 them…	 it	 was	 a	 short	 term	 solution.”66	 Truly,	 this	 was	 a	 solution	which	
proved	to	reinforce	existing	employment	preferences	and	heighten	expectations	of	public	
sector	employment.		
                                                            
63 Caryle Murphy, “GCC to Set up $20bn Bailout Fund for Bahrain and Oman,” The National, March 11, 2011, 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle‐east/gcc‐to‐set‐up‐20bn‐bailout‐fund‐for‐bahrain‐and‐oman; 
Al‐Hashimi, The Omani Spring: Towards the Break of a New Dawn?, 5. 
64 Sunil K. Vaidya, “Heavy Security Prevents Friday Protests in Sohar, Oman,” Gulf News, April 8, 2011, 
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/heavy‐security‐prevents‐friday‐protests‐in‐sohar‐oman‐1.789074; Al‐
Hashimi, The Omani Spring: Towards the Break of a New Dawn?, 5–6. 
65 “Council of Ministers / Statement,” Oman News Agency, February 2, 2013, 
www.omannews.gov.om/ona/english/newsDetailsPrint.jsp?newsID=160144. 
66 Interview with senior official at the then de‐commissioned Ministry of National Economy, January 15, 2012. 
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Qatar,	 despite	 experiencing	 no	 domestic	 unrest	 during	 the	 2011	 uprisings,	 also	
implemented	surprising	reforms.	In	September,	an	Emiri	decree	announced	an	astounding	
60	percent	salary	increase	for	Qataris	in	the	public	sector	and	a	120	percent	increase	for	
military	officers.	This	was	accompanied	by	pension	increases	as	well.67	This	naturally	only	
complicates	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 attract	 local	 labour	 and	 unsurprisingly	
frustrates	efforts	aimed	at	promoting	the	entrepreneurial	path.				
	 The	necessity	of	shifting	the	employment	burden	away	from	the	state	is	quite	high	
across	the	region.	An	IMF	report	in	2012	encouraged	the	GCC	states	to	reduce	the	national	
reliance	on	public	sector	employment	by	developing	a	vibrant	private	sector	and	reforming	
the	wage	and	benefit	discrepancies.68	In	a	speech	at	the	opening	session	of	the	Council	of	
Oman,	Sultan	Qaboos	implored	Omani	youth	to	work	in	the	private	sector:		
Remember	that	work,	as	much	as	it	is	a	right,	it	is	a	duty	as	well.	Everyone	who	has	
completed	their	education	or	training	has	to	take	up	any	useful	profession	which	
fulfils	 their	 sense	 of	 being	 and	 through	 which	 they	 can	 strive	 to	 achieve	 their	
ambitions,	 rather	 than	wait	 to	 get	 a	 government	 job.	The	 state,	with	 all	 its	 civil,	
security	 and	 military	 institutions,	 cannot	 continue	 to	 be	 the	 main	 source	 of	
employment,	as	this	calls	for	a	capacity	beyond	its	reach	and	a	mission	that	the	state	
cannot	sustain	forever.69		
	
Thus	through	a	combination	of	speeches,	programmes,	and	polices	on	the	one	hand,	the	
state	is	encouraging	a	shift	to	the	private	sector	and	the	development	of	SMEs.	On	the	other	
hand,	it	is	simultaneously	incentivizing	the	population	to	remain	in	the	public	sector.			
                                                            
67 Habib Toumi, “Public Sector in Qatar Gets 60 Per Cent Pay Rise,” Gulf News, September 7, 2011, 
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/public‐sector‐in‐qatar‐to‐get‐60‐per‐cent‐pay‐rise‐1.862595. 
68 Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges for the GCC Countries, Annual Meeting of Ministers of Finance and 
Central Bank Governors (Saudi Arabia: International Monetary Fund, October 5, 2012), 20–21. 
69 Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al‐Said, “Speech Before the Annual Session of the Council of Oman,” Ministry of 
Information, November 12, 2012, http://www.omanet.om/english/hmsq/hmsq12.asp. 
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The	 expectation	 of	 public	 sector	 employment	 is	 not	 an	 isolated	 socio‐political	
challenge.	Rather,	it	is	the	convergence	of	expectations	which	makes	the	millennials,	and	
youth	 more	 broadly,	 a	 particular	 generation	 to	 be	 reckoned	 with.	 	 The	 millennial	
generation	 expects	 more.	 Along	 with	 the	 usual	 welfare	 offerings,	 the	 promise	 of	
globalization	 and	 a	 new	 intoxication	 with	 freedom	 converges	 into	 a	 new	 reality	 of	
expectations	that	are	difficult	to	contend	with.	As	Marc	Valeri	presciently	noted	of	Oman	in	
2009,	the	young	generations	“are	reluctant	to	guarantee	the	perpetuation	of	a	system	in	
which	they	feel	excluded	from	political	and	economic	decisions	that	engage	the	country	for	
a	new	era	in	which	oil	will	necessarily	play	a	more	restricted	role.	They	do	not	agree	any	
more	to	be	regarded	as	politically	incapable,	nor	to	abdicate,	like	their	parents,	their	right	
to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 national	 debates	 in	 the	 name	 of	 socio‐economic	welfare.”70	 It	 is	 the	
multiplicity	of	expectations	which	is	particularly	dangerous.	The	gratitude	for	basic	socio‐
economic	welfare	earlier	generations	felt	is	no	longer	relevant	to	the	millennials.	Memories	
of	an	 impoverished	past	are	now	mere	historical	 tale.	As	a	middle‐aged	Qatari	business	
person	asserted,	the	“young	generation	is	impatient	–	they	want	instant	benefits.	They	have	
more	opportunities	but	they	want	outcomes	right	now.”71	The	belief	that	everything	should	
be	 taken	 care	of	 combined	with	newer	expectations	of	 freedom	and	 rights	promises	 to	
challenge	the	very	core	of	the	Gulf	ruling	bargain.		
	
	
	
                                                            
70 Valeri, Oman, 259. 
71 Interview with Qatari entrepreneur, May 7, 2012. 
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7. Navigating	the	Formal	and	Informal		
Although	change	 is	demonstrably	necessary,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	break	free	of	deeply	
embedded	 structures	 and	patterns.	 It	 is	 not	 simply	 the	 economic	 underpinnings	which	
pose	a	challenge,	but	also	the	established	practices	of	economic	and	political	life.	Equally	
important	to	this	discussion,	then,	is	understanding	how	a	system	structured	by	rentierism	
impacts	even	routine	social	and	business	behaviour	and	the	interface	of	state	and	society.72	
Indeed,	while	hydrocarbons	financed	the	Gulf	state	and	fashioned	its	rentier	character,	the	
practice	of	clientelism	fastened	various	segments	of	society	to	it.	Where	wealthy	merchant	
families	became	linked	with	the	ruling	family	or	state	apparatus,	other	social	groups	sought	
avenues	of	access	to	the	state’s	allocative	mechanisms	and	political	clout.	The	commercial	
and	familial	linkages	between	the	ruling	and	merchant	families	are	characteristic	of	Gulf	
states.73	Qatar’s	Al	Thanis,	and	the	families	that	married	into	them,	are	well	established	in	
the	 commercial	 sector.	 In	 Oman,	 the	 old	 merchants	 and	 trading	 families	 are	 well‐
represented	across	state	institutions.	The	state,	 in	some	regards,	positioned	itself	at	the	
centre	of	social	relations.	Its	provision	of	all	types	of	welfare	and	administrative	assistance	
shifted	social	focus	away	from	the	tribe	or	family	to	the	state,	thereby	depoliticizing	other	
social	 groupings	 and	 empowering	 the	 bureaucracy.74	 Both	 the	 tribal	 and	 other	 social	
groups	that	secured	economic	or	political	significance	as	well	as	patterns	of	access	and	rent	
seeking	acquired	a	 certain	path	dependence	 that	 continues	 to	 the	present.	The	 current	
                                                            
72 Hertog, “The Sociology of the Gulf Rentier Systems,” 284. 
73 Mehran Kamrava, “Structural Impediments to Economic Globalization in the Middle East,” Middle East Policy 
XI, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 100; See also Luciani, The Arab State; and Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 1995. 
74 See Marc Valeri, “High Visibility, Low Profile: The Shi’a in Oman Under Sultan Qaboos,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 42, no. 02 (2010): 251–268, doi:10.1017/S0020743810000048. 
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practices	 of	 economic	 life	 form	 a	 combination	 of	 challenges	 to	 attempts	 to	 retool	 the	
private	sector.	
The	millennial	generation	along	with	others	pushing	 for	employment	or	 seeking	
more	 meaningful	 work	 through	 embracing	 the	 push	 toward	 entrepreneurship	 are	
confronted	by	an	unfriendly	business	environment	riddled	with	bureaucratic	hurdles	and	
beset	 with	 nepotism	 and	 favouritism.	 The	 last	 chapter	 detailed	 some	 of	 the	 specific	
bureaucratic	and	financial	hurdles	facing	new	business	entrants.	This	section	discusses	the	
nexus	of	social	and	bureaucratic	behaviours	that	entrepreneurs	must	navigate.		
The	 term	wasta	 best	 captures	 part	 of	 the	 informal	mechanisms	 utilized	 to	 both	
navigate	bureaucracy	and	access	items,	individuals,	and	action.	For	those	who	have	spent	
any	 length	 of	 time	 in	 the	 Middle	 East,	 the	 term	 is	 no	 doubt	 familiar.	 It	 is	 somewhat	
comparable	to	the	notion	of	having	a	‘connection’	or	an	‘in.’	As	Barnett	et	el	note,	“one	is	
said	to	‘have	wasta’	when	those	from	whom	one	can	request	assistance	are	in	positions	of	
power	that	make	it	possible	for	them	to	grant	the	requested	assistance.”75	Those	with	wasta	
can	 then	 bypass	 red	 tape,	 have	 access	 to	 jobs,	 resources,	 government	 contracts	 and	
business	 opportunities	while	 those	without	 can	 find	 themselves	 crushed	 under	 poorly	
defined	 bureaucratic	 processes,	 long	 wait	 times,	 burdensome	 regulations	 and	 anti‐
competitive	 measures.	 Interviewees	 and	 focus	 group	 participants	 across	 both	 cases	
frequently	pointed	to	wasta	as	vital	to	achieving	success.		
	 Although	wasta	has	long	been	a	social	feature	of	the	region,	some	suggest	that	it	was	
the	colonial	powers	 that	reinforced	 it	as	a	socially‐constructed	norm	through	economic	
                                                            
75 Andy Barnett, Bruce Yandle, and George Naufal, “Regulation, Trust, and Cronyism in Middle Eastern Societies: 
The Simple Economics of ‘wasta’,” The Journal of Socio‐Economics 44 (June 2013): 41, 
doi:10.1016/j.socec.2013.02.004. 
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incentives	and	access	to	economic	and	political	power.76	Steffen	Hertog	calls	 individuals	
who	have	wasta	brokers.	“Brokers,”	he	suggests,	are	“intermediaries	who	hold	privileged	
positions	and	can	make	such	resources	available	to	nationals	and	foreigners	who	are	not	
as	well	connected.	Such	brokers	are	a	defining	feature	of	state‐society	relations	in	rentier	
states.”77	 Brokers	 are	 not	 only	 people	 who	 have	wasta,	 but	 also	 those	 who	 have	 been	
prescribed	particular	roles	as	intermediaries.	In	many	cases,	this	represents	the	modern	
state’s	appropriation	of	societal	network	norms	by	the	formalization	of	employable	roles	
to	facilitate	state‐society	relations	through	patron‐client	networks.	In	some	instances,	the	
state	“deliberately	created	regulations	that	encourage	the	emergence	of	brokers,	and	in	
many	cases	have	made	mere	citizenship	an	important	base	for	brokerage	of	state	resources	
to	non‐nationals.”78	The	requirement	for	company	public	relations	officers	to	be	citizens	is	
a	 case	 in	 point.	 In	 Oman,	 this	 also	 doubles	 as	 a	 way	 to	 guarantee	 additional	 local	
employment.	
Although	wasta	 is	 often	 conflated	 with	 corruption	 and	 bribery	 (and	 sometimes	
rightly	so),	it	is	not	always	viewed	in	negative	terms.	As	a	social	norm,	young	entrepreneurs	
look	for	ways	to	use	it	in	their	favour.	Young	men	in	particular	would	point	to	the	majlis	as	
remaining	very	central.	In	basic	terms,	the	majlis	is	“an	informal	social	gathering	of	men”	
held	on	a	regular	basis	in	a	special	room	(or	tent).79	There	is	a	variation	in	the	level	of	majlis	
formality,	 from	social	gathering	places	 to	more	 formal	ones	where	average	citizens	can	
                                                            
76 Ibid., 44. 
77 Hertog, “The Sociology of the Gulf Rentier Systems,” 283. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Herb, All in the Family, 41. 
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present	requests	or	complaints	to	important	members	of	society	and	government.80	Some	
young	 people	would	 tell	 stories	 of	 purposely	 scoping	 out	 particular	majalis	 (plural	 for	
majlis)	where	certain	prominent	business	men	were	rumoured	to	frequent.	Several	Qataris	
noted	that	the	“majlis	is	where	all	contracts	and	business	networking	takes	place.”81	It	is	
evolving	 though,	 some	 would	 note.	 Whereas	 in	 the	 last	 decade	 it	 was	 central	 to	 any	
business	endeavour,	the	format	of	the	majlis	is	evolving	with	business.	Some	young	people	
have	been	trying	to	replicate	the	networking	side	by	hosting	“modern”	majalis	at	trendy	
cafés.			
		 Naturally,	 wasta	 is	 viewed	 more	 negatively	 by	 those	 who	 lack	 access	 to	
advantageous	networks.	 In	 fact,	millennials	are	 increasingly	unhappy	with	bureaucratic	
systems	that	favour	“personal	connections	over	fairness.”82	This	sentiment	was	written	of	
Kuwait,	but	it	is	easily	applicable	to	any	Gulf	state.	When	one	is	not	the	beneficiary	of	wasta,	
the	sense	that	it	represents	the	only	way	to	get	things	done	and	bypass	arduous	regulations	
leaves	young	people	frustrated	and	disenfranchised.	“Bureaucracy	is	a	big	problem:	it	is	
supposed	 to	 take	one	day,	 but	 sometimes	 it	 takes	 two	 to	 four	weeks,”	 commented	one	
Omani	entrepreneur	of	basic	business	registration	paperwork.83	“The	start	up	process	is	
one	of	 the	most	complicated	 things,”	stated	a	Qatari	entrepreneur.84	Although	he	hailed	
from	one	of	the	large,	established	business	families,	he	found	the	bureaucratic	procedures	
long	and	tedious.	“The	steps,	the	time,	the	money	required	–	the	barriers	to	entry	are	quite	
                                                            
80 Ibid. The term majlis is also included in the institutionalized variety Majlis al‐Shura ‐ Consultative Council.  In 
Oman, there is the Majlis Oman, which is akin to a bicameral parliament, and houses the Majlis al‐Dawla or State 
Council and the elected body, the Majlis al‐Shura. 
81 Interviews with Qatari entrepreneurs, April 30, 2012. 
82 Elizabeth Dickinson, “Youth Take up Battle Against Bureaucracy in Kuwait,” The National, March 3, 2013, 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle‐east/youth‐take‐up‐battle‐against‐bureacracy‐in‐kuwait. 
83 Interview with entrepreneur, Muscat, Oman, October 16, 2011. 
84 Interview with entrepreneur, Doha, Qatar, May 3, 2012. 
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high.	You	know,	you	need	200,000	QR	just	to	register.	In	Dubai,	it	takes	one	day.	Here,	it	
takes	anywhere	from	two	weeks	to	two	months.”85	One	would	never	know	how	long	they	
might	have	to	wait	or	what	new	hoop	they	would	have	to	jump	through.	In	most	cases,	the	
requirement	 to	have	a	physical	 office	prior	 to	 registration	would	be	enforced,	 even	 for	
those	 starting	 training	 programmes	 or	 e‐commerce	 businesses	 that	 could	 easily	 be	
operated	from	home.	
Almost	 all	 millennial	 interviewees	 would	 bemoan	 the	 lack	 of	 information	 and	
transparency	of	regulations.	Rules	were	unclear	and,	it	seemed,	left	too	much	discretion	to	
front	 desk	 officers.	 It	 was	 not	 only	 entrepreneurs	 who	 complained,	 members	 of	 the	
bureaucracy	 also	 noted	 the	 unclear	 procedures	 leading	 to	 conflicting	 advice.86	 Several	
Qataris	remarked	that	front	desk	personnel	at	the	business	registration	desk	do	not	even	
know	 the	 rules.	 Those	who	had	no	 complaints	 readily	 admitted	 “knowing	people”	who	
would	 “take	 care	of”	what	 seemed	 to	 them	an	easy	process.87	These	 complaints	prevail	
despite	 the	alleged	efforts	of	 various	government	bodies	at	 streamlining	processes	and	
raising	awareness.	
As	 noted	 in	 the	 last	 chapter,	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 political	 disconnect	 from	 the	
realities	 of	 engaging	 in	 entrepreneurship	 and	 the	day‐to‐day	difficulties	 of	 setting	up	 a	
business.	 This	 has	 led	many	 to	 feel	 as	 though	 they	 are	 caught	 in	 a	web	 of	 entrenched	
government	 and	 elite	 business	 interests	 and	 swimming	 upstream	 against	 the	 strong,	
privileged	monopolies.	With	particular	families	controlling	each	sector,	it	is	difficult	for	a	
                                                            
85 Ibid. 
86 Interviews with an official at the Ministry of Business and Trade, Doha, Qatar, February 15, 2012 and officials 
at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Muscat, Oman, October 25, 2011. 
87 Interviews with entrepreneurs and aspiring entrepreneurs in Oman and Qatar, September 2011 to July 2012. 
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new	 entrant	 to	 break	 into	 a	 market.	 Bureaucratic	 delays	 and	 complicated	 procedures	
further	impede	business	hopefuls.	Without	addressing	these	difficulties,	the	state’s	efforts	
to	push	millennials	toward	entrepreneurship	only	to	be	wedged	between	a	fight	for	space	
in	local	monopolized	market	segments	and	competition	against	international	companies	
and	brands	must	be	questioned.	
Likewise,	commercial	agency	regulations	compel	foreign	companies	to	sell	through	
local	companies.88	The	rationale	is	ensuring	local	representation,	a	form	of	nationalizing	
the	 market	 and	 creating	 another	 type	 of	 intermediary.	 By	 granting	 exclusive	 agency	
licensing	 to	certain	 family	businesses	however,	 this	practice	has	additionally	privileged	
these	 organizations	 to	 the	 disadvantage	 of	 new	 SMEs.	 It	 further	 perpetuates	 a	 system	
whereby	 it	 is	 both	 easier	 and	 more	 immediately	 lucrative	 to	 serve	 as	 an	 agent	 of	 an	
international	brand	than	develop	a	local,	innovative	one.	The	perpetuation	of	this	form	of	
rent	 seeking	 and	 the	 facilitation	 of	 various	 types	 of	 intermediary	 practices	 like	 the	
government	relations	officer	propels	the	current	organization	of	the	market	and	increases	
rigidity	to	attempts	at	change.	“Today,	[the	government]	is	trying	to	ease	it,	but	they	are	
still	 miles	 away,”	 remarked	 an	 entrepreneur	 with	 regard	 to	 recent	 entrepreneurship	
promotion	 efforts	 in	 Qatar.	 “The	 changes	 are	 only	 on	 paper	 now.	 I	 don’t	 see	 any	 real	
outcomes	to	all	the	discussions.	The	will	is	there	and	the	people	are	there,	but	it	is	not	yet	
established.	 Nothing	 is	 happening	 in	 reality.	 Ask	 anyone	 on	 the	 street,	 what	 does	
Enterprise	Qatar	do?	No	one	knows.	Really,	they	probably	don’t	either.”89	
                                                            
88 Hertog, “The Sociology of the Gulf Rentier Systems,” 294. 
89 Interview with entrepreneur, Doha, Qatar, May 3, 2012. 
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It	is	clear	that	the	practice	of	economic	life	also	contributes	to	the	combination	of	
challenges	confronting	millennial	entrepreneurs.	What	is	particularly	problematic	is	that	
these	 practices	 are	 not	 simply	 cultural	 norms,	 but	 have	 become	 embedded	 with	 the	
mechanisms	 of	 government.	 This	makes	 it	 especially	 difficult	 to	 change	 and	move	 the	
promotion	 of	 entrepreneurship,	 and	 private	 sector	 reform	 more	 broadly,	 beyond	 the	
language	of	government.	As	it	stands,	the	availability	of	state	employment	and	unfriendly	
environment	 reduces	 the	 drive	 toward	 innovative	 business	 ideas.	 Millennials	 become	
frustrated,	 opt	 for	 the	 security	 of	 a	 government	 job	 if	 available,	 or	 succumb	 to	 family	
pressure.			
	
8. Entrepreneurship:	Female	and	Family	Dynamics	
Along	with	 socio‐economic	 practices,	 socio‐cultural	 expectations	 can	 also	 prove	
challenging	to	entrepreneurs.	Familial	and	societal	norms	and	expectations	play	a	role	in	
the	lives	of	those	who	wish	to	engage	in	entrepreneurship.	Although,	as	one	would	expect	
anywhere,	 the	 role	 can	 be	 positive,	 the	 pressures	 are	 often	 difficult.	 Young	 female	
entrepreneurs	in	particular	find	these	to	be	an	additional	hurdle	to	overcome.	In	spite	of	
this,	 entrepreneurship	 is	 becoming	 increasingly	 popular	 among	 young	 Gulf	 women.	
Millennial	entrepreneurs,	and	women	 in	particular,	are	often	confronted	by	both	socio‐
cultural	norms	that	frown	on	their	independent	business	aspirations	and	fear	of	family	or	
societal	reaction	to	potential	failure.	
Most	entrepreneurship	initiatives	in	both	Oman	and	Qatar	point	out,	with	a	mixture	
of	 surprise	 and	 pride,	 that	 a	majority	 of	 their	 clientele	 are	 women.	 In	 fact,	 they	 often	
suggest	that	not	only	are	women	better	prepared,	more	detail‐oriented	in	their	business	
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and	 financial	 planning,	 but	 that	 they	 achieve	 success	 more	 often	 than	 their	 male	
counterparts.	This	should	not	be	particularly	surprising.	Attitudes	toward	women	working	
in	 the	 Gulf	 have	 been	 evolving	 for	 some	 time.	 According	 to	 one	 survey,	 monetary	
independence,	a	sense	of	achievement,	and	ambition	are	among	the	strongest	reasons	Gulf	
women	 choose	 to	 work.90	 These	 attitudes	 are	 reflected	 in	 rising	 female	 labour	 force	
participation	rates	in	Oman	and	Qatar.	These	rose	from	17	percent	in	1990	to	27	percent	
in	2010	in	Oman.	In	Qatar,	female	labour	market	participation	increased	sharply	from	14	
percent	in	1986	to	52	percent	in	2010.91		
As	well,	micro‐businesses	 are	 becoming	 a	 popular	 choice	 for	women	 from	 low‐
income	 families,	 those	 who	 live	 in	 conservative	 households,	 and	 divorcés.92	 By	 most	
standards,	 few	 women	 in	 Qatar	 are	 needy.	 Despite	 this,	 divorced	 women	 comprise	 a	
segment	 of	 the	 Qatari	 population	 that	 especially	 benefits	 from	 entrepreneurship	
initiatives.	 In	 a	 still	 heavily	 patriarchal	 society,	 women	 rarely	 remarry	 and	 micro‐
entrepreneurship	 becomes	 an	 attractive	 venue	 for	 economic	 independence.93	 Oman	 is	
beginning	 to	 adjust	 to	 this	 reality,	 recently	 allowing	 certain	 types	 of	micro‐businesses	
permission	to	operate	from	the	home.	Although	this	ruling	is	not	female‐specific,	it	targets	
micro‐enterprises	primarily	associated	with	women	in	the	country.94	Qatar,	on	the	other	
                                                            
90 The Rising Ranks of Women in the Middle East Workplace (Bayt.com and Yougosiraj, April 2007), 14, 
http://www.bayt.com/en/research‐report‐1661/. 
91 Labor Participation Rate, Female (% of Female Population Ages 15+) (The World Bank), accessed March 29, 
2013, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS; Felder and Vuollo, Qatari Women in the 
Workforce, 11. 
92 Repeated in focus groups and interviews with initiative directors and workers across both cases, September 
2011‐July 2012.  
93Interview with faculty at the College of the North Atlantic – Qatar, April 11, 2012, and Qatar Information 
Exchange Database. 
94 Mahmoud Al‐Riyami, “Omanis Can Operate Businesses from Home: MOCI,” Muscat Daily, May 2, 2011, 
http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Stories‐Files/Omanis‐can‐operate‐businesses‐from‐home‐MOCI. 
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hand,	has	not	made	the	shift.	Entrepreneurs	and	support	organizations	were	highly	critical	
of	 this	 lack	of	responsiveness.	“How	are	you	pushing	for	entrepreneurship	but	then	not	
allowing	 people	 to	 open	 a	 business	 from	 home?	 If	 you	 continue	 having	 high	 capital	
requirements	 and	 demand	 only	 certain	 types	 of	 businesses,	 it	 only	 becomes	 an	 elite	
project.”95	Individuals	within	the	Social	Development	Centre	and	the	Roudha	Centre	have	
been	putting	forward	proposals	to	change	the	regulatory	environment	in	favour	of	small	
home	business.		
Young	millennial	women	have	new	expectations	for	themselves,	and	these	transfer	
into	their	entrepreneurial	ambitions.	As	mentioned	earlier,	the	young	have	an	increasing	
desire	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 regional	 change	 narrative.	 This	 is	 combined	 with	 the	
aforementioned	 desire	 to	 for	 economic	 independence	 and	 freedom.	 From	 high	 school	
students	to	college	graduates	to	women	in	their	early‐career	stages,	every	young	female	
entrepreneur	interviewed	pointed	to	an	aspiration	for	freedom	as	a	primary	driver	toward	
entrepreneurship	and	self‐employment.	In	Qatar,	many	pointed	to	the	Emir’s	wife,	Sheikha	
Moza	as	a	strong	role	model.		
I’ve	been	working	for	12	years.	Before	2000,	it	was	rare	to	find	women	interactive	
in	business	or	women	in	the	business	environment.	Now	you	find	it	all	over.	Society	
and	business	has	become	more	open.	I	think	this	is	primarily	because	of	Sheikha	
Moza	–	she	is	a	great	role	model	for	working	women.	She	works	hard,	for	long	hours.	
I	 came	 in	 contact	 with	 her	 several	 times.	 She	 was	 really	 involved	 and	working	
hard.96			
	
The	same	sentiment	was	repeated	time	and	time	again.	Many	felt	that,	despite	criticism	she	
may	 receive	 in	 private	 for	 her	 domination	 of	 certain	 sectors	 and	 activities,	 she	 was	
                                                            
95 Interview with Qatari entrepreneur, Doha, Qatar, May 3, 2011. 
96 Interview with female Qatari entrepreneur, May 7, 2012. 
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transforming	norms	in	the	country	concerning	accepted	and	appropriate	behaviours	for	
Qatari	women.		
Legally,	 there	 are	 no	 constraints	 on	 women	 registering	 businesses	 in	 Oman	 or	
Qatar.	Culturally,	however,	can	be	another	story.	This	is	particularly	true	of	rural	Oman	and	
common	 throughout	 much	 of	 Doha.	 Several	 women	 noted	 the	 surprise	 they	 saw	 in	
expressions	as	they	registered	their	business	at	the	Ministry.	Others	noted	their	discomfort	
at	being	 in	such	heavily	male‐dominated	spaces.	Even	young	social	entrepreneurs	were	
greeted	with	cultural	challenges.	“We	are	facing	some	social	problems,”	noted	one	team.	
“People	 have	 spoken	 ill	 of	 us	 and	 our	 goal,	 speaking	 about	 our	 dream	 to	 work	
independently…	But	we	do	not	mind.	We	also	have	a	lot	of	support.”97	Social	initiatives	in	
particular	 came	 under	 pressure.	 Societal	 concerns	 around	 “the	 mixing	 of	 genders”	 in	
volunteer	activities	were	often	the	subject.	Although	they	continued	to	push	boundaries,	
many	responded	by	ensuring	some	degree	of	gender	segregation	in	their	activities.	The	
sheer	volume	of	young	people	engaging	in	the	initiatives	young	Qataris,	often	women,	have	
initiated	 is	 evidence	of	 change.	 In	 focus	groups,	 entrepreneurial	meetings,	 and	 in	 these	
volunteer	 organizations	 and	 events,	 discussions	pushing	 against	 gender	norms	and	 the	
boundaries	 of	 the	 acceptable	 for	 both	women	 and	 youth	were	 regularly	 discussed	 and	
challenged.		
This	 is	 no	 small	 change.	 As	 in	many	Middle	 Eastern	 societies,	 the	 family	 unit	 is	
central	and	of	critical	importance	to	social	relations.98	For	several	decades,	Gulf	women	in	
particular	have	faced	a	contradictory	environment	reflective	of	other	changes	occurring	in	
                                                            
97 Interview with Qatari entrepreneurs, April 22, 2012. 
98 Khalid Al‐Azri, “Change and Conflict in Contemporary Omani Society: The Case of Kafa’a in Marriage,” British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 2 (2010): 137, doi:10.1080/13530191003794707. 
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the	 region.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 governments	 have	 encouraged	 literacy,	 education,	 and	
bureaucratic	environments	amenable	to	female	progress.	At	the	same	time,	however,	they	
“fostered	sociocultural	climates	that	were	hostile	to	women	fulfilling	the	roles	for	which	
they	were	trained.”99	The	oil	state,	in	fact,	‘liberated’	society	from	the	financial	imperative	
for	women	to	work.	So,	at	the	same	time	as	women	became	better	educated	and	equipped	
for	the	labour	market,	there	were	countervailing	cultural	forces	encouraging	their	return	
to	the	home	in	the	role	of	mother	and	wife.100	Many	of	these	pressures	continue	to	exist.	A	
recent	study	found	that	59	percent	of	young	Gulf	men	think	that	the	primary	role	of	women	
in	society	is	to	be	a	wife	and	mother,	with	only	22	percent	of	young	women	in	agreement.101	
That	 these	 roles	 are	 being	 increasingly	 challenged,	 and	 that	 millennial	 women	 are	
emerging	 as	 strong	 participants	 in	 entrepreneurship,	 holding	more	 advanced	 levels	 of	
education	and	more	willing	to	work	in	non‐traditional	occupations	than	men,	is	of	socio‐
cultural	and	economic	significance.102		
The	 desire	 to	 please	 family	 is	 still	 paramount	 though.	 This	 contributes	 to	 the	
lingering,	if	latent,	risk	aversion	of	the	earlier	generation.	It	is	not	specifically	the	fear	of	
failure,	 one	 interviewee	 noted,	 but	 the	 “fear	 of	 being	 judged.	 It	 is	 about	 how	 I	 will	
appear.”103	 The	 common	 term	 fasheltna	 best	 encapsulates	 this	 sentiment.	Derived	 from	
fashel,	the	word	for	failure,	it	is	used	to	say	“you	have	made	us	look	bad,”	but	means	“you	
are	making	us	failures.”	This	interviewee	continued,	“We	are	creating	a	generation	that	is	
                                                            
99 Foley, The Arab Gulf States, 181. 
100 Ibid., 180–184. 
101 Mona Almunajjed and Karim Sabbagh, Youth in GCC Countries: Meeting the Challenge (Booze & Company, 
2011), 39, http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/BoozCo‐GCC‐Youth‐Challenge.pdf. 
102 See, for example, Chapter 5, “When Only Women Will Work,” in Foley, The Arab Gulf States, 167–210. 
103 Interview with entrepreneur, Doha, Qatar, May 3, 2012. 
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afraid	of	being	judged…	It	is	all	about	what	people	are	going	to	say	about	you.	So	it	becomes	
about	trying	to	control	what	is	around	them	to	try	to	impress	others	rather	than	express	
themselves.	And	this	also	applies	to	starting	a	new	business.	So	unfortunately,	it	is	not	only	
about	policies,	 it	 is	about	our	culture.”104	Young	entrepreneurs	 repeatedly	brought	up	a	
desire	to	not	disappoint	their	family.	
	 Many	 millennials	 do	 face	 a	 difficult	 time	 trying	 to	 overcome	 their	 family	
expectations.	Often	 these	expectations	 come	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	push	 to	 take	a	 traditional	
government	 job	 rather	 than	 risk	 going	 out	 on	 your	 own.	 For	 women,	 it	 is	 often	 this	
combined	with	 pressure	 for	more	 ‘female	 appropriate’	 business	 activities.	 There	 were	
frequent	mentions	of	family	pressure	to	not	quit	jobs	and	risk	going	into	business	full	time,	
which	 naturally	 perpetuates	 the	 practice	 of	 hobby	 entrepreneurship	 and	 stifles	 the	
innovation	a	full‐time	commitment	inspires.	Others	face	dismay	from	an	older	generation,	
still	reminiscent	of	days	past	and	grateful	for	the	development	changes	witnessed	in	their	
lifetime.		
The	new	generation	are	forgetting	their	fathers.	They	do	not	want	to	learn	from	the	
earlier	generations	and	think	themselves	better	because	of	their	education	or	their	
modern	thinking.	The	new	generation,	yes,	 they	are	more	serious	with	work	but	
they	have	no	experience	and	want	 to	make	projects	with	 their	 study	only.	Book	
learning	is	different	from	life	…	They	are	asking	heavy	questions	and	making	heavy	
requirements	 on	 the	budget	which	 is	 not	healthy.	They	want	 increased	 salaries,	
than	 what	 of	 the	 roads?	 Health	 care?	 They	 should	 support	 the	 government	 to	
support	their	future	and	their	families’	future.	They	cannot	eat	everything	and	have	
everything.105	
	
Moving	beyond	 the	 concerns	of	 embedded	patrimonialism	and	government	 loyalty,	 the	
young	generation	has	mixed	expectations.	They	desire	both	freedom	and	facilities.	These	
                                                            
104 Ibid 
105 Interview with business man, Muscat, Oman, January 8, 2012. 
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discussions	“suggest	both	an	awareness	of	tensions	between	traditional	culture	and	social	
and	economic	development	and	an	appetite	for	cultural	renewal	and	genuine	reform.”106	It	
is	a	new,	daunting	mix	for	the	government	to	respond	to.	With	the	state’s	ready	support	of	
entrepreneurship,	one	could	argue	that	it	is	partly	of	its	own	making.		
	
9. The	Folly	of	a	Consumption	Economy	
One	 of	 the	 remaining	 trials	 confronting	 millennial	 entrepreneurs	 is	 the	 trap	 of	
consumption.	If	the	Gulf	economy	has	been	shifting	anywhere	in	the	last	decade	or	two,	it	
is	 toward	 a	 consumption	 economy	 rather	 than	 a	 productive	 one.	 Luciani’s	 useful	
dichotomy	of	productive	versus	allocative	states	now	needs	the	addition	of	consumption	
economy,	where	a	state	dedicates	more	resources	to	both	distribution	and	consumption	
than	production.107	Indeed,	the	expansion	of	the	retail	space	in	all	Gulf	states	in	the	recent	
past	is	remarkable.		If	the	size	of	the	new	malls	is	any	indication,	these	states	have	opted	
into	the	flash	of	the	Western	model	–	another	form	of	capitalism	and	consumerism.		
Aside	from	the	obvious	lack	of	movement	into	the	production	space,	innovation	is	
particularly	challenged	by	the	consumption	economy.	In	fact,	a	good	portion	of	the	micro	
and	small	enterprises	young	people	initiate	feed	into	cycles	of	consumerism	rather	than	
innovation.	 The	 sale	 of	 cupcakes,	 decorative	 chocolate	 products,	 and	 self‐embroidered	
fashion	items	are	all	popular	business	items.108	Young	people,	and	women	in	particular,	
                                                            
106 Al‐Azri, “Change and Conflict in Contemporary Omani Society,” 137. 
107 See Luciani in Beblawi and Luciani, The Rentier State. 
108 Interviews with entrepreneurs, aspiring entrepreneurs, and initiative workers and directors. Oman and Qatar. 
September 2011 – July 2012.  
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facing	 the	 prospect	 of	 unemployment	 turn	 to	 simple,	 trendy	 consumables.109	 It	 is	 less	
surprising	 when	 considering	 statistics	 on	 female	 unemployment.	 With	 youth	
unemployment	 already	 high	 in	 the	 Gulf,	 female	 unemployment	 is	 even	 higher	 than	
males.110	It	readily	becomes	“all	too	all	too	easy	to	succumb	to	the	temptation	of	catering	
to	the	population's	excessive	tendency	to	consume	as	opposed	to	engaging	in	innovative	
entrepreneurship	with	an	exportable	added	value.”111	 	One	interviewee	mused,	“Look	at	
how	easy	 it	 is	 to	 take	a	 loan	 to	get	a	 car	and	compare	 it	 to	how	difficult	 it	 is	 to	 start	a	
business.	 It	 shows	you	how	much	we	are	pushing	 society	 to	be	 consumers	 rather	 than	
producers.”112	 Even	 in	 light	 of	 all	 the	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 promotion	 and	
support,	 governments	 are	 stimulating	 consumption	 rather	 than	 innovation	 and	
production.		
	 While	today’s	generation	may	have	to	fight	the	lure	of	consumption,	it	is	in	reality	
only	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 common	 traps	 which	 began	 in	 earlier	 years.	 These	 include	
contracting	as	well	as	asset	bubbles	like	property	and	equities.	They	are	again	part	and	
parcel	 of	 the	 broader	 distributive	 ailments	 of	 a	 rentier	 economy,	 where	 circulating	
petroleum	 revenue	 through	 the	 economy	 is	 more	 compelling	 than	 innovating.	 These	
categories	of	work	provide	swift	income	for	little	effort.	In	the	case	of	property	bubbles,	
Dubai	may	have	learned	the	hard	way	but	it	is	still	unclear	if	the	region	has	observed	the	
lessons.	A	small	contracting	business	was	long	the	default	business	model.	With	work	and	
management	often	left	to	expatriates,	local	owners	would	earn	income	based	on	contracts	
                                                            
109 Hasan Tariq Alhasan, “The Gulf’s Cupcake Entrepreneurs,” The Guardian, October 3, 2012, sec. Comment is 
free, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/03/gulf‐cupcake‐entrepreneurs. 
110 Almunajjed and Sabbagh, Youth in GCC Countries: Meeting the Challenge, 41. 
111 Alhasan, “The Gulf’s Cupcake Entrepreneurs.” 
112 Interview with entrepreneur, Doha, Qatar, May 3, 2012. 
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from	sectors	like	construction.	As	discussed	earlier,	the	merchant	classes	benefited	from	
an	 inexpensive,	 flexible,	 imported	 labour	class	as	well	as	 little	 to	no	 taxation.	The	mass	
development	of	malls	is	an	extension	of	this	trend	and	comprises	“an	important	part	of	the	
formation	of	the	Gulf	capitalist	class	around	the	commodity	circuit.”113	The	same	large	Gulf	
conglomerates	that	are	active	in	contracting	and	serve	as	agents	of	foreign	companies	or	
owners	of	hypermarkets	are	the	owners	of	the	ever‐expanding	numbers	of	malls.114	Real	
estate	companies,	often	state‐owned	or	public‐private	partnerships,	also	play	a	significant	
role	in	the	growth	of	the	mall/retail	model.	The	shift	to	or	expansion	of	consumption	then,	
is	an	outgrowth	of	earlier	traps	and	suffers	from	similar	path	dependencies.		
Investing	in	equities	may	also	be	risky,	but	the	work‐reward	scale	provides	a	strong	
enough	incentive.	The	commodities	market	exchange	in	the	region	is	big	business,	and	part	
of	a	broader	financialization	of	the	Gulf.	As	Samer	Abboud	demonstrates,	Gulf	states	have	
been	 rather	 successful	 in	 developing	 a	 financial	 service	 sector,	 which	 is	 particularly	
appealing	because	of	its	substantial	value‐added	activities	and	its	complementarity	with	
the	 organization	 of	 resource‐driven	 economies.115	 Indeed,	 there	 exists	 a	 deeply	
contradictory	regulatory	environment	where	the	state	is	encouraging	entrepreneurship	on	
the	one	hand	while	still	making	other	wealth‐generating	activities	easier	 to	engage.	For	
example,	it	is	simpler	to	be	a	51	percent	owner	of	a	company	operating	in	a	silent	partner	
capacity	and	earn	income	from	someone	else’s	business.	Likewise,	it	is	easier	to	consume	
                                                            
113 Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States, 131. 
114 Ibid. 
115 See Samer Abboud, “Oil and Financialization in the Gulf Cooperation Council,” in Legrenzi and Momani, 
Shifting Geo‐economic Power of the Gulf, 91–107. 
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than	 be	 innovative	 and	 produce.	 In	 this	 context,	 then,	 society	 becomes	 adept	 at	 the	
consumption	of	both	products	and	ideas.		
In	 fact,	 the	ease	with	which	a	consumption‐based	economy	latched	onto	existing	
allocative	 patterns	 of	 rent	 recycling	 lends	 to	 an	 argument	 of	 how	 neoliberal	 growth	
complements	 the	 authoritarian	 nature	 of	 rentier	 states.	 Michelle	 Buckley	 makes	 a	
convincing	 case	 that	 among	 the	 central	 aims	 of	 “neoliberal	 urban	 policies”	 is	 the	
marshalling	of	urban	space	into	an	“an	arena	both	for	market‐led	economic	growth	and	
elite	 consumption	while	 securing	order	and	control	amongst	marginalized	groups.”116	A	
cynical	 reading	 would	 suggest	 that	 fostering	 consumption‐based	 businesses,	 even	 if	 it	
clashes	with	larger	aims	of	building	a	knowledge	economy,	may	not	directly	contravene	
the	state’s	political	survival	aims.	Whatever	the	case	may	be,	the	path	toward	innovation	is	
of	high	resistance	and	comprises	an	admittedly	weak	case	in	contrast	to	the	incentive	to	
consume	and	rent	seek.		
	
10. Conclusion	
Private	sector	reform,	and	the	promotion	of	entrepreneurialism,	cannot	be	resigned	
to	language	only.	More	specifically,	it	cannot	be	implemented	in	a	way	that	only	serves	to	
find	a	means	 to	extend	or	retool	rentierism	so	as	 to	 fortify	 the	state’s	position	vis‐à‐vis	
business	 and	 society.	 It	 has	 to	 be	 developed	 in	 a	way	 that	 actually	 allows	 business	 to	
succeed	autonomously,	and	encourages	innovative	activities	rather	than	only	commercial	
ones.	 As	 it	 stands,	 the	 promotion	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 in	 the	 Gulf	 is	
                                                            
116 Michelle Buckley, “Locating Neoliberalism in Dubai: Migrant Workers and Class Struggle in the Autocratic 
City,” Antipode (2012): 7, doi:10.1111/j.1467‐8330.2012.01002.x. 
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confronted	by	significant	structural	obstacles.	If	the	ad	hoc	policy	making	is	any	indication,	
governments	seem	stuck	between	a	rock	and	a	hard	place.	They	may	genuinely	desire	to	
foster	a	vibrant	entrepreneurial	class,	or	at	least	like	the	way	it	sounds	in	policy	memos	
and	status	reports,	but	at	the	same	time	need	to	secure	their	own	position	with	respect	to	
society.	The	distributive	networks,	patterns	of	bestowing	favouritism,	and	co‐option	have	
been	serving	leaders	well	over	the	past	four	decades.	Reframing	the	status	quo,	even	if	only	
at	the	economic	level,	will	entail	significant	costs	to	governance	mechanisms.	Exploiting	
entrepreneurship	promotion	as	a	new	mode	of	state	patronage	is	both	more	appealing	and	
less	demanding	than	the	structural	change.	Yet	the	promise	of	entrepreneurship	seems	to	
have	 resonated	 with	 some	 of	 the	 millennial	 generation.	 The	 hope	 of	 freedom	 and	
independence	combined	with	the	expectation	for	government	support	and	services	may	
further	 destabilize	 an	 already	 questionable	 social	 contract.	 Entrepreneurship	 may	 not	
ultimately	be	the	economic	elixir	some	have	hoped,	but	its	promotion	will	likely	have	wider	
reaching	and	unintended	consequences.		
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Chapter	5	
	
Conclusion:	The	Paradox	of	Entrepreneurship	Promotion	in	Gulf	
Economies	
	
	
	
1. Introduction		
The	explosion	of	a	new	policy	agenda	promoting	entrepreneurship	across	the	Gulf	
Cooperation	Council	is	as	palpable	as	it	may	seem	peculiar.	Despite	a	claim	of	responding	
to	 crucial	 regional	 challenges	of	 economic	diversification	and	 the	weak	participation	of	
nationals	 in	 the	private	 sector,	 entrepreneurship	as	a	key	 component	of	each	country’s	
quest	for	a	knowledge	economy	seems	paradoxical	in	its	ostensible	inconsistency	with	the	
Gulf	rentier	status	quo.	In	response,	through	the	insights	acquired	through	in‐depth	case	
studies	on	Oman	and	Qatar,	this	research	provides	an	explanation	of	the	motivation	for	this	
policy	move	and	posits	on	its	role	in	impacting	the	Gulf	social	contract.		
The	examination	of	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion	in	the	Gulf	is	also	
an	examination	of	transition.	It	is	an	incredibly	policy	rich	story	which	provides	scholars	
and	policy	makers	alike	a	window	into	the	saga	of	development	during	a	time	of	transition	
and	rapid	transformation.	 	It	also	speaks	to	particular	theoretical	insights	scholars	have	
garnered	from	the	examination	of	hydrocarbon‐dependent	economies	and	their	political	
and	economic	development	trajectories.	This	dissertation,	then,	has	traced	an	interval	in	
the	development	paths	of	the	Gulf	states	through	an	exploration	of	these	policy	moves.		
This	conclusion	serves	two	purposes.	First,	it	offers	an	overview	of	the	theoretical	
insights	this	project	provides	to	the	re‐evaluation	of	rentier	state	literature.	Throughout	
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this	chapter,	the	discussion	points	to	the	contributions	of	the	research	to	broad	debates	on	
the	role	of	the	state	and	the	market,	and	the	role	of	rentierism	on	Gulf	governance.	Second,	
it	address	how	this	dissertation	unlocks	a	specific	policy	debate	occurring	in	the	region	and	
at	 the	margins	of	policy	 and	 consultancy	 circles;	 that	 is	 on	 the	 role	 and	 the	benefits	of	
entrepreneurship,	innovation,	and	specifically	SME	support.	After	addressing	this	level	of	
analysis	and	connecting	the	core	insights	of	the	dissertation,	this	conclusion	ends	with	a	
discussion	of	specific	interventions	and	alternative	policy	recommendations.			
	
2. Tales	of	Transition	
This	 dissertation	 answers	 two	 broad	 questions	 on	 the	 phenomenon	 of	
entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion	in	the	GCC	countries.	The	first	asks	about	the	
character	and	motivation	of	these	strategies	in	the	Gulf,	and	what	such	reveals	about	the	
evolution	of	policy	making	practices.	The	second	asks	about	the	role	of	the	millennials	and	
regional	 transformation.	 These	 questions	 encompass	 a	 broader	 set	 of	 subsidiary	 ones	
concerning	 the	 role	 of	 innovation,	 entrepreneurship,	 youth	 and	 ideational	 change,	
authoritarian	 government,	 and	 political	 and	 economic	 reform.	 The	 answers	 have	 been	
explored	in	some	detail	in	the	third	and	fourth	chapters.		
Unlike	the	story	of	transition	in	other	emerging	economies,	the	desired	transition	
of	 the	Gulf	 states	 from	hydrocarbon‐dependent	 economies	 to	 knowledge‐based	 ones	 is	
shaped	by	rather	anomalous	conditions.	The	dependence	of	the	economy	on	hydrocarbons	
on	 the	one	hand	and	 the	deeply	 ensconced	 segmented	 labour	market	 on	 the	other	has	
created	an	unusually	distorted	economic	environment	and	an	insidious	set	of	challenges	
which	 affect	 all	 development	 choices.	 Entrepreneurship	 promotion	 is	 no	 exception.	
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Although	 the	 state’s	 entrepreneurship	 push	 encapsulates	 a	 desire	 to	 respond	 to	 these	
problems,	it	is	simultaneously	constrained	by	them.		
With	development	being	primarily	state‐led	and	the	 line	between	the	public	and	
private	 sector	 opaque,	 it	 is	 no	 surprise	 that	GCC	 countries	 are	not	 strangers	 to	market	
intervention.	 A	 history	 of	 preparing	 development	 strategies	 and	 plans,	 each	 with	 an	
emphasis	 on	 a	 particular	 developmental	 focus	 from	 infrastructure	 to	 human	 capital	
development,	has	generated	a	set	of	expertise	and	a	history	of	networking	with	 foreign	
specialists.	The	recent	push	for	a	transition	to	knowledge	economy	through	the	focus	on	
entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 has	 manifested	 in	 all	 six	 GCC	 countries	 and	 is	
accompanied	by	an	apparent	fervency	expressed	through	media	outlets	and	government	
announcements.		
Previous	attempts	to	diversify	 the	economic	base	and	reduce	reliance	on	foreign	
labour	have	met	limited	success.	The	promotion	of	SMEs	may	hold	promise,	but	it	may	also	
not	be	much	different.	Indeed,	the	constraints	and	contradictions	explored	throughout	this	
dissertation	have	illustrated	the	difficulties	encountered	in	this	process.	 	 It	seems	Qatar	
expects	quick	transformation,	as	it	has	grown	used	to	swift	change	given	its	propensity	to	
dedicate	 vast	 financial	 resources	 to	 new	 projects.	 Even	 without	 heavy	 resource	
dependence,	the	shift	to	innovation‐driven	knowledge	economies	took	over	twenty	years	
in	 the	 East	 Asian	 cases	 known	 for	 their	 rapid	 industrial	 transformation.1	 Structural	
impediments	in	the	Gulf	will	make	effective	rapidity	difficult	and	unlikely.		
                                                            
1 Robert Wade, Governing the Market : Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 3–5; Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 
2012‐2013. 
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Throughout	this	work,	I	have	argued	that	Gulf	governments	are	utilizing	a	revised	
rentierism,	 a	 2.0	 version	 if	 you	will,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 both	 respond	 to	 pressing	 socio‐
economic	needs	whilst	simultaneously	securing	their	own	position	vis‐à‐vis	society.	This	
revised	rentierism	is	not	the	classic	rentierism	so	clearly	typified	in	the	literature.	Although	
it	draws	on	a	similar	playbook,	it	has	had	to	undergo	a	strategic	revision.	It	is	a	deceptive	
revision	 which,	 as	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 two,	 incorporates	 many	 of	 the	 behaviours	 and	
practices	of	developmental	states.	Yet,	as	I	argue	throughout	the	dissertation,	continues	to	
be	plagued	by	path	dependencies	resulting	from	hydrocarbon	dependence	and	how	this	
has	structured	the	underlying	economic	system.		
Whereas	economic	well‐being	and	 the	employment	of	Gulf	 citizens	has	been	 the	
purview	 of	 the	 state,	 the	 demographic	 imbalances	 and	 changing	 economic	 conditions	
discussed	throughout	this	thesis	are	challenging	this	status	quo.	In	some	cases,	economic	
constraints	mean	it	 is	difficult	 to	rely	substantially	on	the	state	purse	to	solve	domestic	
concerns.	 In	 other	 cases,	 where	 additional	 wealth	 distribution	 alone	 would	 seem	 a	
sufficient	solution,	the	state	still	finds	it	necessary	to	respond	to	both	social	concerns	and	
international	 pressure.	 Involving	 the	 private	 sector	 in	 the	 restructuring	 of	 economic	
opportunities	available	to	the	citizen	population	has	become	an	essential	ingredient.	This	
is	enormously	difficult	in	the	Gulf	states	because	of	existing	networks	of	privilege	and	the	
cost	 disparity	 present	 in	 the	 segmented	 labour	 market.	 The	 hope	 is	 that	 encouraging	
indigenously	 created	 and	 operated	 small	 and	 medium	 enterprises	 will	 be	 the	 key	 to	
shifting	 more	 nationals	 into	 the	 private	 sector.	 In	 the	 recent	 past,	 other	 emerging	
economies	found	that	they	“could	not	easily	combine	the	promotion	of	local	capital	with	
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the	realities	of	deep	reliance	on	transnational	capital.”2	The	Gulf	too	is	experiencing	this	
same	 dilemma.	 The	 requirement	 of	 transnational	 capital	 combined	 with	 the	
monopolization	of	local	markets	by	domestic,	privileged	capital	and	the	reliance	on	foreign	
labour	is	all	the	more	complicating.		
	
3. Multilevel	Motivations	and	Politics			
The	 state	 continues	 to	 hold	 the	 developmental	 reigns,	 and	 make	 the	 calls	 on	
direction	 and	 reform.	 Indeed,	 regardless	 of	 wealth	 levels	 and	 hydrocarbon	 reserve	
longevity,	it	is	the	nexus	of	domestic,	regional,	and	global	pressures	which	converge	as	the	
motivational	force	behind	the	shift	to	pursuing	a	knowledge‐based	economy.	Although	the	
specific	recipe	varies	the	quantities	between	cases,	those	three	levels	contain	the	necessary	
ingredients.		
The	 case	 studies	 have	demonstrated	 that	 despite	 the	 differences	 between	 them,	
both	Oman	and	Qatar	have	chosen	the	active	pursuit	of	entrepreneurship	promotion	as	a	
key	policy	 shift.	Although	 the	 evident	path	dependency	 in	both	 case	 studies	 suggests	 a	
particular	 causal	 path,	 there	 is	 some	 variance	 in	 the	 combinations	 of	 factors.	 The	
motivations	of	such	a	move	evolve	from	multiple	levels,	local,	regional,	and	global.	At	the	
local	level,	demographic	challenges	are	a	key	pressure	point.	The	presence	of	a	large	youth	
bulge	combined	with	a	widening	disparity	between	the	numbers	of	expatriates	and	citizens	
all	have	particular	labour	market	repercussions.		With	declining	hydrocarbon	reserves	and	
growing	unemployment,	 the	economic	 imperative	 is	stronger	 in	Oman.	Qatar’s	 financial	
cushion	allows	it	additional	flexibility	and	time	to	respond	to	the	economic	concerns	posed	
                                                            
2 Evans, Embedded Autonomy, 127. 
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by	these	dual	demographic	imbalances.		Social	and	cultural	concerns,	however,	are	not	as	
easily	addressed	by	financial	resources.	In	both	cases,	concerns	over	culture	and	heritage	
deterioration	are	widespread	and	can	be	expected	to	grow.	Moreover,	and	arguably	more	
significant	at	this	stage,	the	millennial	generation	brings	a	host	of	new	challenges	to	the	
status	quo.	As	shown	in	chapter	four,	this	generation	has	a	new	set	of	expectations.	These	
include	the	maintenance	of	the	government’s	economic	benefits,	but	also	a	stronger	voice	
in	socio‐economic	and	political	affairs.	Unemployment,	and	even	underemployment	and	
boredom,	are	unacceptable	outcomes	of	 the	system.	Naturally,	 the	continuance	of	 these	
challenges	can	spark	civil	unrest,	as	witnessed	in	Oman	in	2011.		
			This	is	one	point	where	local	challenges	intersect	with	regional	ones.	The	changes,	
both	 positive	 and	 negative,	 that	 began	 sweeping	 the	 region	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 2011	
impacted	 the	 psyche	 of	 all	 and	 did	 not	 escape	 the	 Gulf	 millennials.	 The	 global	
connectedness,	rising	political	awareness,	and	sense	of	shared	history	all	combined	in	a	
desire	to	be	part	of	a	regional	change	narrative	–	even	 if	 that	narrative	 is	not	currently	
revolutionary.	Omani	and	Qatari	millennial	entrepreneurs	repeatedly	expressed	a	desire	
to	contribute	to	society,	 to	make	an	impact,	to	experience	freedom,	and	be	part	of	 their	
changing	region.		Millennial	entrepreneurs	believed	business	and	social	entrepreneurship	
was	one	way	to	accomplish	this.	The	ultimate	outcome	of	this	trend	may	be	an	unintended	
consequence	 of	 the	 rhetorical	 encouragement	 of	 the	 individual,	 of	 enterprise,	 and	 of	
innovation	despite	the	state’s	best	attempts	to	manage	and	co‐opt	the	process.		
The	beginning	of	this	reform	intersecting	with	the	breeze	of	change	and	a	new	set	
of	expectations	promises	to	contest	the	existing	social	contract.	The	“nature	of	economic	
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reform,”	 like	 Steven	Heydemann	 indicates,	 can	be	 conceptualized	 “as	 a	 social	process.”3	
While	Gulf	rulers	continue	to	manage	the	trajectory	of	development	and	economic	change	
tends	 to	 be	 elite‐driven,	 this	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 social	 change	 does	 not	 occur.	 In	 fact,	
evidence	 indicates	 that	 economic	 change	 is	 leading	 to	 contestation	 from	 below,	
particularly	driven	by	millennials	and	labour	market	conditions	and	challenges.	In	the	last	
several	years,	Jill	Crystal	has	noted	how	changes	among	this	generation	impact	the	style	of	
politics	in	the	Gulf.	Higher	levels	of	education	have	accompanied	revised	networks	among	
millennials	that	cut	across	family	and	tribal	lines.	Accordingly,	policy	makers	tend	to	cast	
their	 announcements,	 strategies,	 and	 reforms	 in	 generic	 policy	 terms	 rather	 than	
patrimonial	 ones.4	 The	 atavism	 evident	 in	 those	 still	 told	 with	 patriarchal	 undertones	
speaks	louder	to	earlier	generations,	with	clearer	attachments	to,	and	gratitude	for,	past	
transformation.	It	is	clear	that	the	youth	dimension	is	affecting	decision	making	and	the	
policy‐making	process	in	the	region.		
What	 is	particularly	 interesting	 is	how	 ideational	 shifts	are	occurring.	Of	course,	
measurement	of	ideational	movement	is	difficult	to	attain	with	any	quantifiable	degree	of	
accuracy.	Nevertheless,	 evidence	 from	personal	 interviews	was	suggestive	of	 ideational	
movement	on	several	fronts.	There	is	recognition	by	both	policy	makers	and	entrepreneurs	
of	the	need	for	a	cultural	or	mentality	change	which	distances	the	citizen	from	both	reliance	
on	the	government	and	from	the	expectation	that	the	government	should	perform	the	basic	
provision	function	and	act	as	the	centre	of	economic	life.	Despite	this	acknowledgement	
even	 on	 the	 bureaucratic	 side,	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 initiatives,	 when	
                                                            
3 Emphasis in original. Steven Heydemann, Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic 
Reform Revisited, 1st ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 13. 
4 Crystal in Teitelbaum, Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf, 48. 
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operating	successfully,	are	often	serving	to	perpetuate	these	very	patterns	they	are	meant	
to	 counter.	 	 They	 are	more	 often	 than	 not	 re‐configuring	 a	 nanny‐state	 approach.	 The	
programmes	supposedly	aimed	at	working	against	these	classically	 ‘rentier	mentalities,’	
actually	serve	to	reinforce	them,	perpetuating	the	conventional	rentier	sense	that	it	is	the	
government’s	 responsibility	 to	 support	 and	 aid	 all	 types	 of	 productive	 activity.5	 In	
combination	 with	 a	 pervasive	 lack	 of	 risk	 taking,	 several	 of	 these	 programmes	mould	
dependency	 and	 continue	 to	 foster	 the	 expectation	 for	 government	 support	 and	 ‘hand	
holding.’6		
The	 global	 impact	 on	 the	 motivation	 for	 entrepreneurship	 promotion	 is	
multifaceted.	On	one	hand,	the	international	flows	of	labour	and	capital	play	an	important	
role	in	this	story.	On	the	other	hand,	and	even	more	directly	related	to	this	specific	policy	
story,	is	the	impact	of	global	norms,	expertise	and	advice.	As	noted	above,	Gulf	millennials	
are	more	connected	to	the	region	and	the	world	than	ever	before.	For	example,	studies	
suggest	that	youthful	Gulf	populations	are	among	the	world’s	most	active	users	of	social	
media.	 As	well,	 Twitter	 penetration	 in	most	 of	 the	 Gulf	 countries	 is	 the	 highest	 of	 the	
MENA.7		Thus,	the	state	cannot	manage	information	through	its	control	of	media	as	it	once	
did.	The	influence	of	technology	and	media	ensures	exposure	to	a	variety	of	international	
ideas	and	expectations	with	regard	to	economic	well‐being	and	political	representation.8	
                                                            
5 It is worth mentioning that Gulf countries have a tendency to reject the term rentier, and thus would not label 
these rentier mentalities.  
6 The Sanad programme in Oman is a prime example of this, as discussed in chapter three. 
7 Jane Kinninmont, To What Extent Is Twitter Changing Gulf Societies? (London: Chatham House, February 2013), 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East/0213kinninmont.pdf. 
8 It is also worth noting that international ideas are not synonymous with liberal or secular ones. See collection 
of pieces in Alanoud Alsharekh and Robert Springborg, eds., Popular Culture and Political Identity in the Arab 
Gulf States, SOAS Middle East Issues (London: Saqi Books, 2008); Some media reports indicate that Gulf youth 
consider increased public participation as extremely important. See “Arab Youth Vote Overwhelmingly for 
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Caught	 between	 conflicting	 sources	 of	 culture	 and	 identity,	 young	 Gulf	 adults	 are	
influenced	by	local	mores,	technological	innovation,	nascent	national	identity,	and	Western	
media.	Drawing	on	Scholte,	 I	view	globalization	here	as	not	 just	 international	economic	
integration,	but	also	the	supraterritorial	spread	of	connections	between	people.9	 In	 this	
regard,	 technology	has	 changed	how	 information	 is	 transferred	and	 connectedness	has	
impacted	behaviours,	social	engagement,	and	expectations	of	opportunities.	It	is	not	just	
international	competition	which	impacts	start	ups	in	the	region,	but	also	the	norms	and	
ideas	which	affect	entrepreneurs.		
International	advice	and	expertise	has	also	been	part	of	the	global‐level	ingredients	
that	constitute	the	motivation	for	state‐led	entrepreneurship	promotion	throughout	the	
region.	International	financial	institutions	like	the	IFC	repeatedly	make	positive	economic	
claims	 about	 entrepreneurship.	 They	 suggest	 that	 “SMEs	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 economic	
development	and	make	an	important	contribution	to	employment	and	GDP.”10	In	addition,	
the	 US	 actively	 endorses	 and	 encourages	 the	 promotion	 of	 entrepreneurship	 through	
public	announcements	and	embassy	programmes	and	partnerships	in	the	region.11		
By	combining	the	urgency	of	necessity	with	the	allure	of	prestige,	Gulf	governments	
view	entrepreneurship	as	a	pragmatic,	and	suitable	policy	alternative	that	is	responsive	to	
the	multilevel	pressures	articulated	above.	The	same	combination	of	prestige	and	urgency	
                                                            
Democracy,” Maktoob News, March 7, 2010, 
http://business.maktoob.com/20090000443478/Arab_youth_vote_overwhelmingly_for_democracy/Article.htm 
9 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: a Critical Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 59. 
10 SME Finance Policy Guide, 9. 
11 See, for example, Joe Biden’s comments on entrepreneurship and the US Ambassador to Oman’s editorial 
advocating a shift to entrepreneurship in the following two articles: Mark Marich, “Global Entrepreneurship 
Summit Moves to GEW 2012,” Global Entrepreneurship Week, December 7, 2011, 
http://www.unleashingideas.org/ges2012; Greta C. Holtz, “Entrepreneurship, an Engine for Employment,” Times 
of Oman, December 15, 2012, http://www.timesofoman.com/Columns/Article‐687.aspx. 
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makes	the	entrepreneurial	lifestyle	potentially	attractive	to	millennials.	As	its	prominence	
is	heightened	in	the	media,	and	pushed	by	state	and	non‐state	actors,	it	may	just	grow	more	
popular.	 If	 real	 innovation	 is	 injected	 into	 the	 mix,	 it	 could	 lead	 to	 many	 positive	
externalities.	 However,	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 excessive	 consumption,	 labour	 market	
inequalities,	 and	 ongoing	 connection	 to	 state	 resources	 will	 only	 reproduce	 existing	
economic	dilemmas.			
	
4. Characterization	and	Contradiction	
Entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion	in	the	Gulf	countries	is	characterized	
by	its	nascence.	As	was	shown	in	the	third	chapter,	2008	can	be	identified	as	the	magic	
commencement	year	in	Qatar.	The	introduction	of	Qatar	National	Vision	2030	that	year	
first	thrust	knowledge	economy	on	the	development	agenda,	translating	into	a	more	easily	
traceable	 history	 of	 Qatar’s	 entrepreneurship	 support	 ecosystem.	 Oman’s	 was	 more	
difficult	to	trace,	reflective	of	its	more	complicated	relationship	with	economic	growth	and	
national	employment.	 Its	earlier	promotion	of	 labour	nationalization	strategies	and	self	
employment	 programmes	 merged	 into	 the	 narrative	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 SME	
advocacy.	If	one	must	pinpoint	a	particular	year	of	significance,	it	would	have	to	be	2011	
when	the	promotion	of	entrepreneurship	and	SMEs	went	into	overdrive.		
The	language	of	entrepreneurship	promotion	is	visionary	and	developmental.	The	
announcements	 are	 cast	 in	 developmental	 and	 nationalistic	 terms,	 emphasizing	
indigenous	support,	employment,	and	national	pride	in	growth.	The	practice	has	been	less	
straightforward.	 Implementation	 has	 been	 ad	 hoc	 with	 endemic	 inconsistencies.	
Government	promotion	through	interventions	is	in	danger	of	duplicating	weaknesses	in	
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the	 system	because	 the	 logic	of	 interventions	 are	not	often	designed	with	 the	 systemic	
challenges	of	 the	Gulf	 in	mind.	Thus,	entrepreneurship	support	and	promotion	are	met	
with	 contradictions	 endogenous	 to	 the	 political	 economy.	 Many	 of	 the	 mechanisms	
introduced	demonstrate	a	political	disconnect	from	the	realities	of	the	GCC	private	sector.	
As	 well,	 it	 has	 created	 conditions	 promotive	 of	 institutional	 competition	 rather	 than	
encouraging	 of	 cooperation.	 Primarily,	 rentier	 path	 dependencies	 and	 labour	 market	
bifurcation	have	perpetuated	incentive	structures	which	obstruct	SME	growth,	innovation,	
and	entrepreneurialism.		Only	through	addressing	these	can	genuine	progress	be	made.	
In	both	cases,	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion	is	characterized	by	an	
elaborate	 ecosystem	 of	 programmes	 and	 initiatives,	 nearly	 all	 connected	 to	 varying	
degrees	with	the	government.12		Those	initiatives	which	were	truly	independent	struggled	
immensely	 to	 emerge	 and/or	 were	 eventually	 absorbed	 in	 or	 connected	 to	 the	 state	
apparatus.	This	demonstrates	the	state’s	ability	to	manipulate	the	process	in	a	way	so	as	to	
remain	pervasive	in	new	‘private’	activities.	By	incorporating	private	actors	into	the	state	
process,	 it	 can	 co‐opt	 the	 narrative	 to	 its	 own	 end.	 This	 is	 different	 from	 cooption	
techniques	of	the	past,	although	those	remain.	Rather	than	the	individual,	they	seem	to	be	
aimed	 at	 co‐opting	 and	 owning	 the	 narrative	 of	 innovation	 and	 entrepreneurship.	
Moreover,	 state	 grants	 and	 loans	 as	 well	 as	 government‐prompted	 loans	 or	 contracts,	
reconstitute	 distributive	 mechanisms	 and	 provide	 a	 novel	 mode	 of	 allocating	 wealth	
among	citizens.		
Scholars	must	ask,	however,	whether	the	state	can	succeed	in	co‐opting	innovation.	
It	seems	unlikely.	Entrepreneurship	may	be	able	to	be	coopted,	absorbing	millennials	and	
                                                            
12 This is illustrated in figures 3.2 and 3.3 in chapter three.   
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others	 into	new	forms	of	patronage	networks	–	whether	via	 lending	or	 integration	 into	
supply	 chain	networks.	 Still	 this	 cooption	 is	 limited.	 Since	 it	 is	 so	 integrated	with	 state	
capacity,	it	faces	the	same	shortfalls	as	other	mechanisms	of	state	patronage.	Instead,	when	
genuine	entrepreneurship	is	produced,	it	creates	socio‐business	classes	independent	from	
the	 state,	 resulting	 in	 a	 series	 of	 downstream	 unintended	 consequences.	 Consumption	
patterns	change,	and	are	importantly	no	longer	tied	to	state	revenue.	13	This	will	inevitably	
impact	the	degrees	of	loyalty	associated	with	state	as	employer	and	provider.	As	well,	new	
jobs	cycles	are	created.	Still,	it	remains	to	be	seen	how	effective	this	will	be	or	how	far	down	
the	road	it	is.	Innovation,	on	the	other	hand,	is	more	disconnected	from	the	state.	Although	
successful	 innovation	 in	 any	 country	 requires	 the	 long‐term	 vision	 national	 planning	
allows	and	 investment	 facilitates,	 its	 autonomy	and	development	will	 eventually	 create	
new	economic	sectors	no	longer	as	reliant	on	the	primary	state	resource	for	survival.		
	 Entrepreneurship	promotion	is	thus	indicative	of	the	ways	the	rentier	state	is	trying	
to	reinvent	itself.	It	has	shown	flexibility	in	the	past	to	both	external	trends	and	domestic	
pressures,	but	 the	promotion	of	entrepreneurship	and	 innovation	extends	this	one	step	
further.	In	many	ways,	these	efforts	invigorate	the	Gulf’s	developmental	tendencies.	New	
linkages	 throughout	 society	 promise	 to	 promote	 better	 regulatory	 mechanisms,	 and	
vitalize	institutions,	lending	to	Evan’s	mutual	embeddedness.	In	other	ways,	attempts	at	
reshaping	political	economy	through	revising	and	invigorating	the	private	sector	recasts	
                                                            
13 Hertog has previously noted the consumption and demand implications of shifting some of the economic 
growth and employment burden from the public to the private sector. These changes will not only necessarily 
affect state‐business relations but also state‐society relationships, potentially unbalancing the social compact. 
See his chapter in  
 Legrenzi and Momani, Shifting Geo‐economic Power of the Gulf, 55–74. 
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the	government’s	role,	aims	at	further	embedding	and	co‐opting	the	state	in	society,	and	in	
essence	gives	a	fresh	face	to	rentier	tendencies.		
	
5. Policy	Implementation	and	Alternatives		
Much	like	previous	economic	reform	attempts,	the	promotion	of	entrepreneurship	
has	to	be	accompanied	by	the	appropriate	governance	or	“policing”	at	micro‐policy	levels	
in	order	to	facilitate	implementation.14	As	noted	above,	contradictions	emerge	because	of	
an	 inherent	 incongruence	 between	 the	 logic	 of	 policy	 and	 the	 structural	 logic	 of	 the	
economy.	 Policy	makers	 are,	 however,	 cognizant	 of	 what	 needs	 to	 be	 done	 even	 if	 an	
inability	or	unwillingness	remains.	In	the	Omani	case,	there	is	a	growing	sense	of	urgency	
and	somewhat	higher	political	will	since	2011.		This	is	evidenced	not	just	by	the	flurry	of	
royal	 decrees,	 but	 more	 recently	 by	 a	 series	 of	 lower	 level	 policy	 changes	 helping	 to	
facilitate	 the	 implementation	 of	 entrepreneurship	 promotion.	 In	 Qatar,	 attempts	 at	
implementation	are	occurring	as	well,	but	they	tend	to	be	limited	to	the	proliferation	of	
trendy	initiatives.		
In	 early	 2013,	 various	 entrepreneurship	 support	 endeavours	 in	 Oman	 joined	
together	in	a	concerted	government	effort	to	promote	the	development	of	Omani	SMEs.	
This	SME	forum	not	only	rallied	various	factions	to	participate	in	different	avenues	of	the	
SME	support	agenda,	but	also	marked	the	beginning	of	a	concentrated	government	push	to	
release	policies	intended	to	facilitate	this	process.15	Serious	moves	began	with	the	financial	
                                                            
14 The term “policing” is borrowed from Peter Evan’s use of the term in his work on promotion and policing in 
chapter five of Embedded Autonomy, 99–127. 
15 For a discussion of the topics covered at the SME forum, see: Bader Al‐Kiyumi, “Establish New Laws,” Oman 
Daily Observer, January 23, 2013, http://main.omanobserver.om/node/141039. 
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sector,	 where	 in	 the	 second	 quarter	 of	 2013	 the	 Central	 Bank	 of	 Oman	 announced	 a	
minimum	 lending	 requirement	 to	 SMEs.	 As	 such,	 all	 licensed	 banks	 should	 allocate	 a	
minimum	of	five	percent	of	their	credit	to	SMEs.16	As	well,	the	tender	board	has	been	asked	
to	allocate	10	percent	of	contracts	to	local	businesses.	The	SME	forum	and	the	subsequent	
policy	announcements	are	the	first	real	evidence	of	the	state	trying	to	‘get	its	ducks	in	a	
row’	on	entrepreneurship,	which	was	preceded	by	the	key	appointment	of	Ali	Al‐Sunaidi	
as	Minister	of	Commerce	and	Industry	last	year,	and	prefaced	by	the	Sultan’s	speech	to	the	
Majlis	 Oman	 in	 2012.17	 In	 addition	 to	 evoking	 senses	 of	 nationalism,	 these	 policies	
demonstrate	the	government’s	genuineness	to	the	population.	Nevertheless,	they	are	still	
crafted	 in	 such	 as	 way	 that	 they	 do	 not	 significantly	 address	 the	 deep	 structural	
contradictions	of	the	labour	market.	Without	addressing	these,	SMEs	will	only	temporarily	
help	redistribute	wealth	to	a	wider	network	beyond	entrenched	monopolies,	but	will	not	
alleviate	real	national	employment	problems.	SMEs	will	only	create	new	jobs	for	expatriate	
labour,	as	previous	private	sector	moves	have	done.18		
	 Although	 we	 have	 yet	 to	 see	 as	 many	 similar	 micro‐level	 policy	 adjustments	
introduced	 in	 Qatar,	 there	 continue	 to	 be	 new	 initiative	 announcements	 and	 ongoing	
language	confirming	 the	 importance	of	entrepreneurship	 to	development.	For	example,	
QDB	 recently	 announced	 a	 deal	 with	 Qatar	 Shell	 which	 would	 provide	 supply	 chain	
                                                            
16 Al‐Zadjali, Central Bank of Oman Circular: Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). 
17 See chapter three. 
18 The Omani government seems in some ways to be floundering to respond to some of the problems 
confronting these moves. If the fact that the development plan that began in 2011 still has not been published is 
any indication, it seems as though the activities of the last few years since the unrest have been so removed 
from the plans and targets that the government does not wish to release the original plan. Only the second part, 
the investment programme for civil ministries, has been made available. 
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opportunities	 for	 local	 SMEs.	 19	 	 Deals	 such	 as	 this	 are	 presented	with	 similar	 tones	 of	
nationalism	and	 framed	as	 the	part	 of	 the	 state’s	 promotion	of	 local	 content.20	 As	well,	
QDB’s	relationship	with	the	IFC,	and	its	partnership	in	the	construction	of	a	tailor‐made	
SME	tool	kit,	has	provided	Qatar	with	a	steady	stream	of	neoliberal	international	financial	
advice	on	SME	policy	development.21		
Numerous	 reports	 offer	 policy	 suggestions	 for	 supporting	 the	 growth	 of	 SMEs,	
including	even	some	government	interventions	provided	they	are	geared	to	correct	market	
failures.	Establishing	credit	rating	agencies	and	providing	government‐sponsored	credit	
guarantee	schemes	are	among	examples.	It	is	worth	noting	here	that	the	rationale	behind	
the	 policy	 prescriptions	 which	 advise	 entrepreneurship	 and	 SME	 support	 diverges	
between	international	financial	institutions	and	GCC	governments.	For	instance,	IFIs	would	
support	opening	debt	markets	 to	expand	 the	borrowing	potential	 of	 SMEs,	 and	 include	
non‐nationals.	They	are	thinking	of	GDP	growth	and	the	expansion	of	the	private	sector.	
State	 interventions	 that	 are	 recommended	 include	 credit	 guarantee	 programmes	 like	
Qatar’s	al‐Dhameen	programme,	primarily	because	this	form	of	intervention	is	viewed	as	
less	distortionary	than	others.22		Such	policies	are	perceived	as	correcting	market	failures,	
                                                            
19 “Shell, QDB Sign Deal to Develop SMEs Sector in Qatar,” Al Bawaba, May 12, 2013, 
http://www.albawaba.com/business/shell‐sme‐qatar‐490931. 
20 Significantly, the encouragement of local content in Qatar has remained verbal and has not be formalized in 
policy legislation. 
21 See Qatar Development Bank and International Financial Corporation, “Learn About Business Startup, How to 
Write a Business Plan, How to Start a Business, Business Forms, SME,” SME Toolkit Qatar, accessed May 24, 
2013, http://qatar.smetoolkit.org/qatar/en. 
22 SME Finance Policy Guide, 78; and section on the “role of loan guarantees” in Equinox Management 
Consultants Ltd, Gaps in SME Financing: An Analytical Framework (Ottawa: Industry Canada, February 2002), 
28–29, 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/vwapj/FinancingGapAnalysisEquinoxFeb2002_e.pdf/$FILE/FinancingGapAn
alysisEquinoxFeb2002_e.pdf. 
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brought	 on	 by	 market	 monopolization	 by	 SOEs	 or	 other	 large	 companies.23	 GCC	
governments	are	utilizing	this	as	another	way	to	redistribute	wealth	to	citizens	however,	
with	 the	 hope	 that	 the	 SME	 promise	 of	 fuelling	 employment	 will	 be	 fulfilled.	 It	 raises	
questions	 around	 the	 compatibility	 of	 economic	 nationalism	 with	 market‐oriented	
reforms.	The	trouble	is	that	neither	is	addressing	the	embedded	structural	problems.		
The	main	concern	of	international	economic	institutions,	indeed,	is	the	reverse:	to	
ensure	that	governments	adhere	to	the	norms	of	the	global	free	market,	rather	than	
protect	their	populations	from	any	damaging	effects	that	follow	from	reliance	on	
the	market.	The	implications	of	the	free	market	at	the	global	level,	therefore,	are	
rather	different	–	and	socially	more	severe	–	than	at	the	domestic	level.24	
	
Thus	the	concept	of	entrepreneurship	in	the	Gulf	remains	bound	within	the	discourse	of	
American‐brand	capitalism	with	the	importance	it	attaches	to	individual	enterprise	and	a	
strong	private	sector.	In	many	ways,	entrepreneurship	can	be	viewed	as	the	mode	du	jour	
following	 the	 footsteps	 of	 discussions	 on	 free‐trade	 agreements	 and	 foreign	 direct	
investment	which	proliferated	in	the	1990s	and	2000s	in	the	GCC.		
	 According	 to	 Robert	 Wade’s	 assessment	 of	 East	 Asian	 economies,	 however,	
“creating”	rents	and	“distorting”	markets	was	an	important	way	of	incentivizing	economic	
behaviours	beyond	those	which	could	emerge	 from	free	markets	alone.	What	had	to	be	
done	however,	and	a	lesson	which	could	be	taken	for	the	Gulf	cases,	is	the	importance	of	
“disciplining	rent‐seeking”	in	order	to	ensure	it	does	not	encourage	unproductive	activities	
or	 interrupt	 ones	 deemed	 useful	 and	 productive.25	 Policies	 and	 practices	 which	 occur	
                                                            
23 To my knowledge, the Central Bank of Oman’s institution of a five percent credit minimum to SMEs is an 
uncommon policy mechanism. Bangladesh is one other example of a country which instituted a minimum five 
percent SME bank loan portfolio.  Md. Shamsul Alam and Md. Anwar Ullah, “SMEs in Bangladesh and Their 
Financing: An Analysis and Some Recommendations,” The Cost and Management 34, no. 3 (June 2006): 62. 
24 Fox, Mourtada‐Sabbah, and al‐Mutawa, Globalization and the Gulf, 95. 
25 See Robert Wade’s introduction to his 2003 edition: creating capitalisms: Governing the Market, xvii. 
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informally,	 although	 not	 often	 discussed	 because	 of	 their	 undocumented	 nature,	 were	
particularly	helpful	in	the	transformation	of	countries	like	Taiwan.	Thus,	unofficial	policies	
which	quietly	prod	 foreign	 firms	 to	develop	domestic	 supply	 chains	or	develop	market	
space	for	local	innovative	companies	have	been	significant	to	encouraging	innovation.26	As	
a	result	of	their	embryonic	state,	the	outcome	of	these	practices	identified	in	this	study’s	
findings	are	yet	to	be	determined,	but	should	not	be	ignored	by	future	researchers.	
It	 is	 clear	 from	 this	 project,	 however,	 that	 genuine	 economic	 transformation	
demands	attention	to	the	deep	structural	problems	of	Gulf	economies.	As	well,	more	formal	
policy	announcements	need	proper	monitoring,	and	this	policing	requires	not	just	enough	
state	capacity,	but	also	enough	political	will	 to	 implement	consistently.27	Despite	policy	
makers	being	broadly	aware	of	what	really	ought	to	be	done,	it	is	difficult	and	politically	
costly.	Political	will	thus	remains	weak.	Ultimately	the	segmentation	of	the	labour	market	
needs	 to	 cease.	 Early	 steps	 toward	 this	 end	 could	 include	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 price	
mechanism	on	foreign	labour	visas	to	lessen	incentives	for	foreign	labour.	Another,	which	
at	the	same	time	as	promising	to	be	the	most	effective	would	also	be	the	most	politically	
difficult,	would	be	gradual	wage	equalization.	In	lieu	of	this,	and	while	state	purses	remain	
sufficient,	 a	 subsidy	 to	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 minimize	 the	 cost	 differential	 between	
expatriates	and	 local	 labour	 is	a	possible	step	 to	begin	chipping	away	at	 the	dual‐wage	
market.		
Based	 on	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 research,	 secondary	 but	 also	 important	 policy	
recommendations	include	the	continuation	and	intensification	of	 investment	in	primary	
                                                            
26 Ibid., xxi; 284–286. 
27 See Evans again on promotion and policing for a discussion on state capacity: Embedded Autonomy, 126–127. 
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and	tertiary	learning.	East	Asian	experiences	demonstrate	that	a	focus	on	technical	training	
and	 higher	 education	 is	 important	 to	 successful	 transition	 and	 innovation.28	 As	 well,	
informal	policies	nudging	the	support	of	international	companies	and	the	introduction	of	
local	 content	 rules	 or	 tender	 board	 requirements	 will	 likely	 prove	 facilitative	 of	
entrepreneurship	as	well.	A	note	of	caution	is	in	order	however.	These	are	only	likely	to	
prove	 helpful	 if	 proper	 safeguards	 are	 put	 in	 place	 which	 monitor	 and	 limit	 the	
exclusionary	effects	of	wasta	and	favouritism.	The	real	challenge	here,	that	seems	unlikely	
to	be	able	to	be	met	at	the	current	juncture,	is	forging	a	path	which	does	not	only	privilege	
the	existing	elite	or	only	slightly	expand	the	wealth	sharing	network,	but	rather	create	an	
accessible	business	environment	for	the	wider	national	population.	
Other	policies	which	require	attention	include	the	implementation	of	antitrust	laws	
to	limit	monopoly,	the	institution	of	a	bankruptcy	law	to	lessen	the	high	penalty	of	failure,	
and	the	dedication	of	resources	necessary	to	support	local	patent	offices	which	remain	in	
varying	states	of	disarray.	 	 In	fact,	although	discussions	often	come	back	to	an	assumed	
cultural	 aversion	 to	entrepreneurship,	 this	 research	has	discredited	 these	assumptions.	
The	challenge	therefore,	is	not	cultural	aversion	but	distorted	incentive	structures.		These	
structures	 create	 enticing	 conditions	 for	 public	 sector	 employment,	 reduce	 the	 value	
ascribed	to	labour,	deter	business	start	ups,	and	raise	the	cost	of	failure.		
	 Already	a	narrative	of	the	significance	of	entrepreneurship	and	SME	development	
has	 been	 circulating	 for	 several	 years.	 If	 the	 government	 actually	makes	 the	necessary	
changes	to	support	new	establishments	by	implementing	some	of	the	recommendations	
                                                            
28 Howard Pack, “Technological Change and Growth in East Asia: Macro Versus Micro Perspectives,” in Stiglitz 
and Yusuf, Rethinking the East Asian Miracle, 122–125. 
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above,	it	may	be	just	the	remedy	needed	for	the	short	term.	Long‐term	solutions,	however,	
require	 a	massive	 overhaul	 addressing	 labour	market	 challenges.	 Significantly,	 the	 real	
contradiction	lies	in	balancing	an	international	neoliberal	agenda	with	a	rent‐buttressed	
authoritarian	desire	to	manage	and	co‐opt	society	and	economy.	 	The	result	has	been	a	
furious	 focus	 on	 entrepreneurship	 promotion	 without	 addressing	 the	 underlying	
structural	impediments	to	private	sector	strength	and	employment	woes.	Indeed,	as	noble	
as	entrepreneurship	schemes	may	appear,	SMEs	will	not	be	the	elixir	of	Gulf	employment	
challenges	as	long	as	the	bifurcation	of	the	labour	market	and	two‐tiered	salary	structure	
endures.		
	
6. Contributions	to	the	Advancement	of	Knowledge			
The	study	of	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion	in	the	Gulf	is	a	story	of	
policy	 development	 and	 it	 is	 a	 story	 of	 transition.	 It	 speaks	 to	 three	 specific	 sets	 of	
literature:	analyses	of	the	rentier	state,	examinations	of	development	and	transition,	and	
studies	 of	 innovation.	 	 The	 analysis	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 promotion	
presented	 in	 this	 dissertation	 not	 only	 provides	 a	 fresh	 examination	 of	 a	 novel	 policy	
agenda	 in	 GCC	 countries,	 it	 unpacks	 the	 motivations,	 multiplicity	 of	 stakeholders	 and	
pressures,	 and	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	 multilayered	 practices	 of	 development	 choices	 and	
economic	 policy	 making.	 Its	 concern	 with	 the	 governance	 of	 development	 and	 policy	
making	practices	in	the	Gulf	will	be	of	interest	to	development	academics	and	practitioners	
and	 scholars	 of	 the	Middle	 East.	 Through	 the	 use	 of	 a	 structured,	 focused	 comparison	
methodology,	this	research	examined	the	paired	cases,	Oman	and	Qatar,	to	provide	a	deep	
analysis	of	the	policy	and	practice	of	entrepreneurship	promotion	in	the	region.		
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Overall,	 this	research	makes	three	contributions	to	the	advancement	of	scholarly	
knowledge	in	Gulf	political	economy	and	development	studies.	First,	empirically‐rich	case	
studies	provide	a	detailed	understanding	of	the	prominent	policy	shift	in	the	Gulf	that	has	
been	largely	ignored	by	other	social	science	researchers.	Given	the	prominence	dedicated	
to	entrepreneurship	discussions	in	policy	circles	in	the	region,	this	absence	was	significant	
and	presented	an	exciting	research	opportunity.	It	is	my	hope	that	this	dissertation	will	be	
the	 first,	and	key,	 step	 toward	unpacking	 the	development	of	 innovation	policies	 in	 the	
region.		
Second,	although	this	is	not	the	first	study	to	engage	literature	on	the	developmental	
state	in	an	analysis	of	the	Gulf,	it	is	one	of	a	very	small	handful.	Most	of	these	have	failed	to	
engage	 in	much	detail	 beyond	a	 token	mention	of	 the	 literature.	Not	only	 this,	 but	 this	
dissertation	 engages	 literature	 sets	 on	 development,	 innovation,	 and	 Gulf	 political	
economy	with	each	other	to	broaden	understandings	of	development	and	transition	in	the	
region.	 Incorporating	 analysis	 on	 innovation	 and	 entrepreneurship	 in	 relation	 to	
knowledge	 economies	with	 reference	 to	 the	Gulf	 experience	 is	 new	and	 allows	 a	more	
thorough	assessment	of	these	policy	mechanisms	than	would	be	possible	otherwise.			
Finally,	through	interrogating	the	entrepreneurship	policy	experience	in	the	case	
studies,	 this	 research	 extends	 beyond	 the	 often	 perfunctory	 assumptions	 gleaned	 from	
rentier	state	literature	to	investigate	the	unfolding	of	development	policies	in	the	current	
milieu.	 This	 project	 then	 has	 provided	 a	 window	 into	 transition	 and	 transformation,	
demonstrating	the	way	rentier	patterns	and	a	combination	of	novel	pressures	interact	and	
affect	the	practices	of	policy	making	and	the	Gulf	ruling	bargain.			
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